HC Deb 02 August 1972 vol 842 cc801-15

3.47 a.m.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington)

I am grateful for the opportunity to raise this important topic, which I know has troubled many hon. Members who would be here in greater numbers but for the lateness of the hour. I have first to declare an interest in that I am a practising barrister. But I hasten to say that I have no reason to complain in any way about the way in which solicitors known to me, whether professionally or personally, handle their business. All my professional clients conduct themselves impeccably.

However, I had occasion earlier this year to take up the case of a constituent who had complained to the Law Society about the conduct of a certain firm of solicitors. The response that I got from my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General was disappointing, but I was surprised by the huge volume of complaints which then reached me from all over the country as a result of the publicity given to my Question.

The taxpayer pays more than £12 million, through the Consolidated Fund, to solicitors for services rendered by them in connection with the legal aid and advice scheme. That sum of money represents a large part of the average solicitor's income and, it being public money, one may reasonably say that nowadays it is not as well husbanded as it should be, and it could often even be a corrupting influence. In other respects, a measure of public accountability has been insisted on when large sums of public money have been involved, but in this instance the only sanction is that of control by the professional body, that is to say, the Law Society. I regret to say that I believe that the Law Society's influence has been directed more to discouraging public criticism than to acting in the public interest.

The noble lord Lord Denning said in another place that solicitors formed the one great profession that is under the control of Parliament."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 2nd March, 1972; Vol. 328. c 1229.] It is formally correct that the Solicitors Act, 1957, governs the profession, but in so far as that Act leaves to solicitors themselves the setting, maintenance and enforcement of professional standards, it is a snare and a delusion. Unlike the Bar, whose work is done in public and whose reputation for integrity stands as high today as ever, I believe that solicitors, operating mostly in private, have steadily become enshrouded in a mist of suspicion because of the volume of genuine and deep grievances held by the public against them.

I do not intend to go into detail with several specific complaints. A large number have reached me in my correspondence. What I am concerned about in this debate and what I find much more serious and ominous is the way in which the Law Society deals with the complaints it gets from the public and also the way in which it deals with applications for grants out of the compensation fund as a result of the dishonesty of some of its members.

I will quote one example from each class to illustrate my point. Last year a young constituent of mine wished to purchase a house in East London which he believed was under-valued. He agreed to pay the price asked, and he paid a deposit. Solicitors were then instructed on behalf of the vendor who lived abroad. But before completion, the sale to my constituent was called off because the vendor's solicitors produced someone willing to pay a little more. Nothing was said to my constituent about the new purchaser or the new price offered. The solicitors simply said that the sale was off.

From another source my constituent had reason to believe that the solicitors concerned had secretly been in league with the new purchaser. So he, I believe reasonably, wrote to the Law Society suggesting that this conduct on the part of the solicitors was improper. The Law Society went through a form of investigation. The Society wrote to the solicitors concerned, and then sent to my constituent the solicitors' reply. It did not dispute the facts, but the last paragraph of the solicitors' letter ran as follows; We are surprised at the allegations contained … in the letter … and in our view these are defamatory. Unless they are unconditionally withdrawn then we will have to consider taking the necessary proceedings. The name of those solicitors is Amhurst Brown. I mention it not because there may be substance in the allegation made against them but because they chose, in a case referred to them privately by the Law Society, improperly in my view to make a threat.

If that was surprising on their part, the terms of the covering letter from the Law Society were astonishing. Although the Law Society knew very well that this was a private person making a private complaint to them on apparently reasonable grounds and, therefore, by any understanding of the principles of law which they exist to serve, a complaint made on a privileged occasion, the Law Society's covering letter went as follows in its penultimate sentence: I would invite your particular attention to the final paragraph of the solicitors' letter In other words, the Law Society, the body charged by Parliament with statutory powers over solicitors, not merely accepted the solicitors' view of the matter without further inquiry but connived in a threat of legal proceedings which it knew was an empty threat. Being directed against an apparently humble person living at an East London address, it was, I believe, most improper in the circumstances. If that is how the Law Society deals with complaints from ordinary members of the public, is it surprising that the public tend to view all solicitors with suspicion?

I took the matter up and wrote to the Law Society. I received a reply which I feel justified in describing as a brushing-off letter. There was no denying that the complaint was privileged, but the reference to the threat was said to be merely to warn the lay complainant should such a warning be necessary". That, I believe, was a feeble excuse, coming from a professional body supposed to know the law and to be capable of distinguishing between a published allegation and one made to it privately.

