HC Deb 20 June 1973 vol 858 cc814-21
Captain Orr

I beg to move Amendment No. 34, in page 19, line 21, after 'day', insert: 'or on a motion requesting dissolution moved in the Assembly and approved by a simple majority of members of the Assembly'.

The Second Deputy Chairman

I suggest that it will be convenient to discuss at the same time the following Amendments:

No. 60, in page 19, line 43, leave out subsection (5).

No. 35, in page 20, line 7, leave out subsection (6).

Captain Orr

The amendment seeks to allow the Assembly, if necessary, to dissolve itself. The purpose is fairly plain. At present the provisions for dissolution laid down in the clause are that it will be dissolved if an Order in Council is made under section 2 above before 30th March 1974, on the fourth anniversary of the appointed day and so on.

I think that there ought to be some method by which, if the Executive should lose the confidence of the Assembly, a motion may be moved in the Assembly which would result in dissolution. I do not think that at this time of night I need deploy a great deal of argument about it. However, I should like to hear my right hon. Friend's views upon that proposal.

[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]

Mr. Merlyn Rees

I think that there is some sense in what was said by the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) about trying to find a better method of dealing with dissolution and prorogation. However, I am not sure that giving that power to the Assembly in Northern Ireland at this stage is the best way of setting about it.

I agree that this whole matter of dissolution and prorogation is difficult. Certainly in the context of this Parliament we have not found it possible to spell it out in legislative form. It has developed and grown over the years, and it is extremely difficult to formulate it for those who come to study our parliamentary system de novo.

There are many classical cases of dissolution, and the relationship between the Prime Minister of the day and the monarch sometimes adds to the reasons for dissolution being granted. In the context of this country, I have always thought that that is the best way of dealing with the matter, not least for the flexibility that it provides. This is one of the hallmarks of our constitution, and I get worried when we get involved in more formal Government in other respects.

It is difficult for the Secretary of State to start afresh and to find suitable words to include in a statute to incorporate ideas that have developed over the years, bearing in mind that we are dealing with an Assembly. Given the curious nature of the Assembly that we are setting up, I wonder whether it is possible to ensure that if it has to be dissolved or prorogued that is done not by an Order in Council but by the Westminster Parliament via the Secretary of State. That would at least put back where it belongs the control of something that is vitally important.

As I said on Second Reading, the Secretary of State has taken an enormous amount of power unto himself and his successors. I have no grumble about that in any personal sense, but if the right hon. Gentleman wishes to dissolve or prorogue the Assembly, the matter should first be debated in the House of Commons. In the short run, anyway, that might be the better way of proceeding.

I do not want to develop the argument any further. I merely put it forward as something that has been on our minds since the Second Reading debate.

Mr. Powell

I imagine that the Committee will not dwell for very long upon these amendments and this clause, but, perhaps ironically, it raises some of the most profound constitutional questions.

If I might first take the point raised in the first amendment tabled by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr), we are here creating a body which, unlike ourselves, is to be dissolved—if it comes into existence at all—after a fixed span of time.

It is commonly the view held by those who work our own constitution that it is one of our great blessings, in contrast with many others on either side of the Atlantic, that we are not bound to a fixed length of life in this House. In the first place the Executive can test the support outside for its policies, whether or not they still command support in the House, and obtain a renewal of its mandate, and, secondly, the country is not saddled with a broken-winged Administration which has perhaps lost the confidence of the country and yet must eke out its existence for that statutory term.

Here we are creating a subordinate Parliament or Assembly, but in this respect we are doing it in the image of local government. That brings out again the contradictory nature of this strange hybrid which the Bill is seeking to create, It is not the subordinate nature of the Assembly that has brought my right hon. Friend into this difficulty. It is once again his central notion of power sharing that has done that. It is because, in accordance with his concept, with his policy, the Assembly is not to behave like any other representative Assembly—upon being elected to ascertain where the majority rests and then to support an Executive resting upon that majority, as long as it commands the support of the majority, or, at an election, the electorate at large. It is because we are trying to introduce some totally different external source of power, of authority and of decision that we find ourselves faced with the embarrassment to which the amendment points.

