HC Deb 23 November 1971 vol 826 cc1271-301

10.12 p.m.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. Norman Wylie)

I beg to move, That the Industrial Court (Appeals) Order 1971, a draft of which was laid before this House on 3rd November, be approved.

Mr. Speaker

There are two orders and two regulations on the Order Paper, and I understand that it would be for the convenience of the House if they were taken together.

The Lord Advocate

That would be for the convenience of the House, Mr. Speaker. The two orders relate to the Industrial Relations Act and the two regulations are consequential in so far as they relate to legal aid provisions in the event of the two orders being passed by the House.

The first order deals with England and Wales and the second with Scotland. They do two things. First, they transfer from the High Court and the Court of Session in Scotland to the Industrial Court appellate jurisdiction in respect of the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963, the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965, and the Equal Pay Act, 1970, which has not yet been activated. Secondly, they seek to confer on the new Industrial Court a similar jurisdiction in respect of new provisions whereby complaints of unfair industrial practices including unfair dismissal and other matters may be presented to an industrial tribunal.

The background to the two orders is as follows. The provisions of the Industrial Relations Act proceeded on the basis that it was, generally speaking, desirable that disputes which arose in the industrial area out of employer/employee relationships ought to be concentrated in specialist tribunals rather than the ordinary courts of the land.

It is against that background that Section 114—on the basis of which these orders are promoted—provides for appeals on questions of law to lie from industrial tribunals to the Industrial Court instead of to the High Court in England or the Court of Session in Scotland. As I shall shortly try to explain, not all the appellate jurisdiction from industrial tribunals is transferred in this way. A residue of jurisdiction remains with our traditional courts. But where disputes arise out of an employer/employee relationship the intention is that the cases should be transferred to the new Industrial Court.

To put the matter briefly, if the House passes these orders, appeals from the industrial tribunals will go to the Industrial Court. Without these orders those appeals would continue to go to the ordinary courts by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1971, which was a consolidation Measure.

As the House is aware, the Industrial Court is now in being. It was set up under Section 99 of the Act, and the provisions of that Section were brought into force on 1st October last. The President of the Court is Mr. Justice Donaldson, and, along with another member of the English Bench, he will be sitting with a member of the Scottish Bench, Lord Thomson. The House will also be aware that last week Her Majesty appointed nine further lay members of that court. It is a unitary court—a Great Britain court—and its composition will be increased if the case load justifies it.

To put it colloquially, as from 1st December of this year, on the assumption that these Orders are passed by the House, the Industrial Court is ready for business and will exercise the jurisdiction which, by these Orders, has been passed to it.

I draw the attention of the House to Section 14 of the Act, which provides that my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland have power, by order, to transfer to the Industrial Court appellate jurisdiction under a variety of Statutes which are set out in the Section and also in the first two orders. One is the Contracts of Employments Act, 1963, about which there has not been a great deal of litigation before industrial tribunals or before the courts. The case load under the 1963 Act has, in recent years at least, been negligible. The second Statute is the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965, in respect of which there is a continuing case load. The third statutory provision is the Equal Pay Act, which has not yet been activated. The effect of the orders will be to transfer to the Industrial Court appellate jurisdiction from the industrial tribunals operating under these statutory provisions.

Mr. Stanley Orme (Salford, West)

Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that these orders will transfer to a highly contentious court legislation that in the past has been dealt with very openly and justly in the other courts? It is the transferance of these items to which we basically object.

The Lord Advocate

I was coming to that. As I have endeavoured to set out before the House as fairly and openly as I can, the feeling behind this legislation is that when disputes arise either under the legislation to which I have just referred or under the provisions referred to in Section 114(1)(d) and (e)—the complaints provisions of the 1971 Act—or the provisions of Section 113 of the Act it would be desirable and preferable that jurisdiction should be exercised by a specialist tribunal in the form of the Industrial Court rather than by the ordinary courts.

Mr. Paul B. Rose (Manchester, Blackley)

If the right hon. and learned Gentleman contends that this should be dealt with by a specialist tribunal, why should not that specialist tribunal be composed, particularly for appeals from the Registrar, as Donovan said, of an independent chairman and two members of the trade union movement?

The Lord Advocate

I think that the composition of the new Industrial Court strikes the right balance. It is presided over by Her Majesty's judges assisted by lay members who are familiar with the industrial scene.

The Equal Pay Act has not yet come into force, as hon. Gentlemen opposite are aware, but when it does, which will be not later than the end of December, 1975, there will be a small, but none the less significant, jurisdiction to be exercised under that legislation.

A major head of new jurisdiction for the tribunals, and, therefore, on appeal before the Industrial Relations Court, will flow from the complaints jurisdiction set out in the 1971 Act. In so far as that relates to unfair dismissals, the expectation is that there will be a fairly substantial number of applications to the industrial tribunal and, as a consequence, a fairly substantial number of appeals to the Industrial Court.

As Section 113 is referred to in Section 114 of the Act to which I have just referred, I should say that it is not the Government's present intention to activate that section, which relates to damages for breach of contract of employment. Until we see the case load which falls upon the industrial tribunals and the Court it would be advisable, in the meantime at least, not to activate that section. So there is no reference in the Orders to the jurisdiction implied under Section 113 of the Act.

I mentioned that not all proceedings which come before the industrial tribunals are automatically transferred on appeal from the High Court to the Industrial Relations Court. The residue of jurisdiction which is unaffected by these orders and which will continue to be exercised is jurisdiction under the Industrial Training Act, 1964, to hear disputes about levies assessed by an industrial training Board; and under the Selective Employment Payments Act, 1966, there will still be jurisdiction to determine questions of registration. Appeals in those cases will go to the courts. Finally, under the Docks and Harbours Act, 1966, there are certain technical disputes about the meaning of "dock work" which it is not intended to, and the orders do not, transfer on appeal to the Industrial Relations Court.

I will deal with the English order, because the Scottish order is in similar terms apart from minor verbal differences.

The first two articles are really formal. The operative provision in both orders is article 3, which confers on the Industrial Court jurisdiction to entertain appeals on questions of law from the decisions of tribunals exercising the jurisdiction spelt out in the article. It applies irrespective of the date on which the decision was made; but—I will come to this in a few moments—if the High Court, or in Scotland the Court of Session, has started to consider an appeal from a decision made before 1st December, by virtue of article 6 that appeal remains unaffected by the order. That means, in effect, that pending appeals which have not already come before the High Court will be covered by the order, and article 5 makes specific provision for dealing with them.