I raised the matter in the House on 1st May, and I regret to say that my right hon and learned Friend the Attorney-General gave me what I believe to have been a question-begging reply. Referring to Amhurst Brown, he said: It was they who made the reference to defamation, and the Law Society, in repeating the letter, repeated that word to the gentleman" —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st May, 1972; Vol. 835, c. 24–5.] I find that a very unsatisfactory attitude for my right hon. and learned Friend to adopt.

If it is the practice—and I believe it is —for the Law Society to reject complaints against solicitors with letters which, directly or indirectly, threaten legal proceedings unless those complaints are withdrawn unconditionally, it is a matter of grave consequence. The practice should be stopped immediately, and I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will at least see to that.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe)

In view of the extent to which my hon. Friend is founding the case he is making upon the suggestion that it is a practice of the Law Society to respond to compaint in the way of which he has complained in the one case he has cited, will he tell the House whether he has any evidence of similar phraseology or similar response in any other case?

Mr. Stanbrook

When I said, "If it is the practice—and I believe it is", the suggestion in my mind that it is derives from the same allegation having been made to me by many other complainants in respect of past cases which have been referred to the Law Society and which have been raised with me in correspondence with members of the public who have written to me recently. I have no evidence other than that.

I see no reason to think that the example which I am giving is exceptional. It seems to me to be based upon a type of complaint which must regularly be raised—indeed, a type of complaint which has been duplicated in examples sent to me by members of the public. As I say, I believe it to be a matter of some grave consequence. If it is, in fact, a general practice, it should certainly be stopped immediately. If it is not, this particular case should, surely, be a matter for withdrawal by the Law Society itself.

The Solicitor-General

I am sorry to press my hon. Friend, but I am still not entirely clear whether he has in his possession specific evidence of any other single case in which the response of the solicitors complained against was, "Unless you withdraw unconditionally, we shall start defamation proceedings", which was supported by a letter from the Law Society drawing attention to such a threat. Has he specific examples, with evidence actually available to him, of that kind of matter?

Mr. Stanbrook

I thought I had indicated that I had no other evidence to confirm that this is the practice of the Law Society in general. I have this one case which is authenticated. What leads me to believe that this may be the general practice is the number of other complaints raised with me by people who have previously complained to the Law Society and such evidence as they have given me, which is not accompanied by copies of letters from the Law Society. I am prepared to say that I have no evidence of this being a general practice other than this case itself, but it is a case of a general kind, and there is no reason to suppose that it is an exceptional case which was dealt with exceptionally. If it is suggested that this is the only case of its kind, then perhaps there is all the more reason for astonishment that the Law Society should have conveyed such a threat in such terms to an ordinary member of the public who wished to make a complaint.

My second example, covering an application to the Law Society for a grant from the compensation fund, was given in another place by Lord Gardiner on 28th March of this year. He quoted the case of a solicitor who embezzled £1,500 which had been entrusted to him by someone who wanted to clear his name. It was all that that individual possessed. An application for compensation from the fund was refused by the Law Society, and no reasons were given.

Why does the professional organisation of a perfectly honourable profession containing thousands of the most upright and public-spirited citizens in this country behave in a way that is calculated to arouse suspicions of its motives and in a way likely to deepen the sense of grievance felt by members of the public against solicitors, both collectively and individually?

The answer, I think, is to be found in the 1957 Act. Unfortunately, when the Act was passed Parliament did not write into it any of those safeguards which nowadays would be thought necessary to protect the public interest. As the Act stands, the tribunals concerned with discipline are composed wholly and exclusively of solicitors. They sit only in private, and they never give reasons for their decisions. Those three features of the present system are, I believe, clearly objectionable and serve to perpetuate the distrust and suspicion surrounding the Law Society.

The Law Society must be aware of that but remains indifferent, apparently, to pleas for reform. The latest such plea was from a committee of Justice which reported in 1970 after two years' study of the problem. In a report entitled "Complaints against Solicitors" the committee noted that the Law Society gets between 4,000 and 5,000 complaints against solicitors every year, of which only 40 or 50 are thought worthy of a formal reference to the disciplinary committee. Perhaps one might justifiably say that that is not surprising, considering the tactics which appear to be adopted with the initial complaints.

