HC Deb 21 May 1971 vol 817 cc1760-70

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Weatherill.]

4.2 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins (Putney)

The House has just been discussing the efforts which society makes to try to look after those who have the misfortune to be chronically sick or disabled. The subject which I wish to raise on the Ajournment is rather different. It concerns the efforts which we make to make people sick, to disable and to kill them.

I wish to raise the subject of chemical and biological warfare, which has been referred to as public health in reverse. It is a method of warfare which attacks the civil population. It is natural that, for this reason, civilised man has endeavoured to outlaw it. Because I feel that these endeavours are at the moment, on the one hand, full of promise and, on the other, full of peril, I venture to raise the matter today.

I think that it will generally be agreed that the current century is perhaps one of the most remarkable through which mankind has travelled. Certainly it is one of the greatest change periods. Perhaps the most alarming change is that it is the century, and ours is the generation, in which men have learned how to destroy not only other men—they have known how to do that from the beginning—but perhaps even all men and conceivably all life. This presents us with an entirely new situation which mankind has never had to face before.

Those of us who have been worried about this situation either actively or inactively, secretly or in public—that really means most of us—have concentrated in the past overmuch on the threat posed by nuclear weapons—this is so in my case, perhaps because I was in Asia when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima—and later the invention of the hydrogen bomb seemed to pose a grave threat to the survival of humanity itself. So we had our great protests, and every Easter for years we marched. Despite our fears, I think that we greatly enjoyed ourselves, but perhaps we did something to increase public awareness and make generally recognised the grave dangers inherent in nuclear warfare. But perhaps also, all the time, we were closing our eyes to what may prove to be an even more dangerous threat—the development of chemical and biological warfare.

The development of nerve gases, much more lethal than those used during the First World War, the use of defoliation and crop destruction in Vietnam, and, above all, the intensive research being done at Porton Down in this country and elsewhere in many other countries on biological warfare threaten mankind with extinction on the cheap as distinct from the huge effort which has to be made to mount an attack by nuclear weapons. A great Power could be crippled by use of these weapons by a small Power which might be prepared to take the terrible risk of world depopulation.

The problem is that inspection or arms control and disarmament is very difficult, if not impossible, in chemical or biological warfare. So we fall back on international agreements and upon the close and trusted observance of international agreements to save us all. For we all have a common interest in survival; this is not a question in which one nation has a greater interest than another.

Perhaps the most important international agreement was the agreement of 1925 when, possibly in the shadow of the use of gas after the First World War, the nations, in a moment of illumination, recognised that this must be outlawed by the Geneva Protocol which has been signed since by 42 nations—unfortunately, not by the United States.

The attitude of successive British Governments to this agreement in recent years has, I am sorry to say, changed for the worse in the last year. On the other hand, the last Labour Government exerted considerable efforts in trying to extend and make more general in application the 1925 Geneva Agreement. In 1966, we supported the United Nations Resolution which called for strict observance of the Protocol, and, ever since, this country has taken the lead in trying to extend the agreement to include biological weapons and to strengthen the existing restraints on chemical warfare.

Unfortunately, and simultaneously with this beneficient activity, the last Government also reinterpreted the 1925 Agreement unilaterally for the worse. That is to say, they sought to strengthen and extend it but, also to weaken its universality by excluding CS gas from it.

An earlier Labour Government, in 1930, made their position very clear, saying that the Protocol prohibited the use in warfare of … asphyxiating poisonous and other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices"— which is about as all-embracing as can be—and that … the use in war of other gases, including lachrymatory gases (i.e. chemical irritants) was also prohibited. That was a quotation from the memorandum on chemical warfare presented to the Preparatory Commission on the Disarmament Conference by the United Kingdom Delegation at Geneva on 18th November, 1930, Command 3747.

To reinforce that, on 24th November, 1930, Mr. Arthur Henderson, in answer to a Question in the House by Mr. Freeman, who thought that the Protocol was not universal, said: My hon. Friend is under a misapprehension. Teargases and shells producing a poisonous fumes are prohibited under the Geneva Protocol. Smoke screens … in so far as they do not contain poisonous elements, are not within the scope of the Protocol."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th November, 1930; Vol. 245, c. 878.] The key phrase there was "in so far as." I suggest that CS gas is not just a smoke in that context and that to claim that it is cannot be sustained on the facts.

Unfortunately, a more recent Labour Foreign Secretary adopted a view different from mine and justified the decision to sell CS gas to the United States for use in Vietnam by arguing that CS and other such gases were, in his view, outside the scope of the Geneva Protocol.

