HC Deb 13 May 1971 vol 817 cc637-68

Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chairman

I should explain to the right hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. George Thomson) that I have not selected Amendment No. 3 which stands in his name—in page 38, line 4, leave out Clause 47—but the substance of that Amendment is covered in the main debate on the Clause, in which it will be in order to discuss new Clause No. 1—Naval offences dealt with summarily.

4.15 p.m.

Mr. John Morris

As I understand it, Clause 47 is a tidying up operation. We have sought to continue this tidying up operation in the new Clause, the purpose of which is to carry on the good work of rationalising the Services one with another so far as is practicable. Much has been done over a wide front in the Ministry of Defence over some years. The former Secretary of State for War, who did some of this work, knows a great deal about what was done. During our period of office, we continued this work and in many respects—victualling and furnishings, to name only two—we rationalise the Services one with another to save expenditure.

The discipline of a ceiling expenditure concentrates the mind wonderfully with a view to seeing what can be done to rationalise one Service with another so as to save money.

As regards discipline, there are respectable precedents for rationalising. The last Select Committee in 1962 suggested that henceforward when questions of discipline came before the House and the various pieces of legislation were examined the Naval Discipline Act should be reviewed at the same time as the Acts for the Army and the Air Force.

Page 1 of the present Select Committee's report states that the last Select Committee also recommended that the Ministry of Defence, with the aim of standardisation, should consider over the next five years what practical advantages and disadvantages stem from the differences in status between the 1955 and 1957 Acts. Clause 1 of the present Bill now seeks to bring the Navy into line with the other Services in this matter by subjecting the Naval Discipline Act to the same procedure for review and renewal as the Army and Air Force Acts. This is the highly respectable and historical precedent for rationalisation and for bringing the Navy into line with the other Services in regard to discipline as with many other matters where there is a cross-interest between the Services.

The Select Committee went into considerable detail. I pay tribute to our Chairman for guiding us in our proceedings Clause by Clause. As I had not sat on a Select Committee for many years, I found very refreshing the method and speed with which we examined highly detailed matters and traversed a great deal of ground during our 11 sittings.

One major issue which substantially divided the Select Committee was whether the Navy's existing summary powers should continue. Paragraph 8 of the report sets out the differences, in that the Navy can still deal summarily with all ratings for any offence other than the very few remaining offences punishable by death and can award up to three months imprisonment, detention or dismissal or derating, although most of these punishments require the approval of the flag officer.

In the Army and the Air Force commanding officers can deal with a somewhat lower range of offences and the maximum punishment they can award is 28 days detention. That is the basic difference between the Navy and the other two Services, and the Navy has possessed these substantially greater powers for a long time.

I sympathised with the main argument which was canvassed by the Navy for the retention of these substantially greater powers. The Navy much more frequently than the other two Services operated in distant waters far from immediate administrative support and the whole paraphernalia of courts martial and references to high authority, and it was necessary in the interests of discipline to cut corners—I do not put that offensively; perhaps I should say that it was necessary to deal speedily with matters arising within the jurisdiction of a commanding officer on a vessel which might be hundreds, if not thousands, of miles from administrative support.

By tradition the Royal Navy is a highly mobile force. In those circumstances, it was said that the Royal Navy's powers were necessary, and it wanted to retain them. I understand the reasoning behind the argument, but from time to time the other Services, too, though perhaps not on the same scale as the Royal Navy, have to operate without recourse to the administrative support which was regarded by the Royal Navy as the main reason for wanting these powers. There was no evidence before the Select Committee that, because the Navy's activities were far-flung, these increased powers were necessary.

Bearing that in mind, the Select Committee examined with great care—I apologise to my colleagues on the Committee for the length of my cross-examination, but I was anxious to probe the matter in depth—the Navy's case for the retention of its increased powers.

Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)

The right hon. Gentleman keeps using the word "increased". I think that he means "different". I am sure that he would not wish to mislead the Committee by suggesting that the Navy is asking for increased powers.

Mr. Morris

I apologise to the Committee. I had no intention of making a false point. I was seeking to say that the power required by the Navy was in excess of that possessed by the other two Services. There was no claim by the Royal Navy that its powers should be increased. I apologise if that was the impression that I gave.

The Navy's case is based on the fact that its activities are far-flung, and that it often operates outside immediate administrative support but, when one examines the facts, one finds that only 45 per cent. of the Royal Navy is at sea. The majority of Royal Navy personnel are serving at shore establishments, and no case can be made for saying that that component of the Royal Navy is outside the range of immediate administrative support. What is more, of that 45 per cent. at sea, I am not sure what percentage would be regarded as being outside immediate administrative support. That percentage would include vessels in ports, and vessels in home waters, so perhaps only a small proportion of that 45 per cent. could really be said to be outside immediate administrative support.

That is the compass of the Navy's case for being singled out to be given powers in excess of those possessed by the other two Services. A minority of the Royal Navy is outside immediate administrative support, and for this small proportion it is considered necessary for the Navy to be given powers in excess of those exercised by the other two Services.

The new Clause is sensible. I could have introduced a new Clause to bring the Royal Navy completely into line with the other two Services and let it deal with whatever problems arise in the same way as they are dealt with by the other two Services when they find themselves outside the range of immediate administrative support. We know from the evidence that we heard that personnel of the other Services often go on missions which put them outside immediate administrative support, but they are able to deal with any problems that arise, without any apparent difficulty.

