HC Deb 03 July 1973 vol 859 cc335-41
Captain Orr

I beg to move Amendment No. 4, in page 2, line 42, at end insert:

'(3) Where a resolution has been passed under the provisions of subsection (2) above the Secretary of State shall give effect to such a resolution in not less than three years from the passing of such resolutions'.

The purpose of the amendment is simply to discover what is in the Government's mind about the time scale in certain circumstances.

In Committee I pointed out that in the Act of 1920 the powers which were held in temporary reserve, especially those relating to internal security, were so held for three years. At the end of the three years they were duly handed over to the Parliament of Northern Ireland.

In this Bill we are not writing in any period for the transfer of powers. Probably it would be unreasonable to tie the Government to a term of years in present circumstances where we are producing a form of constitution which is so highly experimental and so very doubtful in its effect. I admit that the amendment does that and in many senses probably is defective. However, it is merely a peg on which to hang an argument in order to explore the mind of the Government about the timing.

Despite all that we have said, let us suppose that the Secretary of State is able to form an Executive. Let us suppose, further, that Part II of this legislation is implemented and the transfer of powers commences. How long do the Government think it will take to transfer those powers? Are the Government thinking of a long period or of transferring the powers as fast as possible?

If the Government are concerned that the scheme should work—in other words, if it is the intention that it shall be put into operation so soon as we are able to get a chief executive with an Executive around him which commands a majority in the Assembly—I suggest that they will have to try to devolve the powers fairly fast. If they do not and it is seen that the Executive and the Assembly have precious little power over anything, especially over internal security and the general fate of the people, it will be a further stimulus to the failure of the whole concept.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister of State will be able to say that the Government intend to get on with the transfer of powers as fast as possible. That is all I want to know at this stage, and that is the sole purpose of the amendment.

7.45 p.m.

Mr. Paul B. Rose (Manchester, Blackley)

The hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) has provided a peg upon which to hang an argument. I wish to take advantage of that peg and say to the Government that I hope that in transferring any powers they will have learned the lesson of the past 50 years and will at no time transfer the power of internal security to those forces which held that power during the years which led to the current crisis.

If there is anything that we have learned during those years it is that it was not until it was too late that we used the reserve powers available to us under Section 75 of the Act of 1920. Often hon. Members who foresaw exactly what would happen in Northern Ireland were frustrated by the fact that the devolution of powers precluded them from raising these matters.

I hope that the Government will not be misled by the hon. and gallant Member's reference to a majority of the Assembly, because, as I understand it, under Clause 25(2) and (5) the consultative committees will have to be balanced and there will have to be a balance of parties. That means an Assembly where one would expect committees to be composed, perhaps, of a leader from the Executive or the majority party, a deputy leader from the Opposition or a minority party, and a balance of parties. In other words, it would be a partnership and a sharing of powers.

Unless that comes about and we end the old position of a majority forcing its will upon the minority, and unless we have co-operation between the two, I do not see how those subsections can be implemented.

Captain Orr

The hon. Member has raised a very interesting point. Presumably, an Executive cannot last if it cannot command a majority in the Assembly, because it has to get any measure through the Assembly.

Mr. Rose

An Executive which commands the support of one section of a divided community into which the other can never enter because of its position is precisely the sort of Executive which has failed Northern Ireland over the last 50 years.

What I am asking for is an Executive which commands the support of the majority based upon a very different concept; that is, a majority in partnership and, therefore, a majority which would comprise, one would expect, the more moderate elements of the Unionist Party and those around it, and those who are represented in this House by my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt). Unless that happens, the power cannot be transferred and there cannot be a devolution.

I find a growing impatience in my constituency and as I travel around the country at the presence of British troops maintaining security in Northern Ireland and because of the failure of certain elements to accept that co-operation is necessary.

I hope, therefore, that the implementation of this provision will be guided by the ability of the Assembly to find this modus vivendi between the majority and the minority, in the recognition that this is its last chance to do so. I hope that in transferring these powers we do not at the same time divest ourselves of the ultimate sanction and the ultimate control, which we did over so long a period and which allowed this crisis to occur.

Using the hon. and gallant Member's peg, I oppose his amendment. I urge the Government to be very careful in bringing into being the powers that are set out in Clause 25 and not to allow those powers to be devolved upon any Government who are not truly representative of both the major communities in Northern Ireland.

