NORTHERN IRELAND (WHITE PAPER) (Hansard, 29 March 1973)

§ Mr. Harold Wilson (Huyton)
The question which the House has to decide tonight involves the acceptance or rejection of the logic of the constitutional White Paper on Northern Ireland. I believe that the Government had the right to ask for a clear decision. This is not a Green Paper on the future constitution of Northern Ireland, nor can the present state of the Province stand a "take note" attitude in this debate. What is before us is a draft constitution which the people of Northern Ireland—and it is their choice, and theirs alone—must accept or reject, as a basis for further discussion or debate on detail, but on the basis of implementation of its principles.
On that choice depends not only the immediate problem of peace and reconciliation in the Province but also the whole issue of the link with Britain. Comfortable though it may seem to some, no one in Ulster, in our view, can in one breath reject the White Paper and in the next say he is doing so to prove his loyalty to Britain, his desire to show that he is more British than the British. The oft-abused word "loyalist" is now to be put to the test, as indeed are all sections of opinion in Northern Ireland. Therefore, if tonight's vote is challenged, my right hon. Friends and I will vote for the White Paper in the Lobby and we appeal to as many of our hon. Friends as possible to vote with us.
This does not mean that we regard the White Paper as perfect. It does mean that we accept from the Government that they have approached this problem on the basis of the fullest possible consideration and consultation. Indeed, it could be said that they have delayed their decision almost to the point of danger. We accept, and we hope the House will 1538 accept, that the White Paper, in the Government's judgment—and it is their judgment; it must be—is the fairest and most balanced proposition they feel they can put forward. That is the Government's assertion, and they have the right to ask for the backing of this House not only for a fair consideration but, more than that, for its full-hearted implementation by the people of Northern Ireland.
To us this is an honest attempt to put constitutional flesh and blood on the bones of the Downing Street Agreement of 20th August 1969, which the then Government regarded as a corollary to our action in putting in British troops in a major security rôle. In the longer term, it must be regarded as aimed at providing a basis for creating a situation in which the troops could in fact be withdrawn and purely civilian safeguards for law and order left to operate. But this must obviously be a long-term development.
We could criticise this or that particular paragraph or proposal, but in the last resort the judgment must be that of the Northern Ireland communities themselves. It is not for us in this House, I suggest, to amend, still less to encourage factional division on, detailed proposals. We, this House, and Northern Ireland have already waited too long. But the people of Northern Ireland must realise that if on a free vote, in the security of the ballot box, they reject the main principles of this document, this must inevitably mean an agonising reappraisal over the whole field of the Great Britain-Northern Ireland relationship.
In giving the Government full support in the lobbies tonight, should a Division be called, this does not mean that we endorse all the decisions and policies which have led us and Northern Ireland to the point at which this White Paper is presented. The Secretary of State would not expect that. There have been errors —errors of judgment, in our view, though not in the main basically misdirected policies. Perhaps most of all there have been errors of timing, and failure to capitalise on opportunities presented either by outside events or sometimes by well-thought-out actions of the Government themselves.
We regret that the Government did not take action nearly two years ago now when we called for virtually total withdrawal of gun licences. We believe that 1539 the internment decision as soon as the House was up in August 1971 heralded a new and much more dangerous situation from which we are still barely recovering. And, again, for too long there was too confident a belief, repeatedly stated, that the security operations were about to come out on top against the wreakers of violence.
Again, when we thought the Government were prepared to enter into all-party talks here and in both the areas of the Irish dimension on our 15-point proposals, there was, first, delay and then a sudden change of front on the part of the Government, immediately after Lord Devlin's BBC programme. Following that programme, the Government reacted wrongly, in our view. But they decided and announced—and this was fully within their rights as a Government—that they would produce their own solution.
That solution took the best part of three months, during which there was Bloody Sunday, during which paramilitary mobilisation developed on the other side. Seventeen weeks passed, in fact, before the Government were ready to announce their proposals, and there was an unfortunate leak, very early in that period, of the main principles on which they had decided. This inflamed attitudes in the North and drove hard-line militants to redouble their preparations.
The proposals, when they finally came just a year ago, were, despite the loss of irrecoverable time, rightly judged, in our opinion, and we said so at the time. They fell far short of our own proposals, but we gave them our full support. We had never sought recourse to direct rule any more than had the Government. Neither of us wanted it. But in the circumstances of a year ago the Government had no option, and we gave them our fullest backing in the Division Lobby. As the Prime Minister recalls, I took a ministerial broadcast reply for one purpose only—to make it clear, above all in Northern Ireland, that he had the full support of the Opposition in the action he had taken.
