HC Deb 14 June 1973 vol 857 cc1825-58

Again considered in Committee.

[Mr. E. L. MALLALIEU in the Chair]

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Mr. Powell

If a parliamentarian of long experience who had spent many years in this House, one well versed in legislation but not being privy to the events in Northern Ireland in the last year or two, were to have come to the House and to have been confronted with the Bill he would have found Clause 2 totally incomprehensible. Here, he would have said to himself, was Parliament setting up a subordinate Assembly and a subordinate administration in part of the United Kingdom. Here was a Bill which set out the procedure for the electing of the Assembly and which filled in the details both of the Assembly and of the Executive.

But, he would have asked, what was the possible meaning or purpose of subsection (1)? Even if all the amendments in the name of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) were to be accepted, it would still be remarkable enough. It would be remarkable, first, in seeking to set up an Assembly and Executive, to make it a condition of starting the show going that the Assembly should have made Standing Orders which, after all, any Assembly has and must make in order to function; and secondly, that there should be an Executive of some sort which should command a majority, since without that obviously an Executive cannot function. Even to specify those basic and objective requirements—and my hon. and gallant Friend's amendments render objective what in the Bill is subjective—even in that limited, stripped-down form it would have been an extremely surprising provision.

But as it stands it is incomprehensible except against the background of the Government's policy in the last 12 or 15 months, and in particular against the background of the scheme which the Bill sets out to attempt to implement. I do not wish to traverse the ground I covered in my speech on Second Reading when referring to the clause. However, I must draw attention to the remarkable accumulation of conditions which are here imposed and all of which are subjected to the judgment of the Secretary of State.

Quite apart from coming to the conclusion that the Standing Orders are satisfactory in certain respects, he has to form his opinion, first, on the support which the Executive commands in the Assembly; secondly, on the electorate on which that support is based; thirdly, on the likelihood of its being—and then there are three separately emphatic words— widely accepted throughout the community"; fourthly, on top of that and apparently separate therefore, that there is a reasonable basis for the establishment in Northern Ireland of government by consent". I pause for a moment upon that last point. I hope that my right hon. Friend, in replying, will make clear, though it is a subordinate issue, why there is any separate consideration as to there being a reasonable basis for establishing government by consent in Northern Ireland from the previous conditions which are already specified.

If the Executive were likely to be widely accepted throughout the community it could be taken for granted, I should have thought, that there was a reasonable basis for establishing government by consent. Yet the latter is treated as a separate point upon which the Secretary of State must be satisfied. It is clear that the clause is deliberately drafted so as to make that an additional, super-eminent requirement. Otherwise the words in lines 6 to 8 on page 2 would be not only tautological but dangerously tautological.

Why, having set up an elective Assembly, are we in the Bill imposing these four successive conditions dependent upon the judgment of the Secretary of State before the Assembly or the Executive are allowed to function? The key is not in the Bill but in the White Paper, which denoted as the central element of the whole scheme which this legislation is intended to implement the sharing of power.

I can be the more brief in considering the practicability of that proposal by reason of the interchange which took place just now between my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and my hon. and gallant Friend. For the analogy which my right hon. Friend invoked for the sharing of power in an administration between persons who otherwise were deeply divided politically was this country at war, and at war for its very existence in the Second World War. I do not think it is obscure that the reason why power was shared, necessarily shared, voluntarily shared, and for the most part enthusiastically shared, between deeply divided political opponents was that for the duration of the war—just for the duration of the war, for the limited period of the war—they shared an aim which overrode all other aims, namely, that of survival and victory.

But it is completely fallacious to try to transfer that demonstration of power-sharing to the situation in Northern Ireland. The object of this power-sharing in Northern Ireland is not to share power between people who differ marginally about policies, who have different views upon the subsidising of housing, even on regional policy, even upon taxation. That would be bad enough. That would be difficult and impractical enough in a peacetime administration which is intended to continue from one year to another.

But no; clearly in the context of the White Paper, in the real context in which the whole matter is placed, the object is to endeavour to yoke together those who, in words which my hon. and gallant Friend has already used in today's sitting, are irreconcilable, are divided as regards their ultimate aims. They are those for whom the most important things do not coincide, as they did with us during the war, but are diametrically opposite. So that is the reason for this totally unique and unexpected precondition being imposed upon the functioning of the Assembly and of the Executive.

How can it possibly work? My right hon. Friend once again interjected just now, "If there is the will." But let us suppose that there is a will, if at all possible, to carry on. Even if there is open-hearted generosity on the part of all concerned, there is the ultimate divergence where all policies are seen and judged in the light of whether they tend towards or away from those ultimate aims. The adventure would be found impracticable in its nature.

A little while ago the hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Merlyn Rees) posed the possibility that the scheme might be sabotaged and made unworkable. I think that the voice, grammatically speaking, in which he expressed that prospect was the wrong one. That implies that those concerned will deliberately sabotage something which would otherwise work; that they would deliberately render unworkable something which was inherently workable by its nature. That implies that deliberate contrivance would be necessary to sabotage or to make unworkable. But the nature of the scheme which is put before us is such that it does not require to be sabotaged. It is inherently unworkable by its nature because it implies the co-operation of those whose political objectives are not merely different but irreconcilably opposed.

In the context to which I have referred the hon. Member for Leeds, South said "If this happens, what is to be done?" For my own part I have offered my answer to that question many a time both in debates in the House and in public on this side of the Irish Sea and on the other side. I believe that the only practicable course which can be adopted consistent with the common policy to which both sides of the Committee have adhered in past debate and in Clause 1 is to accept the thorough-going total integration and unification of the Six Counties of Northern Ireland with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Obviously that is not the subject of our present debate upon the amendment. Nevertheless, it would be wrong if we were to discuss the clause under the assumption that this was the end of the line, under the assumption that we must accept these proposals, however inherently contradictory and unworkable they may he, because there is nothing else. That is always a dangerous frame of mind in which to deliberate. There is no need for us to accept the clause and to accept that central part of the White Paper on the basis that there is no alternative. There is an alternative, and I believe that it is the alternative to which the House will find that perhaps before very long it comes, which will be found when the inherent contradictions of what we are here invited to enact have revealed themselves in practice.

[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]

10.15 p.m.