But I have not sought to bring the Royal Navy completely into line with the other two Services. I have not sought to take an unreasonable attitude. What I have sought to do is to bring the Royal Navy generally into line with the other two Services, and to leave it to the Defence Council to decide when extra powers are needed. That power is given to the Defence Council so that while, in general, the Royal Navy will be in line with the other two Services, in circumstances in which the Defence Council, in its wisdom, considers that extra powers requested by the Royal Navy are necessary, it can authorise the use of those powers by means of a simple administrative order. The commanding officer can be authorised to use the powers which have been requested.

Most of the arguments that have been raised against my proposal arise from my having taken a reasonable attitude. If I had suggested bringing the Royal Navy into line with the other two services in all respects, none of the arguments which have been canvassed would arise, because they all stem from administrative difficulties. Anyone who has served in the Ministry of Defence knows that there are administrative difficulties to be overcome in achieving most objectives, and that at the end of the day the Ministry of Defence is more willing than any other Department to ensure that the difficulties are surmounted and to deal with the problems that arise.

What are the administrative difficulties? It is said, first, that there would be two systems of discipline for sailors. It is said that they would not know where they stood, that they would not know whether they could be dealt with by the commanding officer, or not. It is said that some sailors in a garrison town would be regarded as capable of being dealt with by the commanding officer, while others would not, and that if two sets of sailors were involved in a fracas, some could be dealt with by the commanding officer, and some could not.

I am aware of that difficulty, but a similar problem arises and is overcome when Royal Marines go on board ships of the Royal Navy. They are then subject to the discipline of the Royal Navy, and no difficulty seems to arise from the fact that Royal Marines are subject to one discipline when they are on shore, and another when they are on the high seas.

The difficulty envisaged in dealing with sailors who are subject to two sets of discipline is, in certain circumstances, paralleled in civil life. Two persons, be they sailors, soldiers or civilians, can be dealt with in different ways. This situation arises nearly every day in the courts. If two people are charged with an offence that can be dealt with summarily, one may elect to be tried by a jury—which he is entitled to do in a number of circumstances—with the result that the other person, who may wish to be tried by the magistrates, nevertheless has to be tried at sessions. If a difficulty arises here, I am sure that if two sailors could be dealt with by different systems of discipline, it would not be beyond the wit of their lawyers and the Secretary of State to cope with this situation. If, today, in a garrison town, a soldier and sailor are joined in a charge after a fracas, the soldier can be dealt with by a court-martial and the sailor by his commanding officer. So the administrative difficulties have been exaggerated.

4.30 p.m.

One of the arguments against the amendment is that one is seeking to reduce the disparity between seagoing sailors and those ashore, but there is a policy of further aligning the Services, and these arguments cancel out. The weakest argument put forward by the Navy is that it would greatly increase the administrative burden, in that there would be a much greater number of courts-martial. An increase has been prophesied of from 60 to 500, but there has been no evidence for this mathematical projection. In 1970, the total number for the Army was a mere 1,900, so the total of 500 is difficult to accept.

My Amendment would give rise to only a portion of that, because the Royal Navy would not be put on a par with the other two Services. If the other two Services find a need for courts-martial, the fact that courts-martial would arise in the Navy for similar offences is not in itself an argument against a common system.

I was concerned at the policy of sentencing in the Armed Services and I called for papers and statistics. I am grateful to those who spent a great deal of time preparing the evidence for our consideration. I was concerned that the number of sentences in the 28- to 90-days' bracket was much higher in every category of offence.

It was suggested to the Committee that desertion was sui generis in the Royal Navy perhaps more than in the other Services. But the same trend was borne out in the other offences, in that there were many more sentences in the Navy in this bracket. In the Navy, the total of sentences up to 90 days for desertion was 47, in the Army it was three and in the Royal Air Force it was one. So the sheer numbers cause a great deal of concern.

Although my Amendment was not acceptable to the Committee, it was this underlying concern which resulted in the Committee carrying the very important Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeenshire, West (Lieut.-Colonel Colin Mitchell). The report said: Your Committee also consider that the whole purpose of Service detention and its implementation should be examined in view of the changed conditions in both modern Service life and the civilian environment. That was only one of the reasons why some of us voted for the hon. and gallant Member's Amendment.

It might be argued that the figures for the other Forces are higher than for the Royal Navy for sentencing over 90 days, but the increased numbers, having regard to the sheer size of the other two Services, cannot be moved sideways. Because a naval commanding officer uses his powers to the extent that there are overwhelmingly larger numbers being sentenced to 90 days and under, the numbers in the other two Forces do not bear out the fear that the Navy is treating its men more leniently.

If this were true, it could be proved statistically. I challenged one of the witnesses to assist the Committee on this, to ascertain whether this moving of the figures to the right could be explained in statistical terms. So far, no evidence has been forthcoming on this. I wish that it were: it would relieve me of a great deal of anxiety.

From the offences set out here, one can see that the naval commanding officers enjoying these greater powers inflict a far greater number of these punishments and this is not compensated for by the higher punishments imposed by the other two Services.

In the course of the proceedings, we considered whether the powers enjoyed by the Royal Navy might be extended to the other two Services. We had the advantage of the assistance of the Vice-Judge Advocate General, speaking on behalf of the Navy. It is germane to consider the attitude of the other two Armed Services, as represented by their witnesses, about what would happen if the powers enjoyed by the Navy were given to the other two Services.

