HC Deb 28 May 1971 vol 818 cc759-72

12.58 p.m.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Bradford, West)

I am glad to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, on this day in particular, which is the opening day of the Paris Air Show, and when it has been announced that a long-term treaty of friendship has been signed between the Soviet Union and Egypt. In the course of the debate, I want to take account of considerations both strategic and military and also industrial considerations.

In the long course of our history as a naval power, there have been a great many technical developments which have revolutionised naval warfare. In recent times there was the development of the "Dreadnought". After that, the most significant change was the development of naval air power and the whole new dimension it gave to naval operations. In the struggle for the Royal Air Force's identity which took place primarily in a period of retrenchment after the First World War, over-emphasis was perhaps laid on the salient principle of the indivisibility of air power.

This was understandable at the time, but it had costly repercussions. It meant that in those lean inter-war years naval air power found itself way down the list of operational priorities of the Royal Air Force. As one of the leading fighting admirals of the Second World War, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope remarked in his autobiography: From start to finish the control of the Naval air arm was a costly failure which militated against the vital air efficiency of the Navy. As the Air Estimates were also ruthlessly shorn, the Naval air arm became a sort of Cinderella service, neglected and nearly forgotten. It was not until 1937, after a severe and protracted struggle on the part of the Admiralty, that ship-borne aircraft again came under the full operational and administrative control of the Royal Navy with whom they would work in war. It was only just in time. It was very much as a result of Sir Winston Churchill's submission to the then Minister of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, in 1936 that the Fleet Air Arm as a separate entity came into being. I do not want to rehearse all those familiar arguments and go back to the inter-Service wrangles of that period, or the period immediately after the First World War. I believe that the policy which the Government are now pursuing, leading to functionalism, is the right one. In other words, the flying of the aircraft in support of naval operations should essentially be professionally a Royal Air Force function, although for command purposes it would, understandably, come under naval command where the military effect impinged on the outcome of purely naval operations.

These inter-Service wrangles have, even in the post-war period, cost the British defence policy dear. In the mid-1950s the Royal Air Force was very proud to wield the strategic nuclear deterrent. It was a former Air Officer Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command, Sir John Slessor, who was instrumental, I think, in winning the battle of the Atlantic, who did almost more than any other airman at that period to weld the great deterrent of the "V" force into an effective instrument of air power and deterrence. In his memoirs he made some pertinent observations of which I would remind the House. He said: The original Inskip award of 1937 did endeavour to make provision against unnecessarily wasteful overlapping in shore establishments between the Royal Air Force and Naval aviation. Actually, the decision was drafted by Sir Winston Churchill who later admitted that he had not conceived how enormous was the charge involved. In other words, there had been quite unjustifiable duplication of overheads, shore depots and training establishments, to say nothing of staffs, all of which largely stemmed from this idea that the maritime airman must be something essentially naval and different from his shore-based counterpart. We have to get out of our mind prejudices about what colour uniform the men who fly naval aircraft at sea will wear. These are matters for Whitehall to decide, but I do think that we have important principles of policy to lay down. The first of these is that although the Royal Air Force must provide functionally for the maintenance of maritime air power, there is a danger that it will be too low a priority.

I welcome most warmly the courageous step the Government have taken in retaining H.M.S. "Ark Royal" in service until the late 1970s. This decision is absolutely right. It is economically right because of the expensive refits which she has recently undergone and it is militarily right because of the wide range of options which the various aircraft embarked upon her will allow military commanders to dispose. For these reasons and not least because of the increasing emphasis on our maritime contribution to N.A.T.O. the "Ark Royal" decision was absolutely right.

There are a lot of questions which remain to be answer. Two or three years ago the defence correspondent of The Times, and others, were writing a number of articles—which I believe to be far- sighted—in which they referred to the gap in naval armaments, a gap which was likely to yawn after the arbitrary and unnecessary abolition of the fixed-wing element of British air power, then to take place before the change of government. The first of these articles was 8th July 1969, headed, "The gap in Naval armament". Then came another on 3rd October, 1969, "Insurance at Sea" in which Charles Douglas-Home hoped that the announcement that the late Admiral Sir Michael Le Fanu, was to become Chief of Defence Staff would mean that a greater emphasis would once again be placed upon the value of naval air power.

Then came an editorial on 30th October entitled, "Tragedy of Errors." It referred to the great procurement errors that had been committed so far in not allowing the Harrier in particular to be converted to the full for naval operations. This year, after the change of government, came an article, perhaps the last that Charles Douglas-Home wrote as defence correspondent, in which he referred to the aircraft carrier gap, which must have influenced the Government in their decision to retain the "Ark Royal", although I am sure they will not necessarily admit this.