Obviously, these three amendments stand on different levels. I would again, as in the case of the last amendment considered, appeal to the Secretary of State to consider whether the clause would not be better for some mechanism whereby the rigidities of a fixed term could be avoided otherwise than in the case of the sort of breakdown for which the clause already provides. I cannot see that he would lose anything if he could devise a means whereby the life of the Assembly could be terminated short of the four-year periods. The method suggested by my hon. and gallant Friend might not be the ideal, but if my right hon. Friend can avoid the rigidity of a fixed four-year term for his Assembly come what may, he will find it potentially an advantage and it can hardly be a disadvantage.

The other two amendments are the means whereby, although perhaps the Executive in the Assembly still commands the assent of the majority, indoors and out of doors, my right hon. Friend, in pursuance of the White Paper policy, can either put it into hibernation or execute it and terminate its existence. As I said to my right hon. Friend on Second Reading, these provisions and the policy of the White Paper mean in effect that he will carry the responsibility for the administration which is carried on by the new Executive and for the functioning of the new Assembly.

Just because my right hon. Friend possesses these powers of regulation and of intervention, because he keeps in his hand the right of life and death over the new creature which this House tonight is forming, therefore he will be responsible, whether he likes it or not, negatively or positively, for the acts of omission or commission of the Executive and Assembly of Northern Ireland. That is one of the many reasons why I am by no means alone in fearing that the attempted scheme of power sharing will recoil upon its inventors and that we shall find that, however much we wish to disclaim it, direct responsibility for the governance of Northern Ireland will come back to us in this House.

I have no intention of using these amendments as a means of reopening tile Second Reading debate, but this is a very important clause. It is always a solemn moment when this House sets about the task of creating another House, especially a House that is not in its own image. There are many instances scattered around the world where this House has set up Assemblies and made them different from itself, and has afterwards found reason to regret it.

Although I realise that my right hon. Friend cannot share the philosophic doubts—I do not know whether they are Hegelian—which assail some of the rest of us, he will at any rate be sensitive to the practical difficulties, one of which has been highlighted by my hon. and gallant Friend.

Mr. Whitelaw

Ever since Second Reading, I have had investigations made into this clause and these powers. I was impressed by the arguments at that time about the difficulties and problems created by the clause. Therefore, I am further impressed by the speeches on this subject which have ben made tonight.

10.45 p.m.

I could not accept the amendments exactly as they stand. Nevertheless, in view of the work that has been done, I can go a good deal further than I went on the last occasion, and I should like to say this: it is essential that both the Assembly and the House of Commons—this Parliament—should at least contribute to the decision if a dissolution is in question.

As a result of the work that has been done, I am fairly confident that I can put forward an amendment on Report which I hope would do two things: first, make sure that due weight is given to the views of the Assembly on the question of dissolution; secondly, preserve the interests of this Parliament, which would be closely involved in questions which might be of great political significance, and on which it would certainly be right for the House of Commons to pronounce and for a Secretary of State responsible to the House of Commons to be answerable to it directly under the terms of the clause that we could devise.

I can bring forward a new proposal on Report which will meet those points. On that basis I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Mr. Molyneaux

I hope that I have not infected in any way the hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Merlyn Rees). He described the Assembly as a "curious Assembly." If my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) were present, he could probably identify for us the passage in the Bible which contains a description of a "sorrowful assembly." I am not sure which is the more accurate description.

The amendments would do much to remove from the minds of the electorate the main weaknesses, namely, that the Assembly has so little power over its operations and functions that it lacks credibility. The promised amendment that my right hon. Friend has mentioned may go some way towards improving matters.

However, if a future Secretary of State does not like the look of the representatives returned at an election or is at variance with their views, he can dissolve the Assembly and hope for better luck next time. As the clause stands, it would perpetuate the impression that the whole body was a creature of the Secretary of State.