In paragraph 722, the Vice-Judge Advocate General said: The Judge Advocate General does not want to express an opinion of his own as to whether any such increase in powers of punishment is needed because he thinks that that is a question of policy for the Services and for this Committee, but he would wish to emphasise—the point has been made to some extent, but the Judge Advocate General wishes it to be voiced in his name—that if it were decided that there should be any significant increase in the powers of punishment of the Army and the Royal Air Force commanding officers, it would be indispensable to introduce adequate measures to safeguard the interests of the accused persons. The Judge Advocate General considers that those measures would have to cover the procedure to be followed by commanding officers when dealing with cases—such questions as whether the accused should be represented or advised—and whether some sort of formal record of the evidence should be kept which would be capable of scrutiny afterwards. There would have to be a proper provision as to procedure at that stage. Further, the Judge Advocate General considers that adequate facilities for reviewing cases after trial and possibly providing facilities for petitions or appeals would have to be considered. He suggests that it would be unacceptable simply to increase the powers of commanding officers without considering in detail the interests of those who would be brought within their net. Those are all matters which would require pretty careful consideration. At question 776 I asked: Would the Judge Advocate General be satisfied to have for the Army the same kind of arrangements to look after the interests of the accused as exist in the Navy? Dog does not eat dog. I received the answer: I would hesitate to say anything in this room which would appear to be critical of the arrangements which exist in the Navy, but what the Judge Advocate General is uneasy about is that, so far as he understands the naval system, there does not appear to be any provision whereby the evidence which is taken at summary hearings is recorded. He apprehends that there must be difficulty in knowing afterwards what has gone on and in conducting any review to cover the merits of the case. I asked: Where does he lay the greatest stress—on recording the evidence or on ensuring that the accused is adequately protected and given the right legal advice? I was told: I think that he thinks that both are desirable. At question 778 I asked: As I understand it, the Judge Advocate General would not be satisfied if the arrangements which exist in the Navy, without criticising the Navy's arrangements, were to be introduced in the Army? The answer was: I do not think he would be very happy about it. That was the Judge Advocate General replying to questions from me during the hearing of the Committee. His answers were disquieting because, while he was obviously anxious not to tread on anybody's toes, it is clear that, although in the context of another Service, he would not want this sort of thing introduced into the Army. Indeed, I submit that it is out of the mouth of the Judge Advocate General and his representative that the Navy stands convicted in its desire to retain these extraordinary powers.

The defence offered by the Navy for the retention of this system has been the same over the years. On this occasion Vice-Admiral Wildish said, in answer to question 735: We must come back to the nature of our Service, which is very much more of a separated Service. Men who are separated from their families and homes are much more likely to come under some form of sentencing policy". The last argument seems to be that, because the Navy is somewhat different from the other two Services, it needs these extraordinary powers of sentencing.

This type of argument has been traditional over the centuries. It has been adduced in the past by those who wanted to retain the status quo for sentencing, punishment and discipline in the Armed Forces. I will not weary the Committee by going over the utterances made through the centuries by Service people who have wanted to maintain the status quo.

Consider, for example, those who campaigned for the retention of flogging. Lord Palmerston, when Secretary of State for War—and he was Secretary of State for a very long time indeed—said in 1815 in defence of flogging that foreign soldiers serving in the British Army retreated more readily than British troops. Although they were as liable to be flogged as British soldiers, Portuguese and other foreign Service men were flogged less often because, in the view of Lord Palmerston, the English—I am pleased, being a Welshman, that he specifically referred to the English—like all soldiers from northern lands, were more likely to get drunk than men from southern nations and were, therefore, more liable to commit offences.

The same argument is being used now, in a different context. Lord Palmerston had not changed his mind by 1827, when he was still Secretary of State for War. He said: If the infliction of corporal punishment were abolished, it must be followed by the abolition of the Army itself, which, without it, will soon become the most dangerous establishment in the Empire. On that occasion, as on previous occasions when similar matters had been discussed, Lord Palmerston was accompanied and supported by many distinguished military gentlemen. I will not weary the Committee by naming them all. They all wanted to retain the status quo, including one General Duff, who declared that it was as easy to chain the north wind as to manage British soldiers without the aid of corporal punishment.

The proposal which my hon, Friends are making at this stage is merely designed to bring the Services into line.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. James Ramsden (Harrogate)

It was with clarity and force that the right hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. John Morris) moved the new Clause. Hon. Members who had the privilege of serving on the Select Committee will be familiar with the arguments and background to the controversy over this issue. The liveliness with which the right hon. Gentleman puts these matters is welcome, and his concluding illustrations from history will have been new to the Committee.

I do not propose to detain hon. Members at this stage and I will not, therefore, attempt to refute or counter in detail the arguments, which the right hon. Gentleman adduced for what he wants to do, which I gather is to bring as nearly as possible into line the code of discipline of the three Services. My noble Friend will no doubt undertake the detailed refutation of that case, if he considers that course to be necessary.

I will only give the background to the Committee's consideration of this issue and make some general observation about my approach to the question, an approach which, in the result, was shared by the majority of the Committee—dividing not, I am glad to say, quite along party lines. The right hon. Member for Aberavon will recall that he put the substance of his case in the form of an amendment to the Chairman's draft report, and this appears on page xviii, but the Committee, by a majority, rejected his view.

This whole controversy about standardisation, both in the disciplinary and other spheres, is not new. As the right hon. Gentleman began his speech by saying, it started in my time, about 10 years ago, if not before, and it has been going on ever since. One cannot get away from the fact that one's approach to the central controversy depends very much on one's individual cast of mind. That produces two distinct sets of opinions. It is a difference of approach which is not confined to politicians. One is either a standardiser by inclination, an aligner, or a non-aligner, a non-standardiser. The right hon. Gentleman will have found in his time, as I found in mine, that this propensity to be one or the other exists as much among senior members of the Services and civil servants as among politicians.