Having set out what we consider to be the unfortunate aspects of the Government's policy during those months before direct rule, I think it right to say, and it must be said, that the right hon. 1540 Gentleman the Secretary of State, once he had assumed the invidious and unsought responsibility as arbiter of the fortunes of the Northern Ireland people, in our view discharged his proconsular responsibilities with an even hand, with a growing degree of trust, with courage, and indeed, on more than one occasion, with imagination. He was criticised for meeting the IRA, and indeed he has regretted it since. I think that, however unfortunately that turned out, he was right to do it, as I believe we were right in similar and equally unproductive action. He showed parallel courage in the release of some internees, thought it is arguable that he had the worst of both worlds in that while releasing so many he did not seek the advantages he might have derived by ending internment entirely, as was expected when direct rule was introduced.
It is easy, looking back, to regard Operation Motorman as a success so obvious that he might have done it at any time, but that cannot have been now it appeared to the right hon. Gentleman and the security forces in advance of that difficult operation. I think we were all delighted that it went through so successfully and speedily and with minimal loss of life. With hindsight, it was easy to say he could have done it before, but it was an act of courage when it happened which could have led to a heavy loss of life.
Some of us felt—and perhaps the right hon. Gentleman may later himself have come to feel—that the political bonus which he gained from the success of that operation might have been used almost within the hour to enable him to grasp the nettle of internment. For, whatever the military and security arguments for internment, no one can deny that, as we warned, for every murderer or potential murderer interned—and I say nothing of those who were wrongly interned—ten or a dozen or more young people were recruited to the cause of violence, to the forces of evil, as though dragons' teeth had been sown and sprung to arms.
Throughout this period we continued without avail to press for energetic action against the private holding of lethal weapons, against the tolerance of illegal paramilitary political forces provocatively flaunting their illegal uniforms, against their implied threat to law and order.
1541 We on this side of the House have consistently argued—indeed, it was the whole basis of the Downing Street Declaration in 1969—that the problems of Northern Ireland were not susceptible to a purely military solution, that there must be a political solution. But despite all our reservations about what had happened, the delays and the missed opportunities, as we see them, the errors, above all of timing, we regard it as our duty today to join the Government in commending to the people of Northern Ireland the political solution they have devised.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Merlyn Rees) has set out our approach to the individual issues raised in the White Paper. I do not think it profitable for us to seek to amend, still less to interpret, the individual paragraphs with a nicely calculated less-or-more argument. It is as a package that the Government have presented these proposals to the House and it is as a package that they must be taken or rejected by this House, and still more by the people of Northern Ireland.
But I join with my hon. Friend in pressing with all the emphasis at our command the paramount need for speedy elections. I think Northern Ireland wants elections. I believe the people in Northern Ireland really need elections, after all they have been through. They need an opportunity to register a vote for their own future, rather than feel that they are being pushed around, whether by politicians whose gold backing in terms of electoral support has not yet been proved, or, worse still, by men of violence on either side.
I plead with the Government not to allow the Assembly elections to be delayed until the autumn. Whatever hope, whatever magic, even, there is in the White Paper can be destroyed in the torrid high noon of the marching season this summer. There is no possible justification for delay. The Government must produce their legislation, whether one Bill or more, with the utmost speed. It is a reflection, perhaps, on their foresight and planning—and I think that the Secretary of State will not object to what I am saying here—that, eight months after Operation Motorman, the Bill is not ready with the White Paper. We made clear, the day after the White Paper was 1542 published, our determination to give the Government all reasonable assistance in speeding the passage of the legislation, whether it be one Bill or more than one.
Should there be any doubts on this score, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South has proposed that the representation of the people clauses of the legislation should be in a separate Bill which would be given right of way over all the other Ulster legislation. If that is decided upon, we shall support it. But if that path cannot be followed for any reason, if the electoral provisions are to be included in the major constitutional Bill, I hope that there will be no argument to the effect that the electoral procedures—the machinery—cannot be set in motion until the Bill receives the Royal Assent. I hope that the passage of the Second Reading of the Bill, in whatever form, would be taken by the Government as giving parliamentary authority for going ahead with all the decisions and electoral machinery procedures that are required. If there are any arguments about that proposal, we would be prepared to make another one—to support a special motion in the House authorising the Government to proceed with the necessary pre-election arrangements.
We urge that the Assembly elections must be held within the next three months. We must not allow the commitment to hold the postponed local elections in May to stand in the way. There are two arguments here. First, even those who feel it right to have the local elections before the Assembly elections ought, in our view, to agree that this order of priorities should not be insisted upon if it means putting off the Assembly elections to the autumn. In our view, there is an undeniable argument on merit for saying that the Assembly elections should precede the local elections.
