HC Deb 27 May 1971 vol 818 cc710-20

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Clegg.]

10.0 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Willey (Sunderland, North)

In raising the case of lames Hanratty I do not want to be misunderstood. I was one of the handful of Members who raised the case of Timothy Evans. I raise this case in the same spirit. I am not concerned with the issue of capital punishment, or with the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. Above all, I am not challenging the integrity of the administration of justice.

The Hanratty case was exceptional, as was that of Timothy Evans. It must be 18 years since I spoke in this House on the Evans case.

Anyone who has practised the law knows that it is impossible to devise a judicial system with absolute safeguards against mistake and error. The issue in the Hanratty case is whether there is a genuine possibility that there may have been such a mistake and whether grounds have been established for believing that there may have been a miscarriage of justice sufficient to warrant a public inquiry.

In this context, miscarriage of justice has a particular and limited connotation. We are not charged with the burden of establishing the innocence of James Hanratty. The case for an inquiry is whether, if information now available had been before the jury, it is reasonable to conclude that they would not have convicted James Hanratty.

If the case for an inquiry is conceded, I earnestly believe that it must be a public and judicial inquiry. It is an investigation into a conviction by a jury made in open court. If there is the possibility of any reflection upon that conviction, then I believe that the further consideration and the further evidence must be held equally openly. This is cardinal to the administration of justice and of special importance for three reasons.

First, while I fully recognise that there were exceptional circumstances in the Evans case, the Scott-Henderson inquiry did more than anything else to upset public confidence.

Secondly, whatever the relative merits of the continental inquisitorial system compared with our accusatory system, whether or not it is better to investigate the truth of a crime rather than the guilt or innocence of the accused, if, on balance, we regard our system as better, we have at the same time to recognise that there are some inherent dangers in concentrating on the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused. I believe that an essential safeguard against this danger is the possibility of a subsequent judicial inquiry.

Thirdly—I regard this as particularly important—if we are concerned about the independent integrity of British justice we should always strive to maintain the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive. We should always be on guard against the executive trespassing on the functions of the judiciary; we should be on guard against officials, however well-intentioned, assuming judicial functions.

It is largely for these reasons that I press the Home Secretary to institute a public and judicial inquiry into the Hanratty case. I am not suggesting that the Home Secretary should institute such an inquiry, save in exceptional circumstances, but I suggest that those circumstances obtain in the Hanratty case. I would not dispute that successive Home Secretaries have given the case a tremendous amount of careful thought, and no doubt the present Home Secretary is doing so. I considered postponing the debate but, on second thoughts, believed that it would be better to put my point of view to him before he completed his consideration.

Moreover, I do not accept the right hon. Gentlman's replies at Question Time last week as altogether satisfactory. I got the impression that he regarded it as incumbent upon him to decide what I have emphasised is the responsibility of a judicial inquiry. What he has to decide is only whether there are sufficient exceptional circumstances and a strong enough prima facie case to warrant an inquiry. I thought that it was somewhat unsatisfactory also for him to say that his concern was to determine whether there were any new factors not previously known. That did not apply to the setting-up of the inquiry by Mr. Justice Brabin into the Evans case.

In any case, we do not know—it is one of the difficulties in dealing with the case—what factors the right hon. Gentleman knew before he received Mr. Paul Foot's book. The factors he should now be considering are, I believe, first, that there is considerable public anxiety about the Hanratty case. This has been demonstrated by the response to Mr. Foot's book. Last week, the Home Secretary himself said that the case gave rise to considerable public concern. This in itself provides for me sufficient grounds for an inquiry. The only way to allay that public anxiety is to institute a public inquiry judicially conducted, and this is the primary responsibility of the Home Secretary.

The second factor is that the Home Office, I believe, is obliged to reconsider its own position. It has already stated its case against the holding of an inquiry and, indeed, has repeated it. Lord Brooke, when he was Home Secretary, gave it first, and it was repeated by Lord Stonham later in another place. The Home Office relies on the force of the prosecution's evidence of identification. I would not deny that it is important but, in the light of Mr. Foot's full account, I am sure that many people now share my serious reservations about it.