Mr. Merlyn Rees

The right hon. Gentleman, quite properly, harks back to what we were saying earlier. I remind him that we were postulating that because of the way the elections went, the system would break down, which would be another factor in the inherent contradictions, not necessarily in the way the clause was drawn. I always find it difficult to understand the right hon. Gentleman's analysis. The hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) talks about irreconcilables, and the right hon. Gentleman has just said that the Secretary of State would be unable to get agreement to work this constitution, not just because of the way it is drawn but because of the contradictions in society in Northern Ireland. Given that, and all the feelings that have been there for so long and which have bedevilled the House of Commons back to Joseph Chamberlain and beyond, how, on his analysis, can the right hon. Gentleman talk about integration? The same irreconcilables are there. The same people who will not work together in Northern Ireland are there. How can this irreconcilability be translated here?

Mr. Powell

I will respond to the challenge. Because these irreconcilabilities would render impracticable in the case assumed the operation of a Northern Ireland local Assembly and Executive, it by no means follows that they would have the same result when the politics and parties of Northern Ireland were dissolved and subsumed in the whole of the United Kingdom. I do not want to be drawn into a lengthy disquisition upon this matter, but from the point of view, for example, of the Roman Catholic citizen of Northern Ireland who might well wish to sustain the union and might also wish to take a part in the politics and government of his country, how much easier it would be for that man to play a part in the politics of the United Kingdom than to find a practicable rôle in a constitution such as we are at present drawing up of the Province of Northern Ireland.

I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I give no more than that indication of a reply to his question, but I believe it is adequate sufficiently to demonstrate that we have no need and we have no right to decide upon these amendments under the pressure of the notion that either we accept this or there is nothing else acceptable. But still my right hon. Friend or the hon. Gentleman might say, "Maybe you are right in your fear, your conviction, that anything of this character so constructed, so contrived, is impracticable. But why oppose it now? Why support the amendments which would remove these impracticable features, if they are impracticable, these impracticable requirements, if they are such, from the clause? Why not be content to sit back with good will and the best optimism one can muster and see? If it breaks down, then it breaks down, but why seek to amend the Bill now?"

I will answer that question. It is because this House is enacting, in the context of Northern Ireland, something which it would not dream of enacting in another context, and because it is doing so not in order to reassure and buttress the security which we purport to have promised in Clause 1 but to render the constitution acceptable not to those who accept the union but to those who fundamentally reject the union.

That intention is itself one of the causes of the continuing bloodshed and violence in Northern Ireland. It is uncertainty not certainty which lies behind the troubles of that Province. It is uncertainty as to the purpose of Her Majesty's Government, as to whether terrorism will not prevail. It is the uncertainty, which speech after speech this afternoon has illustrated, whether the people of Britain presently may not be rattled and frightened and bored and bothered out of their maintenance of law and order in Northern Ireland so that after all the purpose of a minority, even a small majority, may be attained.

When that small minority, those who do believe that this can be achieved without consent, see this impracticability being enacted by this House for the reasons for which it is being enacted, far from being discouraged they are powerfully encouraged to believe that they are on their way and have moved another step towards their goal. That is the very practical reason, in which the lives of men and women are bound up, why I believe my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South was right to seek to eliminate these abnormal elements from this provision and to say, "If we are to set up an Assembly and an Executive in Northern Ireland, let it be done upon the terms and conditions on which we would set up an Assembly and an Executive anywhere else in the United Kingdom". If we accept my hon. and gallant Friend's amendments we shall not only be easing the prospects of a workable Assembly and Executive being formed and brought into existence; we shall he reducing rather than enhancing the prospect of continued violence in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Stratton Mills

Now that we have come to these amendments which touch the central core of the Bill we are undoubtedly moving, in House of Commons terms, into uncharted territory. Although my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) has applied his brilliant and devastating logic to this clause, it is not as simple as he suggests. We are not starting from scratch and we have to provide answers to the situation confronting us in Northern Ireland.

It is easy to point to uncertainties, problems and difficulties. We know how difficult it will be to get the Executive off the ground. Nevertheless, I do not believe that my right hon. Friend's proposals for complete integration are the answer. At one time I hoped that such proposals might be the answer and I looked at them carefully. I am convinced that they are not. We have to face these proposals within a Northern Ireland context. It is no good saying that we must operate on the basis of the simple democratic Westminster pattern. That is no answer. That has been tried and now we have to move to new ground.

Although I entirely accept that this is a difficult argument, I believe it to be essential and right that we try to build a system of power-sharing into the executive government of Northern Ireland. It is basically wrong for people to analyse these proposals on the basis of comparisons with the House of Commons, which we all know so well. The Assembly is not a similar type of body. It is a new type.

My right hon. Friend asked whether there was the will to make it work. This was echoed in other exchanges. The proposals are a compromise between two basic objectives. However, my guess—and it has been confirmed by much that I have seen in the last two months since the White Paper was published—is that at the grass roots people in Northern Ireland desperately want them to work and they will have precious little sympathy with politicians who are out to sabotage them. However, it will be a difficult task to implement them and that is probably why considerable latitude has been left to my right hon. Friend in getting the Executive off the ground.

The basis of my exploratory Amendment No. 13 is that I feel it important that if the Executive gets off the ground we should move to a stage whereby the methods by which an Executive is formulated are set out clearly in an order of the new Assembly. I do not think it satisfactory to leave the matter entirely open and vague from now till kingdom come. Therefore, in Amendment No. 13, taken with Amendments Nos. 31 and 32, I have set out the idea that the Assembly should, in its standing orders, set out some basic principles for putting together an Executive.

In Amendment No. 14, which is also exploratory, I suggest that the Executive should have the support of at least, say, 60 per cent. of the members of the Assembly. That is to meet the situation about which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) and I talked on Second Reading. It is important to spell out that the Executive should have—because it will not make sense if it does not have—the support of a majority of members of the Assembly. Plainly it cannot be effective if it does not. There is an argument for saying that a majority of one to back up an Executive of this nature is not enough and that to be effective something larger will be needed for a broadly-based Executive to be able to operate effectively.

