HC Deb 20 June 1972 vol 839 cc430-40

12.46 a.m.

Mr. Arthur Palmer (Bristol, Central)

I wish to raise at the end of what has been a long sitting what I regard as being by all judgments an important subject—the question of the future of the British nuclear reactor industry in relation to the Vinter Report.

It is obviously impossible in the space of a short Adjournment debate to deal with all the complexities of the subject. Also, I am anxious to leave sufficient time to the Minister to make amends for the way in which the Government have so far treated the House of Commons about their intentions in relation to the Vinter Report. I do not think that this is in any sense a private issue, because from the last war to the present time many millions of pounds of taxpayers' money have gone into the development of nuclear power—indeed, the sum spent has almost Concorde-like dimensions if taken in total.

Therefore, the House has a right to have its questions on this subject answered. I object to the kind of reply that I received as recently as yesterday to a Question asking whether the Minister would publish the comments of the Central Electricity Generating Board about the recommendations of the Vinter Committee on Nuclear Reactor Policy. I had the enlightening answer that this could not be done, that the House was aware that the report was confidential and that, therefore, the CEGB comments on it must equally be so.

That was an extraordinary answer. The House may be aware that the Government treat the report as confidential, but it is not self-evident. It is the Government who make the report confidential, and no one else, unless we are to assume that the industry's policy is so important that Parliament and the people must know nothing about it. Apart from the public's financial interest it should not be supposed that nuclear technology is a special science, of narrow interest only; it is bound up with the whole future of our general industrial technology at home and in world markets.

Nuclear technology can reasonably be said to be on the wave of the future because however long the fossil fuels—coal, oil and natural gas—last, everyone agrees that their life is finite. Modern industrial civilisation is based on energy and without the potential energy of the atom our civilisation, whether we regard it as good or bad, will not endure for long when the fossil fuels are finished. We are therefore all concerned with nuclear development, whether we realise it or not.

Mr. Peter Vinter has been immediately concerned with this business in this country. He is a highly placed and, I am sure, competent civil servant. But he has not served alone on the Committee. Although the names of the other members have never been given I do not think that the Under-Secretary will deny that they include Sir Stanley Brown, head of the CEGB, and Sir John Hill, head of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, in short, representatives of both the principal State monopoly purchasing organisation and the State monopoly research organisation.

The manufacturers depend on the two State organisations. I only wish that the Labour Government had remembered this when they rejected the report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology in 1967, of which I then had the privilege of being chairman. We recommended that there should be one united British design and construction company for nuclear energy development. To me that was and is an obvious solution. Britain needs a powerful concentrated international company, perhaps part public and part private—although I would not object too much if it were entirely public—which can compete in world markets against the American giants and the new German giants which are developing.

This obvious solution was rejected by the Labour Government in favour of what has turned out to be a very muddled compromise. The reduction of the three consortia, which existed previously, to two, in circumstances where there is no guarantee of orders to keep both financially and technically viable, was a mistake which was pointed out by the Select Committee five years ago. I have not much doubt that now, five years on, Mr. Peter Vinter, with Sir Stanley Brown and Sir John Hill roughly cancelling each other out, has found, as we found in 1967, that a decision on the choice of reactor systems cannot be separated from the important issue of the organisation of the nuclear reactor industry itself.

The idea that consortia, set up to build complete nuclear power stations from the foundations to the electronic control systems, where every constituent company wants its share of the work, can satisfy present industrial needs in relation to nuclear reactors, has been a nonsense for over a decade. The buyer of a nuclear boiler does not always want to buy the rest of the power station from the same source. The United States and Germany have long realised this, and they have concentrated on establishing single companies which specialise in reactor building. We must do the same if we are to make any future progress.

In the short time available I propose to put one or two pertinent questions to the Minister, to whom I am anxious to give the opportunity of a very full reply. First, following Vinter, will not the Government now have to make up their mind not only about the reactor systems but about the structure of the entire industry? Secondly, does not that mean that we must have one nuclear boiler company involving certainly the Atomic Energy Authority in part, and, I believe equally important, the new nuclear fuel company and the appropriate selected manufacturing interests? Has not there been a struggle between the Weinstock and the CEGB view, as expressed in the industrial sense through the Nuclear Development Company, and the McAlpine and the Atomic Energy Authority view, as represented through the Nuclear Power Group? Is it not true that Sir Arnold Weinstock has stressed his own company's profitability to such an extent that he urged at one stage that we should if necessary abandon our own nuclear reactor industry and import reactors from America, where I think I am right in saying, the General Electric Company has a considerable stake in Westinghouse? That suggestion, I believe, Mr. Vinter's Committee rightly rejected. It would be appalling if Britain, which was the pioneer in the peaceful development of nuclear energy, should now turn tamely to the United States for its nuclear future.

