HC Deb 08 June 1972 vol 838 cc855-64

11.4 p.m.

Mr. Ivor Richard (Barons Court)

According to the Order Paper, I am supposed to be raising on the Adjournment of the House what is described as the subject of uniformity of detention for those convicted of identical crimes. It is true that what I shall have to say will have some general application, but what I propose to raise this evening can better be described as the specific sentences which were passed on the various defendants who were convicted of complicity in what came to be known as the Great Train Robbery.

As the House will remember, this crime took place in 1963, and in the course of it a very large sum of money was stolen. As for the trials, what happened was that in 1964, in what I would call the main trial of the defendants, seven of them—Messrs. Wilson, Biggs, Wisbey, Welch, Hussey, James and Goody—were convicted, firstly, of conspiracy to rob the mail and, secondly, of armed robbery.

On the first count, the conspiracy, they were each sentenced to a term of 25 years' imprisonment. On the second count, the armed robbery, they were each sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. No doubt, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you and the House will recollect the interest and stir that those very large sentences caused at the time.

In the same trial, two others were convicted of conspiracy to rob and were each sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment, the same as the main seven defendants. Two other defendants, Messrs. Boal and Cordrey, were in a totally different category from that of the main defendants. Mr. Cordrey pleaded guilty and received 20 years' imprisonment. Mr, Boal received 21 years for conspiracy and 24 years for robbery.

On appeal, the convictions of two of the defendants who received 25 years for conspiracy were quashed, and they, there- fore, passed from the picture. The main convictions and sentences of 25 years for conspiracy and 30 years for robbery on what I call the seven major defendants—Messrs. Wilson, Biggs, Wisbey, Welch, Hussey, James and Goody—were upheld by the Court of Appeal. The only two sentences which were reduced were those of Messrs. Cordrey and Boal, which were reduced to 14 years apiece. They were in an entirely different category and were recognised as such by the trial judge, Mr. Justice Edmund Davies, as he then was, and by the Court of Appeal. Mr. Boal has since died, and I think that Mr. Cordrey was released on bail in April, 1971.

That was, so to speak, the initial trial, with the main seven receiving 25 years' imprisonment for conspiracy to rob and 30 years' imprisonment for the robbery.

No doubt the House will remember that at the time it was said—as it turned out, with some justification—that there were obviously others involved in this crime who had not then been apprehended.

The next event was that Mr. Edwards surrendered. Eventually, at Nottingham Assizes, on 9th December, 1966, he was tried on the two identical counts—conspiracy to rob the mail and armed robbery of the train. On that occasion he did not get the same sentences—25 years and 30 years. On the contrary, on the conspiracy charge, unlike those who got 25 years, he got 12 years; on the armed robbery charge, unlike the others, who received 30 years, he got precisely half, 15 years. In 1966 also, Mr. White, again in a separate trial, was convicted of the two identical offences and sentenced not to 15 years or 30 years but to 18 years. Finally, Mr. Reynolds, arrested in Torquay in November, 1968, was convicted of the two identical offences and received a sentence of 25 years.

Therefore, we have this spread of sentences for the identical crime committed on the same night—namely, robbery of this one train—varying from as low as 15 years for Edwards, to 18 years for White, 25 for Reynolds and 40 years for the seven first convicted. I reiterate that these sentences were for precisely the same crime.

On these facts, it seems to me that two questions arise. First, is it possible in a situation like this that one could produce any greater degree of uniformity of sentencing? Secondly, indeed should one try to produce any greater degree of uniformity of sentencing? I will deal with the second question first, since it is probably better to deal with the "shoulds" before one gets on to the possibilities.

I say at once that I am not in the least criticising any of the judges who passed any of the sentences in this case. Those of us who had had any experience, either appearing in court or sitting as a judge in one form or another, charged with the responsibility of passing sentence, all recognise that this is one of the most difficult and thankless tasks the judiciary has to carry out. Sentencing is extremely difficult.

From the sentences in this case it is clear that the first judge, now Lord Justice Edmund Davies, at the Aylesbury trial, and the Court of Appeal, which considered the sentences he imposed, thought that it was impossible to distinguish between any of the major offenders. Had the judge thought it possible to distinguish, no doubt he would have passed different sentences. Had the Court of Appeal thought it right to distinguish, no doubt it would have imposed different sentences. The fact is that they did not. Not only did the judge take the view that it was right to treat all the robbers in one category, but the Court of Appeal also took the view that he was entitled so to do. To anyone looking at the facts as we know them, and reading what the learned judge and the Court of Appeal said, it is undeniable that that was the position then taken up by the courts.

If that is right, it would seem that had Edwards, White and Reynolds been standing alongside the other seven in the dock at Aylesbury they would have received identical sentences from the same judge, and it would seem—if their cases had gone up on appeal—they would have been judged in precisely the same way by the appellate tribunal. In the event, certain conclusions seem to me to flow from these facts.