The reasons why that change was made are perhaps comprehensible. We were then employing the gas in Ulster, and the argument was that what could be done in Northern Ireland could surely be done internationally. In my view, that was wrong reasoning and a mistake. I regret that the present Government have adopted what I believe to have been an error on the part of the Labour Government, and my purpose today is to ask the Minister to take the matter back and to see whether we should not reinterpret the Agreement in the way in which it was interpreted by successive Governments, Labour and Conservative, right up to the incorrect decision, as I regard it, made only a few months ago.

It is said that the Foreign Office was against the proposal and that it was the Minister of Defence who carried the day in what was at that time a Cabinet decision. However, the Foreign Office had to carry the can and in both Houses of Parliament Foreign Office Ministers interpreted this change as one that could be explained away. In my view it could not be explained away and I hope that, on reflection, my right hon. and hon. Friends will conclude that it was a decision made in error. I equally hope that the present Government will reach the same decision.

Incidentally, we are still awaiting the Himsworth report on the effects of CS gas in Ulster. The report was promised for the autumn of 1970 and later it was put back to the end of that year. We were then told it would be ready by the spring of 1971. Spring seems to be a little late this year.

There is a more hopeful development. In 1969 we tabled a germ warfare draft to add to the existing chemical and biological warfare agreements. Last month the Soviet Union and other Communist countries tabled a draft virtually accepting the British proposals. This has been welcomed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Caernarvon (Mr. Goronwy Roberts), who I am glad to see in his place and who, I hope, will have an opportunity to comment in this short debate.

This Soviet move has been welcomed in the United States and by responsible sections of the Press in this country. For example, The Times suggests that the cause I am pressing on the Government would be a right one for the Government to follow and that our action in this matter and in welcoming the Soviet move in our direction indicates that we should emphasise our agreement with them by changing our view back to the original one of what chemical warfare is all about. We should go back to our view of its all-embracing nature.

If we adhere to international agreements, we cannot at the same time put our own interpretation on what those agreements mean. If we were to go back to Geneva and tell the Soviet Union, "We welcome your move and we want to make it more embracing, including all kinds of chemical and biological warfare, and we will accept not only the international agreement but the international interpretation of it, and we will abide by it", then we could, I believe, make a great step forward in this important and grave matter.

4.15 p.m.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts (Caernarvon)

I am grateful for this opportunity to intervene very briefly in this debate in order to indicate general support for the submission made by my hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins). I think that we would all be ready to consider whether these CS gases should not be included within the definition of the Geneva Protocol. That is not to say that the subject is not one of great difficulty, and in putting it in that way I am reinforcing my hon. Friend's plea that consideration might be given to redefining the content of the Protocol in the light of the discussions now going on in Geneva.

I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to repeat today the United Kingdom position in regard to biological weapons. I will not say that this is an easy subject but compared with the problem of chemical weapons it is much easier. We in this country have no such weapons. We have no intention of developing or possessing them. We believe that they should be banned and can be banned and, indeed, we would consider accepting a ban without inspection provisions. I hope that I do not put it too high, but we may well be in a position of reacting in that way to a proposal for the banning of biological weapons.

One recognises that the banning of chemical weapons presents very great difficulties. On this aspect of disarmament, the Soviet Union has practically always taken the view that there would be no provision for inspection. During the past quarter century, since the Baruch plan for atomic control was first presented, this has been the Russian attitude. However, in their own propositions the Russians have always provided for report to the Security Council and, indeed, for the presentation to the Security Council of complaints of infringement. We and other countries have insisted, and still do, I am sure, insist, on there being an effective system of inspection, including on-site inspection.

I wonder whether this impasse—and it is a continuing impasse—between the Soviet attitude that there shall not be inspection and our own insistence on a very wide-ranging and thorough system of inpection cannot be bridged? I suggest that the Under-Secretary of State and his colleagues might look at the possibility of marrying the important and valuable Soviet acceptance of Security Council authority—because the Soviet Union does accept it—with possibly a modified system of inspection resting, perhaps, on prominent experts from both sides of the Curtain, or perhaps exclusively on experts from non-aligned countries.

If we fail to do something to bridge this seemingly irreconcilable difference between the two sides, as it were, chemical warfare research and development may well proceed on a headlong course, and we may find ourselves facing a graver danger to the human race than even nuclear weapons have hitherto presented.

4.19 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Anthony Royle)

The hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) has chosen the important issue of chemical and biological warfare as his subject for this debate. I am glad that he has done so.