In Europe, following the failure of the French to a great extent in this field, British nuclear technology has a great opportunity. Not all Europeans are happy about the present domination of American reactor systems, under licence or otherwise. Knowing the scientific and technical capacity of this country, I think that if given the right leadership the Continental Europeans would respond to a lead from the United Kingdom. But this means a firm and urgent decision on the British third generation of reactors. I think we have now completed the last of the Magnox stations, and the advanced gas-cooled reactor has had a very disappointing technical history. After all the praise that was given to it a few years ago there is unfortunately not yet one advanced gas-cooled reactor operating in this country. Therefore, following Magnox and the AGR we must fill a gap until the fast Dounreay breeder can come in as the final solution. Has Vinter made a recommendation on this?

The Select Committee in its Second Report on the industry some years ago concluded that the AEA steam-generating heavy water reactor should be adopted and commercial prototypes placed on both the English and Scottish supply systems if necessary. It was argued that the best way to convince foreign buyers of the advantages of a steam generating heavy water reactor, which can be made in small sizes and is therefore attractive in export markets, would be to try it out in a genuine commercial sense.

The Select Committee suggested that we should do what the Germans propose—have the reactor taken straight on to the system, even at prototype stage, and then, if the supply undertaking makes a loss as a result, and can prove it, the loss in financial terms is made up out of the public purse. The experts of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, representative of the employees who do much of the designing, take the same general view.

I referred earlier to the Scottish supply system. There is an important issue connected with the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board. It wishes to buy, if given some encouragement, a £120 million nuclear power station using the heavy water reactor technique. It would be valuable to the country as a whole and to the export prospects if there were a supply undertaking immediately prepared to install a steam generating heavy water reactor. The CEGB in this matter has been too cautious, pleading safety considerations. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Robert Hughes) knows, the North of Scotland Board cannot wait indefinitely. It will be forced, unless a firm decision is announced, to substitute for this most interesting nuclear power system, using the heavy water reactor technique, an oil-fired power station, which would be a loss not only to Scotland but also to our nuclear export trade and its prospects.

Unfortunately, the Government, instead of moving towards a decision following the report of the industrious and hardworking Mr. Vinter, are now opening further consultations with the interests concerned—yet another round of talking. This is based on the assumption that decisions delayed are always good decisions. My experience of life is that it is generally the other way round.

The Government must come to a speedy decision on the future shape of the nuclear reactor industry. They must not delay any longer. They must decide on the choice of reactor. Further delay in relation to both these considerations would amount to an abdication of leadership in the industrial sense. As I have stressed, the public interest demands an end to treating the Vinter Report as if it were some kind of State secret. What is the justification for it? No doubt the hon. Gentleman will say that it is commercial considerations, the giving away of our details to our competitors. I am sure the report could be published with any information of that kind omitted. The truth is that the Government are not anxious to have the report published because it would expose even more than has been done so far their failure to make up their minds.

1.4 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Peter Emery)

I thank the hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer) for raising this matter and for the way in which he did it until, perhaps, his last sentence. I pay tribute also to his knowledge of the electricity generating industry and to his work as Chairman of the Select Committee on Science and Technology.

As a background to the debate I am sorry to have to say that nuclear power has not so far fulfilled the high promise originally held out for it. Nowhere in the world is there a reactor system that was launched without considerable problems. But obviously nuclear power is a long-term business and the Government have no doubt of its increasing importance to the United Kingdom. Short-term considerations will not be allowed to impair our capacity to exploit this valuable and vital source of power.

The main questions are two. The first is, how to build up a strong nuclear industry to provide us with a cheap and reliable source of electricity, bearing in mind that nowhere in the world does the industry yet manage without some support from public funds, and the second is how to make the best use of the development expertise that has been built up here and overseas at considerable expense?

The Vinter Committee and its work needs to be put into perspective. The Thermal Reactor Working Party—TRWP as it is known—was set up to review the choice of thermal nuclear reactors. While this is only one of the questions the Government must consider in the course of their wider review of our national investment in nuclear power, the working party was structured so that the Government, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Authority and the generating boards, could, in consultation with the nuclear industry, consider the main types of thermal reactor on offer. May I here pay a tribute to the civil servant who chaired the Committee and all who served with him. An extensive amount of work had to be undertaken and this involved the mastering of the most detailed technological and scientific information. I am grateful for the way in which this difficult task was undertaken.

Here may I reply to the demands that this should be published. I think I know the hon. Member fairly well. He would want all Ministers to be able to recruit the best possible advice, whether in committee form or individually, so as to reach decisions. The decisions that will be made will be the Government's, not the Committee's and it will be the Government who will be responsible. For this report it was essential that all of the most secret and the most commercially sensitive information should be at the disposal of Ministers. If that is to be obtained, assurances must be given to those providing this advice that it will be held to be confidential. Therefore I cannot hold out any hope that the report, which is to Ministers, will be published.