Article 4 is really complementary to article 3, because it picks up the implications of the concluding words of article 3 which provides that appeals shall … lie to the Industrial Court and shall not lie to any other court. Article 4 spells that out in some detail and has the effect of disapplying the provisions of Section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1971, from the proceedings referred to in article 3. That is obviously sensible, because it would not be satisfactory to have two concurrent jurisdictions on appeal exercised by the Industrial Court and by the High Court and the Court of Session.

Article 5 deals with transitional provisions. The effect of article 5 is simply to provide—

Mr. Emlyn Hooson (Montgomery)

How will the Industrial Court be constituted for the purpose of appeals on the Contracts of Employment Act? Will it have lay members as well as judges for this purpose, or will it consist of judges only?

The Lord Advocate

The Industrial Court as such is constituted by Her Majesty's judges and, I think, nine lay members. The court will work in divisions. What I expect is that in Scotland, for example, it would be Lord Thomson who would normally preside, with lay members. In England and Wales it would be one or other of the two judges; but it is a unitary court. It is essentially a Great Britain court, and one hopes that there will be considerable interchange between jurisdiction in England on the one hand and Scotland on the other.

Article 5 automatically transfers pending appeals, but, as the House will see, article 6 saves those appeals upon which the Court has already entered into consideration. There is one paragraph of article 5 to which I ought to draw attention, and that is that it confers on the Court a power which it does not otherwise have; namely, a general discretion to award costs or expenses in those cases in which appeals have been automatically transferred from the courts to the Industrial Court. That is only right in principle, because it would be wrong to transfer automatically an appeal which was pending before the Court but upon which the Court had not entered into consideration, bearing in mind that the ordinary court has a general discretion to award expenses, whereas the Industrial Court does not. Article 6 saves the situation in which the High Court or Court of Session has entered upon consideration of an appeal. In those cases the appeal will remain with the court.

There is no question of any prejudice being sustained as a result of the provisions in articles 5 and 6, in the sense that the period within which an appeal can be taken to the Industrial Court will be the same as the period within which an appeal can be taken to the Court of Appeal, and a Scottish appellant will be granted an advantage, because at the moment the period within which an appeal can be taken in Scotland is only 21 days, but the appeal provisions under the Act and the rules made under it will provide for 42 days, which, as I understand it, is the position under the rules of the Supreme Court.

Mr. Raphael Tuck (Watford)

I am not quite clear about this. Are we to understand that there is no provision, assuming a case has not been transferred but goes straight from the industrial tribunal to the Industrial Court, for costs of the appeal?

The Lord Advocate

The Industrial Court does not have a statutory power to make an award of costs except in the exceptional case where it is held that the appeal has been frivolous. That is in paragraph 24 of the Third Schedule to the Statute. But the provisions to which I have referred introduce a saving provision in the case of appeals presently pending and compulsorily transferred from the courts to the Industrial Court.

Paragraph 24 of the Third Schedule says that the only circumstances in which the Industrial Court can make an awards of costs is where the proceedings were unnecessary, improper or vexatious, or … there has been unreasonable delay or other unreasonable conduct in bringing or conducting the proceedings. That is the general statutory provision, but the provision to which I have referred in both these orders relates to the transitional situation in which, in the discharge of this jurisdiction, certain pending appeals are transferred to the Industrial Court.

I would say something about the anticipated work load under this new jurisdiction. Under the present provisions, there are virtually no appeals; there are almost certainly none in Scotland, and certainly very few in England under the 1963 Act. Under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965, there are roughly 50 appeals a year in England and Wales and 15 in Scotland. So it is expected that under that legislation there will be about 60 appeals a year.

When it comes to assessing the number of appeals from industrial tribunals under the 1971 Act, it must, of course, to some extent be speculative. But it is expected that under the complaints provisions there will be a substantial number of appeals to the Industrial Court. When the Equal Pay Act is activated, it is not expected that there will be a great number of appeals but, of course, there will be some.

It would obviously be right when one is transferring an appellate jurisdiction from the ordinary courts of the land to the new Industrial Court that provision should be made for legal aid. An undertaking was given to that effect. In these circumstances, there will not be much dispute between the two sides of the House. If the Industrial Court is to receive this new appellate jurisdiction, it is only right that some provision should be made to enable appellants to enjoy the same facilities of legal aid as they would otherwise have enjoyed had the appeal been taken to the Court of Appeal, or in Scotland, the Court of Session. That it is intended to do, and it is towards that end that the third and fourth regulations are directed.

I would only add—this arises out of the question of the limited discretion which the Industrial Court has on costs and expenses—that the normal provision under the existing provisions of the legal aid scheme is that there is a first charge in favour of the legal aid funds on any award which is made to an assisted person. Normally, of course, where an award of costs is made it is only the net balance, as it were, which is attached by the legal aid fund. When the court cannot make any award of costs except in exceptional circumstances, some provision in equity obviously has to be made to avoid the erosion of an award which is made to an assisted person appearing before the Industrial Court. Regulations for this purpose will be laid in the near future. Regulations have to be made in any event to adapt the legal aid scheme to the procedures and special circumstances of the Industrial Court. These regulations will include provision so that no charge will be made by the Legal Aid Fund on any award made to an assisted person.

Mr. S. C. Silkin (Dulwich)

I understand that an estimate has been made of what is expected to be the cost of legal aid. May we be told about that and how that estimate has been arrived at?

The Lord Advocate

One can quantify with some accuracy the number of appeals likely to be taken under the 1965 Act. I have indicated what is the probable continuing figure in that respect. When one is dealing with applications to an industrial tribunal and appeals there from to the Industrial Court under the complaints jurisdiction set up by the 1971 Act it must be speculative. The best estimate that can be made is that it would be in the region of 50,000 a year.

I do not conceal the fact that this is very largely a rough estimate and entirely depends on the extent to which applications are made to the tribunals under the new jurisdiction which will be conferred on them. As the hon. and learned Gentleman is aware, legal aid is not open to incorporated or unincorporated bodies. It will apply only to individuals. I would have thought that, on the unfair dismissal jurisdiction which the legislation imposes on the industrial tribunals, there is bound to be a fair volume of litigation, and the estimate of that is the one that I have given.

I hope that, with that outline of the effect of this legislation and the reasons behind it, these orders and regulations will commend themselves to the House. Throughout the history of the parent legislation there has been violent disagreement, and strong views have been held.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover)

And still remain.