What must be borne in mind is what is not generally appreciated—that, surprisingly enough, evidence of identification is often unreliable. There have been several recent cases, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, in which identification has subsequently been disproved. The National Council for Civil Liberties in 1968 presented the Home Office with a list of over 15 cases of apparent false identification, and this was at any rate recognised by the Home Office to the extent that it issued a circular recommending certain precautions. Clearly, some of the precautions recommended in that circular—issued in 1969—were not followed in the Handatty case.

The Home Office said that, against the evidence of identification, the demand for an inquiry depended on Mr. Alphon's confession, which was spurious and contained nothing that could not have been known from the trial—in particular, that the location of the field was widely known at the time, that Mr. Alphon did not drive a car and that he had a complete alibi which was beyond challenge. But it now seems to me and I am sure to many people who have read the book that all these assertions are badly shaken by Mr. Paul Foot's book. The incident of the greyhound remains unscathed but even that has not the significance that Lord Brooke attributed to it.

In considering the attitude taken by the Home Office, there is also the question of the Rhyl alibi. On this, in 1967, my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins), the then Home Secretary, accepted that new factors had been brought forward, and he appointed Chief Superintendent Nimmo to make investigations. After considering Superintendent Nimmo's reports, he decided that there was no further evidence which, if put before the jury, might have influenced the verdict.

I am sure that this was a carefully considered conclusion of the then Home Secretary on the very point which is, I believe, at issue. But as I have argued, the Home Secretary's examination should have been limited to the preliminary inquiry into whether there was a prima facie case for a public inquiry. Apart from this, I find it difficult not to agree with Mr. Paul Foot that the manner and nature of Superintendent Nimmo's inquiries were thoroughly unsatisfactory.

In the third place, as he has said, it is for the Home Secretary to consider whether there is any new material of substance which has now been presented. This, he has told us, is what he is doing. I can only comment that, without knowing what information the Home Office had before receiving Mr. Foot's book, it seems that Mr. Foot has provided some significant new material about some aspects of the case, providing greater cogency for the argument for an inquiry about the Rhyl alibi and about Mr. Alphon.

The Home Secretary must, I believe, consider whether, in the light of all the circumstances, the fit and proper course is to hold a public inquiry. Hitherto I have not been drawn into this case. In the Timothy Evans case I was especially intrigued by two incongruous factors. Early on I was told authoritatively and confidentially that Timothy Evans, a Roman Catholic, had protested his innocence to the end. I was also told that he was an inveterate liar. Oddly enough, I find these same factors colouring the case of James Hanratty.

But I have done no more than read Mr. Paul Foot's brilliantly powerful analysis. Of course, it is biased. Nevertheless, I feel satisfied—the burden is no greater than this—that Mr. Foot has established a strong prima facie case for a public inquiry.

When Lord Brooke, as Home Secretary, gave the Home Office's reasons for not holding such an inquiry, he also defined the attitude of the Home Office. He said: If I thought that there was anything in this memorandum I have received, I would not hesitate to appoint a public inquiry. Indeed, I go further than that. If I thought that on any reasonable view there could possibly be anything in it, I would welcome an independent investigation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1963; Vol. 682, c. 831.] Whether or not the reader is personally persuaded by Mr. Foot's book, I do not think that any objective reader could deny that on any reasonable view, there could possibly be anything in it. Accepting the Home Office's criterion, I consider that the Home Secretary has no alternative but to institute an independent judicial inquiry.

I acknowledge at once all the difficulties, especially those caused by the lapse of time. I acknowledge the distress that this could occasion some people, but further evasion and procrastination will only aggravate public anxiety and suspicion. We must recognise the fact that Mr. Paul Foot's book has disturbed the public's conscience. I urge the Home Secretary, therefore, to allay that anxiety and to remove that suspicion, and, incidentally, to express his confidence in the judiciary by announcing, without much further delay, his decision to institute a public judicial inquiry.

