SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS (Hansard, 28 November 1974)

§ Mr. Stainton
I beg to move Amendment No. 48, in page 7, line 37, after "the", insert "threat of".

§ The Deputy Chairman
With this, we are to discuss the following:

§ Mr. Stainton
I am concerned about the definition of "terrorism". I suggest that it would not take a very adroit lawyer to interpret "terrorism". defined in the clause as meaning … the use of violence for political ends", as being what is now known as violent picketing.
The endeavours in these amendments are sparse. They might have gone on to ask about various other aspects in order to get a more specific concept of terrorism. The draftsman has had a shot. It is a shot in the dark. I want clarification.

§ Mr. Powell
It must be admitted that the definition of "terrorism" is unsatisfactory. We are but young in this kind of legislation and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sudbury and Woodbridge (Mr. Stainton) said, this is a first shot. But I do not think that it is a successful first shot.
If a gang of ruffians were systematically to break up the public meetings held by a party at an election, that would be the use of violence for political ends. I do not think that that is what is meant by "terrorism". The violence could be used in pursuance of political ends even by threatening people systematically by rampaging through the streets in certain areas. Again, that would not be terrorism in the sense that we are discussing it in this context.
There must be a special quality when we assemble in our minds actions which would be properly described as "terrorist" which is missing from this definition. It is difficult to imagine terrorism without either the threat or the act of an assassination or murder. It is not merely violence which is implicit. It is murderous violence. What is more, it is not murderous violence conducted in the open by 913 formed bodies of men. Its essence is that it is murderous violence which strikes in the dark, as it were, and unsystematically from the point of view of the sufferers.
I will not elaborate on this. Everyone must feel that the definition in the Bill is most unsatisfactory as a definition of "terrorism". It is too wide and it is not sufficiently specific.

§ Mrs. Wise
A number of my hon. Friends and I are worried about the definition of "terrorism", and I draw attention to Amendments Nos. 57 and 58. which seek to alter the definition by narrowing it and keeping it in context.
The reasoning behind the amendments is simply that, as we understand it, there is not at the moment any statutory definition of "terrorism". This would be the first one. If it is to be defined simply as … the use of violence for political ends", the definition could be used in other contexts. As the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) pointed out, it is very unsatisfactory from that point of view.
In the present context, we all know, because of the circumstances from which these temporary provisions arise, the kind of thing with which they are intended to deal. As soon as we say simply that terrorism is violence for political ends, we open up enormous territories so far unexplored.
We feel that it is unsuitable, within the context of a temporary provisions Bill, to introduce a very wide definition of "terrorism" which could be used subsequently in other contexts. Therefore, we would urge that Amendments Nos. 57 and 58 be accepted. They do not in any way alter the substance of the Bill. They simply keep the definition of "terrorism" strictly tied to the circumstances surrounding these temporary provisions. By defining "terrorism" as meaning the use of violence in Great Britain designed to influence public opinion or Government policy with respect to affairs in Northern Ireland", we are keeping it strictly tied to this Bill and this Bill only. I ask my right hon. Friend for an assurance that this alternative definition is acceptable to him.

§ Mr. Mendelson
My concern is not strictly connected with tying the definition of "terrorism" to Northern Ireland. 914 As the whole Bill relates in substantial part to affairs connected with Northern Ireland, the position might be safeguarded. However, even if it were so interpreted—the merit of the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, South-West (Mrs. Wise) means that we will be able to elicit whether that is so—I still see dangers in this very wide definition which arise particularly from the general application of the term. putting the public … in fear. I think that the definition ought to be more precise. Even if the Government do not wish to accept Amendment No. 57, I think that they ought to have another look at the definition. It would be better for the process of legislation in this and future measures, if necessary, if from the start the most rigid definition were applied. I submit that the proposition that it should be tied to actual attack on human life is valid.

§ Mr. Stainton
The definition is as important as the execution of the act.

§ Mr. Mendelson
It is very important. At the same time the general definition would make too wide an interpretation possible. As in matters of this kind the sense of the Committee as well as of the country has been that rigid far-reaching punishment should be applied, it is all the more important to be very careful about the terms in which the offence is defined.

§ Mr. Alexander W. Lyon
There is some force in the argument about the definition being in general terms. However, I ask hon. Members to accept that this definition relates only to this Bill, not to any other legislation that might go on the statute book unless there were some reference back from that future Bill. This definition relates to the use of the term "terrorism" in Clause 1(3) which provides: The Secretary of State may by order add to Schedule 1 to this Act any organisation that appears to him to be concerned in terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom and connected with Northern Irish affairs The qualification is there, and it occurs again in Clause 3(3) where it says that an exclusion order can be made against any person concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. 915 That again is qualified by Clause 3(1) which says that the Secretary of State may exercise his powers only in relation to acts of terrorism designed to influence public opinion or Government policy with respect to affairs in Northern Ireland. The one area in which that qualification is not contained is Clause 7(1) which has been referred to twice tonight as we have been going through the amendments, and my right hon. Friend has given the Committee the explanation for that. In that circumstance, a police officer faced with a man whom he suspects of terrorism in the Northern Irish context and who is exhibiting signs of being a terrorist would not necessarily be able to define there and then whether he was a Northern Ireland terrorist or some other kind of terrorist. It therefore seems right that we should not restrict the power of the officer at that stage, but I give the assurance that the power will not be used in any of the areas suggested during the debate. In those circumstances, although it may be that given time and hindsight more precision could be imported into what we mean by terrorism, I do not think any harm is done by the definition as it stands.
Nor do I think it would be improved by the amendments that were suggested by the hon. Member for Sudbury and Woodbridge (Mr. Stainton). The first of his amendments refers to the threat of violence. That is covered by the fact that the definition is used in the Bill in conjunction with the words "commission, preparation or instigation", which would include threats of violence.
The hon. Gentleman's second amendment relates to armed violence as distinct from violence generally. It is difficult to see why if a terrorist wanted to kick an opponent to death rather than blow him up or use a weapon upon him that kind of violence should be excluded, whereas violence with arms should be included.
The third amendment refers to kidnapping as an addition to violence. This is probably well covered by the word "violence" anyway. Someone who kidnaps does so against the victim's will and uses violence for that purpose.