I tend to be, though not, I hope, as square as some of my predecessors to whom the right hon. Gentleman referred, a non-standardiser rather than a standardiser. It does not annoy me that there should be differences and idiosyncrasies peculiar to one or other of the Services. I tend to accept that they exist in a Service but that, if they work and the desired result is obtained, we should not get tremendously fussed about it.

Broadly speaking, the Committee, having given full consideration to the argument, so ably assisted by the right hon. Gentleman's cross-examination, came to the conclusion that the existing code of discipline, by and large, works for the Royal Navy and is justified by the rather different conditions in which it has to operate. While there is force in the right hon. Gentleman's arguments—taken one by one, they are not easy to counter—none the less the Committee felt that it worked and did not want to come down on the Royal Navy or on my hon. Friend's Department by recommending that there should be further changes.

In inclining to this view I had the following consideration at the back of my mind. The Select Committee procedure is comparatively new. I think that this is the third Select Committee on the Army Act and on the other Acts. In some ways it is a help to the Services to have a five-yearly opportunity to revise their legislation and to bring improvements before the House for consideration. In some ways this is an advantage which other Departments of State do not share. It is quite different in some other spheres where Ministers who want to bring forward legislation cannot get a foot in the legislative door because there is always a queue of business waiting to come before the House. The Service Departments, under this procedure, get a five-yearly chance as of right.

There may be a disadvantage accompanying this opportunity in that a Select Committee, meeting every five years, may almost feel obliged to make recommendations before the next Select Committee is formed. In that way it is possible to build up a rolling impetus towards change for the sake of change. That could operate to the disadvantage of the Services. It is not a bad thing to do what this year's Select Commitee did, namely, to say, "Let us stand back for a moment and consider whether all these changes are necessarily to the benefit of the Services themselves." We said to the Ministry of Defence, "We do not want to put pressure on you to go in for more changes and particularly more standardisation for the sake of standardisation." We may have been right or wrong. This, at any rate, was the majority view of the Committee.

That is really all that I wanted to say. However, as a postscript, I should refer to two matters mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. He was perhaps a little misleading—quite unintentionally, I am sure—in his reference to the amendment moved by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Aberdeenshire, West (Lt.-Col. Colin Mitchell) which was accepted by the Committee. That amendment arose from the visits paid by the Committee to the two detention establishments at Portsmouth and Colchester, on which I do not intend to comment at length.

Having seen those establishments and discussed various points arising from those visits, to an active mind accustomed to Service affairs, like that of my hon. and gallant Friend, a basic question which cannot fail to arise is: "What is all this about; what is the basic purpose of detention and punishment in relation to Service discipline?" Until one has answered that question, many of the subsidiary questions which arise can be misleading. In proposing the amendment, I am sure that my hon. and gallant Friend did not think that it would give rise to any change; nor was he wanting to generate any particular pressure for change. He was asking a fundamental question about the underlying philosophy of discipline in the Services. I think that it was more in that spirit than the way indicated by the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. John Morris

I certainly should not dissent from what the right hon. Gentleman has said about the motive of his hon. and gallant Friend in moving the amendment. But he will remember that there was no great discussion about this matter. It was done almost at the end of the meeting when we had considered the whole of these factors and deliberated on all the amendments. This was one consideration which was well in my mind and in the minds of some of my hon. Friends when we voted for it. It was a great pleasure to us that the amendment was carried.

Mr. Ramsden

I accept that. It cropped up, as the right hon. Gentleman said, right at the end. Some Members of the Committee may have put different interpretations on it from others. I am not prepared to argue about that. It is a pity that my hon. and gallant Friend is unable to be here this afternoon.

I thought that the right hon. Gentleman gave a bit too much weight to the evidence of the Judge Advocate General. As a gloss on his speech, anybody who is interested ought to read with care the evidence of the commanding officers and the directors of personnel services of the three Services. I say this not out of any desire to be offensive, but because the right hon. Gentleman is a lawyer and Judge Advocates General are members of that cloth, too. I think that in these matters we should be guided by the layman as well as by the professional experts. On the whole, I am sure that it will be no surprise to the right hon. Gentleman to hear that I am against his argument. I hope that my hon. Friend will resist it.

Mr. Richard Crawshaw (Liverpool, Toxteth)

I did not support my right hon. Friend when the new Clause was moved in Committee. I have not changed my mind, despite a powerful speech by my right hon. Friend, who has put forward every possible argument for the new Clause.

I hope that I do not come in the category which he has been reading out. I am not the kind of person who expects that discipline can be imposed only by having a man strung from the yardarm every morning before breakfast. However, I am against change merely for the sake of change.

I have been honoured to serve on the Committee. It has been a most interesting Committee and all Members have sought to do what they thought best for the Armed Forces. There has been disagreement within the parties on different matters, and on a Bill of this nature that is how it should be.

5.0 p.m.

We have been given statistics which I shall not go into in support of my argument, because I believe that one can make them come to any conclusion one wishes. I am more concerned with what I feel are the realities of life in the Services. I want first to deal with the suggestion that there might be a double system in the Navy—for situations where the commanding officer has these powers and for situations where he does not. I think that that is a non-starter. It would cause confusion. My right hon. Friend mentioned that soldiers are subject to naval discipline when serving on board ships, but that is something which is quite clear to them. It is not imposed upon them without their knowing that they are going to be subject to that sort of discipline. It would be most unfortunate if a person serving in the Navy did not know from one day to the other what code of conduct he would come under.