The two things I want to emphasise are these First, it is not necessarily impossible, with current aircraft, to maintain a wide spectrum of maritime air capability Secondly, for only a relatively small additional cost to our procurement budget we could provide a whole range of options for our naval air arm and for the marines, in its amphibious rôle, that should not be ignored. In particular, in the second case, the range of options and the confidence in British hardware expressed by certain procurement orders that I shall recommend would have an immense significance to our export achievement in the aerospace sphere.

If we go back to the 1950s and 1960s and the wranglings of that time, the Fleet Air Arm was always adamant that for naval air operations jet aircraft should have two engines and two seats. This was the central philosophy which always underlay its arguments. In the context of air operations at sea, I can understand the good reasons for those arguments. This led to excessively long and heated controversy and not just a compromise of design that turned out to be impossible to attain, but to different procurement decisions on the part of the two Services.

In the first instance, there was the choice, in the Royal Air Force, of the Javelin and in the Royal Navy of the Sea Vixen for an all-weather interceptor. Then came the wranglings over the P1154 which were ultimately contributory to the project's tragic cancellation. I am glad that those wrangles are behind us and I ask the House and the Government to draw the right conclusions from them. One thing that both sets of staff, naval and air, always wanted was a range of aircraft that would be truly inter-operable. I have said this before but I make no apology for repeating it. It was hitherto an impossible goal for various reasons. Now at last there is a generation of high performance aircraft which are truly inter-operable—Phantoms, Buccaneers, the Jaguar, the Harrier and beyond that the M.R.C.A. There is also all the M.R.C.A.'s progeny which one could imagine in the shape of a whole range of variable geometry aircraft, which possess remarkable capability for short take-off and landing.

In short take-off and landing, just as much in the pure vertical take-off and landing sense, there are technical breakthroughs which could revolutionise naval air warfare. In view of the contribution which we have made in the post-war era to developments in air naval warfare, it would be tragic if we did not take the lead in this matter. We developed the steam catapult, the angled flight deck, and the mirror landing aid. All these developments made the operation of modern high performance jet aircraft possible at sea. The United States followed up those developments and the free world has been a much safer place for it.

At the beginning of the Second World War the Fleet Air Arm did not have the advantage of similar technical developments. If what the history books tell us, or what your experience, Mr. Deputy Speaker, tells you, is right, it went into action and established for itself a heroic tradition of engaging overwhelming hostile forces in antiquated machines against all the odds and pulling off amaz- ing achievements. But that is not the sort of thing that I should want to call upon British naval air power to undertake in future.

The Royal Air Force was able to develop the variable pitch airscrew, radar direction for interception, and the high performance benefits of the monoplane. At the beginning of World War II the Fleet Air Arm had none of these. I earnestly hope that the British Navy will have at its command—and I emphasise the word "command"—the advantages of vertical short take-off and landing aircraft and variable geometry aircraft which will not only augment its capability enormously but enable it to maintain its presence on the high seas where it will be increasingly needed in the years ahead.

The naval picture overall is bleak. There is a movement towards Europe. If that means anything—and I know that in recent years we have had collaborative projects with Europe which have worked well—it will lead to a more rational allocation of our defence effort. In other words, at a time when America will inevitably be tempted towards disengagement, Europe should be playing a greater part in her own defence. For us islanders in the United Kingdom it must mean an increasing maritime and air rôle. One envisages that, on the central front, the Germans will bear the main manpower burdens, but that we on the flanks and at the rear of the Alliance will be called upon to provide the mobility and flexibility and long-range strike capability which alone maritime and air power can enable us to provide. It is therefore imperative, especially at this time, when we are going into Europe, that we should develop fully our technical and traditional capabilities in naval and air warfare, which would have immense industrial ramifications.

I must mention the question of the hardware which is available. I know that, in spite of the protestations of Captain Baldwin and others, manpower considerations heavily impinge on naval planning. Will the Government consider again the period for which H.M.S. "Eagle" is likely to be retained in service? I know that she is due to retire from the active Fleet in 1972, but I hope that she will be retained longer. There is absolutely no reason why that fine capital ship which has only fairly recently been refitted should not operate the Jaguar even if she cannot operate the Phantom, with its present catapult and arrester gear.

H.M.S. "Hermes" is being re-equipped for a commando rôle, which is all very fine. But we would be very foolish if we were not to follow the example of the United States and operate our own aircraft, the Harrier, at sea in the close support rôle for backing up amphibious forces. There is no reason why Harriers should not be part of the complement at sea of "Hermes" in addition to the helicopters which she will carry for assault duties.