We must clearly spell out—and I hope my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will do this—that power-sharing is the central theme of the new constitutional proposals. He should also clearly spell out that anyone who adduces the argument that the central proposal is negotiable is in danger of trying to fool the electorate. If we want a regional Assembly—and I believe that the people in Northern Ireland do—we must learn to share power in it. If we do not, I fear that there will be no regional Assembly.

I am encouraged to see from the Daily Telegraph today that the leader of the party of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South, Mr. Faulkner, has said that he is prepared to share power with those who are prepared to take the oath of members of the Executive, which ensures that they should work for the benefit of people in Northern Ireland. It is also encouraging that the SDLP, in its Press conference yesterday, Reported in the Daily Telegraph, has indicated that its members would be prepared to take the oath.

Mr. Maginnis

Has not the leader of the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland categorically stated that he will not share power with those who are out to wreck the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom?

10.30 p.m.

Mr. Mills

Yes, but my hon. Friend has missed the point. The leader of his party has changed his position since he said that. Although he said that he was not prepared to share power with those whose primary objective was a united Ireland, he has qualified it by pinpointing those who are prepared to take the oath to the Executive and to pledge themselves to work for the benefit of Northern Ireland. That is what politicians are there for. Those who take that oath put themselves inside the catchment area.

Mr. Maginnis

Does not my hon. Friend recall that the SDLP stated categorically that members seeking election to the Assembly took the oath only to enable them to receive their parliamentary remuneration?

Mr. Mills

My hon. Friend is introducing a different element. He must think about the point to which I am addressing myself, look at today's Daily Telegraph and sort it out with the leader of his party.

The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), speaking impromptu from the Opposition Front Bench, made a speech of immense significance which the people of Northern Ireland must heed. The main anxiety of many of us is about what is to happen if these proposals are made unworkable after the election. I do not know the complete answer, but I am certain that if the proposals are made unworkable there will be no united Ireland, there will be no return to the old Stormont, and I fear that opinion in the United Kingdom will go sour and fluid. I do not know in which direction events will move, but I am convinced that no section of the Northern Ireland community will be the beneficiary.

Mr. McMaster

I rise to support the amendment, but I do so with no great pleasure. I find this part of the clause difficult to comprehend. The Green Paper and the White Paper on which the Bill is based set out in the preamble that if a solution is to be found to the problems of Northern Ireland it must be clear, precise and easily understood. The clause does not match those requisites. It is not clear, precise or easily understood.

It is not made clear to the ordinary man in the street what is meant by if it appears to the Secretary of State". What criteria is the Secretary of State to apply in judging whether the Assembly has made satisfactory provisions by its standing orders. What is the definition of "satisfactory"? Perhaps the vaguest and most difficult phrase to understand appears in Clause 2(1)(b)— is likely to be widely accepted throughout the community". What does it mean? Does it mean that it will be accepted by a simple majority of the people of Northern Ireland? What other test of acceptability can there be in a democracy? The Bill should state what the Government intend by "widely accepted". Some clear provision must be incorporated in the Bill so that those who are putting themselves up for election for the new Assembly will know the situation, and so that the head of the Executive will know the test which he has to satisfy in order that the Assembly can get off the ground.

I rise hesitantly in this debate, for I personally am worried about the position in which I now find myself. Am I to criticise the Bill if I find it faulty, or am I to accept it? There is great pressure on all the Ulster Members to try out the Bill's provisions, not to point out the difficulties which logic suggest to them—difficulties which my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) so clearly expressed in his remarks. There is pressure to wait and see. We in Northern Ireland are war-weary. We are aware that if this Bill does not work we must ask what is the future for Northern Ireland. We are afraid that anything we might say in this House may tend to jeopardise the position in Northern Ireland, that it would add fuel to the fire—a fire which has already been kindled in the United Kingdom and which has resulted in a feeling, "Bring home our soldiers—let us withdraw, let us disengage".

However, we must not fall into the temptation to do nothing, to sit back and to hope for the best. If the Bill plainly is unworkable or appears to us to be unworkable, then surely our clear duty is to state here our doubts. We would be performing no service to the people of Northern Ireland if we sat back quietly and let something about which we are worried pass through this House. If we do and the Bill turns out to be unworkable, how much greater will be the disillusion in this country, and what damage we shall do to the Ulster cause in Britain.

For these reasons I support the important Amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder). I hesitated to take part in this debate because I fully appreciate the work carried out by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the past 14 or 15 months. We accept without any doubt or equivocation his sincerity and his dedication to his difficult task. Therefore, I am reluctant to do anything which, either directly or indirectly, appears to criticise the product of the last 14 months. We must think clearly about the situation. The hour is late and we are war-weary after years of bombing and blasting in Northern Ireland. We want tremendously to have peace in Northern Ireland. Perhaps we are tired tonight after a long day's debate, but we must pause at this late hour here because these provisions are vital and we must give them due consideration. Therefore, our words must be weighed carefully and tested against the clear test of logic.

Will this provision work or will it not work? I suggest that we should apply the criteria clearly set out in the opening paragraph of the White Paper. Is it clear, precise, can it be understood by the ordinary man in the street and will it work? I suggest that these words do not fit this formula because they fall far short of satisfying that test.

Mr. Merlyn Rees

The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) spoke about the dilemma which faced him of sitting back quietly. Whatever else might have been the situation before direct rule, no one can accuse Northern Ireland Members in this House of sitting back quietly on matters concerning Northern Ireland. Of course, that is right. When a Bill of this kind is passing through the House, it is their duty to raise their doubts on it. But when people talk about making it unworkable, that is in a different context and at a different stage.

The hon. Gentleman asked what "widely acceptable" meant, and I have tried to find an answer. As with so many other problems, it is easier to discover what it does not mean. Certainly I do not wish to rake up the past but, in terms of the Parliament which existed before the imposition of direct rule being widely acceptable, that it was not. Many of the people elected to it did not take up their seats. What is more, the very name "Stormont" makes people ask whether the new Assembly must be at Stormont. There is no doubt that amongst certain sections of the community part of the irreconcilability to which the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) referred is just this.

It is not an issue which can be ignored. The previous set-up, whatever the proportions and whatever may be said about the number of Catholics in North Antrim who voted Unionist, created a serious problem in Northern Ireland. If it had been otherwise, there would not have been the difficulties which we all face today.