I accept the argument—I have heard nothing to disprove it—that the type of service in the Navy in many instances makes it most difficult to impose discipline in the same way as in the other Services. Ships are away for long periods on their own. It is claimed that it is easy to get the man to a court-martial, and, of course, it is. But the question arises of how many other people from the same ship might have to go to the court-martial. That is one of the important factors which we must bear in mind. It is not just a question of transferring a prisoner to where he can have his court-martial but of how many other people from the same ship might be required as witnesses. I can foresee grave difficulties if the commanding officer of a ship could give only up to 28 days.

The new Clause might not be in the best interests of the man himself. Many men would prefer their commanding officer to deal out the sentence, knowing the maximum he can give, rather than find themselves sent to court-martial where they might get a more severe sentence. My right hon. Friend, who is in the legal profession, knows that quite often a magistrates' court concludes that a six-months' sentence of imprisonment is not sufficient, and may have in mind a sentence of, say, 12 months. But the magistrates cannot give such a sentence and must send the man to a higher court, which may pass a sentience of two or three years' imprisonment. In the magistrates' court, however, the man would probably have got away with 12 months. I am not saying that this sort of thing would happen in the Navy under the new Clause, but these are practical possibilities. It may well be that in the Navy there are men who receive sentences of from one to three months from their commanding officers but who would receive longer sentences at court-martial. I appreciate that in the Navy there are different circumstances. In the Army, people are detached for various periods. It is much easier for the Army to get people to a court-martial than for the Navy.

I have heard no argument which would convince me that this change would be administratively better, I have heard no argument which would convince me that it would be better for the man concerned. I began by saying that I do not believe in change merely for the sake of change and, although I hope eventually to see these Acts as a whole brought together, I am not satisfied that the new Clause is a reasonable suggestion to put forward at present, and I will not be able to support it.

Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles

I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw), who has given us interesting illustrations of his knowledge of the practical aspects of Service life. I cannot agree with the right hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. John Morris) in his enthusiasm for rationalising. The new Clause seems to be either part of an attempt to diminish the disciplinary powers of the commanding officers of ships or an attempt to bring naval discipline into line more exactly with that of the other two Services, or both. I resist it on both these grounds.

The right hon. Gentleman has overlooked the very clear enunciation of Appendix 1 of the Select Committee's report. When this matter came up in the Committee, a supplementary memorandum submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State said—and this is quoted on page 139 of the report— It would not be acceptable to operate different disciplinary systems afloat and ashore for the following reasons: It then gave six valid reasons which I shall not now repeat. I do not think that it is true to say that the only reasons given were those of administrative difficulty. There is a much more important threat in this argument right through the proceedings of the Committee.

Right throughout this matter, I have made the fundamental point that the three Services are very different organisations. I am not looking backwards to flogging—I do not think that that was the right sort of emotive phrase to bring into the quieter proceedings we are engaged in. Nor am I resisting a combined Ministry. Obviously, a combined Ministry makes good administrative and operational sense. But each Service must keep its own identity. Field-Marshal Montgomery said that the British Army is essentially a tribal organisation, and the same is true of the other two Services in their own ways.

I believe that the Bill must not be allowed to be used as an excuse for trying to merge the Forces little by little, as I fear the right hon. Gentleman appears to want to do, into one characterless whole. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman, who has been a Minister, from the global viewpoint in the Ministry to pooh-pooh the differences between the Services, but to a young recruit who has earned his badge to sew on his sleeve and who engages in the little rivalries with the other arms within his own Service, that is his horizon. We would dismiss these small differences at that sort of level at our peril.

Mr. John Morris

I am sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman does not wish to do me a disservice by misinterpreting my views. I would be the last person to want to reduce the Armed Forces to one colourless whole. In my military career—short and undistinguished compared with his service—I had the privilege of belonging to a distinguished regiment of infantry, and the pride with which we wore the flash on our shoulder straps and the hackle on our hats was drummed into new recruits, just as we impressed upon them that in 1917 we had the honour of refusing to become the Welsh Guards, preferring to remain the Royal Welch Fusiliers, which is also a matter of great pride.

Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles

The hon. Gentleman has now made the case against his own suggestion that the disciplinary systems should be merged. He first gave no good reason for it and has now given an illustration from the Army against it. In the Navy, officers and ratings live together in the same ship in very close company and in different conditions from those prevailing even in distinguished regiments ashore. They share the same bad weather, the same good weather. They know one another and live, as the term says, as a "ship's company" and an excellent term it is. They have loyalties to their ships and healthy rivalries with other ships in the same squadron, which are to be encouraged. These ratings do not want any disciplinary matters which may have arisen in their ship dealt with by outsiders, even outsiders from within the same Service.

The report of the Select Committee on page viii has a key sentence. It says: Your Committee do not wish to recommend the expenditure of further time and effort in an attempt to achieve standardisation for standardisation's sake. On the evidence they have received, your Committee are satisfied that the powers at present exercised by naval commanding officers are suited to the needs of that Service and should not be reduced. That seems to be an absolutely unequivocal statement.

The right hon. Member for Aberavon, in his remarks about sentencing was not comparing like with like. In dealing with the investigation of offences in ships at sea and the recording of investigations, he was, similarly, not comparing like with like. It is more important to be quick, while the memory of what happened is fresh in the minds of witnesses and everyone concerned with the case. It is more important that it should be dealt with quickly than with formality, with tape recorders, notebooks and all the rest of it.

With a small ship heaving round in a seaway the more formal proceedings of a court martial are entirely inappropriate. To sum up, the conditions are not the same between the three Services, and it is therefore no good trying to reconcile their disciplinary conditions. The last sentence of the report sets the tone for what we should be discussing and the way we should proceed. It says: Your Committee therefore emphasise that in preparing the next Bill the Ministry of Defence should have only one object in mind: the best interests of the Services themselves. With the utmost respect to you, Madam Deputy Chairman, I end by saying that on the quarter deck, as in the boudoir, I am a great believer in the old saying vive la difference.