However, the committee's general conclusion, as expressed in paragraph 32 on page 12, is mild. It says: It is quite clear that a substantial number of complaints are made each year against members of the legal profession, and that a significant number of the complainants are left unsatisfied that their complaints have been fully investigated. Judging from the letters which have descended upon me recently, I feel that that is an understatement.

The Committee made a number of important and far-reaching recommendations for reform: new machinery to investigate complaints; the participation of laymen in the tribunals; reasons given for decisions; and, perhaps most important of all, the creation of an independent review body. But none of those important recommendations has apparently found favour with the Law Society. We know that, because a Bill before the House which aims to tidy up the provisions of the 1957 Act contains nothing to show that the Law Society is willing to adopt reforms of the type advocated in the Justice report. Perhaps not surprisingly, that Bill has aroused the opposition of certain hon. Members.

In the end the problem resolves itself into one of the difficulty of securing good public relations. The present somewhat arrogant attitude displayed by the Law Society must be changed. In the interests of its own members, I hope that the Law Society will learn that by being seen to serve the public interest it will be serving its own.

4.7 a.m.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe)

The general point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) about the machinery for investigation of complaints made to the Law Society about solicitors is plainly one which is of interest to the House and people outside, and which well deserves to be raised during a debate of this kind. In raising it, he referred to one case in some detail and to another rather more lightly. I hope to deal with the matter in both its general and its particular sense.

First, I should like to say by way of preliminary that it may seem a little odd to those in the Law Society, who will no doubt read the OFFICIAL REPORT of these proceedings with interest, that two members of the other half of the legal profession should be discussing criticisms made of their half. As members of the Bar, we certainly recognise our own responsibility to our own profession and to the public, and the high obligation on members of all professions entrusted with that kind of responsibility to the public for upholding their professional standards. It is right, also, to acknowledge that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, in the course of his address to the annual general meeting of the Bar last Saturday, specifically referred to one aspect of this. The responsibility for the administration of justice is shared by both halves of the profession. I approach the subject with that very much in mind.

I do not in any sense criticise my hon. Friend for having raised this subject but I find myself disturbed by the style of advocacy he has adopted because he seems to have presented the Law Society not so much in an unfavourable light—the Law Society like any other body is more than prepared to withstand and scrutinise criticism of itself—but in a style which seems to do less than justice to the way in which it tries to carry out its function and its job.

To speak of it, speaking as a member of the other half of the legal profession, as a body that is almost wilfully inward-looking, to imply as he almost did, that the solicitors' branch of the profession was to some extent—I think he used the word "corrupted" or capable of corruption—by the dependence of that half on public funds seems to do ill-service to the case he was trying to present and to the public understanding of this problem and the attempts which the Law Society is making to deal with it.

If I may take his reference to the legal aid fund, for example, of course the funds, civil and criminal, provide a significant proportion of the income of solicitors, but not I think, and I speak from memory, beyond 20 per cent. to 25 per cent.—and it may not be as high as that.

In respect of the administration of the legal aid fund scheme, civil and criminal, there exists in each case a complaints tribunal established by Statute with representation, in the case of civil legal aid proceedings, of a member of the Lord Chancellor's Department, and of a layman on the criminal complaints tribunal. Any complaint about the disposition or conduct of legal aid matters are dealt with through the statutory machineries established by this House.

Mr. Stanbrook

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that references to this tribunal must be made through the Law Society or the Bar Council?

The Solicitor-General

That is right so far as the Law Society is concerned. The interesting thing is that only a comparatively small number of cases have gone to those tribunals because they are also looked at by the disciplinary committee as well—or as an alternative. At all events, there exists in respect of criminal and civil legal aid an express statutory complaints procedure established by authority of Parliament within a reasonably recent time. It is only with this aspect of the matter that the House is concerned in this debate.

I hope my hon. Friend will forgive my rebuking him, if I can steel myself to such an unfriendly notion at this hour in the morning, because I do not really intend it as more than a modest rebuke that he should have discussed the matter in the way he did. Having said that, I would be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge and go along with him to this extent, that any one of us, as Members of this House, is bound to feel some anxiety about the number of cases, and I do not want to imply they are more than a handful for each Member, in which we find our constituents anxious about relationships between themselves and one or other solicitor.