Mr. McMaster

If the hon. Gentleman cares to refer back, he will find that those who did not turn up represented fewer than 7 per cent. Therefore in terms of being widely acceptable, 93 per cent. accepted the former Stormont Parliament.

Captain Orr

The words "widely acceptable" in this context are used not in relation to an institution but in relation to a Government. The Executive shall be "widely acceptable". Surely those words cannot be used of any government, local or otherwise, in any other part of the United Kingdom. Could it he said, for example, the Conservatives in London widely accept the present GLC?

Mr. Rees

I quite agree. However, the hon. Member for Belfast, East took me away from my "widely acceptable" to a different form of it, and this is part of the difficulty that we all have to face.

It is extremely difficult. Much will depend on the elections on 28th June. I believe that, whatever else is the bonus from the work of this House and of the Secretary of State and his Ministers, there is to be a new Assembly and there are new parties. There have been changes. The Unionist Party is not what it was, and one could not expect it to be, given the traumatic effect of direct rule. The Nationalist Party has been replaced by the Social Democratic and Labour Party. There will be different groupings in the new Assembly. Much will depend on the result of the elections, and I do not care to guess what that might be.

There is a tendency on this side of the water to sneer at the leaders of political parties in Northern Ireland. But political leaders and Members of Parliament in the North of Ireland face an almost continuous primary in a way that we do not on this side of the water where political differences are often based less on ideas and ideals overall and more on different social origins.

10.45 p.m.

In many respects we are protected from the continuous primary position that is shown there. I understand that the attendance at meetings for the re-selection of Unionist Members of Parliament runs to a very large number—certainly quite different from the situation on this side of the water.

I believe that the leaders of the parties in Northern Ireland will be in the front line after 28th June. If they believe that they can leave it to the Secretary of State, they are gravely mistaken. There are problems about the rôle of Opposition. In my view, those in Northern Ireland who think that this matter will meander on from 28th or 29th June through to March next year are gravely mistaken. The leaders of the parties there will have to face this fact very quickly, not because of the weariness of people on this side of the water with what they see, but because people will expect action and support to be given to the Secretary of State.

I believe that flexibility is the key to this clause, just as I was asking for flexibility on Clause 1. I am glad to see it in Clause 2. I hope that when we get back to Clause 1 at a later stage that same flexibility will be found. There must be flexibility here. We cannot spell it out in detail. There must be a great deal of give and take. Much will depend on the Secretary of State and the leaders of the parties.

I should like to ask about support from the Assembly. This point was touched on on Second Reading. In the spirit of flexibility, I do not expect the Secretary of State to spell it out, because the merit of the clause is that it is drawn up in a very British way. However, it leaves a great deal of room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, an Executive that does not have support in the Assembly will be asking for trouble. While I do not expect certainty on this point, I hope that the Secretary of State will give us some indication of his thinking.

In general, I am against these amendments, but it is most valuable to have had a chance to talk about power sharing.

Mr. Maginnis

Power sharing is the kernel of the whole problem facing Northern Ireland. I support the amendment moved by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr), but I do not do so with any great pleasure, and I agree with the sentiment expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) that it is our duty to give a workable constitution to Northern Ireland.

I am not against the concept of power sharing, but I am against sharing power with those who are out to destroy the very institution of which they are members. This is the problem that we face.

In the debate either on Second Reading or on the White Paper I said that if members of the elected body known as the Assembly who are out to destroy the very state of Northern Ireland were selected by the Secretary of State to be members of the Executive, they would not need to use the tactics which were used against the walls of Jericho to bring down Stormont. I stick to what I then said.

I am not against the concept of power sharing with those who may be of a different religious belief from myself. That makes no difference whatsoever to me. But I am against sharing power with those who are out to destroy the very State of Northern Ireland. If we pass the Bill unamended and members of the Assembly in Northern Ireland are appointed to the Executive and then proceed to wreck the institutions of which they are members, we shall have a lot to answer for.

I know that the Secretary of State has a very difficult job. I hope that he can make this Assembly work and appoint the Executive. I am not against hoping because I am an optimist, but the test of acceptability is—would we in this House accept such a proposal?

Mr. Molyneaux

Not on your life.

Mr. Maginnis

My uncle, who spent a lifetime in the Church of England, was once officiating at the wedding of a sailor in Portsmouth. When he put the question, "Do you take this woman to be your lawful wedded wife?", the answer was, "Would you?"

Mr. Kilfedder

He must have been sober by that time.

Mr. Maginnis

The test of acceptability is what we in this House would accept.

I believe that my hon. Friends the Members for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder) and Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) are candidates for the Assembly. If I went along to any of the election meetings of any of the gentlemen running for the Assembly and asked, "How do you propose to institute in the Assembly the proposals in your manifesto?", they would be completely floored. The due processes of British democracy will not be carried out.

The election to the Assembly in these terms is the greatest confidence trick in British politics. If I were running for election on a party manifesto, I should be honest enough to tell the people that, if my party won a majority, we should put into operation the proposals in our manifesto. That is how Governments operate. Often, time does not permit them to do everything in their manifestoes, but I hope that the Committee will see the point.

If a party in Northern Ireland—there is a conglomeration of parties there now; the situation is as bad as in some African States—gained a majority in the Assembly, it would be deceiving the electorate if it said that it would carry out the programme in its manifesto. I hope that we shall look seriously at this part of the Bill. I believe that there is a will to work the Assembly—I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills)—but it must be given the proper machinery to make it work. That is our job here.

There are many good things in the Bill, but the kernel of the Bill will have to be worked on, and there must be give and take. I described the Secretary of State earlier as magnanimous in his approach to Clause 1. I hope that he will deal with this matter magnanimously and that at the end of the day something more satisfactory than is in the Bill will emerge.

Mr. Kilfedder

I am sorry that we did not hear the rest of what my hon. Friend the Member for Armagh (Mr. Maginnis) had to say about his uncle and what happened to the sailor and his proposed bride. My hon. Friend told us that the bridegroom, when asked if he would take this woman to be his wife, said to the clergyman, "Would you?" Perhaps reality had set in for the sailor! That is the sort of position which we are in today. The time will come if we have this Assembly when the people of Northern Ireland will be in the same position as the sailor who was to be married by my hon. Friend's uncle.