The Lord Advocate

I accept that, but, Parliament having taken the decision to enact that legislation, it is logical and proper that the consequential orders—and these are consequential orders—should be passed, and in that spirit I commend them.

10.37 p.m.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton)

We have said time and again that the industrial relations legislation will be a lawyers' paradise. As I listened to the Lord Advocate and looked around the Chamber, that view was doubly confirmed. Indeed, for a moment I thought I was in the Inns of Court. Many distinguished members of the Bar are present tonight, which is an indication of the character of the Act and these orders.

The Lord Advocate described these as the first orders in connection with the Industrial Relations Act. It is clear that these orders, whatever they do or do not do, will make absolutely no contribution to solving any industrial relations problem that may confront us and will in no way help to solve the unemployment problem.

If these instruments are accepted they will come into operation on 1st December. Under Section 124 of the Act the old Industrial Court has become the Industrial Arbitration Board. Thus, when talking about the "Industrial Court" we are not talking about the old Industrial Court, which has gone for all time. Although there may be some confusion over this, we are talking about the National Industrial Relations Court, from now on referred to as the "Industrial Court" established under the Industrial Relations Act.

I must disappoint the Lord Advocate and his colleagues by telling him that we shall oppose these proposals. We shall oppose the order for a number of reasons. On the surface, it looks harmless enough. It deals with appeals arising from decisions of the industrial tribunal.

The industrial tribunals have been transformed under the Act from purely arbitral bodies with a limited jurisdictional rôle to "mini-courts", a sort of lesser breed, as it were, of the National Industrial Relations Court. As we are all aware, the industrial tribunals were originally set up under the Industrial Training Act, 1964. Since then, the functions have been extended by subsequent Acts. That is why the order refers to appeals arising out of the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963, the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965, and the Equal Pay Act, 1970.

Added to the question of appeals arising out of these Acts are the complaints to the industrial tribunals under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. I list some of these complaints because, although we have opposed the whole concept, they are the essential basic objections to the order.

Under Section 106 a complaint may be presented against any employer by any person regarding an unfair industrial practice under Section 5 and Section 22 of the Act. Those of us who lived night and day through the passage of the Industrial Relations Act will remember that Section 5 deals with the right of a worker to belong or not to belong to a trade union. That section embodies what in the United States would be described as a right-to-work law. We took very strong objection to that. We take strong objection to it now. The trade union movement will continue to take strong objection to this and many other parts of the Act. It protects the non-unionist.

Section 22 is slightly more congenial to us because it deals with complaints about unfair dismissal. Possibly it is the only part of the Act which in any way commends itself to us, and even that part does not go far enough because it does not give the right to reinstatement.

Under Section 107 any person can lay a complaint of unfair industrial practice under Section 66 and Section 70 of the Act, or of breach of rules. Section 66 deals with contravention of the principles set out in Section 65.

When one discusses the Act one finds that some hon. Members do not remember the details. Every section hinges upon every other section. I am not a lawyer, but I imagine that by the time I have finished with my studies of the Act I could possibly go to the Bar at any time and claim the right to be a lawyer.

We on this side of the House particularly objected to Section 65 because, in effect, it is a direct interference with the internal affairs of the trade union movement. Under Section 65(7) it constitutes an unfair industrial practice if a trade union disciplines a member for not taking part in an industrial action which under the Act is described as not being industrial action. In other words, it is an argument as to what constitutes industrial action and what constitutes political action. This raises the whole question of workers who might be involved in industrial action which would be considered under the Act to be political action. If a union disciplines such members it will be an unfair industrial practice and a complaint can be laid under the order if the matter is proved.

Under Section 108 the Registrar can lay a complaint to the industrial tribunal under Section 81. Section 81 contains wide industrial power for the Registrar, and includes the power to look into the refusal of any trade union to accept an applicant who wishes to join a union. We consider this to be direct interference in the internal affairs of the trade union movement.

Under Section 109 the industrial tribunal can, if it finds the complaint of unfair industrial practice proved, impose two remedies. These remedies are, first, to make an order determining the rights of the relevant person and of the organisation named in the complaint and, second, to award compensation to be paid by the organisation to the relevant person. Section 117 lays down what compensation can be paid. The general principles are set out in Section 116. Under Section 110 any person can lay a complaint against an employer if certain actions have not been taken under Section 57.

In addition to the appeals arising out of the three Acts mentioned in the order—the Contracts of Employment Act, the Redundancy Payments Act, and the Equal Pay Act—the industrial tribunal can accept complaints under Sections 106 to 110—all of which are complaints concerning unfair industrial practice, which we reject.

It is for these reasons and because under Section 111 they can be transferred to the National Industrial Relations Court that we oppose the Order.

Mr. Daniel Awdry (Chippenham)

The orders are about appeals on points of law. The orders provide that appeals should go to the Industrial Court and not to the High Court. Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that such appeals should go to the High Court?

Mr. Heffer

We object to the National Industrial Relations Court. We objected to it during the passage of the Bill. We do not believe that there should be this piece of machinery to deal with industrial relations questions. We do not accept the concept of unfair industrial practice. The hon. Gentleman may not have read the order as closely as I have. It is because all these matters can be dealt with under, and arise from, the Order that we object to it. We strongly object to the National Industrial Relations Court because, as the hon. Gentleman rightly said, under the Act that Court will have the powers of a High Court. This is why article 5 provides that cases pending in the High Court on 1st December 1971, will be transferred to the National Industrial Relations Court with that Court being empowered to award costs in appeals or motions.

We do not agree that the law should be introduced in this way into industrial relations. The order raises fundamental issues. In a sense, it goes to the heart of the Act. It is a demonstration of the Government's philosophy. I assure the Government—to disappoint the Lord Advocate and his right hon. Friends—that we shall continue to oppose all orders which will activate the Act. We shall pray against those against which we can pray, and we shall vote against the present order tonight.

10.51 p.m.

Mr. Daniel Awdry (Chippenham)

I had not intended to intervene, and what I have to say now can be very brief. I understand that what we are discussing is simply where appeals on a point of law should go from the industrial tribunals. At present, they go to the High Court. Under the order they will go to the Industrial Court. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) says that he and his hon. Friends do not agree with the establishment of the Industrial Court in this context and will fight against the whole concept. But, with respect, the Court is there. It has been set up.

I wonder whether it is not a little out of order to mount a debate on whether one agrees with the setting up of the Industrial Court. We are told that the Court is in existence. The question before us is where appeals should go from the tribunals. Do they go to the new Industrial Court, which seems fairly good sense to me, or do they go to the High Court? Can we have a general debate on whether we like the whole concept of the Industrial Court? It has been set up, and it is part of our law now.