10.15 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Mark Carlisle)

May I say at once to the right hon. Gentleman that I fully appreciate the concern that has led him to raise this case tonight. I am sure that he will accept from me—indeed, it was almost anxiomatic in the words he used—that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is no less anxious than he is to be satisfied of the truth of this matter.

As long ago as August, 1963, the then Home Secretary, now Lord Brooke of Cumnor, speaking on a similar occasion in this House, said: … few criminal cases in recent years have been so widely publicised as the one that we are now considering."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1963: Vol. 682, c. 823.] In the years since then, a good deal more has been written and said about this case. Other aspects of the case have been ventilated. Earlier points have been enlarged upon and argued about. Statements have been made and retracted. I emphasise that much careful thought has been given, as the right hon. Gentleman himself accepted, by the Home Office and by successive Home Secretaries to each of the various new decelopments in this case.

Before stating, as I propose to, the approach that my right hon. Friend the present Home Secretary takes on these matters, it is right that I should remind the House on the background, because the background is an essential part of any approach to this matter at this time. While fresh facets of the case continue to be presented, it is not, I believe, having listened to the right hon. Gentleman's argument tonight, any part of his argument that he is bringing forward entirely new matters.

From time to time over the years attention has been drawn to many different points in this complex case, so that by now there are few aspects of it which have not in some way been either commented on, inquired into or considered. That is not to say that they have necessarily been settled to everyone's satisfaction; nor that we should regard the matter as thereby necessarily closed. The Home Secretary is always ready to consider fresh evidence and to listen to new arguments.

In examining the case for further consideration and inquiry, however, it is necessary that we should remember and take account of the very thorough consideration which the case has already received. Whatever views hon. Members may hold on the decisions of successive Home Secretaries in this matter, the House will, I am sure—and the right hon. Gentleman accepted this—accept that they were not reached lightly or, indeed, without the most careful and anxious thought.

Of course, it is right that there should be critical discussion as to whether the Minister came to a correct conclusion. But I do not believe that it is of any service to the case of those who are concerned at the possibility of a miscarriage of justice to suggest for a moment that the conclusions which have so far been reached were reached other than with due consideration.

I remind the right hon. Gentleman and the House of the background. Hanratty was convicted and sentenced to death on 17th February, 1962, and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 13th March. It then fell to the Home Secretary of the day, now Lord Butler, to decide whether there were grounds on which he could recommend a reprieve, and therefore the first Departmental examination of the case began.

Ministers who have previously spoken in debates on this case here and in another place, and on other cases, have remarked on the onerous burden which responsibility for the decision placed on Home Secretaries at that time. Mr. Henry Brooke, as he then was, spoke of the load on the mind and the heart of any such decision. In accordance with normal practice all relevant facts which were known at the time and which might have any bearing on the careful decision that had to be taken were marshalled and examined by the Department and submitted to the Home Secretary for decision. After most careful consideration the then Home Secretary, Mr. Butler as he then was, decided that the law must take its course.

The following year, as a result of renewed representations, the case was again gone into very thoroughly by the next Home Secretary, the then Mr. Henry Brooke. In reply to a similar Adjournment debate on 2nd August, 1963, Mr. Brooke informed the House that on the facts available to him he could find nothing which caused him to doubt that Hanratty was rightly convicted and that he could find no grounds to justify the appointment of a public inquiry. In the course of that reply Mr. Brooke went into some details of the matters he had considered, including the suspicions that had been attached to the man who at that stage was referred to throughout the debate as "Mr. X" but who in the light of what has happened subsequently can now be identified as Mr. Peter Alphon.

In 1965 Lord Russell of Liverpool wrote a book on the case in which he concluded that the jury was not justified in its verdict and in August, 1966, he initiated a debate on this case in another place. By then it had fallen to another Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins), to bring a fresh mind to bear on the intricacies of this case. Replying to that debate in another place Lord Stonham referred to the difficulties attaching to the sort of public inquiry for which Lord Russell was asking and described the careful thought that the then Home Secretary had given and was still giving to the case.