The suggestion has been made that some people may wreck the Assembly. I am a candidate for the Assembly. I do not believe in engaging in any double talk and I wish to say that I cannot accept a position where the majority would be forced to share power with those whose long-term aim is the destruction of the link between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

It is clear that if any Republicans are prepared to serve on the Executive, those Republicans will set out to wreck the Assembly. They will not need to do very much because the clause reveals contradictions and conditions which make it virtually impossible for the Assembly or the Executive to work effectively. It is no use anyone in the Committee saying to the Unionists or to any other loyalists in Northern Ireland that they are out to wreck the Assembly. The position is that the people of Northern Ireland are being forced to accept the sort of machinery of government that is not really government at all.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said that the people of Northern Ireland are war-weary. He is depending upon that. The people who have succeeded in Ulster are those who are members of the Irish Republic Army. Through their campaign of violence and terror, they have got rid of the Stormont Government and the Stormont Parliament. They have got rid of the oath of allegiance and many other manifestations of the British link.

I am sorry that no representative of the Republican side in Northern Ireland is in the Chamber for the debate on this clause. It is no use anyone on the Opposition side of the Committee saying that the Loyalists are out to wreck the Assembly. We shall do our best to make it work, but I have serious doubts whether it is workable, bearing in mind the conditions which must be satisfied even before the Executive is approved by the Secretary of State.

The purpose of the clause is to force the majority to share power with the Republicans in the hope that the Republicans will then bring violence to an end. I fear that it is a hope that will never be realised. That will not come about. The White Paper did not bring peace. The border poll did not bring peace. The Assembly elections will not bring peace.

In Northern Ireland the men of violence will continue their campaign of terror because from month to month they see the present Government giving way to them. Therefore, all that those men have to do is to wait, to fight on and to continue to murder innocent men, women and children. They know that this great Government, with all their proclaimed resolution, will one day give way to their demands if the gruesome murders take place from time to time.

11 p.m.

The hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) talked glibly, I thought, about the ease with which politicians should be able to share power with those who take the oath. No doubt the hon. Gentleman was referring to Republicans, or perhaps to members of the Social Democratic and Labour Party. But the oath has been done away with for members of the Assembly. Only members of the Executive have to take the oath.

The oath upon which so much reliance is placed is set out in Schedule 4 on page 34. It is a simple, straightforward statement: I swear by Almighty God [or affirm] that I will uphold the laws of Northern Ireland and conscientiously fulfil [as a member of the Northern Ireland Executive] my duties under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 and so on. It is a simple oath, and I doubt whether any Republicans, or even members of the IRA, would shy away from taking it.

What about the oath which we proudly take as Members of this House? By that oath we swear to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen. That oath has been done away with in Northern Ireland because the Republicans would not take it, but they can take an oath which will allow them to become members of the Executive and pursue their long-term aim of taking Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Stratton Mills

The hon. Gentleman will know that the form of oath—and this was the point made yesterday by the leader of his party, Mr. Faulkner—means that there is an undertaking to uphold the laws of Northern Ireland—which will include this Bill when it becomes an Act—and also the status of Northern Ireland as envisaged in Clause 1.

Mr. Kilfedeer

I agree that under the oath set out in Schedule 4 a person swears to uphold the laws of Northern Ireland, but I am not certain that much reliance can be placed even on that. So far as I am aware, the SDLP has already declared that it wants an amnesty for all those who have engaged in atrocities in Northern Ireland, and this must include those IRA men who murdered six men and women and mutilated women and children in Coleraine. The SDLP wants an amnesty for those so-called political criminals. There may be some hooligans among the Loyalists—one finds them in all walks of life, in the trade unions when strikes take place in Great Britain and all over the world—but one thing that is clear is that the Republicans have no intention of preserving Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Since 1969 we have seen what illegal action the Republican can take.

If the Assembly is to act responsibly as a law-making body, it should at least have the responsibility of deciding what its own standing orders shall be and who shall be members of the Executive. At present, the members of the Assembly cannot or may not be responsible for the appointment or selection of those who will be on the Executive. Surely that is not a democratic system of Government.

But it goes even further. The majority of the Assembly may not find it possible to support the actions of the Executive, yet it will not be able to remove the Executive from power. We must bear in mind that this Executive, which is screened by the Secretary of State as set out in the conditions in the clause, has powers under Clause 12 to enter into arrangements and agreements with any authority in the Republic of Ireland with respect to any transferred matter. That is why we must treat the matter with great caution. I can understand why standing orders of a borough council should have to be approved by a Government Department. But it seems to diminish the status of the Assembly for those standing orders to require the approval of the Secretary of State. Here again he is taking on powers which are far too wide.

The general practice in Northern Ireland where an authority has been set up—whether it is a fire authority or a hospital authority or something of that sort—is that its standing orders must he devised and determined by the statutory authority, and the approval which is required by a Government Department is a mere formality. But the Department's powers to approve standing orders are usually relegated to subordinate legislation under the main Act. Here the clause provides for an Executive which is not responsible, or need not be, for its actions to the members of the Assembly as in a normal legislative council.

The Executive will not be responsible even to the majority of the people in Northern Ireland. It is a creature of the Secretary of State. I suppose that it cannot even be discussed by the members of the Assembly. Perhaps my right hon. Friend will tell me if I am wrong. I hope that the Assembly can discuss the actions of the Executive and go further and express disapproval of its actions if it so disapproves. I hope that it will have some means of getting rid of members of the Executive if they act contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Assembly.

This is an elaborate piece of legislative machinery which seems to exist for the purpose of enabling my right hon. Friend to discharge his functions as conveniently as possible. The members of the Assembly will realise the frustrations which will result from the system as devised and the conditions set out in the clause. It will not be long before that dismay is transmitted to the electorate, who will soon realise that the Assembly will have no real power to take decisions on matters touching their everyday lives. The Ulster people will find that they go through the whole process of listening to the election campaign, voting and sending their members to the Assembly, but that in the long run they will have a sham Assembly, that the terrorism will continue and that the Government will take further action which will appease the Republicans and the IRA. The law-abiding majority of the Ulster people, the war-weary people of Northern Ireland, will be left to make their final protest.

Mr. Stratton Mills

Before my hon. Friend sits down——

The Chairman

Order. The hon. Member has already sat down. Mr. Marsden.