10.52 p.m.

Mr. Greville Janner (Leicester, North-West)

The point of the order is that it is giving a new jurisdiction to a new Court. We are entitled to look both at the Court and at the jurisdiction which it is to receive. I object to the order on an additional ground beyond those taken by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). We must look not just at the work load which the Court will acquire as a result of the Order; we must look also at the overall work load which the Court will have.

In my view, the entire jurisdiction which the Court is to acquire will bring the law of the land into disrepute. Outside these three new Courts—I do not mind if the number is doubled and there are six of them—there will be one of the most staggering queues in the not inconsiderable history of queues outside our courts.

The Court will not just have jurisdiction over the appeals referred to in the order. Its jurisdiction will stretch over a vast area. It is to have jurisdiction over agency shop agreements and disputes arising under Section 11. It is to have jurisdiction over the continuance of agency shop agreements under Section 14, and I imagine that that will keep the three Courts busy enough. It is to have jurisdiction over breaches of collective agreements under Section 36. I doubt that that will trouble it much because I doubt that any trade union will enter into an agreement which does not contain a non-enforceability clause, and, in my opinion, any employer who does so should have his head examined. So Section 36 will probably not cause much trouble.

The Court is to have jurisdiction under Section 37 relating to procedural provi- sions. The Secretary of State can activate that, and no doubt he will do so. It is to have jurisdiction under Section 45, about applications for recognition of sole bargaining agencies, and this, unfortunately, will take a great deal of its time. It is to have jurisdiction under Section 51, about applications to the Court with a view to withdrawal of recognition. It is to have jurisdiction under Section 54, about unfair industrial practices relating to pending questions as to recognition of sole bargaining agents. It will, alas, have jurisdiction regarding approval of the rules of trade unions. It will have jurisdiction concerning the cancellation of registration on other grounds under Section 77. As if that were not enough, it will have jurisdiction in so-called emergency procedures under Section 138, the so-called 60-day cooling-off period, and jurisdiction under Section 141 in respect of secret strike ballots.

On top of that jurisdiction, it is now to be given jurisdiction in connection with a line of appeal procedures. It is not good enough just to say, "It will have a work load of maybe 60 appeals under the Redundancy Payments Act and we do not know how many under the Industrial Relations Act." We must consider the total work the Court will be lumbered with.

The Commission on Industrial Relations will have referred to it some of that work. It will then make references and recommendations to the Court and the Court will make orders. I presume that the Court will consider what the Commission says and not just make orders automatically. I presume that people will appear before it, make applications and argue before it. I should like to know precisely how much work it is expected the Court will have. We should not simply take its appeals jurisdiction on its own but should consider the entire jurisdiction of this extraordinary new Court.

I say that with no disrespect to the judges. It is a great pity that the Court should be set up with so little thought that when these appeal jurisdictions are put before the House reference is made not to the work load as a whole but simply to this very small section of its activities.

Second, it is a mistake to transfer to a court like this—indeed, to any court —jurisdiction which is so highly controversial. It has been said that we should have specialist tribunals for employer-employee disputes. That may be so, provided that they will do the work better and swifter and in a less controversial spirit than the courts we have. But to put three judges in charge of this Court, knowing how people feel about it and its jurisdiction, is asking for trouble, trouble which some of us who are lawyers foresee with a great deal of dismay, because we respect the law and wish it to be respected, and because we consider that this is the surest way to bring it into disrepute.

Sir Derek Walker-Smith (Hertfordshire, East)

It will be convenient if the hon. and learned Gentleman will pursue the logic of his argument for a moment. He is seeking the defeat of the order. He will agree that its defeat would not bring the Industrial Court to an end. All it would mean is that the appeals would be transferred to the ordinary courts. The hon. Gentleman argues that it is wrong to entrust the matter to judges, although the judges concerned will be specialists in this branch of the law. Why is it an effective remedy to transfer that appeals jurisdiction to judges who are not specialists in this branch?

Mr. Greville Janner

One of my great worries on the subject is that the judges will not necessarily be specialists in industrial law, in the sense that they are people with training either in that area of law or with understanding of how the people concerned consider the matters with which they are involved. Industrial disputes cannot be dealt with purely on the basis of a so-called legal framework. It must be understood that the Court is dealing with people on the shop floor, and the judges who deal with them need not merely a training in the law but an understanding of those people.

Mr. Awdry

The hon. and learned Gentleman has missed the point. If he succeeds in defeating the order, all the appeals go to this High Court. Why is it better that they should go to the High Court than to the new Industrial Court?

Mr. Greville Janner

Because I consider that the Industrial Court is going to be a disaster. I prefer the law to remain at least in good repute in part of the area in which it is administered. I think that this Court is unfair to the judges who will have to deal with it, to the litigants who will appear before it, and that it is wrong that this transfer should be achieved.

It is said that there are to be the same facilities for legal aid before this Court as before any other court. That is the trouble. The legal aid facilities available in courts in general are not good enough. They are alright if one has nothing, but they are useless for the average person earning an ordinary sort of living in factory, office or anywhere else. He cannot avail himself of these facilities in the ordinary courts and, therefore, cannot necessarily get representation and justice, and he will not be able to make use of them in this new appeal Court, which will be dealing with one of the most involved and difficult Statutes in the history of our time. These are bad orders and they will be opposed.

11.1 p.m.

Mr. Alex Eadie (Midlothian)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman opened this debate with moderation and no one could take offence at what he said. But the question of the Industrial Relations Act, the industrial relations tribunals and the Industrial Court is tainted in this House, as it is to the trade unionists outside. The right hon. and learned Gentleman can talk as much as he likes about the law but the fact remains, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner) pointed out, that law is in disrepute.

We often say that our people are law-abiding, and so they are if they have respect for the law. What right hon. and hon. Members opposite do not seem to understand is that the vast mass of trade unionists have no respect for the propositions put forward in the Government's industrial relations law. The debate about the Act rages on. As we have said all along, it will create a lawyer's paradise but the ordinary people will suffer. We are at least to have one growth industry under this Government—for the lawyers through the implementation of the industrial relations legislation.

People outside may misunderstand the situation. Many of them will regard it as provocative that Parliament should be discussing this matter when there is such heavy unemployment in the country. Despite all the niceties we hear from hon. Members opposite, people believe that the Act was not discussed properly in the House because of the Guillotine. Trade unionists take great exception to the way in which the Government have handled this issue, and indeed the method has been harmful not only to Parliament but to democracy itself.