It seems to be fundamentally unjust and basically insupportable, taking the two cases, to have Wisbey in one cell and Edwards in another, both convicted on armed robbery, an identical offence, but both convicted on different occasions before different judges, and one sentenced to precisely twice the length of the term of imprisonment imposed on the other. One could have the position in which one of the seven at the first trial, Wisbey for example, with 30 years, is in one cell and next door one could have Edwards with 15 years. I submit—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)

Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman. I am listening carefully to his argument and I am a little worried about exactly where Ministerial responsibility comes into this. If he can assure me that there is Ministerial responsibility, then he can proceed with his argument. If he cannot, it is very difficult for me to permit him to go on.

Mr. Richard

With great respect, Six Robert, I am reasonably well aware of the rules governing Adjournment debates. Had I not thought there was Ministerial responsibility I would never have asked for an Adjournment debate, and had there not been any Ministerial responsibility I am certain that Mr. Speaker would not have granted it. The second half of my argument will be devoted to trying to establish how the Home Office can do something in relation to these sentences and I will urge upon it that it should do so. I have already been in correspondence with the Minister and I have had a negative reply. Perhaps I may continue.

I turn to the second part of my argument, namely that if there is a basic injustice and a basic anomaly in the sentences as they now appear, what, if anything, can be done? The answer may lie in the parole powers which the Home Office has as a result of Section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967. We know that the right of the Home Office to use these powers must depend upon an examination of the facts of each individual case and upon an examination of the character and the background of the antecedents of each individual. I totally accept that as the general position.

I must also accept the fact that as a general principle it would not be right merely to use the parole powers to produce a situation in which the Parole Board or the Home Office was saying, "We do not think that the decision of a particular judge in relation to two offenders, where he has given one perhaps a greater sentence than the other, was right and therefore we will use this power for equalising purposes." But that is not the situation here. Here we have had not decisions by one judge who saw fit to distinguish between two or more defendants, but different decisions by no fewer than five judges in five separate trials dealing with identical offences in respect of which totally different sentences have been passed.

In that situation I should have thought that the Minister could say that in principle, having regard to the extraordinary nature of this crime and the extraordinary disparity that exists in the sentences, he would see nothing wrong in the Parole Board using its powers so as to produce uniformity of detention, even if, quite clearly, it would no longer be possible to produce uniformity of sentences. The Minister is a humane man, experienced in these matters and could do much tonight to bring some hope to the man at present serving a 30-year sentence. It is a dreadful thought—whether or not the sentence is justified—that people in this country might be facing a sentence as long as 30 years. I find it difficult to envisage how an individual faced with that sort of sentence and that sort of possibility would react.

When I wrote to the Home Office about this the Minister replied on 17th March: I appreciate your point about the difference in the sentences imposed in this case It has always been recognised that there is a wide disparity between the sentence of those, including Wisbey, who were dealt with at the first trial in 1964, and of White and Edwards who did not stand trial until 1966. The position is, however, that the Court of Appeal considered the 30 years' sentences and found that 'they were not wrong in principle or excessive'. In the knowledge of those sentences the judges who dealt with White and Edwards found reasons for differentiation.… Pausing there, one knows not what were the reasons for differentiation. It is difficult to imagine precisely what they could have been. The Minister of State continued. even if it were accepted that there were no grounds for distinction it does not necessarily follow that justice requires that the longer sentence should be consequentially reduced. I see the argument that he is putting up. It seems to me that in all con- science it is wrong for two men who have committed an identical crime and have been convicted before a different court to find themselves in a situation in which one is serving exactly double the sentence that the other is bound to serve. I should have thought that the Minister could say in principle that he accepted the use of paroling powers as a method of putting it right.

11.21 p.m.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Mark Carlisle)

As the hon. and learned Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) has said, under this rather wide term of "uniformity of detention for those convicted of identical crimes" he has chosen to concentrate his argument on the case of those convicted of the Great Train Robbery and the disparity of sentence passed on those who were convicted at different times for their part in that offence.

This is a matter which the hon. and learned Gentleman has raised with me in correspondence and I shall try to deal with the specific case of the Train Robbery before making more general remarks. In dealing with this specific case I must make it clear that it is not in any way the function of a Minister nor would it be appropriate for myself as a Minister, to comment on the merits of the individual sentences passed in any particular case.

I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman will be the first to agree that the sentence passed on any individual in any particular case is, and must remain, a matter for the judiciary at the time of sentence with knowledge of all the facts. It is essential that we should retain that separation of powers that exists between the judiciary and the Executive and a sentence in any particular case is a matter for the courts and not for the Government of the day.

I do not dispute any of the facts which the hon. and learned Gentleman has raised. The offence that came to be known as the Great Train Robbery, which was one of the utmost gravity, took place in 1963. The main trial took place in 1964, when seven men were convicted on the principal charges of armed robbery and conspiracy to rob and were sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.

Since then three individuals have been arrested and convicted at separate trials for the same offence: namely, James White in 1966, who received a sentence of 18 years; Ronald Edwards, who was sentenced to 15 years in the same year; and Bruce Reynolds, who was sentenced to 25 years.