Mr. Marsden

I have sat through the whole debate, like many hon. Members opposite. I am sorry that I am the only Opposition backbencher present at this time of night. It is not my fault.

We are debating a Bill to make new provision for the government of Northern Ireland. With great reservation, I have been in the Lobby with the Government, something I am not accustomed to doing, to protect the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. I have read the Bill, which, like all Bills, looks like the back of an insurance policy. I do not know whether the people of Northern Ireland will be able to understand it or not. But I understand it sufficiently to know that it contains many things for the minority which five years ago were beyond their wildest dreams.

I ask myself: how do hon. Members know that people will not power-share? How do they know whether a Bill is workable until they have tried to work it or had the opportunity to do so? It is not a Bill for all time. It can be amended in the light of subsequent events and in the course of time.

I am appalled by the lack of good will that has been shown to the Bill and in the debate generally by the Unionist Members for Northern Ireland.

Mr. Molyneaux

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) that the body provided for in the Bill is of a new kind. I do not condemn it for that. To me, its main defect is that it does not even begin to look credible. The thinking behind it so obviously flies in the face of common sense that the whole structure is viewed with utter disbelief.

My hon. Friend said that many people at grass-roots level desperately want the Bill and the structure to work. I differ from his estimate of what the people at grass-roots level are thinking. A number of people certainly hope that the Bill may work. That is about as far as any hon. Member would dare go. A vast number of people lack any faith in its working and see little in the text of the Bill on which they can base such faith.

We should all have some hope and faith if only the structure had the appearance of stability, but because that is lacking there can be no real return to settled conditions. There can be no real end to the violence. There can be no effective counter to the guerilla warfare that has plagued us for four years, and that some of us have been very reluctant to recognise as such. The political uncertainty over Northern Ireland will be perpetuated, and with it will be perpetuated all the unrest, terrorism and disturbance which we have already encountered.

It has been suggested that if only Republicans subscribed to the oath as set out in Schedule 4 they could be expected to work loyally as members of the proposed fantastic structure. I hope my right hon. Friend will forgive me for using that expression. We must remember that they took an even more binding oath at Stormont and when they came here. But that did not inhibit them from set- ting about undermining the entire constitution of the Province. I do not believe that the watered-down oath in the Bill will deter them in any way. My hon. Friend the Member for Armagh (Mr. Maginnis) said that a candidate should keep a promise that if his party secured a majority in the Assembly he would press for the implementation of policies in the manifesto on which he was elected. But the new political ethics of Westminster would brand such a man as a wrecker. We in this House have reached a crazy situation. If sincerely held views are endorsed by the majority of the electorate in an election in Northern Ireland there will be accusations of sabotage and wrecking. It is only if one promises on election to foresake genuinely held beliefs—that is, to be a good boy and do exactly what one is told—that one becomes acceptable in the eyes of the Westminster Parliament.

That is a crazy situation, and it is hardly surprising that the clause and its possible product is regarded privately in the Palace of Westminster and publicly throughout the country with derision.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. Whitelaw

Having spent 15 months as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland I have been led inescapably to an approach of great humility, and that is my approach when dealing with all the problems which arise when dealing with the Bill and individual clauses.

I ask that those who disagree with me—and I understand that there are some who are in disagreement—should be prepared to exercise a similar degree of humility. If I say that I hope desperately that something will work and that I wish to explain why it will work, they are entitled to say that it will not work. If I am in the position of not being absolutely certain, I might find it a little hard to accept that others should be so absolutely certain. Are they so much more certain of themselves than I am? Perhaps they are. Perhaps they are certain. Perhaps they have a pride and a determination in their judgment which I do not always have. I have learned in life that I am not always right, and I find difficulty in believing those who assert that they are always right.

Be that as it may, the problem of power-sharing is something which is fundamental to a new start in Northern Ireland. I agree very much with my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) that there will be difficulties. This is new ground. It will require a will to make it work. I do not believe that comparisons with this Parliament and the House of Commons are right.

The situation which Her Majesty's Government and I on their behalf have found in Northern Ireland is not the same as that which has been found by others. Sometimes I feel that I am entitled to say that we did not start from scratch. To hear it said, as is sometimes suggested, that the previous arrangements worked so well causes me to say that—and no one should forget it—it was not this Parliament which asked to send the troops into Northern Ireland. It was not the Government of the day here who sought that. It was the Parliament, the people and the Government of the day in Northern Ireland who had to ask for the British troops to go in. It is no use running away from that. That is the situation which happened in 1969 and from which one has to start.

Mr. Maginnis

I am following the right hon. Gentleman's reasoning with care. He must understand that the reason for the then Stormont Government asking for the troops to be brought into Northern Ireland in support of the civil forces was the fact that propaganda was being used against the civil forces of Northern Ireland in the situation which then prevailed.

Mr. Whitelaw

I am not going to argue what happened. All I am saying is that that is what did happen. That is the point we have to start from, and that is what many of the problems with which we are confronted stem from. It is no use running away from it.

I believe that we have to make a new start; I think everyone accepts that we have to do so. If we are to make a new start, we shall inevitably be faced with the arguments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr), who are entitled to their view that the proposals we put forward will not succeed.

But equally I say that it must be right to seek to make a new start. I have had responsibility for Northern Ireland for 15 months, and I may be right or I may be wrong, but I believe that this is a new start which could work given the will. Here I agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool, Scotland (Mr. Marsden) that it could work, given the will.

I take the point that if it does not work there will be a difficult and serious situation. Obviously, a new situation will arise and other methods will have to be tried. I accept that my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West and others genuinely believe that the system of power-sharing will not work. If they are right and our efforts to make it work are not successful, we shall have to try something else. That is a fair proposition. But this is, in my judgment, something which should be given a chance to work and about which there should be the will to make it work.

Some derision was poured upon my recollection that it was possible to have a coalition in this country during the war. I agree that comparison in this context between our situation and Northern Ireland's situation now is not real. But there is no doubt that a crisis situation exists in Northern Ireland and that something new has to be tried.

Those who suggest that we can go on as before, that all will be well if we put back the whole thing to where it was before, must surely agree that in the present situation, after all the time and weariness borne in upon people, as my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) rightly pointed out, a new start has to be made and something new has to be tried.