I am glad that the right hon. Member for Caernarvon (Mr. Goronwy Roberts) has appeared for and spoken in this debate, for the personal reason that the last time that I took part in an Adjournment debate the subject was rather different and the right hon. Gentleman was the responsible Minister and I was in opposition. I am very glad that we again confront each other today in an Adjournment debate, although I do not think that the confrontation will be very damaging to either of us.

As I say, I am glad that the hon. Member for Putney has chosen this subject, because although he focussed attention during much of his speech on rather specialised aspects of this field, there have recently been significant and, in our view, welcome developments in the general field of chemical and biological warfare.

As my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs told the House on 19th April this year, in the international disarmament negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Government have now indicated their readiness to seek agreement on the basis which British Governments have consistently advocated since 1968—that the most practical approach to the problem of chemical and biological warfare is to tackle the biological aspect first before going on to deal with the much more complex problem of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union and its allies, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, have now tabled their own draft convention prohibiting production and possession of biological weapons and toxins. As my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs reminded the House on 22nd March this year, in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker), a revised British draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, which also covers toxins, was tabled at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 18th August, 1970. But we are studying the new Soviet draft with close attention, and have in fact already made a number of comments on it to the Soviet Government.

We very much hope that there will now be rapid progress in the disarmamént negotiations towards agreement on banning biological methods of warfare and toxins, and that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will this autumn be able to remit a generally agreed draft to the United Nations General Assembly. I have no hesitation in saying that an agreement of this kind will reflect considerable credit on Britain. The British draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare was first tabled at Geneva as the result of an initiative taken by the previous Government.

I pay my personal tribute to the right hon. Member for Caernarvon for the part he played during his time at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the matter of disarmament.

We for our part had no hesitation in strongly commending it to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a practical and realistic way of tackling the problem of chemical and biological warfare. The recent developments in Geneva have amply justified the sounding of this British approach.

I would also remind the House that the fact that we have strongly advocated agreement first on banning biological methods of warfare and toxins, and the fact that such agreement now seems to be within reach, does not mean that we intend to disregard the problem of chemical weapons. Our reasons for separating biological from chemical methods of warfare and tackling the biological side first are essentially practical. The development of biological warfare is at a much earlier stage, so that its prohibition would be a more straightforward matter.

The British draft biological warfare convention does include an article under which parties would undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to strengthen the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare. The new Soviet draft likewise envisages further negotiations on chemical warfare. We have played, and will continue to play, an active part in the discussions at Geneva on ways of dealing with this, but we have always maintained that it is illogical as well as dangerous to hold up agreement meanwhile on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare and toxins, which we have always believed to be attainable now. We are very glad that others have come to share our view.

I should like to look very carefully at the further detailed points the right hon. Gentleman made this afternoon, to see whether there are any moves we can make to meet some of his observations on inspection.

I listened with great interest to what the hon. Member for Putney said about CS gas. The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned the complex question of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and CS gas. It is indeed a complex question. The issue is one of a number that we inherited from the previous Administration, who announced their decision on 2nd February, 1970. We are naturally giving careful thought to the matter and will take into full account the considerations put forward both in this debate and elsewhere. The British Government respect the Geneva Protocol, to which Britain has long been a party. We regard it as the foundation for all the efforts we have made to seek further agreement on measures of arms control and disarmament in the biological and chemical warfare field.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Himsworth Report. I am happy to be able to tell him that, as announced in a Parliamentary answer to him, Part II of the Report is due to be published in the middle of this year. I cannot give him any further information now, but at least that is a crumb of information for him.

The right hon. Gentleman referred to the military aspects of chemical and biological warfare. Such questions must be for answer by my noble Friend the Minister of State for Defence. As successive British Governments have made clear, this country does not possess or manufacture any lethal chemical or biological weapons. Perhaps that is rather a short answer, but it is probably the answer the right hon. Gentleman wanted me to give.

Mr. Jenkins

The original date for the publication of the Himsworth Report was the autumn of 1970. It is very unusual for an original date like that to become the end of 1970, then the spring of 1971, and now the middle of 1971. Can the Minister give us any idea of the reason for the continual postponements and delays of the Report?

Mr. Royle

The hon. Gentleman has been in the House for many years, and I have had the privilege of serving here with him during that time. Sometimes an hon. Member asks the Government of the day when a report will be published, and they reply, "Soon" Then the question is always, "When is 'soon'?". There are always problems, and many reports have been delayed. I cannot go further than to say that Part II of the Himsworth Report is due to be published in the middle of the year.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Four o'clock.