REHABILITATION OF OFFENDERS BILL (Hansard, 3 May 1974)

Mr. Piers Dixon (Truro)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The purpose of the Bill is to change certain anomalies in the present legal system. The House might find it convenient in the few moments we have before us to concentrate not on a series of philosophical arguments but on one specific case. I shall not mention the name of the person concerned but in every other respect the facts are entirely true.
1543 I shall refer to him as Robert. When he was a young man he was convicted of housebreaking and sent to prison, although he was a first offender. After his release he got a job as a shop assistant. He worked hard at his job and, at night schools, got his O and A levels and, eventually, a university degree. He married a girl who had no knowledge of the conviction and they had three children. He had a successful academic life, and 14 years after the offence he was offered a lectureship in a university in the Commonwealth, which he accepted and he and his wife sold their house and most of their possessions. Everything was arranged. The university in the Commonwealth country made no inquiries at the time and did not ask him any questions.
His whole future life seemed to be set for the good, but four days before he was due to leave this country for the Commonwealth country concerned he was told that his appointment had been cancelled. What had happened was that the High Commission of the Commonwealth country involved had been asked to make inquiries and had successfully—or should I say, unfairly, though successfully from the law's point of view—discovered the earlier conviction. He was given virtually no compensation, and this anonymous figure whom I am describing, but who is a perfectly true character, had to wait another six years before he had an opportunity of gaining a job comparable to the one he had given up.
I could give endless examples, such as the possibility of blackmail and the reluctance of witnesses to appear in court in cases in which they are not the accused. For instance, a person may witness a motor car accident. As it is, people are anyhow reluctant to appear in court when they are completely innocent. But in the sort of case I have in mind a person may fear that when he appears in the witness box defending counsel, or indeed prosecuting counsel, might start questioning him about an offence he had committed many years ago. Such a situation can only make the operation of the law courts even more difficult.
I hope that the House will agree that the various features of the Bill do much 1544 towards making the society in which we live not only a more agreeable and humane society but a society in which the law itself will be more effective.
There are, surprisingly, 1 million people in this country—there may indeed be some among hon. Members—who are in the position of having been convicted of what was in many cases a minor offence and having to carry this around with them all their lives. It is for these million people that I am asking the support of the House this afternoon. The curious thing is that the million people, who in most cases have been convicted of minor offences, later in life have a much lower criminal record than the rest of the population who have not been convicted of offences.
As is already known the Bill has in effect already been through both Houses of Parliament. I pay tribute to Lord Gardiner and to the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Marks), whom I am glad to say is one of my cosponsors on the Bill, and who introduced an almost identical Bill before the dissolution of Parliament. One of the ironies of the situation is that the present Minister of State was a sponsor of his hon. Friend's Bill and one of my sponsors is my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) who was Minister of State, holding the same position as the present Minister of State, in the last Parliament. An almost identical equivalent of the Bill went through all its stages in the other place, and had a recent Second Reading in this House. I hope that the Bill has the non-controversial blessing of hon. Members on both sides of the House.

§ Mr. Roger Sims (Chislehurst)
I am in some sympathy with the spirit of the Bill, but I have to express some reservations on the letter of the Bill. However, I hope that the House will give it a Second Reading so that it may be more closely considered in Committee.
The idea of the Bill is not new. There already exist certain restrictions on, for example, quoting convictions that took place before the age of 14. In January 1973 a Home Office circular, No. 17, went to clerks to justices suggesting certain circumstances in which discretion might be exercised by the justices in 1545 quoting previous convictions. Whereas the circular suggested that there can be no hard and fast rules, the effect of the Bill might be to make rather harder and faster rules and thereby restrict justices' discretion.
In the past few years there has been legislation which has tended perhaps too much to restrict justices' discretion. If I make the point with some feeling, it is because before I entered the House I sat as a justice of the peace for 12 years.
I do not propose in the brief time available to go through the Bill in detail, but one or two features should be more closely examined. For example, it is suggested that the period of rehabilitation should depend upon the sentence. I suggest that it might well depend upon the nature of the original offence, because the justices, in sentencing, will take other matters into consideration which might well have to be reconsidered at a later date. For example, a sex offence, regardless of the way in which it was treated originally, should perhaps have a rather longer rehabilitation period.
I should want to look much more closely at the question of rehabilitation as it affects children and young people. The one year proposed seems to me to be extremely short. The proposal perhaps misinterprets the purpose of orders that might well be made in a juvenile court. The welfare of the child is paramount in the court; an order is not purely punitive. Under the Bill, as I read it, within a couple of days of the completion of an order of the court the child or young person might commit another offence, but the fact that he had been under another order could not be quoted in court. That could be particularly unfortunate, because it is the sort of information the court should have.
Whilst I feel that this is a well-meaning Bill, some parts may be a little misguided or misinformed. I hope that they can be put right in Committee, but that meanwhile the House will give the Bill a Second Reading.

§ Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead)
I should like some information from the Minister. When people are sentenced for serious crimes, such as sexual crimes, to what extent is it advisable that previous similar offences should not be taken into consideration? Surely, 1546 such information would in large measure affect the sentence of a court. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) on his point concerning young people. I am not opposing the Bill. I have merely raised two points which I hope the Minister will deal with in the short time available.

§ The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon)
I congratulate the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. Dixon) on introducing the Bill and having achieved a high place in the Ballot. The Government accept fully the principle contained within the Bill. We were ourselves considering whether we should introduce a Government Bill to this effect. Bearing in mind the hon. Gentleman's lucky place in the Ballot, we are happy to use his Bill as a vehicle for a full discussion of the many difficulties that are enunciated within what is undoubtedly a principle that will command respect from almost every well-meaning person in the community.
If a man has committed an indiscretion that brings him before the courts and results in his being convicted and penalised, it must be right that after he has served that penalty and lived it down by a substantial period of good conduct thereafter, it should be without meaning for most people of good will.
There is a real difficulty in translating that principle into legislative terms. I accept what has been said by the hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) about one of the difficulties. I do not necessarily accept that the difficulty is insuperable. It may be that when we discuss that matter in Committee we may be able to persuade the hon. Gentleman that there are reasons for accepting the Bill even in its present form. It may be better that we leave that matter to our discussions in Committee.
There are some detailed consequences of the Bill that the Government think can be overcome with good will in Committee. However, I must raise one issue of principle that has been voiced by the Committee on Defamation under Mr. Justice Faulks which will require a good deal of discussion in Committee. Mr. Justice Faulks' committee is concerned about the Bill and particularly the section on 1547 defamation. He and the committee believe that it is wrong in principle that when a person states the truth about another person he should be liable in defamation merely because an Act of Parliament says that the truth has no effect. That is a material and, indeed crucial issue in the Bill.
Mr. Justice Faulks and his committee recommend that for that reason, and apart from some technical matters that we shall no doubt discuss in Committee, the clause on defamation should be omitted. If that were so the Bill would be without meaning. If it were the case that, though a man was not bound to disclose when asked about a previous conviction which had become spent, someone else could disclose it to those who were inquiring about it, no protection would be given by the Bill.
We must consider the issue of principle. Is it right that in this community what has been true in the sense that a man has been convicted should be regarded for all practical purposes as untrue? I think that that is right. I take the view that truth is not any more paramount than any other principle of civilised conduct in a civilised society. There is also compassion and understanding. For that reason we must balance compassion and understanding against a declaration of truth. I think that Mr. Justice Faulks' committee underestimated the concern that there is in society about this area of difficulty.
We had the same argument on the Younger Committee, of which I was a member, in relation to privacy. We had to meet that problem, too. Increasingly, this whole matter of whether it is right that everyone in society should be able to know everything that is to be known about someone else will be questioned, and it is questioned in this Bill.
I have made my position plain. Of course in our discussions about defamation we shall have to consider whether it is right to leave the Bill in its present state or whether there should not be some amendment to meet some of the legitimate concerns of the Faulks Committee and others. That can be done in Committee. At the moment, the Government give the 1548 Bill a fair wind, and I hope that the House will give it a Second Reading.