If we look at the Congressional Record and the testimony of General Hill of the United States Marine Corps about the Harrier, we cannot but fail to be impressed. He said: The Harrier has a very unique capability It has either V.T.O.L. or outstanding S.T.O.L. capability. This will permit us in our ship-to-shore mission to operate off any type of ship in the fleet with this aircraft. Not only that, it will permit us to phase ashore earlier. In other words just about every ship in the Fleet which can carry a helicopter can carry the Harrier. It is arguable whether we should employ our air power in penny packets operating from small platforms and relatively small ships at sea. That is a matter for the Naval Staff to argue about ad infinitum. But this is a unique aircraft which is years ahead of its time—a typical brain child of British ingenuity and inventiveness which has not been realised to the full in its country of birth.

I know that the R.A.F. has done extremely well with Harrier. Conversions on to the aircraft at No. 233 Operational Conversion Unit are going smoothly and well. Three squadrons are operating: No. 1 in this country, which was recently embarked on "Ark Royal" in the Moray Firth, to the great interest of the Russians if to nobody else, No. 4 in Germany and No. 20 in Germany. It will be most valuable in the N.A.T.O. rôle operating from dispersed sites where aircraft are relatively invulnerable to the first strike which N.A.T.O. as a defensive alliance must expect.

The R.A.F. has acted laudably in getting the aircraft operational and proving it so effectively. But it has been not just myopia over the technical possibilities of vertical and short take-off and landing operations but political prejudice which has failed to allow the Royal Navy to get its feet wet with the Harrier. Until the Navy gets its feet wet with the Harrier, the large export potential of this aircraft will not be fully realised.

At a time when the Paris Air Show is under way and the British aerospace industry has suffered cruelly from grave difficulties—for example, over the RB211 engine—it would be a most valuable fillip, not only for morale in the Fleet where air cover is essential, but industrially throughout the country if an order for this aircraft were placed. If we managed to get one or two squadrons at sea in the next 18 months it would be a great advance.

Militarily the arguments for getting this aircraft to sea quickly are overwhelming. The Soviet Union has a large range of surface-to-surface guided weapons of immense capability. They range from the fairly short-range Styx which is operated from patrol boats—and one need only cast one's mind back to the "Eilat" incident to realise how effective they are—to the extremely long-range Shadock which has a range of between 200 and 300 nautical miles. This is a capability which the Government have realised and emphasised in the order for the Anglo-French Exocet as an acknowledgement of the reality of this threat.

I would refer to an article in "Navy" about the surface-to-surface capability of the Russian Navy. The Styx, which will range about 15 miles, is fitted in patrol boats of the Osa and Komar classes. In other words, there are almost hundreds of vessels operating this weapon, and it is a weapon which, so far, we have yet to counter and unless we do counter it we shall be virtually powerless. This, to me, is most alarming, particularly in the narrow waters around these islands and off Europe, where one can expect those patrol boats to operate.

Then there is the medium-range Strela with a range of about 100 miles on the Kildin and Krupny class destroyers of which there are some ten already in the Soviet Navy and in service. It is a very fine weapon but has nowhere near the 300 mile range of Shadock. The veterans of Trafalgar, were there any surviving, and the veterans of Jutland or of Coronel or of the Scharnhorst engagements, or of the chase of the Bismark, would all say that the side which, as in armoured warfare, has the largest range of fire has an overwhelming, indeed insuperable, advantage.

Therefore it is quite essential that we do have air power to counter this threat. For the short term I am glad that we have the "Ark Royal" and "Eagle" in commission, but for the longer term I have my anxieties, and I would most earnestly ask my hon. Friend whether he will get in touch with the naval person of the Front Bench, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, and impress upon him the urgency of getting further ships at sea, ships which can operate the most modern aircraft.

I know we are giving serious thought to the through deck command cruiser, which will have augmented capability. I believe that this vessel is commensurate with our resources, both of manpower and finance. For goodness sake, if we are not to retain the existing strike carriers very long, let us get on with ordering that cruiser. After all, the shipyards at Birkenhead and on the Tyne and on the Clyde need orders. Let us get on with ordering those ships, and embrace the aerial technology which can exploit the potential of those ships.