The miners are holding a ballot on whether to have a strike. Rightly or wrongly, they will regard the propositions in these orders as provocative. When people have no respect for law, a dangerous situation arises. The danger of this Government is that they are bringing not only the law but also democracy into disrepute. I hope that we shall go into the Lobby to demonstrate our opposition to both the orders and the Government.

11.4 p.m.

Mr. Stanley Orme (Salford, West)

The whole concept of the Industrial Court flies in the face of the Donovan Report, which recommended that industrial disputes should not be settled in courts of law, the inference being—and I believe it to betrue—that learned High Court judges, for all their great expertise in the law and its interpretation, do not necessarily know a great deal about industrial relations.

Sir D. Walker-Smith

I want to put the same point to the hon. Member which I unsuccessfully put to the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner).

Mr. Greville Janner

You will get the same answer.

Sir D. Walker-Smith

I hope it will be a better answer. It was the answer which was unsuccessful, not the question. The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) has played a much more prominent part in our debates than the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West and, therefore, I am tempted to see whether I get a more rational answer from a non-legal Member. He says he does not want these issues to go to judges. But the effect of defeating the order will be that they will go either to the Court of Appeal or to the High Court on a case stated. That means going to judges and it therefore seems a little illogical for the hon. Member to wish to defeat the order.

Mr. Orme

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is, as usual, extremely subtle and clever in his questioning. What he says is quite right. If we leave the Industrial Relations Act as it now is and do not approve these orders, these matters will go to the equivalent High Court. But the whole basis of the Act, with its legal implications, is wrong. We listen to the right hon. and learned Gentleman with great respect on matters of law. But actions under certain Acts are to be transferred to this court—the Contracts of Employment Act, the Redundancy Payments Act, and the Equal Pay Act.

At present proceedings under these Acts have to go occasionally to a court of law to be adjudicated. But now they will be transferred into a highly political court for legal interpretation. The Industrial Court will be manned by High Court judges. It will have equivalent status to the normal High Court. But the assessors who will sit in the court with the judges will be appointed by the Government and will not be representative of industry as a whole.

Both the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor-General, the evil genius behind the Act, know that the trade unions will not co-operate in operating the Act because they believe it to be thoroughly bad. I put it to the lawyers here that if a large section of the community is opposed to a law, that law is brought into disrepute. We all know of laws like this which have had to be changed. In a democracy, unlike a totalitarian State, if the people do not support a law, that law is ignored. There are examples in the driving laws which are ignored because they do not carry the support of the vast majority.

Cases will be channelled to the Industrial Relations Court not merely from the Redundancy Payments Acts or the Equal Pay Act, but from the Industrial Relations Act, highly controversial cases. The controversy will arise, as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) said, when there are cases arising from Section 5 of the Industrial Relations Act, issues such as agency shops and other matters coming straight from the shop floor to be adjudicated upon by people without practical experience of these matters and assisted by assessors who will not have been chosen with a view to balancing the two sides of industry.

Mr. Nigel Spearing (Acton)

My hon. Friend has much more experience than I have of industrial relations. Would he say what would be the likely reaction of shop stewards and ordinary trade unionists to the assessors? What sort of attitude would they have to the people who would be, as it were, prompting the judges?

Mr. Orme

They will simply label them nominees of the Government with no independent standing.

Already working-class people are not particularly enamoured, rightly or wrongly, of the way in which the law courts are run. They feel that the background of a judge may not make him sympathetic to their views. They are sometimes right, sometimes wrong. But this Industrial Relations Court will start damned from the beginning and without a vestige of independence.

Mr. Anthony Fell (Yarmouth)

I have always thought that the hon. Member of all people had been brought up to believe in democracy—that that was something which he had been preaching all his life. Here is an Act democratically passed by Parliament and he and his friends are refusing to allow it to work, on his own admission. He talks of an Act being abhored by all trade unionists. I have not received one letter about it.

Mr. Orme

When the Act starts to operate, the hon. Gentleman may find that things change.

I say without any cant or hypocrisy that I believe in democracy, and because I believe in the democratic State and the democratic society and that one has to uphold the law, I oppose the Act. It is not we who are bringing the law into disrepute; it is the Act.

Mr. Fell

The hon. Gentleman talks of supporting the law of the land, but he and his friends are trying to undermine a law which has been democratically passed by the House.

Mr. Orme

I will leave the House to judge the very clear differences which exist. We seem to be back on the familiar treadmill and we shall have many more late evenings. This is the first of many bits of paper. I have made the point about what should go in its place. We are back to first principles. This is built on a foundation which will not last and therefore we must oppose it and subsequent orders.

11.16 p.m.

Mr. Ronald King Murray (Edinburgh, Leith)

I want to put two points to the Solicitor-General. Will he confirm that there have been only three commencement orders so far and that none of the grounds of complaint which could activate the procedures under paragraph 3(d) of the order has yet been activated? If he confirms that, may I ask when these parts are to be activated. I have in mind Sections 5, 22, 57, 65 and 70 and the others mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer).

The Lord Advocate has not explained to my satisfaction why it is that the Government have seen fit to redistribute the appellate jurisdiction of the industrial tribunals between these different Statutes. Why is it that under the Industrial Training Act, 1964, the Docks and Harbours Act, 1966, and the Selective Employment Payments Act, 1966, the ordinary courts are to be the appropriate appellate jurisdiction, when under the measures listed in paragraph 3(d) the Industrial Court is to be the appropriate jurisdiction? This seems strange because I would have thought that under paragraph 3(d) complaints originating under Section 5 or Section 22 of the Industrial Relations Act will be hotly disputed matters of fact which are more likely to be disputed on appeal than matters arising under the Industrial Training Act, the Docks and Harbours Act and the Selective Employment Payments Act. Why are the orders limited to appeals on points of law?

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) is hoping to say something about legal aid and I will simply express my regret that we have no order before us applying legal aid to the industrial tribunals.

11.18 p.m.

Mr. S. C. Silkin (Dulwich)

These orders and regulations have been taken together but there is a distinction on this side of the House in our approach to the orders on which the main debate has centered and the legal aid regulations. We said that if this court were set up, it was essential that legal aid be provided. We are glad that on this question sound advice has been taken.

There are three matters arising out of the regulations. As I understand the schedule setting out the practice of the court, paragraph 21 provides for a person who appears before it to be represented, not only by counsel, solicitor or trade union but also by any other person whom he wishes to help him. I am not altogether clear what that means. Can the Solicitor-General tell us whether, if payment is involved, it will fall within these regulations?