Mr. J. D. Concannon (Mansfield)

It is always a pleasure to follow in debate the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles). I wish to support the amendment. On page xviii of the report it will be seen that I voted against the recommendation that the Ministry of Defence should give early consideration to substituting for the next quinquennial review a common Act applicable to all three Services. I did that for two reasons. One was that I was the first one who had to register a vote and did not know whether to say "aye" or "no". [Interruption.] I am perfectly honest.

The other point was that there was a second paragraph and it was that which, to me at that moment, was much more important. This is the way I think the Services will develop and we must take this steadily. I should not like to think that we have to rush the Ministry of Defence into doing this within the next five years. I see it as something which will happen in any case—I see the rear-admiral fighting a rearguard action.

I was interested in the point raised about the powers of commanding officers in the Royal Navy being over and above those of commanding officers in the Army and Air Force. I do not know whether times have changed, but I can remember that my commanding officer in the Army could give only 28 days detention or send one for court-martial. Alternatively, one could opt for a court-martial. I can remember that on the two or three occasions when the C.O. asked me, "Will you accept my punishment?" I practically grabbed it, because I did not want a court-martial, whether or not I was guilty. What happens in the Royal Navy? Are those dealt with summarily given the chance of a court-martial? It is only too clear that the Amendment will not be accepted, but it is good to give the point an airing and to give the senior Service a warning that in time we will have the Services under a common Act.

5.15 p.m.

Major-General Jack d'Avigdor-Goldsmid (Lichfield and Tamworth)

The right hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. John Morris), supported by his hon. Friend the hon. Member for Mansfield (Mr. Concannon) has stated the case for the Amendment clearly. I should like to support the hon. Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw). The gist of the right hon. Member's case was that on the whole, summary naval punishments are much more severe than their Army equivalent. He mentioned the four reasons we gave in the report. We said that we thought it unsuitable to have two systems of law in the Navy. This was because it was not in the interests of the Navy, secondly because the choice of summary punishment or court-martial might depend not so much on the gravity of the offence as upon where the accused was serving—whether at sea or ashore. Thirdly, there was a disparity, which we did not want to encourage, between shore and sea service; and, fourthly, we said that there was the administrative load to consider.

I believe it goes a good deal further than this. Conditions in the Royal Navy are a good deal different from the other two Services. The one essential for all three Services is that justice must be fair, impartial and rapid. The naval system has been tried and proved effective over a long time. We would have received complaints from constituents if this were not so. We fall over backwards to give accused people a fair trial.

I know that it is not intentional, but I very much deprecate the impression that is given that we are trying to reduce the powers of senior officers in the Royal Navy because we do not feel that they are impartial or fair. There is the same sort of feeling of mistrust in the Army. Take my own regiment, where the commanding officer of a regiment of Chieftain tanks has £5 million worth of tanks in his charge but has a limit of write-off of £25.

On 12th November in another place the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, had this to say on this subject: I think it will be accepted by everybody who knows this subject that the system of administering justice in the Royal Navy has stood the test of time, is well understood by all in the Navy, and, most important of all, meets seafaring operating requirements by being both swift and economical. I am glad to say that there have been very few criticisms of Naval justice, either from within the Service or from the judges. The Army and R.A.F. system is no less suited to the environment in which these Services live and operate, and it is equally well understood and accepted by their personnel. We must never lose sight of the fact that the disciplinary systems of the Services must be grounded in the operational and environmental needs of each particular Service. So far as the Royal Navy is concerned, it is self-evident that forces afloat must have some means of dealing quickly with breaches of discipline. It is, in our judgment, still right that there should still continue to be two disciplinary systems: that of the Army and Royal Air Force, which gives the commanding officers a relatively modest power of punishment, and that of the Royal Navy, which gives commanding officers greater powers of punishment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 12th November, 1970; Vol. 312, c. 807–8.] It would be wrong to differentiate between sea and land service and would cause anomalies which were mentioned in the evidence and contained in the report. It would be unpardonable to increase the number of courts-martial. The figures quoted for courts-martial show that there are of the order of 60 in a year. It was suggested that this figure might rise to 500, and such an increase would be unforgivable.

The Committee took evidence from four commanding officers, namely a captain of the Royal Navy, a group-captain station commander in the Royal Air Force and two lieutenant-colonels, one a marine commando and one who commanded an artillery regiment. We asked them their views on their powers of punishment. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force accepted the adequacy of their powers, whereas the Army and particularly the commando commanders asked for increased powers in respect of detention and fines. This was not from any point of view of vindictiveness, since one of the chief reasons was to try to avoid courts-martial.

Mr. John Morris

I am sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman does not wish to mislead the Committee, but he would be the first to concede that this was the particular opinion of two Army commanding officers. He will remember that the Director-General of Personnel for the Army in his evidence, gave a contrary view and mentioned a poll which had been taken of hundreds of Army officers.

Major-General d'Avigdor-Goldsmid

The two officers concerned, one a marine and the other a solider, said that 100 officers had been asked and that 70 per cent. had asked for increased powers.

Mr. John Morris

No.

Major-General d'Avigdor-Goldsmid

If I am wrong I stand corrected, since I see the right hon. Member for Aberavon has the Committee's report before him, whereas I have not. I am saying that the accused are safeguarded. The hon. Member for Mansfield (Mr. Concannon) raised the point about the Royal Navy.