I accept the view of those who say they do not believe that this is the right new start that we are proposing. But I challenge those who say that there is no need to make a new start at all, that one has simply to go on as before. I do not believe that is possible, could conceivably work or would not lead back to all the troubles we are trying to emerge from. We have to make a new start, and I believe that power-sharing can work. I think one has to accept that there is no comparison with what has happened here. I equally accept that some of the criteria set out are vague. As the hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Merlyn Rees) said, they are deliberately so because I believe that some flexibility is right.

I do not think that the Government can be charged in two ways at the same time—on the one hand, that they are seeking to impose an exact solution on Northern Ireland, and, on the other, that they are being too flexible in their approach. One cannot have it both ways. I believe that if one is seeking a flexible solution and to give the new members of the Assembly an opportunity to come together and seek to work out a scheme of power-sharing which will work, that is better than saying exactly how it is to work down to the last dot.

Captain Orr

One of the things which worry us is not so much the lack of flexibility or too much rigidity but the obscurity. The very phrase "power-sharing", even in the White Paper, is not clear. One does not know exactly what is in my right hon. Friend's mind in this matter. Are we talking about sectarian power-sharing? Are we talking in religious or political terms? Are we talking about sharing all power between the majority who favour the union and the minority who favour ultimately a republic? Or are we talking about power-sharing across the sectarian divide?

Mr. Whitelaw

I believe we are talking of trying to achieve a broadly based Executive. We must remember that for 50 years the government of Northern Ireland was entrusted, perfectly democratically, to one party which drew all its elected representatives from one section of a divided community. That is a fact which cannot be denied and which I do not believe can in future be continued, as we say in the White Paper. That is a fundamental principle which we have to accept.

I come to some of the other points raised by the hon. Member for Leeds, South and others. There was, first, the question of support in the Assembly. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West said that there would have to be a majority in the Assembly, and I believe that that is inevitable. The Executive, if the powers are transferred, will be in charge of legislation, and if it does not command a majority it will not be able to get its legislation through. If the Assembly did not have a majority there would not be a broadly based Executive and it would not be government by consent. It would not work.

I am asked: Might it not be better to lay down the exact size of the majority to be achieved to have a broadly-based Executive? This would immediately bring about a rigidity which would be extremely unwise. If we found that there was an Executive, broadly-based, with a wide measure of consent to work together, commanding a 68 per cent. majority in the Assembly and we had stated that there had to be a 70 per cent. majority we would look very stupid. Rigidity there would be a great mistake. That is why the flexibility makes sense.

My right hon. Friend enters this discussion about ultimate aims and diversions. There is a considerable argument about this in Northern Ireland. Contrary to what was stated by my hon. Friend the Member for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder), I believe that the form of the oath is, of itself, most important. He derided it and more or less said that no oath anyone takes is any good because no one pays the smallest attention to it. If we carry that argument to its logical conclusion we would never have any oath at any time for anyone under any circumstances. I cannot see the point of that argument.

Mr. Kilfedder

I did not say what my right hon. Friend is imputing to me. I was making a comparison between the oath set out in Schedule 4 and the oath which we take as Members of this House, and asking the simple question, which my right hon. Friend has never answered: Why cannot members of the Assembly and the Executive take a similar oath? Why should we be ashamed of taking an oath to Her Majesty the Queen and swearing to be faithful and give our true allegiance?

11.30 p.m.

Mr. Whitelaw

If I am wrong HANSARD will state the opposite of what I am saying, but I recollect my hon. Friend as saying that people whom he described as "Republicans" took the oath in this House and that made not the smallest difference to them. If that is not what he said, I do not know what it is. I think that that is in fact what he said.

I cannot accept that argument. If a person is prepared to uphold the laws of Northern Ireland and conscientiously fulfil [as a member of the Northern Ireland Executive] his duties under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 in the interests of Northern Ireland and its people", it is reasonable to say that he is seeking to serve the interests of that State and not to destroy it. I cannot find anything in those words which suggests that someone who has sworn that oath is seeking to destroy the State; he would be swearing exactly the opposite.

I answer my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West in this way. If a member of a party believes ultimately in a united Ireland and accepts, as I believe many do, that there is no question of having a united Ireland in the foreseeable future and, therefore, wishes to work within the State of Northern Ireland to improve the employment prospects and to ensure that more hospitals and schools are built, is he not prepared to work, as his primary aim, in the interests of the State of Northern Ireland? I should have thought that he was prepared to do so.

My hon. Friend the Member for Armagh (Mr. Maginnis) is very fair. He says that he is not against power-sharing but he is against sharing power with those who are out to destroy the State. However, if they are people such as those I have described, I think one can say that they are not out to destroy the State because they know that that will not happen, and they would wish to see improvements made in the employment situation and in the economic conditions and housing of the people. If they are able to work together in transferred functions to that end, surely it can be said that they are people with whom one can share power, people who are not out to destroy the State. I should have thought that that was a reasonable proposition

Mr. McMaster

I do not think my right hon. Friend has made a valid test. If a person whose long-term aim is the establishment of a republic in Ireland is, say, Minister of Education and he has to decide what type of history book the children shall read in the schools, how can he become part of an Executive whose aims are totally different and which might not approve of the type of history book that he wishes to introduce in the schools?

Mr. Whitelaw

If someone had the ultimate aim of a united Ireland, it would not be a great advance in the position of Northern Ireland, nor would it be necessary to try to continue a situation which has, in some cases, two different histories of what has happened. It is a question not only of history but of day-to-day reading. There are two completely different and totally divergent versions of almost any incident set out in two newspapers in Northern Ireland every morning. However, I should have thought that if one wished to work sensibly forward, it would be right to have one history book and that a power-sharing Executive would seek to achieve that. I cannot see why it should not do so.

I take the view that it is perfectly possible for people to have a long-term aim that they want or would wish in certain circumstances which they cannot foresee at this moment. Anyone who is a realist knows that one cannot force a majority into a united Ireland against their will. No one wants to do so. Certainly the Government of the Republic are the last people who want to do so. If that be the case and no one wants it, I do not see what is the fear of people who would wish to work together for the good of the State as it exists at the moment and who therefore wish, under the terms of the oath and the Bill, to work together for the good of their own country I would have thought that this was something that could be accepted.