§ Sir M. Havers
The hon. Gentleman said that given time and hindsight the 916 definition could be improved. I do not know whether he means that this is the first time this definition has been used. If he does, I must tell him that he is wrong. The definition has respectable antecedents, because it is in similar terms in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act which went through the House about 18 months ago. There has been plenty of time and hindsight to consider it if that was not an effective definition to use.

§ Mr. Lyon
That merely reinforces my point that the definition as it stands in the Bill is adequate and confined in a way that will ensure that it is not abused, because it has not been abused in the earlier legislation. All I was conceding to those who suggested that a more precise definition of terrorism could be arrived at which equated the legal definition with what we mean in common parlance by terrorism was that it could no doubt be done as an exercise. It has not done any harm to have this definition in earlier legislation, and for the reasons that I have indicated I doubt whether it will do any harm to have it in this legislation.

§ Mr. Kilfedder
The Minister has too lightly dismissed the fear about this definition by saying that it refers only to this piece of legislation and might never be used again. But would he accept—

§ Sir M. Havers
It has been used before.

§ Mr. Kilfedder
I appreciate that. Parliamentary draftsmen have a habit of referring back to something that has gone through Parliament and saying that it has been accepted. The former Solicitor-General has given us such an example. Does not that add to our concern? Will the Minister look at this again?

§ Mr. John Mendelson
I am completely unconvinced by the intervention of the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon (Sir M. Havers), which he has just made for the second time tonight. He seems to think that if something was contained in another Bill 18 months ago, that makes it at the same time convincing and respectable. It makes it nothing of the kind. It is precisely that sort of self-satisfied attitude that we want to avoid in future.

§ Mr. Sedgemore
I am not sure that the point has been cleared up. The Minister says that the reason that the arrest is not qualified by relating the acts of terrorism to Northern Ireland is that it is unreasonable to expect a police constable to decide on the spot whether the preparation or commission of the act relates to Northern Ireland. I can see that, but if a policeman arrests under this provision and it becomes clear within a matter of hours that the offence did not concern terrorism in Northern Ireland, the Home Secretary's power to extend the period in custody from 48 hours to seven days with none of the normal protections, arises simply by virtue of the arrest. Therefore, the Home Secretary's power could relate not at all to any act concerned with Northern Ireland. Can the Minister assure us that the Secretary of State will not use his powers in that case?

§ Mr. Lyon
My hon. Friend's fears are not justified. This wholly exceptional power is to deal with a Northern Irish situation and its repercussions on Great Britain. We should certainly not seek to use the power to deal with any other form of terrorism. That is why we have undertaken that in such a situation we should have to bring forward fresh legislation.

§ Mr. Beith
The Minister is surely not saying that his right hon. Friend would neglect to use that power in a situation of some doubt as to the motivation of an act of terrorism, when questioning was proceeding and it was for that purpose that the continued detention over a few days was sought.

§ Mr. Lyon
The hon. Gentleman should understand that this exceptional power relates to a particular crisis at the moment. There are occasional outbreaks of terrorism which have nothing to do with Northern Ireland. We have dealt with them under the general law, and it would be the intention to deal with this in the same way unless the development could not be contained in that framework.
The other matters about the exercise of power are contained in my earlier answer. This definition, apparently wide, is in fact limited by the context in which it is found. It does not matter what was in earlier Bills or what will be in later 918 Bills. Each Bill will have to be considered and approved by the House of Commons. Within the context of this Bill and the way in which the terms is used in the Bill, it is clear that the limitations are such as not to justify the alarm that has been expressed by some hon. Members.

§ Mr. Stainton
The dawn is breaking and the sun is rising. It would be unkind of me to be too harsh on the Minister of State. However, I cannot let his reply go just like that. Indeed, the word to use has, happily, been provided for me in Clause 4. It is "frivolous". The definition of "terrorism" is too wide, and. curiously, too shallow. I say that most assertively. It does scant credit to the undoubted scholarship, vocabulary and comprehension of the Home Secretary, his colleagues and his draftsmen.

§ Mr. McNamara
The hon. Gentleman surely realises that this is the same definition as was used by his Government in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act.

§ Mr. Stainton
The question is whether it is a correct definition and an acceptable one. I have said how I see this definition. It horrifies me that the Minister of State has swallowed his brief and gone through my tiny amendments in the way that he did. My amendments were drafted hurriedly just before the House adjourned last night so that I could get my toe in, as it were, to endeavour to reveal the possible inadequacies of the definition. Although the Minister of State rested sublimely on a most easy, lazy definition of terrorism, I will not pursue the point. I think that I have made it adequately. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.