On another occasion I suggested playfully that if the Assembly were to be formed as suggested in the Bill it would inevitably mean that my right hon. Friend would find himself in the difficulty of writing the manifestos for all the political parties involved at the next election. I should like to spare him that punishment. I hope that his promised amendment will do something towards that.

Captain Orr

Once again my right hon. Friend has been helpful. He has not gone the whole way with us. We did not expect that, in the light of the philosophy that lies behind the Bill. Nevertheless, if I understand him aright, he is saying in effect that there will be no arbitrary dissolution of the Assembly on the part of the Secretary of State.

On Report my right hon. Friend is to produce an amendment which will give the Assembly some voice in the matter. I take it that in that sense it would also be giving considerable weight to the Executive so that, at a stage, an initiative could come from the Assembly itself, if necessary. In other words, one can envisage a situation in which, perhaps, the chief executive felt either that he was losing his majority in the Assembly or that he was losing some considerable confidence in the country, and would feel that the time had come to test the opinion of the electorate of the Assembly. He would then come to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State could make his decision in the light of that advice.

In that sense we would be moving towards something a little more along parliamentary lines. I take it that this is a reasonably fair representation of the sense of what my right hon. Friend wants to do on Report. I take it that I not misrepresenting him.

Mr. Whitelaw

My hon. and gallant Friend is certainly not misrepresenting me. That is what I want to do with regard to the Assembly and the House. The moment to judge whether I have done it is when the proposals are on the Order Paper on Report. That is what I intend to do, and I believe that with the best legal advice available to me I can do it.

Captain Orr

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. He has gone a long way in the matter. In view of that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Biggs-Davison

I beg to move Amendment No. 36, in page 20, line 14, leave out 'Her Majesty may' and insert: 'the Secretary of State shall'. My right hon. Friend is being most helpful to the Committee. It may be when he comes forward with the new proposals on Report that the point behind this amendment will be coveted.

As I understand subsection (7) if the Assembly is dissolved it might be open to the Secretary of State by not appointing a day before the first meeting of the new Assembly effectively to prevent that Assembly ever coming into existence. If one Assembly is dissolved it should be followed by another unless Parliament decides otherwise.

Mr. Powell

Since my right hon. Friend evidently intends to think again about the drafting and shape of the whole clause, perhaps I might put a point to him arising out of the amendment. One of the constitutional safeguards enjoyed by this House for the past three centuries is that there is a very short limit to the time during which this country can be without a Parliament. It has been the case, I think since the seventeenth century, that it is not lawfully possible for this country to be without a Parliament for a little over three weeks.

My right hon. Friend is in a considerable difficulty with his new creation. If it should prove unworkable he would want a considerable period of time for reflection before new legislation which would then become necessary was brought forward. Also, if, for reasons short of total breakdown, dissolution became desirable in the view of the Assembly, the Executive or the Secretary of State of the time, a period of three weeks might be inconvenient and unsatisfactory.

Nevertheless I would ask him to consider when he reviews the whole working of the clause whether some period of time, not just a positive order as is suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Bigg-Davison), but a specific maximum period of time in which a new Assembly is created, should be written into the clause.

Mr. Whitelaw

I think my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), following my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison), has put his finger on a very important point. Perhaps I did not stress this point sufficiently in answering the previous amendment.

My right hon. Friend is right: of course there is a difference between Clause 27(1)(b) and the first Assembly and the problem which might arise if that successful step is taken, and future Assemblies. As for Clause 27(1)(b), my right hon. Friend is perfectly correct there. If it is found impossible to find that one can establish the Executive and can transfer powers in accordance with Clause 2, then indeed the Assembly comes to an end on 30th March and it will be necessary at that time to decide what course should be taken. That might take time to decide. My right hon. Friend might then believe that one of the courses open would be the course which he most favours, and that would be open, obviously, as one of the matters to be considered. It would be wrong to have a mandatory general election quickly, because that might not be desirable.

As to the further points, I think that they come within the proposals which I hope to put forward. I certainly take note of the points which my right hon. Friend made about limiting the period in which any part of the United Kingdom should be without an effective assembly.

Mr. Biggs-Davison

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 28 to 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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