With 10 per cent. augmentation of thrust of the Pegasus engine, we get virtually double the ordnance payload from the Harrier in a given radius of action, and even that augmentation of thrust would make the most immense operational difference to the capabilities of that aircraft. The Harrier has experienced over the past 10 years an augmentation of some 100 per cent. in the thrust of Pegasus engine from that of the original Pegasus for the 1127 back in 1960.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that similar developments will be possible in the next 10 years. If that is the case there would be an immense break-through for naval air warfare, and in the immediate future there is no reason at all why the Navy should not get at least one or two squadrons of this aircraft at sea. What is required at present is a proper funding of the Pegasus 15 engine, which will augment the power of the Pegasus to about 24,000 lb. static thrust. Were this done I personally have no doubt that in addition to the United States Marine Corps the United States Navy as well would possibly order the aircraft, and, beyond that, one can see a whole range of navies ordering it:—the Spanish, the Argentinian, the Italian. Virtually any navy which has ships of a size to operate helicopters, they, too, would operate the Harrier.

In conclusion, unless at this crucial time in our naval history we are prepared to make sure that the Fleet Air Arm, whether flown by people in Navy blue uniforms or pale blue uniforms, has a continued high-performance capability into the late '70s or early '80s it will not have the potential which is required to counter the effectiveness in surface-to-surface weaponry which the Soviet Navy possesses. I myself find that a frightening prospect, and the solution is so easy both industrially and nationally. I do ask my hon. Friend to give me some assurance that, following the very successful trials of No. 1 Harrier Squadron in the Moray Firth, he will be very forthcoming to the Navy.

1.26 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Antony Lambton)

I would open by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Wilkinson) upon the interesting speech he has made. At the same time I would express the regrets of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, who is unable, due to unforeseen circumstances, to be here today.

My hon. Friend has raised an interesting issue, the development of naval air power. To give him a comprehensible answer I should like to answer him in toto, as it were, for it would be unreal to speak in this debate only about organic air power, by which I mean aircraft which fly from ships. What I think he wants to hear about is the arrangements for providing air power in its widest sense for maritime operations, and, taking this into consideration, I should like to deal with three points, fixed-wing operations, V.S.T.O.L. aircraft, and helicopters.

First of all, I speak of fixed-wing air operations. My hon. Friend knows that it is the Government's intention that responsibility for carrying out fixed-wing operations will be assumed by the Royal Air Force, and he will also know that it is not planned to build more fixed-wing aircraft carriers to succeed "Eagle", or "Ark Royal" which will be phased out in the late 1970s. I do not propose this afternoon to go into the arguments which my hon. Friend touched upon, because these arguments we have been through in the House so many times. I can only repeat that the policy ultimately to phase out fixed-wing aircraft carriers, and to transfer responsibility for maritime fixed-wing air operations to the Royal Air Force, is not in any way—I am sure my hon. Friends will agree with this—a reflection upon the performance of the Fleet Air Arm. I think everyone in the House will agree that it has served with the greatest distinction in this rôle, and who would not pay tribute to its remarkable record over the last 50 years? However, as my hon. Friend said, we are moving into an era in which the main contribution of the Fleet Air Arm will be in other forms of aviation, to which I shall refer later.

Shore based aircraft for maritime operations will be provided by the R.A.F. and the Air Forces of our allies. So far as the R.A.F. is concerned, there will be the Nimrods for long-range reconnaissance and anti-submarine work, and Lightnings, Phantoms and Buccaneers for air defence, strike and reconnaissance. These aircraft are well suited to the task, and will be supported by tankers for air to air refuelling. From next year the R.A.F. will also be providing a number of Shackleton long range aircraft equipped with airborne early warning radar to supplement the cover provided by the Gannets embarked on the "Ark Royal". In the longer term we look to the M.R.C.A. to take over from the Phantoms and the Buccaneers.

I am sure that my hon. Friend will not want me to refer to the "Ark Royal" or to the Government's decision to extend her service until the late 1970s. This has been debated too often in the House before. I will merely say that "Ark Royal" is being run on to cover the gap, to which he referred, until the improved ships and weapons systems planned for the Fleet come into service on a wider scale. I again stress that it is not planned to replace "Ark Royal" with another fixed wing carrier.

It is important to make this point about the nature of the further service of "Ark Royal" because it is an integral part of the plan that the aircraft for "Ark Royal" will be provided from the total numbers already planned. The Phantoms and Buccaneers have many years service ahead of them, and we should not be justified in buying aircraft to replace those in the carrier rôle My hon. Friend mentioned other aircraft for instance, Jaguars, but their use for "Ark Royal" does not arise, Similarly, there is no question of operating the M.R.C.A. from "Ark Royal" for reasons which are obvious.