The wide differences between the sentences imposed at the main trial and some of those passed later is a plain matter of fact, and it is not for me to explain or justify them. At the original trial the learned judge found no reason to distinguish between the seven men convicted of robbery and conspiracy and sentenced them to equal sentences of 30 years. The sentences were appealed against, and the Court of Criminal Appeal found that they were not wrong in principle or excessive having regard to the exceptional gravity of the crime. The appeal court found it not appropriate to distinguish between the seven men convicted. In regard to those tried at a later date, each of the judges involved in the later trials was aware of the sentences passed at the earlier trials, and they were aware of the views of the appeal court, but in each case the individual judges found reasons for differentiating in the sentences which were passed.

I come to the general point that different sentences imposed for identical offences are not unusual. What is unusual is that where there are long sentences the differences are much more marked.

Mr. Richard

But no court has ever reviewed—indeed no court could ever do so—all the sentences which were passed on all the robbers at one and the same time. Nobody has sat down and compared the individuals, all of whom were convicted.

Mr. Carlisle

That is true, but I must repeat that individual judges in imposing sentence in the case of White, Edwards and Reynolds were aware of the sentences which had been passed in the previous case and of the comments of the appeal court on them. The hon. and learned Member must accept that the Home Secretary's responsibility in these matters is not to attempt to act as a further or additional court of appeal. If we are to retain the necessary distinc- tion between the judiciary and the executive, the Home Secretary must realise that if he is to use his exceptional power of the Royal Prerogative of mercy, it is only right for him to do so if facts come to light at a later stage which were not available to the court at the time when sentence was passed. There was nothing in these sentences which I can see, having studied the letters sent to me, to justify interference by the Home Secretary on the basis of evidence coming to light at a stage which was not available to the court at the time of trial.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is saying that, despite our judicial processes, where there remain differences between sentences involving the same or similar crimes the Executive should seek administratively to equalise the terms of detention, presumably by scaling down the longest to correspond with the lower sentences, since he would not suggest that the Executive should attempt to raise the lower sentences to correspond with the higher ones.

There are weighty objections in principle to the course which the hon. and learned Member suggests. I fear it would give the opportunity and freedom to the Executive to interfere with the judicial function and to go behind the decision of the courts as it thought fit. That would involve a fundamental departure from the constitutional principle—a departure which the House would find unacceptable. That is why I do not believe it would be right for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to attempt to interfere directly with these sentences.

Quite reasonably, the hon. and learned Gentleman points out that now there is parole, which is the power provided by Parliament for the Secretary of State, at his discretion, and on the recommendation of the Parole Board, to provide for immediate release on licence after a person has served a third of his sentence or a year, whichever expires the later. The hon. and learned Gentleman asks why the parole mechanism should not be used as a method of limiting or reducing differentials in sentences for identical offences. I must make the point that the procedure of parole has to operate within the framework of the sentences already determined by the courts. It is not, and never was, intended to be a means of reviewing the decisions of the courts or of purporting to ensure a standardisation of sentences. The Parole Board itself has been careful to point out that in many ways it must reflect the differences between the length of sentences passed in similar cases rather than attempt to undo differences which have been provided.

Mr. Richard

I am not saying that. I am saying that in the case to which I have referred there is a clear unfairness and that in those circumstances it would be right for the Parole Board to try to correct that unfairness.

Mr. Carlisle

I must repeat that I am not prepared to comment on the merits of the sentences passed in that case. It would be improper for me to do so. It would not be right for parole to be used to deal with what were thought to be extraordinary disparities in any case.

Parole is granted on the basis of criteria which take into account the likelihood of future offences, the previous conduct of the prisoner and his behaviour in prison. There is no question of using it to achieve a uniformity which the court of trial has not attempted to impose.

Taking the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument, what does he suggest should be done in the case of a sentence which was felt to be unduly light? Does he suggest that the Parole Board should refuse parole for so long as necessary to bring up the sentence to what was felt to be the appropriate period passed in the other cases? If so, that would mean that certain people would never receive parole, not on the basis that the board did not think them suitable but because an associate in the same crime had received a longer, and what was considered a more appropriate, sentence.

Using the hon. and learned Gentleman's example, the time will come when certain of the offenders who received shorter sentences will become eligible for consideration. That will happen be- fore those who received sentences of 30 years. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not suggest that those cases should not be reviewed when the time is appropriate.

Within reason, the Parole Board always looks at the cases of associates in the same crime, irrespective of whether there is a recommendation by the local review committee. But it makes it clear that it is its duty to notice any differentiation in sentence passed on people convicted of the same offence. However, there are two fundamental points which must not be overlooked. Cases are considered for parole after the minimum interval, and, when they are, parole is granted at the earliest moment considered acceptable in the interests of the offender and the public. There could be no question of granting release on licence to an individual before that point was reached merely on the basis of other people having received shorter sentences.

The consideration which is of crucial importance for the continued successful operation of the parole scheme is the essential one of maintaining a correct relationship between the Parole Board and the judiciary to ensure the continuation of confidence not merely between the judiciary and the board but also between the public and the board. Members of the board include High Court judges and recorders. Thanks to its wisdom under the chairmanship of Lord Hunt the Parole Board has succeeded in achieving public support and the support of the courts in carrying out its task. But the board's continuing success depends on its seeing its function as reviewing individual cases—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at twenty-six minutes to Twleve o'clock.

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