The Department of Trade and Industry and senior officials are in continuous consultation with both sides of industry. The AEA, the CEGB, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., the boilermakers, Babcock and Wilcox, Clarke Chapman and John Thompson, as well as GEC, have all been involved in talks in the last few weeks.

It is not only the employers' side of the industry that has been consulted. I was present when the Minister for Industry saw the Institution of Professional Civil Servants on 18th May, and when I visited Winfrith recently I ensured that I met the staff and trade union side.

The need for speed in this matter is understood. In all this it is widely recognised that the design and construction consortia, the Nuclear Power Group and British Nuclear Design and Construction, are seriously short of work, like many of the important manufacturers with shareholdings in them. The Government realise the disadvantages from continuing the delay to staff morale, to business planning at home and to our export potential. Events have, however, conspired against us to the extent that earlier this year the fall off in demand for electricity has postponed the need for the generating boards to order more power stations.

Not the least of the many complexities to be faced in the current review is the need to weigh up the several interests of the designers, now in TNPG and BNDC, the hardware manufacturers, now spread throughout the electrical and heavy engineering industries, and the nuclear fuel company itself. There are many problems between a turnkey operation or a sales, design and construction concept based on the nuclear island, all of which have to be fully considered.

Mr. Robert Hughes (Aberdeen, North)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Emery

I have only five minutes. I am sorry.

Mr. Hughes

It is on one specific question.

Mr. Emery

I still have six to answer of the hon. Member for Bristol, Central and it is his Adjournment debate. If I have time I promise to give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Hughes

This question affects Scotland.

Mr. Emery

I am coming to Scotland.

I turn now to international collaboration. The Government are fully seized of the advantages of international collaboration. By this it would be possible to reduce the cost of large projects to the benefit of all parties involved.

Three main kinds of collaboration are being investigated: first, collaboration between R and D bodies, such as the West German research institutes and the AEA; secondly, collaboration between customer utilities, which can play a useful part in focussing demand on fewer types of equipment; and, thirdly, collaboration between manufacturers, possibly extending to jointly owned companies.

The Department is in close touch with potential partners in West Europe and in Canada. There are also licence possibilities with the USA. It would be wrong not to consider those. From this it will be seen that the patterns of industrial nuclear organisation abroad are of great interest tous and have been scrutinised with care. All of us should realise that mutual co-operation within Europe may well present considerable advantages.

I should like to mention our Commonwealth partner, Canada. The Canadians, as well as ourselves, have a heavy water reactor which in one form especially—that installed at Gentilly—has close simi- larities with our steam generating heavy water reactor. The CANDU system, however, is not geared to use enriched uranium like the SGHWR, which puts it at some economic disadvantage. Nonetheless, if it is decided to adopt the SGHWR generally in the United Kingdom, there appears to be scope for useful collaboration on pressure tube reactor technology between the United Kingdom and Canada.

It would be wrong not to mention quickly the fast breeder reactor. The sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor is inherently promising and of great interest. Whereas thermal reactors, of whatever type, use only about 1 per cent. of the potential energy contained in uranium, fast reactors are designed to use at least 70 per cent. In other words, whereas thermal reactors skim off the cream, fast reactors use the milk as well. This means that fast reactors should, and most people think must, have an important part to play in the optimum use of world resources. For this reason they are being pursued in most advanced industrial countries, but the Government are well aware of the outstanding progress made on our own design at Dounreay. Here again it is interesting to see that Scotland is taking a lead in this aspect of nuclear technology. It is important to realise that the thermal reactor needs to be an intermediary choice between the passage of the AGRs and the time the fast breeder can be brought in.

Despite the potential advantage of the fast breeders and the encouraging progress made on them in this country, perhaps even more than elsewhere, there is still and must be a place for thermal reactors. The range of Magnox reactors now in use throughout the country is reliable. They will, however, not continue to be built, because of the cost of their construction.

The main purpose of the Vinter Committee was to assess the relative merits of the three types which are left, the advanced gas-cooled reactor, the steam generating heavy water reactor and the high temperature reactor, alongside the main foreign systems. All aspects, including economic, technical, industrial and safety questions, are covered by our consideration. However, it would be foolish for anyone to believe that the overall assessment of these alternatives is a simple matter, or that it should be made quickly purely for the sake of speed of decision.

I conclude by making three positive points. The Government realise only too well the overall need for a decision on future reactor policy, and we are dealing with this as a matter of urgency. We also realise that this may mean the basic reconstruction of the structures and organisations controlling the whole sphere of nuclear power. Lastly, the Government are absolutely determined that there shall be a strong, important and active nuclear industry in the United Kingdom. That is what our decision making is about, and we are treating it as a matter of urgency to make the right decision.

Mr. Robert Hughes

Will the Minister answer a specific point? The electricity demand in the North of Scotland is urgent and needs a decision.

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Deputy Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at sixteen minutes past One o'clock