Nor do I take the argument to which some hon. Members seem to get near, the argument that if one believes as a long-term aim in a united Ireland one is inevitably against everything in Northern Ireland, against every improvement for its people and against all the things that are happening in the Northern Ireland State. I have not found this in these people at all, and I do not think it is right.

I must take issue with those who believe that any form of power-sharing, any form of new start that we are proposing, is a concession, a giving way, yet another surrender of some sort. I cannot accept this in any way. I believe quite the reverse. I believe that those who wish to continue with violence would be desperately upset if power-sharing worked, because it would remove one of the major items which move them to sustain their violence and their hold on many parts of the community. I believe that they are the people who desperately do not wish to see power-sharing working. Therefore, that is one of the major reasons why I think a new start with power-sharing, difficult as my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North says it is, is nevertheless in the long run right. Equally, if it worked it would be a significant advance.

I do not pretend, nor should anyone, that it will be easy to achieve this. Nor do I suggest that, if one achieves it, overnight one suddently removes violence and all the motives behind it. Of course, one does not do any such thing. I know, however—I go further than "believe"; I know for a fact—that the men of violence would be very upset if an Assembly succeeded in working, if it succeeded in achieving an Executive which shared power on the lines we are setting out.

If it is suggested that the proposals are too flexible and give the Secretary of State too much power, one must then come back to the point that if the Secretary of State believes, after his discussions, that such an Executive can be formed, he has to come to this House with the proposals and this House has the final say whether it believes that his judgment is right or wrong. He rightly and properly has to submit his judgment to this House, to which, as a member of Her Majesty's Government, he is ultimately responsible. That is a fundamental principle.

Perhaps I may end by dealing with some points made in detail by my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North in his various amendments. As regards those which impinge on the Assembly standing orders, again I would say I believe it to be right that the Assembly should be given the maximum flexibility in setting out its own standing orders. Therefore, I would not like to set out details of exactly how they had to work. Again, I believe that flexibility is important.

I say to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South and those who have supported him that I cannot accept the amendment. I recognise the inherent problems of the central feature of power-sharing and the immense difficulties that will face those who are seeking to achieve power-sharing. It is an immensely worthwhile goal which could be frustrated if we tried either to stop it being attempted or to tie it down so much that a degree of flexibility was not available.

I hope that the Committee will accept that I cannot accede to the amendment and that the chance must be taken to embark on a new start. It would be ridiculous for me to pretend that we shall necessarily succeed, but I believe it to be a vision on which we should embark and one in which the prize of success will he great.

Captain Orr

I am sorry that my right hon. Friend cannot accept my amendment. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Scotland (Mr. Marsden)—whom I admire for staying to make a contribution despite the absence of so many of his colleagues—suggested that there was a lack of good will in myself and my hon. Friends towards the possibility of the peaceful operation of the Assembly. I assure him that that is not so.

For three years Ulster has suffered from a ghastly campaign of murder and violence. People are so sick of it that the great majority of the population in Ulster on either side of the sectarian divide are only too axious to find a decent way of living at peace with each other.

All we are saying is that what my right hon. Friend appears to have in mind—and we still do not quite know what it is—is impracticable. I accept from him that one's opinions are put forward with a degree of humility, and I concede that one cannot tell what will ultimately happen, but there is nothing in the amendment to prevent power-sharing.

If the Assembly elections follow the pattern of the local government elections, as most of us think they will, there will have to be power-sharing because it is likely that no one party will command a majority in the Assembly. The question is whether it will be power-sharing by coalition entered into voluntarily between parties to find a majority in the Assembly to form a Government, or whether it is to be an artificially composed Executive imposed by the Secretary of State upon the Assembly. If it is the latter, it is unlikely to find a majority in the Assembly. If it is the former—a natural coalition formed by people who are nearer to each other than others might be—power-sharing will almost certainly come about.

I cannot see a possibility of power-sharing across the deep political divide. The sectarian issue may not enter into it. It may be perfectly possible to achieve power-sharing across the

Division No. 157.] AYES [11.41 p.m.
Biggs-Davison, John
McMaster, Stanley
Maginnis, John E.
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Mr. James Kilfedder and Mr. James Molyneuax.
NOES
Adley, Robert Howell, David (Guildford) Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.
Atkins, Humphrey Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.) Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis
Biffen, John Hunt, John Raison, Timothy
Blaker, Peter James, David Redmond, Robert
Bray, Ronald Jopling, Michael Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Buchanan-Smith, Alick(Angus,N&M) Knox, David Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Chapman, Sydney Lane, David Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey
Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher Langford-Holt, Sir John Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Clegg, Walter MacArthur, Ian Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Concannon, J. D. McNair-Wilson, Michael Russell, Sir Ronald
Cordle, John McNamara, J. Kevin Shelton, William (Clapham)
Crouch, David Maddan, Martin Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)
Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove) Madel, David Tebbit, Norman
English, Michael Marsden, F. Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
Eyre, Reginald Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J. Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon,S.)
Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton) Meyer, Sir Anthony Vaughan, Dr. Gerard
Fortescue, Tim Mills, Peter (Torrington) Waddington, David
Fowler, Norman Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.) Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Fox, Marcus Moate, Roger Weatherill, Bernard
Green, Alan More, Jasper Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Grylls, Michael Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh) Wiggin, Jerry
Haselhurst. Alan Murton, Oscar TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Hawkins, Paul Page, Rt. Hn. Graham (Crosby) Mr. Kenneth Clarke and Mr. Hamish Gray.
Hiley, Joseph Peel, John
Hornsby-Smith,Rt.Hn.Dame Patricia Price, David (Eastleigh)

Question accordingly negatived.

To report Progress and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Whitelaw.]

Committee report Progress; to sit again tomorrow

sectarian divide. If that is what my right hon. Friend has in mind, there is no difficulty about it.

I am sorry that my right hon. Friend cannot accept the amendments, for they would not, if accepted, prevent power-sharing. In fact, in order to get a majority in the Assembly as contained in my amendment, there would have to be power-sharing anyway. However, because of the total obscurity of the words I seek to delete, I shall have to advise my hon. Friends to vote on the amendment and no doubt we can return to the general subject when we have a debate on the Question, "That the clause stand part of the Bill".

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 71.

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