Secondly, the Lord Advocate has drawn attention to paragraph 24 of the schedule, which provides that the court is not to have power to grant costs against a party except in certain specific circumstances. Will that power to grant costs in those circumstances override the normal rules of legal aid, under which the court will not normally award costs against a legally-aided party, at any rate above the extent of his contribution?

Finally, in reply to my question, the right hon. and learned Gentleman told the House that the anticipation—he admitted that it was speculation—was that the annual cost of legal aid in the court would be £50,000. Having heard what the right hon. and learned Gentleman had to say and what my hon. Friends have said, I cannot begin to conceive how any estimate at all—certainly an annual estimate—can be made. I hope that the learned Solicitor-General will be able to give us a better explanation of that figure than his right hon. and learned Friend was able to give.

11.21 p.m.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe)

I should like to begin by replying to the characteristically penetrating and detailed points put by the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) in his remarks—so far as I follow them. First, he asked me whether representation by any other person—if that other person were paid—will entitle legal aid to be granted in respect of such other person. I do not think so, because the Legal Aid and Advice Act extends only to lawyers on the panels of one kind or another.

The second question was whether the rule limiting the power to award costs vested in the Industrial Court would override the normal limitation of the likelihood of costs being awarded against a legally-aided person. As I see it, it would work in the opposite direction. The court would make an order for costs, in any event, only if it were satisfied that the proceedings were either frivolous or vexatious, and would then go on to apply the test whether it should make an order against a legally-aided person.

On the hon. and learned Member's third question, as to the accuracy of the estimate of the cost of legal aid being granted in the Industrial Court, the hon. and learned Gentleman fairly said that it is not possible to have great confidence in the certainty and accuracy of the estimate of £50,000. He will know that in any comparable jurisdiction introduced by successive Governments it has proved very difficult to estimate what the case load—and in particular the legal aid case load—of any new legal jurisdiction would be. There were wildly differing estimates in respect of the case load of the rent tribunals and rent assessment officers under the Rent Act, 1965 and, similarly, the Race Relations Act, 1968, and it must be acknowledged that the estimate given by the Lord Advocate is the first target figure, and is dependent on whether one accepts the views of the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme), who suggests that the court will be largely disregarded, or of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner), who appeared to paint an extravagant picture of the extent to which the court will be used. Whichever view one takes, the estimate will vary one way or the other.

I confess that it is odd to see the wildly different postures adopted by hon. Members opposite to this package of instruments. We had the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) presenting his familiar denunciation of the lawyers' paradise represented—he said—by this legislation, and then the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich and several of his colleagues stressing the importance of legal aid being made available—

Mr. Rose

There is nothing inconsistent about that.

The Solicitor-General

Indeed there is, I shall analyse the position, but before doing so I want to deal with the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray). The Sections covered by the list which he gave—Sections 5, 20, 65, 67 and so on—are not to be activated until Commencement Order No. 4, which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State hopes to lay before the House some time in the early part of the New Year. That is the specific answer to that point.

Coming to the central question of principle, we are dealing with the establishment of an appeal pattern for the most important parts of the Industrial Relations Act—appeals arising under the contracts of Employment Act, the Redundancy Payments Act, and, particularly, the unfair dismissal provisions. It cannot be argued at one and the same time by hon. Gentlemen opposite that this is part of the sinister by-product of a kind of evil genius, to borrow the phrase of the hon. Member for Salford, West. We are propounding the remedies for actual grievances of individual workpeople in all parts of industry. We are putting forward a framework designed to deal with those grievances. In the second group of orders we are providing legal aid for appeals. I suggest that that makes a perfectly sensible balanced package.

The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith expressed a modest note of regret that legal aid was not available in the industrial tribunals. He knows that that was considered by the Legal Aid Advisory Committee in 1968 and again in its report just out. It maintained its attitude that the extension of legal aid to tribunals, including the industrial tribunals, was not justified, certainly in advance of the results of the research being undertaken by the Nuffield Foundation and other organisations.

Its view has been sustained by the President of the Industrial Tribunals who spoke not long back about the desirability of maintaining the informality of proceedings in the industrial tribunals. He said that, although he would not look forward to legal aid and extended representation by lawyers in the industrial tribunals, he thought that it would be advantageous if litigants could have the benefit of legal advice in the preparation of their cases. That is one of the many reasons for the Government announcing that it is their intention to introduce the £25 scheme to extend the availability of legal advice in that way. Pending any advice by the Legal Aid Advisory Committee, I think that that represents the right balance to maintain. I suggest that we have got our proposals correct concerning legal aid.

I come back to the subjects with which the first group of orders deals and to what was said by the hon. Member for Walton. By and large, the hon. Gentleman gave an accurate account of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act in respect of which appeals will go to the Industrial Court as a result of the first two orders.

Listening to the hon. Gentleman, I could not help thinking that if, ten years hence, somebody reading his accurate analysis of the provisions which we were establishing and the appeal machinery which we were proposing were able to hear the tone of voice in which he had been speaking, the kind of sustained, implied acceptance, as though the entire world must accept the monstrosity of what we were putting forward, he would say: "Yes, I quite see. That makes absolute sense. It is entirely right that machinery for appeal against an employer's refusal to allow a man to belong to a trade union should be provided and that it should go to an industrially sophisticated court." He might say, as the hon. Member for Walton said, "It is right that an appeal procedure against unfair dismissal should be provided. It is astonishing that it has not been provided before. It is entirely right that complaints against trade unions for failing to conform with the rules of natural justice, the trade union member's bill of rights, should be provided for in this way."

He would applaud the accuracy of the hon. Gentleman's summary of what we are dealing with and wonder only at the tone of voice, so far as it could be defined from the musty columns of HANSARD ten years hence, and look back in astonishment that he should have sought to address the matter in this way.

I come now to the way in which the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West dealt with the matter. He painted a picture of queues of litigants outside the industrial tribunals and the Industrial Relations Court. It may be that some of these litigants—not many—will be concerned with unfair industrial practices arising out of industrial action. The great majority of these litigants will be individual work people complaining about harsh treatment at the hands of large organisations, be they employers or trade unions. In so far as there are many of them coming to these tribunals, and to the Industrial Court, that will be a measure of the need that has for so long been un-met, short of the Industrial Relations Act. I think that the hon. Gentleman greatly overestimates the extent to which they will appear before the court, because he overlooks the extent to which, built into the entire legislation, there is provision for conciliation and resolution of disputes without the need for litigation.