Mr. Ramsden

It may have been the other way round. I do not think the intervention of the right hon. Member for Aberavon was altogether relevant, because the question to which he referred was asked in a rather different context from that of discipline to which my hon. and gallant Friend was referring.

Major-General d'Avigdor-Goldsmid

As I was saying, there are safeguards, and the more serious punishments in the Royal Navy have to obtain the approval of a flag officer. Leading ratings and above have the option in more serious offences of electing for trial by court-martial. In the same way, in the Army or Air Force any punishment that affects a man's pay—and detention automatically incurs forfeiture of pay—means that the man has the option of a trial by court-martial. This, of course, applies to more serious offences.

I will outline to the Committee what happens when a case goes before a court-martial. A summary of evidence has to be taken which involves the taking down of all the evidence of prosecution witnesses in the presence of the accused. This summary of evidence is then forwarded through the normal channels to the legal authorities who give advice on the charge and say whether the evidence so produced is sufficient to prove the case. That evidence then comes back and a court is convened. This process alone can take from between four to six weeks. The court when convened probably contains three officers, other than those belonging to the accused's unit. It also contains a prosecuting officer and a defending officer.

After the case has been heard the proceedings are sent again to higher authority for confirmation. The whole of this procedure involves delay and means a great deal of entirely unproductive work over and above the normal day's routine. Furthermore, a court-martial causes publicity which in many cases brings stigma upon the unit or a ship and therefore courts-martial are resorted to only when all else has failed. Commanding officers do not send men to detention just for the love of doing so. A man sent to detention probably remains on a unit's strength or establishment. This means that this penalises the good soldiers in the unit who behave themselves, because it means that they will have to do the miscreant's work for him while he is away. I feel that for these and other reasons it would be wrong to try to standardise procedure. Therefore, the Royal Navy should be allowed to retain its present system.

Mr. Wellbeloved

One of the difficulties in these debates is that normally, apart from the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Mr. Concannon), we seldom hear the authentic voice of the "other ranks". We always have the benefit of speeches by the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) who served with distinction as an admiral in the Royal Navy, and we are now joined by the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Major-General Jack d'Avigdor-Goldsmid), who served as a distinguished major-general, and by hordes of other ex-officers.

Whenever we hear the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester talk about officers and ratings living together in the ship, we have a wonderful picture of them all tucking in on the same mess deck and all living a nice, comfortable, cosy life. But the real facts are that the officers live in the wardroom, very often with a cabin each, while the ordinary seaman on the lower decks messes with a large number of his colleagues and comrades in cramped conditions, often finding his sleeping quarters in the best way he can. The paternalistic idea put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester is absolute rubbish when measured against the reality of actual service in the Royal Navy. The next time we set up a Select Committee on the Armed Forces we should see to it that its members should go round and discuss the application of the discipline Acts with Service men rather than with officers. Those are the men to whom the discipline Acts are applied, yet we never hear the authentic voice of the ordinary Service man in our debates.

The right hon. Member for Harrogate (Mr. Ramsden) said that he was against the amendment because he was not a standardiser and did not believe in uniformity throughout the whole of the Services. I share his view. We do not want uniformity and standardisation to be pursued merely for their own sake. However, the case made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon in moving the Amendment was not based purely and simply on a desire for uniformity, but on the basis of seeking justice for Service men in the Royal Navy. He mentioned the evidence given by the Judge Advocate General in which the judge made it clear that neither he nor his Department would wish to see the same loose form of summary justice in the Royal Navy applied to the other two Services. What my right hon. Friend is seeking, and he has my support, is a more just system of disciplinary code applied to the Royal Navy.

Mr. Crawshaw

Is this loose procedure relevant only in regard to the 28 days to three-month sentence? Does not this same loose procedure take place in a unit where the officer can award up to 28 days and where there are no committal procedures?

Mr. Wellbeloved

The graver the offence the more formal should be the proceedings. One of our objections to the Royal Navy disciplinary system is that the proceedings on board ship when trial is taking place before a commanding officer are not up to the standard which, according to the evidence of the Judge Advocate General, they should be and, in his view, those same standards would not be acceptable to the other two Services.

I turn to the Naval Discipline Act and the powers of commanding officers in the operation of those provisions. It is not without significance that when one looks at the number of men who reengage in the three respective arms of our Services one sees that the Royal Navy has the lowest percentage of re-engagement. I do not suggest that that low percentage after a period of nine years is due wholly to the application of what can only be described as an unfair disciplinary system, but I suggest that it is a contributory factor. The fact that the Royal Navy can induce only just over a third of Service men to re-engage, as against 50 per cent. in the Army and nearly 60 per cent. of men in the Royal Air Force, should be a factor to cause the Ministry of Defence to look at the disciplinary code in the Navy to see whether it is having any effect on this percentage of re-engagement.

My right hon. Friend referred to the evidence given to the Committee about the sea/shore ratio and went on to develop the argument that because only 45 per cent. of the Navy is at sea—and only a small percentage of that 45 per cent. is beyond the range of administrative support—therefore he suggested we should have a dual system as suggested in the amendment. Since he was trying to be fair to the Navy, I feel that he illustrated a weakness in his own code. I hope that when eventually we consider bringing a greater degree of justice into the Navy, we will not adopt entirely my right hon. Friend's proposals since it would be difficult to operate two systems in the Navy. On the point about the small number involved—and I take a different stand from my right hon. Friend in regard to the sea/ shore ratio—the Ministry's figure in the White Paper make the sea/shore ratio much less than 45 per cent. They make it about a third. So the problem is probably easier to deal with than my right hon. Friend suggests: a smaller number of people are at sea, and the required range of administrative support is less than my right hon. Friend thought.