I do not mean to imply that this is a matter of widespread or continuous concern, still less do I intend to imply that it is something of which the Law Society is unmindful. But we do find ourselves involved sufficiently often for it to be notable, often as a court of last resort, and to confirm my hon. Friend's general point that there is here a case for continuous vigilance, notably by the legal profession. It is a case which is not disregarded or brushed heedlessly to one side by the Law Society, as my hon. Friend sought to imply. Inevitably solicitors find themselves more often in the firing line in respect of complaints of this kind. Their profession is 10 times or more larger than ours. They are in daily contact with the public. They work under considerable pressure and do not find it easy to get qualified staff.

It was the kind of facts with which hon. Members on both sides are familiar which no doubt led Justice to establish the committee which investigated this matter some years ago at a time when, I confess, I was a member of the executive of Justice —and I confess it without any apology. Facts of the same kind mean that the problem raised by my hon. Friends is very much in the mind of the Law Society and all of us concerned with the administration of justice.

I turn to the complaint raised by my hon. Friend in relation to the purchase of property in East London. He raised it with my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General at Question Time in May this year. It involved the purchase of a house by my hon. Friend's son, I understand.

Mr. Stanbrook

The relationship is not of any significance.

The Solicitor-General

I apologise if my hon. Friend feels that it was wrong of me to mention that, but I thought it right that all the circumstances should be before the House, particularly in view of the extent to which he has seen fit to identify the solicitors concerned.

Beyond the last letter to which my hon. Friend referred, I think that he received a communication from the Law Society making it plain that the solicitors complained of had had the second purchaser of the house introduced to them by the agents for the vendor and had acted in respect of the second purchaser on the instructions of, or certainly as a result of, the communication received from the agents. I understand that no evidence challenging that proposition has been proffered since that fact was made plain by the Law Society on behalf of the solicitors complained of.

As my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General pointed out when the question was first raised by my hon. Friend, since the allegation against the solicitors of serious misconduct, originally made in the letter of complaint, was admittedly founded on no more than inference, and since the inference seems to have been dispelled, at least in the eyes of anyone who looks at the matter as a whole, by the proposition that the introduction was made by the agents and not in any improper way, it would seem that the matter had been fully investigated by the Law Society and I find it difficult to see how the case against them in respect of the quality of their investigation can be sustained in the light of the facts subsequently revealed.

In the circumstances, one can understand why the firm of solicitors complained or reacted in the way described. As the Attorney-General said on 1st May, They had given their explanation and they resented the allegation of misconduct which was made against them".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st May, 1972; Vol. 835, c. 24.] I follow the point made by my hon. Friend about the threat of defamation proceedings made by the solicitors in their letter of reply, but if they believe, as the evidence seems to suggest, that the complaint against them is without foundation, it may be understandable and forgivable that they should require it to be withdrawn. Whether or not the Law Society was justified in passing on the letter merely with the comment drawing attention to the threat of defamation proceedings is a separate issue which my hon. Friend has canvassed this morning. It is true, of course, that the occasion of the communication was privileged both ways. It is equally true, however, that if the allegation against the solicitors was not justifiable its repetition in another context could have given rise to liability.

It could be argued, I suppose, that those two elements in the matter could have been explained in the covering letter from the Law Society. Again, one wonders, nevertheless, how far my hon. Friend was entitled to use that one letter arising in the circumstances in which it did as the foundation for the precise charge he made against the Law Society that this was, or could he regarded as, or might be regarded as, an illustration of the normal way in which it responds to complaints because when I pressed him to tell the House whether he had got any further specific examples illustrating that specific point, as I understood him, finally he acknowledged that he had no such; he inferred from the fact that there were other dissatisfied complainants around that they would have been treated in the same way.

Again, one would be reluctant to accept that propostion upon that basis. As I say, there may be room for some reconsideration of the way in which a letter of that kind from solicitors who believe them selves unjustly complained of is passed on to the complainant, whether that method of passing it on should or should not be adopted in precisely the same form, but I would suggest to the House that the complaint does not justify the wider nature of the attack made by my hon. Friend on the foundation of that case.

On the more general point, it is right to acknowledge that the solicitors' profession is subject to very wide-ranging procedures and machineries for the protection of its clients and the public. It may well be said that it is right and proper that it should be so in view of the figure of between 4,000 and 5,000 complaints made to the Law Society each year, although, again, I think it would have been fairer of my hon. Friend to have acknowledged, having quoted that figure, that the Justice report to which he referred said between 4,000 and 5,000, of which perhaps only half had any appreciable substance". But even so, no doubt that figure justifies the elaborate and comprehensive machinery which does exist.