To come to the point on which the hon. Member for Salford, West concentrated his attack, and on which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) pressed two hon. Gentlemen opposite, what is wrong about the substantive proposals in the first two orders for the machinery for the resolution of disputes in relation to industrial relations? Is it not right that they should be heard by a specially designed court, representative of people in industry with industrial experience, rather than by ordinary lawyers?

The hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) has played a leading part in the debates in opposition to the Act, as has his colleague the hon. Member for Salford, West, but they must accept to some extent the responsibility for having created amongst the ranks of their colleagues the impression that this court, as one of them put it, will be thoroughly bad. The court is designed to meet the analysis of many people who have looked at this kind of problem and have said that this is the kind of court that ought to be established.

If one looks at the comments made by some of the most articulate and consistent critics of the Industrial Relations Act who have studied the existing appeals procedure, one finds positive support for this kind of change. Professor Wedderburn, an old friend and doughty opponent of mine, who has not been conspicuous for his enthusiasm over the Industrial Relations Act, said in his book "Employment Grievances and Disputes Procedures in Britain" that appeals to ordinary courts in these matters tend to destroy the flexibility and discretion, which is one of the reasons for adding wing men to the chairmen of industrial tribunals allowing appeals to the ordinary courts as characterised by him as a curious mistake, and the same kind of view is expressed by Dr. Geoffrey Clark in his publication "Remedies for Unjust Dismissal", and by Dr. Rideout who wrote about this in current legal problems in 1969. They all criticised appeals to ordinary judges in ordinary courts, and all commended this kind of change.

Mr. Rose

Is not the Solicitor-General misrepresenting Professor Wedderburn? He knows that Professor Wedderburn not only opposed appeals to ordinary courts but proposed wing men purely as a substitute for something better. The Solicitor-General knows that if Professer Wedderburn were here he would dismiss this proposal out of hand. People versed in industrial arbitration are far better equipped to deal with this sort of matter than are judges with a training which does not equip them to know what happens on the factory floor. Will the Solicitor-General please not quote Professor Wedderburn in support of something which he knows the professor opposed?

The Solicitor-General

I am not misrepresenting Professor Wedderburn. He takes the view that, so far as possible, lawyers should remain off the industrial scene. I do not want to do him any discredit in that respect, but he says that in so far as appeals exist under this kind of legislation, they should go not to the ordinary judges but to a more industrially sophisticated court, including wing men of the kind he describes.

He is supported by other critics. Dr. Geoffrey Clark, a left-wing critic of this legislation, and opposed to it in principle, makes the same point. And so does Dr. Rideout. What do hon. Gentlemen opposite want? Do they want appeals to go to the ordinary judges, or to this court which is more attuned and more specifically designed to hear such appeals? Of course it is a matter for regret that the real grievances of really effective work people will not yet be heard by a court which is as fully and as wholly representative of both sides of industry as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State would wish. It is not the Government, however, who are to blame for that. It is a great tragedy that the people, representative of both sides of industry, who would be willing to show a real willingness to serve are still deterred from coming forward to take the places which remain vacant for them on the National Industrial Relations Court.

The court will achieve its purpose, to the greater advantage of people on both sides of industry, and it will achieve it the more effectively and the more readily, as soon as passions, provoked beyond reason by the debate on the legislation, have been allowed to die and as soon as the places which stand available for representatives of the trade union movement are filled, as they should be in the interests of that movement and of the members of that movement.

Question put:—

The House divided: Ayes 237, Noes 216.