I come now to the central theme of my hon. Friend's speech, the deployment of V.S.T.O.L. aircraft at sea. The House will know of the trials which have been carried out this month, and of the Government's position which has been stated on a number of occasions. As my hon. Friend has raised it, I shall go over the main points again. The value of V.S.T.O.L. aircraft operating effectively from ships at sea would obviously stem from their rapid reaction capability. This would obviously be valuable and would complement shore-based aircraft and the ships' own weapon systems. Because we recognise this potential value we are carefully looking at this. The Government have also preserved the option of deploying V.S.T.O.L. aircraft from the cruisers. If V.S.T.O.L. aircraft were to be deployed at sea, they would be capable of operating from the flat tops of such ships as "Hermes". But I prefer not to speculate at this stage about which ships might carry V.S.T.O.L. aircraft if the decision were to employ aircraft of this type in the maritime rôle. As my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Navy said in an earlier debate, the first priority is to complete the conversion of "Hermes" to the commando ship rôle.

I turn now to the trials which have been carried out recently jointly by the Navy and the Royal Air Force. We are, naturally, concerned to establish whether the costs of deploying aircraft of the V.S.T.O.L. type would be commensurate with the return which would be obtained from such an investment, measured in terms of operational capability compared with meeting the task with shore based aircraft.

As regards effectiveness, these trials will be of considerable value. Earlier trials of the Harrier which were carried out in "Eagle", "Ark Royal" and "Blake" were aimed at assessing the deck operating characteristics of the Harrier. These established that the Harrier could be flown satisfactorily on and off the decks of ships at sea. The most recent trials were designed to carry the process a stage further by investigating the operational capability of these aircraft in the new environment.

These trials, which were witnessed by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Navy, were thorough and extensive. In all, 57 aircraft sorties were flown, including 21 in which the aircraft carried weapons. The results of all these trials are now being evaluated and they will form an essential and important contribution to our studies. There is no want of urgency in this matter; my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy is fully aware of its importance, and a decision will be taken as soon as possible.

I will say a word or two about the sale of Harriers abroad. The United States Marine Corps has ordered 30 and has authorised orders for long dated material for a further 30 aircraft for delivery in 1973. The more of these aircraft we are able to sell, the better pleased we shall be.

My hon. Friend brought up the question of "Eagle". He will know that considerable costs are involved, both in manpower and in money, which would not be justified by the extension of "Eagle" beyond the time when it is to be withdrawn.

Mr. Wilkinson

My hon. Friend said earlier that he did not see any fixed wing carrier being built. Looking at the possibilities which the through deck cruiser provides, the V.S.T.O.L. aircraft of the Harrier class could be considered just like a rotary wing aircraft in the landing and take-off mode—just a bit more puff downwards and a bit hotter. In terms of space taken up and logistically there is essentially no difference. Therefore, politically, outside semantics about the decision of the last Government, should not this be considered?

Mr. Lambton

All these questions are being considered, as well as the question of the armaments to be put in the new cruisers if they are to be developed.

I come now to helicopters. There is no question nowadays of rotary wing aircraft being the poor relation of fixed wing aircraft. Without doubt, the helicopter will be one of the main weapons of the Fleet in coming years. In the future, almost all ships of the Royal Navy of frigate class and above will be equipped with them. The Wasp, for example, is now largely used in the Fleet, mainly in frigates. It is an antisubmarine weapon-carrying helicopter, but it also operates in the search and reconnaissance rôle. Starting in the middle 1970s, it is intended to replace it progressively in the small ship rôle by the Anglo-French Lynx helicopter, which will have an improved capability.

The large Wessex 3 helicopter, which is fitted with sonar, operates in the antisubmarine rôle from larger ships. It is deployed at present in the County Class destroyers and H.M.S. "Blake", and will be replaced in "Blake" by the Sea King helicopter in the early years of this decade. The Sea King is already operating from "Eagle" and "Ark Royal", and in due course it will be deployed in H.M.S. "Tiger" as well as "Blake" and later in the new cruisers, when they enter service. The Sea King is a more powerful and longer range version of the Sikorsky SH3-D helicopter. It can be said to have added a new capability to the armoury at the disposal of the Royal Navy.

The growing scope and importance of the rotary wing flying task is giving the Fleet Air Arm a new rôle to play in the development of naval air power. Although the fixed wing flying task of the Fleet Air Arm is not complete, there is rather a change of emphasis. And I am certain that tasks in the future will be met by the Fleet Air Arm with rotary wing aircraft with the same readiness and skill as they have been met in the past.