If the local elections come first, they will inevitably be fought much more on the White Paper than on local issues. There are many acute students of these matters, from within and without Northern Ireland, who believe that, at the end of the day, when the nightmare of these past years is over, it will be the progress at local, community level in housing and other community problems that can ultimately be the greatest healing factor of all.
1543 Secondly, there is the danger that local elections fought primarily on a factional or sectarian basis will not only fail to give an opportunity for the silent, non-sectarian or cross-sectarian votes to express a constructive vote; there is the further danger that the voting might have a further and undesirable reaction on the Assembly elections themselves if they were to come later.
Then again, there is the additional practical factor that two elections within so short a period could impose an excessive strain both on the financial and on the organisational resources of parties and groupings, particularly the smaller ones, which have the right to be heard and to support in the ballot box. I urge the Government at all costs to ensure that the Assembly elections are held before the end of June.
It may be that the Secretary of State is loath to postpone the local elections for a second time. We understand his problem. We shall not criticise him if he does so, and I do not think that others will. We shall support him. But I hope that he will accept our arguments for ensuring that, whenever the local elections come, they will follow and not precede the Assembly elections. I owe what I have to suggest now to my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) who, if he catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, hopes to develop the proposal further.
We propose that the Government should now publish the date for the Assembly elections, giving this House and all in Northern Ireland the timetable necessary for all the premilinaries to be carried through on a D-10 or D-20 or D-2 months basis so that we can all see the timetable we are working on—and above all so that the people of Northern Ireland can see it.
Nothing so concentrates the mind of democracy in a period of major constitutional change as a fixed date. That was Earl Attlee's achievement in India. It has been a constitutional catalyst. More than that, it has provided a degree of constitutional magic time after time in situations not all that different from this one.
I must refer to points raised in the debate by a number of hon. Members 1544 about representation of Northern Ireland at Westminster. We support the White Paper on this question. It is not only that an increase in the numbers of Northern Ireland Members here would sharply increase the possibility that the majority of any Government, Conservative or Labour, could depend on a predominantly Unionist vote. I believe that this is an important issue relevant to the governance of Northern Ireland itself. For example, Sir Winston Churchill's Government in 1951 might not have been able to introduce a major Irish measure because of that level of dependence on the Northern Irish vote, which at the time was largely concentrated in a single party.
Again, if the Prime Minister himself in June 1970 had acquired an overall majority of, say, 10 or 12, even the present degree of Ulster representation, without expansion, could, if all the Unionists were hostile, have prevented him from carrying this White Paper through except with the support of the Opposition.
I say with the greatest respect to hon. Members from Northern Ireland—and, however much we may disagree with a number of things said and with certain events in the past, we in this House have genuine respect for other points of view—that I do not need to underline the dangers for Northern Ireland policy if a Government with a highly vulnerable majority in this House had to negotiate a fair and balanced package with all sections of opinion in Northern Ireland when one such section had a virtual veto in Westminster.
I have said that we are not going to criticise individual paragraphs of the White Paper. But the Government have left a number of important questions open, some of which are, I think, rightly intended to be left for the people of Northern Ireland themselves to pronounce upon, with the Secretary of State taking certain final decisions. One of these relates to power sharing. This is not in any sense spelt out in the White Paper I for one would be content with that, on the assumption that the Government intend to take their final decisions after, and not before, the election of the Assembly.
Clearly, the Secretary of State should be free to discuss these matters, but the whole White Paper and all it represents 1545 could be imperilled if there were to be any question of a prior deal with one or other faction in Northern Ireland. I hope I am wrong in reading the conference proceedings of one Northern Ireland party last Tuesday as implying a demand for separate negotiations before the election of the Assembly, or separate clarifications or—still worse—a separate deal with the Secretary of State, going beyond the parameters of the White Paper. It would not be playing straight with the House of Commons or with the people of Northern Ireland if what we are asked to approve today could be changed by separate and secret negotiations. Indeed, a unilateral deal made at the expense of the views and interests of other parties with equal right to be heard would not be conducive to a final settlement, still less to a spirit of reconciliation.
Power sharing has been left vague, which creates great difficulty for many interests in Northern Ireland of every point of view. The Irish dimension has been left vague. I myself have been thinking a great deal about this, and I do not complain on the point. This matter involves the Government of the Republic of Ireland, who had been barely confirmed in office when the White Paper was almost in final draft.