The court itself is responsible for the surveillance of solicitors. Anyone can go to court with a complaint of civil breach or negligence by a solicitor. Solicitors can face criminal proceedings. The court can order them to pay costs and, in certain circumstances, order them to be struck off, although normally the Law Society procedure would be gone through. The court can enforce undertakings of solicitors. The solicitors' profession is regulated by the solicitors' practice rules and the solicitors' account rules. A client who is aggrieved by the size of his solicitors' bill can apply to the Law Society for a certificate to certify whether or not the charges are reasonable, or he can have his bill taxed by the court. There exist also the two different forms of legal aid tribunal which I have already mentioned.

Finally, there is the compensation fund from which a client can receive compensation in respect of his loss. The compensation fund to which all solicitors are required to contribute was established by Statute passed by Parliament. My hon. Friend raised his complaint by reference to what has been said by the noble lord, Lord Gardiner, of the Law Society not giving reasons for the refusal of compensation from the compensation fund. He may be glad to know that this is a matter which obviously deserves consideration and which has been under consideration by the Law Society since it has been raised, and one hope that there may be some progress on that particular front quite shortly. I do not say more about it than that. It is a matter which has been carefully considered.

On the wider question of whether different machinery, or an extension of the existing machinery, is required for investigation of complaints against solicitors, my hon. Friend referred to recommendations in the Justice report. Again, it is important that the House should know that the Law Society, from about the time that the Justice report was published, has been giving close consideration to the whole question of the right machinery for the handling of complaints against solicitors. Throughout its various committees it has looked at a variety of alternatives and variations, and they are still under consideration.

The chairman of the Justice Committee and one or more of his colleagues have met those responsible in the Law Society on more than one occasion to discuss the right approach and the way in which matters can be changed. It is right to acknowledge—not least because, the overwhelming number of complaints that come in in the last resort are found to be without foundation, though they are sometimes disturbing, that it would be difficult to produce a machinery that could be adapted to work on a fail-safe basis.

Suggestions have been made for the involvement of lay members at different levels. It is right to remember that the Justice report did not suggest the inclusion of lay members on the disciplinary tribunal. It suggested a review body, but that might be introducing a lay element, if it can be introduced, at too late a stage in the process. If one were to suggest the introduction of laymen to process all the four or five thousand cases at the first stage, it is difficult to see how they could be expected to handle the matter at that early sifting stage. To introduce a lay element in a way that would work is not as easy as it would seem. The problems are rather different from those involved in cases which go before other professional bodies. If one has a complaint against other professions, one goes to a solicitor to take up the case on one's behalf. In the present instance one would have to go to a solicitor to take up a complaint against a solicitor—which increases the difficulty of coping with such matters.

It would be quite wrong to suggest that the Law Society has brushed on one side, or has failed arrogantly to respond to, suggestions made in the Justice report or other views on this subject. It must be acknowledged that the situation is not as easy as it looks, and even those responsible for the preparation of the Justice report now acknowledge that it is not easy when it comes down to practicalities.

It is the Government's view that matters of professional conduct should be handled by the professions, if possible without interference by the Government. The professions have long upheld a tradition of responsibility for their own standards and are in practice best able to decide whether their procedures are adequate to cope with cases of misconduct. They are sensitive and indeed must be, to criticisms from outside sources. I suggest that there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that within the limitations of the problem the Law Society is conscientious and meticulous in examining complaints. Furthermore, in matters which do not amount to professional misconduct, but which amount to allegations of negligence it goes out of its way to assist complainants by finding solicitors to act for them. In addition, the Law Society will shortly publish leaflets giving advice to those who seek assistance on ways in which complaints against solicitors can be handled; they suggest how somebody who wishes to raise such a complaint should set about it. I suggest that these leaflets would be of value to hon. Members. That is the way in which the Government feel the matter should proceed.

I am sure that the Law Society and those in it responsible for these matters will read carefully what has been said in the debate. I hope that I have managed to strike a judicious and constructive posture, if not seeking—because I am sure that the Law Society would not wish me to do so—to defend the Law Society as though everything in its garden was perfect and beyond need of reform. But I hope that I have done justice to the Law Society, as I think it is entitled to have it done, by suggesting that my hon. Friend has rather over-painted the case against it on the basis of the particular cases he cited.

Our experience in the House suggests evidence that there is here a matter about which there should be ongoing concern, but we for our part should recognise that there has been ongoing concern in the Law Society and give it credit for recognising it too and trying, so far and as fast as it can, to improve its existing machinery.