Mr. McMaster

I have been trying to follow the argument of the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose). I direct his attention to the facts of the case in Northern Ireland. Under the provisions of the Bill we in Northern Ireland are being asked to share power in a way that would never be contemplated in this country. I see that the hon. Member nods assent. He would probably say that the reason is that the circumstances are totally different in Northern Ireland. But one cannot imagine that in this country members of, for example, the National Socialist Party or of the Communist Party, which are small minority parties here, would be invited to form part of the Government of this country, be it a Labour Government or a Conservative Government, on the ground that unless such persons were invited they would not be properly represented.

I ask the hon. Member to consider whether his argument is not fallacious. He is saying that because of the different circumstances in Northern Ireland, and the terror and gunfire of the past three years and the terrible death roll, we are being asked to accept something less than an ordinary standard of democracy. Surely that must be wrong. It means that we are being asked—it is provided for in the Bill—to accept certain provisions which are less than the ordinary rule of and understanding of democracy; that is, that the majority rules.

Mr. Rose

Will not the hon. Member accept that there are many countries in the world that have precisely the same problem of an ethnic, racial or religious division which provide institutions safeguarding both or, perhaps, more than one of such groups within the framework of democracy? That is the difference between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. It is not possible for a built-in minority ever to come to power as it is, for example, for a political party in this country to come to power, for here politics are not along sectarian lines.

Mr. McMaster

Yes, but there are similar groups, even in this country, and if the hon. Gentleman searches he will not find any other country where the provisions set out in the clause apply, where they are being invited not just to form part of a parliament and provide leaders of committees, as the Unionist Party suggested in the Green Paper in Northern Ireland before Stormont was suspended, but to provide members of the Executive, men who in a few years' time will be facing one another again at an election with conflicting policies.

These provisions are less than the ordinary democratic provisions that we expect in this country. They are being forced on us when we should be on our guard not to give concessions to terrorism. It is no argument——

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. E. L. Mallalieu) Order

The hon. Gentleman must not continue with that line. This is a matter of three years.

Mr. McMaster

Yes, Mr. Deputy Speaker. You have been generous, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I do not wish to delay the House on this point. However, I felt pressed to answer the points made by the hon. Member for Blackley.

The Minister of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. David Howell)

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) for the moderate tone in which he moved his amendment, for his candour in recognising that it may well be unreasonable and for admitting that it may be defective. He will not be surprised to hear me say that from the Government's point of view it is unacceptable. Nevertheless, he made clear that he was putting it forward to probe, and he provided a peg, as the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) recognised, for some speculation about the future. I must disappoint my hon. and gallant Friend, because this speculation is of a kind in which it would not be right for the Government to enter. Indeed, many of the questions about the future that my hon. and gallant Friend poses are questions I am not in a position to answer, nor would anyone else be at this stage.

The situation is as set out in the Bill—that, when the criteria in Clause 2(1)(b) are satisfied in the mind of my right hon. Friend, the procedures laid down in the Bill for the devolution of those powers not mentioned in Schedule 3—obviously, not in Schedule 2—will take place. But the timetable and scheduling of that process is something on which I am not in a position to give the House any opinion or hard information at this stage.

What is in the Bill as a procedure for the devolution of the powers not mentioned in Schedule 3 is the procedure that we shall follow. If one took it literally, the amendment would go in the opposite direction because it would go far beyond the intentions of Clause 3(2) in giving to the Assembly powers of initiation in requiring items to he taken back from the transferred list and put into the Schedule 3 list, which would be rather an odd process.

In addition, it would put a subordinate legislative assembly in a position to dictate to this House, which would be upside down and thoroughly unacceptable to the House and to Parliament. This was really a means of trying to peer into the future. Hon. Members may well he able to do that but the Government cannot join in that exercise today. I must ask my hon. and gallant Friend, in the light of what I have said, whether he will withdraw his amendment.

Captain Orr

Of course, the Minister has said almost precisely what I expected. Consequently, I can hardly even plead disappointment. I think it is a pity that, when one is concerned with the devolution of all these powers, nobody has any idea whatever as to the order in which they might be devolved, or the time scale during which they might be devolved or anything like that. However, I understand my hon. Friend's reticence, and it would be silly if I, who do not imagine that the scheme will work, should engage hotly in academic argument about what will happen when what I believe an impossibility takes place. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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