But the Government's proposal for a tripartite conference is, in our view, right. I would go further and describe it as imaginative—if I did not regard it as the adoption in miniature of the kind of consultations between Westminster, Belfast and Dublin envisaged in my 15-point programme. So, obviously, because of my usual modesty, I will restrain my hyperbole and just say it is right.
I hope, however, that the Government will not seek to set arbitrary limits on the issues which can be debated either in that conference or, ultimately, in the Council of Ireland when it is established. If the Council of Ireland is to be regarded simply as a soulless economic, consultative body, a sort of all-Irish OECD or a glorified chamber of commerce, not only will a great opportunity be missed but disillusion could set in fast, North and South of the border—and disillusion in Ireland spells danger.
The theme of my 15-point speech, as long ago as November 1971, was that when men have nothing to hope for, men 1546 of violence have everything to shoot for. The proposals on the Irish dimension must therefore provide hope. As I argued in that speech so long ago, it is in my view essential that, within the terms of reference of the Council of Ireland or the tripartite commission which I proposed in my second point, there should be provision for the examination of what would be involved in agreeing on a constitution of a united Ireland—while repeating once again my fifth principle, namely no union without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.
Nevertheless, what I was proposing then and propose now is that, without prejudice to the right of the Northern Ireland people to decide their own future, as set out in the Attlee Declaration, in the 1969 Downing Street Declaration and again in this White Paper—and, I understand in the legislation which is to follow—the Council of Ireland should have power—if this is agreed—to embark on what might be called a feasibility study to include an examination of the very deep social and economic questions which would require solution in a United Ireland.
In my speech of November 1971 I suggested that a term of 15 years was the minimum required for the implementation of such a proposal, even granted the full acceptance of the principle by the people of Northern Ireland. But I believe that peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland will be assisted if, following the discussions with the proposed Northern Ireland Executive and the Government of the Republic, such terms of reference could be included in the work of the Council of Ireland.
This White Paper is an answer to our demand for a political solution. It is perilously late but it accepts our point that while the security forces must be given every backing in getting on top of violence, there is at the end of the road no military solution but only a political solution. We emphasise that that political solution must give the right of free expression, as the White Paper proposes, to all those in Northern Ireland who believe that reason, tolerance and compromise, not violence or the veneration of long-dead household gods, should be the basis of the creation of the Northern Ireland of the future.
1547 This is a problem not for Northern Ireland only, it it ever was. It is a problem and a challenge to hon. Members on this side of the water and all whom we represent here. There is hardly an hon. Member from England, Scotland or Wales who does not know constituents who have served in the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland, in many cases not just once or twice, but three or four times, and now a fifth time. Each of us knows and the Government know, the appalling strain on the Armed Forces, on our constituents. Their loyalty and dedication to duty is not in question. This has been shown.
But we have a duty, too—and that is not to impose on the loyalty and dedication of the Armed Forces more than they can reasonably be asked to bear. They were put in to hold the ring and to preserve an impartial security authority, and they were cheered when they went into action in August 1969. They were never asked by their presence to provide a political solution, still less to provide a military solution in the absence of a political solution.
There are many Members in this House who mourn, just as every Northern Irish Member mourns, the loss of constituents, the direct victims of violence. Many on this side of the water know of the tragic loss of a young constituent and in some cases many constituents. Many of us have come to know something of the tragedy that has overtaken British homes on this side of the water. In my own constituency I can think of a young man who joined up because he could not get a job in an area of heavy youth unemployment, and very soon after he was killed his father committed suicide. This is not an isolated case and there is nothing more unjustified than for anyone in this House today to regard the events of Northern Ireland as taking place in a far away country of which we know little or nothing, or care nothing. It is not a far away country. It is not even a problem on our doorstep. It is a problem within our curtilage, and we all bear responsibility for it.
It is a problem not only for those who in Northern Ireland are of an age to pronounce and vote under the terms of this White Paper. As much as anything, it is a problem of education. My right 1548 hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), whose own courageous and imaginative contribution to the solution of these problems in the troubled months of 1969 and 1970 will be remembered for all the years to come, once put the issue very simply. "What a difference there would be in Northern Ireland", he said, "if the schoolchildren of the two main communities were learning their Irish history from the same textbooks."
That was some time ago, but some of the children still at school when he spoke have already been recruited into what 18 months ago, recalling a famous Will Dyson cartoon, I called the class of 1990. Perhaps I was optimistic and looking too far ahead. The age of consent in terrorist terms has now reached so young a generation that I should have referred then to the class of 1980 or even 1975.