As the right hon. Gentleman has said, at that time attention was focusing especially on Hanratty's claim that he was in Rhyl on the date on which the murder took place. In the light of the material that had then been submitted to him the right hon. Member for Stechford decided to arrange for a senior police officer who had not previously had any connection with this case—that was Detective Chief Superintendent Nimmo, then with the Manchester City Police—to make a detailed investigation into the alibi.

In November, 1967, the right hon. Gentleman informed the House of the result of the investigations Mr. Nimmo had carried out. He said then that nothing had been found to strengthen the evidence called at the trial on Hanratty's behalf and there was no further evidence which if put before the jury might have influenced its verdict. He concluded therefore that there were no grounds for his taking any further action in the case.

Since then the case has continued to engage the attention of subsequent Home Secretaries. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) reviewed the case, I understand, with equally thorough care. I have recited that history, not to suggest for one moment that there is nothing more to be said, because as the right hon. Gentleman accepts, in a matter of such continuing concern the Home Secretary ought not and does not close his mind, but to explain the way in which any Home Secretary is bound to approach renewed representations for a further and public inquiry. As my right hon. Friend informed the House last week at Question Time, he is having a full analysis made of the latest publication by Mr. Paul Foot on the subject. What he will have to decide is whether it brings out any new factors not previously known which justify an inquiry at this stage.

As I have said, over the years there have been many examinations of the case. Different points have been raised, and many inquiries have been made. It would be wrong for anyone to think that all the points marshalled in the new book are dramatic new revelations to which no thought has hitherto been given. Where matters have already been the subject of exhaustive inquiry which has proved negative, it would be misleading to re-open them, unless there were good reason to believe that facts hitherto concealed could yet be brought to light. What we have now to consider first, therefore, is whether any new facts have been presented which have not already been fully considered and into which new inquiries should be instituted, and whether the balance of argument in the case merits a further opening up of old lines of inquiry.

I remind the House of what the Home Secretary's function must be. A good deal of space in the book is devoted to rehearsals of the evidence before the trial court and the author's evaluation. That is relevant, but only in so far as it bears on what has since come to light. The trial of criminal cases is a matter for the courts, and the decision on the evidence adduced is one for the jury. It is not for the Home Secretary to revalue what was before the jury and to presume to interfere because he thinks, without having had the benefit of hearing the witnesses under examination and cross-examination, that he might have reached a different verdict. That is an approach that the Home Secretary cannot and will not adopt.

The approach of my right hon. Friend must be to see whether new factors have come to light which were not before the jury then, and which, had they been before it, might have led to a different decision.

There is on the Order Paper a Motion in the name of the right hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Gordon Walker) and others which argues the desirability of a public inquiry on the ground that the jury would not have reached the same verdict if it had been in possession of evidence which has since become available. It is that which I believe to be the right approach and that is what the Home Secretary must now assess—the weight and significance of those matters which a jury was not in a position to take into account.

Mr. Willey

I accept that it is new evidence which was not before the jury which demands consideration, but if there should be a prima facie case for serious consideration, does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that that should be the function of a judicial tribunal, because of the very point he has made, that what we are dealing with is a conviction made in open court by the jury?

Mr. Carlisle

Of course, I accept that if the Home Secretary is satisfied that there is a prima facie case he would be right to institute an inquiry. The point I wanted to make is that a decision on whether there is a prima facie case must be based on new evidence that was not available to the jury.

I have deliberately and advisedly refrained from making any comment on the details of the case or its merits, and I do not intend to do so. As my right hon. Friend has indicated, all the matters that have lately been raised are being carefully analysed, and it would not be right for me to express any opinion until all the many considerations have been fully digested and considered. This is a grave matter, and the House will realise the care that is needed to consider it.

The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, the last Home Secretary, speaking last week from his own experience of the matter, recognised that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary must be allowed time to consider it. My right hon. Friend has said that he will make up his mind as soon as possible. The right hon. Gentleman and the House may be assured that in doing so he will take very carefully into account all the points that the right hon. Gentleman has made.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Ten o'clock.