Division No.15.] AYES [11.36 p.m.
Adley, Robert Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton) Lane, David
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash) Fookes, Miss Janet Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead) Fowler, Norman Le Marchant, Spencer
Archer, Jeffrey (Louth) Fox, Marcus Longden, Gilbert
Astor, John Fry, Peter Loveridge, John
Atkins, Humphrey Galbraith, Hn. T. G. MacArthur, Ian
Awdry, Daniel Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B. McCrindle, R. A.
Baker, W. H. K. (Banff) Goodhart, Philip McLaren, Martin
Balniel, Lord Goodhew, Victor Maclean, Sir Fitzroy
Batsford, Brian Gower, Raymond McMaster, Stanley
Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.) McNair-Wilson, Michael
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) Gray, Hamish McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport) Green, Alan Madel, David
Benyon, W. Grieve, Percy Mather, Carol
Biffen, John Grylls, Michael Mawby, Ray
Biggs-Davison, John Gummer, Selwyn Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Blaker, Peter Gurden, Harold Meyer, Sir Anthony
Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.) Hall, John (Wycombe) Mills, Peter (Torrington)
Boscawen, Robert Hall-Davis, A. G. F. Miscampbell, Norman
Bossom, Sir Clive Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W.)
Bowden, Andrew Hannam, John (Exeter) Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John Haselhurst, Alan Monte, Roger
Bray, Ronald Hastings, Stephen Molyneaux, James
Brinton, Sir Tatton Havers, Michael Money, Ernie
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) Hawkins, Paul Monks, Mrs. Connie
Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M) Hayhoe, Barney Monro, Hector
Hicks, Robert Montgomery, Fergus
Burden, F. A. Higgins, Terence L. More, Jasper
Butler, Adam (Bosworth) Hiley, Joseph Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)
Carlisle, Mark Hill, James (Southampton, Test) Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.
Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.) Morrison, Charles
Chapman, Sydney Holland, Philip Mudd, David
Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher Holt, Miss Mary Murton, Oscar
Chichester-Clark, R. Hooson, Emlyn Neave, Airey
Churchill, W. S. Hornby, Richard Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Clegg, Walter Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate) Normanton, Tom
Cockeram, Eric Howell, David (Guildford) Nott, John
Cooke, Robert Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.) Onslow, Cranley
Coombs, Derek Hunt, John Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally
Cooper, A. E. Hutchison, Michael Clark Osborn, John
Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick Iremonger, T. L. Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)
Cormack, Patrick Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye) Page, Graham (Crosby)
Critchley, Julian James, David Page, John (Harrow, W.)
Crouch, David Jessel, Toby Parkinson, Cecil
Crowder, F. P. Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.) Percival, Ian
Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford) Jopling, Michael Peyton, Rt. Hn. John
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry Kaberry, Sir Donald Pink, R. Bonner
Dean, Paul Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine Powell, Rt. Ho. J. Enoch
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. Kershaw, Anthony Price, David (Eastleigh)
Dodds-Parker, Douglas Kilfedder, James Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.
Dykes, Hugh Kimball, Marcus Proudfoot, Wilfred
Eden, Sir John King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.) Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis
Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke) King, Tom (Bridgwater) Raison, Timothy
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.) Kinsey, J. R. Redmond, Robert
Eyre, Reginald Kirk, Peter Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Farr, John Kitson, Timothy Rees-Davies, W. R.
Fell, Anthony Knox, David Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy Lambton, Antony Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Ridsdale, Julian Steel, David Waddington, David
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.) Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper) Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Roberts, Wyn (Conway) Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.) Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks) Stokes, John Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Rost, Peter Stuttaford, Dr. Tom Wall, Patrick
Russell, Sir Ronald Sutcliffe, John Ward, Dame Irene
Sandys, Rt. Hn. D. Tapsell, Peter Weatherill, Bernard
Scott, Nicholas Tsylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart) Wells, John (Maidstone)
Scott-Hopkins, James Taylor, Frank (Moss Side) Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Sharples, Richard Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N. W.) Wiggin, Jerry
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & whitby) Tebbit, Norman Wilkinson, John
Shelton, William (Clapham) Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret Winterton, Nicholas
Simeons, Charles Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth) Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Sinclair, Sir George Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.) Woodnutt, Mark
Skeet, T. H. H. Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy Worsley, Marcus
Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington) Trafford, Dr. Anthony Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.
Soref, Harold Trew, Peter Younger, Hn. George
Speed, Keith Tugendhat, Christopher
Spence, John Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Sproat, Iain van Straubenzee, W. R. Mr. Hugh Rossi and
Stainton, Keith Vaughan, Dr. Gerard Mr. Tim Fortescue.
Stanbrook, Ivor Vickers, Dame Joan
NOES
Allaun, Frank, (Salford, E.) Ford, Ben McCartney, Hugh
Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis) Forrester, John McElhone, Frank
Ashley, Jack Fraser, John (Norwood) McGuire, Michael
Ashton, Joe Galpern, Sir Myer Mackenzie, Gregor
Atkinson, Norman Garrett, W. E. Hackie, John
Bagier, Gordon A. T. Ginsburg, David (Dewsbury) Mackintosh, John P.
Barnett, Guy (Greenwich) Golding, John Maclennan, Robert
Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood Gourley, Harry McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Bishop, E. S. Grant, George (Morpeth) McNamara, J. Kevin
Blenkinsop, Arthur Grant, John D. (Islington, E.) Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Booth, Albert Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside) Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Bradley, Tom Griffiths, Will (Exchange) Marks, Kenneth
Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-up on-Tyne, W.) Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Marquand, David
Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan) Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill) Marsden, F.
Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury) Hardy, Peter Marshall, Dr. Edmund
Buchan, Norman Harper, Joseph Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy
Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Meacher, Michael
Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.) Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Carmichael, Neil Hattersley, Roy Mendelson, John
Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield) Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis Millan, Bruce
Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles) Heffer, Eric S. Miller, Dr. M. S.
Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara Horan, John Milne, Edward
Clark, David (Colne Valley) Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)
Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.) Howell, Denis (Small Heath) Molloy, William
Cohen, Stanley Huckfield, Leslie Morgan, Elysian (Cardiganshire)
Coleman, Donald Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey) Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Concannon, J. D. Hughes, Mark (Durham) Morris Charles R. (Openshaw)
Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.) Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.) Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)
Crawshaw, Richard Hughes, Roy (Newport) Moyle, Roland
Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony Hunter, Adam Murray, Ronald King
Cunningham, Dr. J. A. (Whitehaven) Janner, Greville Oakes, Gordon
Davidson, Arthur Jeger, Mrs. Lena Ogden, Eric
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.) Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) O'Halloran, Michael
Davies, Ifor (Gower) Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford) O'Malley, Brian
Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.) John, Brynmor Orme, Stanley
Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove) Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.) Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)
de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey Jones, Barry (Flint. E.) Palmer, Arthur
Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund Jones, Dan (Burnley) Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)
Dempsey, James Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.) Pavitt, Laurie
Doig, Peter Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen) Pearl, Rt. Hn. Fred
Dormand, J. D. Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.) Pendry, Tom
Douglas-Mann, Bruce Judd, Frank Pentland, Norman
Dribera, Tom Kaufman, Gerald Perry, Ernest G.
Duffy, A. E. P. Kerr, Russell Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.
Dunn, James A. Kinnock, Neil Prescott, John
Dunnett, Jack Lambie, David Price, William (Rugby)
Eadie, Alex Lamond, James Probert, Arthur
Edwards, Robert (Bilston) Latham, Arthur Reed, D. (Sedgefield)
Ellis, Tom Lawson, George Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
English, Michael Leadbitter, Ted Rhodes, Geoffrey
Evans, Fred Leonard, Dick Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Ewing, Harry Lestor, Miss Jean Robertson, John (Paisley)
Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E. Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n & R'dnor)
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood) Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Rodgers, William (Stockton on-Tees)
Fitt, Gerard (Belfast, W.) Lomas, Kenneth Roper, John
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.) Rose, Paul B.
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson Ross, Rt. Hn. Willem (Kilmarnock)
Foley, Maurice McBride, Neil Sandelson, Neville
Foot, Michael McCann, John Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne) Strang, Gavin Wellbeloved, James
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.) Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford) Swain, Thomas White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich) Taverne, Dick Whitehead, Phillip
Sillars, James Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.) Whitlock, William
Silverman, Julius Tinn, James Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)
Skinner, Dennis Torney, Tom Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)
Small, William Tuck, Raphael Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.) Urwln, T. W. Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Spearing, Nigel Varley, Eric G. Woof, Robert
Spriggs, Leslie Wainwright, Edwin
Stallard, A. W. Walker, Harold (Doncaster) TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Stewart, Donald (Western Isles) Wallace, George Mr. Ernest Armstrong and
Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham) Watkins, David Mr. William Hamling.
Stoddart, David (Swindon)

Resolved, That the Industrial Court (Appeals) Order 1971, a draft of which was laid before this House on 3rd November, be approved.

Resolved, That the Industrial Court (Appeals) (Scotland) Order 1971, a draft of which was laid before this House on 3rd November, be approved.—[The Lord Advocate.]

Resolved, That the Legal Aid (Extension of Proceedings) Regulations 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd November, be approved.—[The Lord Advocate.]

Resolved, That the Legal Aid (Scotland) (Extension of Proceedings) (No. 2) Regulations 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd November, be approved.—[The Lord Advocate.]

    c1301
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