The House today faces a great responsibility. I have expressed our reservations, as I have a right and a duty to do, about errors of judgment or of timing over this past two years. They will not affect the vote I shall cast or the vote I shall ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to cast this evening. Still less, I hope, will ancestral voices of the 'twenties or the nineteenth, eighteenth or seventeenth centuries dictate the response, whether of hon. Members of this House or of those with whom the final decision lies, the people of Northern Ireland. This House and, after this House has given a decision, still more, the people of Northern Ireland, are faced with a choice, a challenge and a great opportunity. It is a new start, a fresh start which is at their command. Let none of the people of this unhappy, war-torn, bewildered Province delude themselves when they have to take the decision we are presenting to them.

§ Mr. Stanley R. McMaster (Belfast, East)
I apologise for interrupting the right hon. Gentleman but there is just one point I should like him to clarify. Why does he say that it is wrong for a minority in Northern Ireland to hold the balance here at Westminster when at the same time he appears to argue that a minority in Northern Ireland should have a right of veto in the Parliament of Northern Ireland?

§ Mr Wilson
I was not referring to a right of veto in the Parliament of 1549 Northern Ireland. We hope that the result of the Assembly elections will be to provide a viable Assembly. That will be the case if no hon. Member in this House or in Northern Ireland speaks of being elected to the Assembly only to wreck its proceedings.
I have consistently rejected the seductive arguments of those who say that we should pull the troops out and leave the Irish of all factions to cut one another's throats. A withdrawal, a denial of adequate security provision, as I have repeatedly said, could lead to a bloodbath, a massacre, which would make St. Bartholomew's Eve look like a vicarage tea party, and the victims, in all probability, would not necessarily be of the same faith as the victims of St. Bartholomew's Eve. But those who are determined to base their response to this White Paper on the dictates of short-term political advantage or on ancient and now totally irrelevant historical allegiance must realise that there is a growing feeling on this side of the water —a feeling that in my view must not command our vote tonight—that we cannot indefinitely commit the security forces to the task they have fulfilled with such courage and devotion over these years.
Last December I referred to the growing impatience of the British public, faced with a situation in which the writ of law and order increasingly ceased to run, a situation in which British troops are … caught in a cross-fire which British public opinion is increasingly regarding as intolerable. The public opinion it is our duty to represent in this House will not tolerate for long the continuance either of terrorism or a spate of bilateral sectarian assassinations.
Her Majesty's Government have at long last injected into the situation the basis for a political solution. Those whom we represent in this House will be disposed to show little patience for any who seek to impose on the Government, or on this House, a cross-fire of political manoeuvring. Still less would they be prepared to tolerate recourse to violence which could inflict on the Armed Forces what I have referred to as a cross-fire of murder and assassination". Two successive Governments, two successive Parliaments, perhaps more, have earned the right to insist that the people 1550 of Northern Ireland, in the freedom of democratic choice through the ballot-box, should now decide this issue against a background fairly set out and clearly stated on the first page of the White Paper where the Government, speaking for all of us, say something which has not been picked up much in the discussions on the White Paper: As long as Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament must be acknowledged, and due provision made for the Uniled Kingdom Government to have an effective and continuing voice in Northern Ireland's affairs, commensurate with the commitment of financial, economic and military resources in the Province. It is the claim that I urged more than 18 months ago, that, whether in fiscal terms or the provision of a military contribution to security, the Imperial Parliament and those we represent cannot long be asked to shoulder a burden of taxation without representation. The stake that we have earned and now seek to turn into reality is the demand that with this White Paper the people of Northern Ireland now, by free and democratic vote, shoulder the decision which is rightly theirs. It is their right, and it is equally their duty. For in military terms alone, the Forces of the Crown have done their duty, beyond any ordinary call of duty, and in conditions in which no other force has been trained to operate or called to operate—with wives and families similarly asked to share anxieties beyond any ordinary call.
With the approval of the White Paper tonight, the decision is increasingly transferred from the sentry post, the street patrol, the Saracen, the control point, the road-block, to the ballot-box.
The Government have responded, as I have said, overlate to our demand that military containment must give way to a political solution. But from today, the responsibility for Westminster's political solution becoming a reality passes from this House over the water to Northern Ireland itself. Whether there is after tonight a political solution depends on one thing—the response of the people of Northern Ireland.
I said a few moments ago that this was a challenge, an opportunity. The people of Northern Ireland, who have walked in darkness, are now bathed in at least the prospect of light. With this 1551 White Paper, they now have the chance, forswearing private ambition, sectarian ambition and every partial affection, to express in the secrecy of the ballot their own desires for the future of their country.
When they do so, with the heart-felt concern and prayers of all of us in this House and those we represent, let them recognise that not only is this for them their opportunity. It may be more than that. It may be their last.