In five years' time, when we consider these matters again, it may be that the Admiralty will be more enlightened and more receptive to the idea of bringing its disciplinary systems into line with those of the other two Services.

We have been told that, because of the vast improvements that have been made and because ships now operate with advanced machinery and very complicated systems, many of the old traditions of the Navy have had to go. Rum has disappeared, much as I disagreed with my right hon. and hon. Friends about it. Now it is rumoured that duty-free tobacco is to go. It seems that the Admiralty is prepared to see all the old traditions which made up the "perks" for the lower deck swept away, but that it will fight to the death to preserve an outdated and unjustifiable disciplinary code. If it maintains that the "perks" must go, it must in turn introduce a system of summary justice which is comparable in all respects with those of the other two Services. For those reasons, I support my right hon. Friend's amendment.

Mr. Ramsdell

May I apologise to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Major-General Jack d'Avigdor-Goldsmid)? He said that 70 out of 100 commanding officers would prefer to have their powers increased. Some members of the Committee did not trust their recollection of the report and thought that my hon. and gallant Friend had the figures the wrong way round. However, he was quite right, and his recollection is confirmed by paragraph 10 of the report, which refers to Question 793 in the evidence to the Committee.

Mr. John Morris

May I add a similar apology? It was my recollection too, that the hon. and gallant Gentleman had expressed the proportions in the reverse order. That was also the recollection of my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved). It is amazing how three members of the Committee thought that the record was quite different. Who is right, I am not sure. However, the record confirms the view of the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

Mr. Lambton

As this will be my only opportunity to address the Committee, perhaps I might begin by stressing the very constructive nature of the report, practically every part of which has been accepted by the Government. The Committee set out to do constructive work, and it succeeded. It is no exaggeration to say that very good results have flown from its work.

I want also to assure the right hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. John Morris) that, even if I advise against the acceptance of his amendment, I have listened carefully to everything that he said and his arguments will be considered before the next review. The same goes for all the arguments put forward by hon. Members on both sides.

It would be wrong not to express from the Front Bench on behalf of the Committee our thanks to the Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate (Mr. Ramsden), for the way in which he conducted our meetings. From this side, we must express our gratitude to the right hon. Member for Aberavon for the way in which he led his side of the Committee in our debates. What was very refreshing about some of our meetings was the cross-voting which resulted. I think that the hon. Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw), at any rate agrees with my right hon. and hon. Friends today. That is a rarity which is always refreshing in politics.

I come, then, to the effect of the Amendment and the proposed new Clause. It would be to reduce the powers of naval commanders to the same level as those in the Army and the R.A.F. At the same time, it would give the Defence Council the power by regulation to restore the present naval powers in whole or in part to appropriate categories of naval commanding officers.

The Amendment is based on the argument that, though the captains of distant naval ships require the present powers, they are not necessary for the captains of ships operating closer to administrative support or for the captains of fleet establishments ashore.

The right hon. Member for Aberavon made a powerful speech in moving this Amendment. I understand entirely his motivation. However, there are a number of major arguments against accepting it.

It is not possible to distinguish in the way that the right hon. Gentleman proposes between different categories of ships. Some ships are detached from the rest of the fleet. In such cases, any reduction of commanding officers' powers would be difficult to operate. Equally, there are a few naval vessels which do not very often go far from their home ports. If one looks carefully at the disposition of the ships of the fleet, however, it becomes clear that few of them falls into these two extreme categories. The pattern of activity of most ships of the fleet is much more varied and is liable to be changed at very short notice as ships are redeployed to take account of changing operational and other requirements.

Perhaps most important of all is the point that almost every ship in commission has to be ready at short notice to proceed on duties which may involve its being well beyond the range of immediate administrative support, although normally it would be within its reach. At the same time, although fewer ships are now in far distant waters than was formerly the case, this has not altered the fact that the fleet has to be highly mobile and ready to accept immediate changes of plan.

5.45 p.m.

My second argument relates to the suggestion that it is possible to have two disciplinary procedures in the navy, one for the seagoing fleet or some part of it—and again it is possible that some confusion might arise here—and the other for naval establishments ashore. Unlike the right hon. Gentleman, I can see very serious objections to any arrangements which would place the members of a single Service under two disciplinary procedures. I listened with interest to the right hon. Gentleman's comparison when he referred to someone in civilian life committing some crime and finding himself shuttlecocked from one court of justice to another. However, that is not a relevant comparison. When a man joins a Service, he expects to be in that Service under one disciplinary system.

I ask the Committee to listen to some of the following difficulties that it would cause. From the point of view of men in the Navy, there is a great deal to be said for a single disciplinary system. If there were more than one, men might find themselves passing from one system to the other without being certain which one they were under at the time. Secondly, under two systems, a man would be tried summarily or by court martial depending on whether he was serving ashore or afloat rather than depending on the seriousness of his offence. Thirdly, a difficulty would arise in the case of an absentee or deserter. Once his ship sailed, he would have to be tried under the disciplinary system operating ashore, whereas members of the same ship's company who had sailed with the ship would be dealt with under a different system for what probably were less serious offences. At the same time, there is no doubt that two systems of discipline would complicate administration both in the fleet and at headquarters.

My views contradict the arguments which have been advanced by hon. Members opposite. We have been told that the Amendment would not impose too great a strain upon the disciplinary system of the Navy. If men were court-martialled instead of receiving summary justice, there would be a large number of cases for court-martial requiring evidence to be brought ashore from those at sea. That would create considerable inconvenience to ships which might require all their men at effective stations.

It is important to stress the considerable differences between naval life and Army and Air Force life. When men come ashore after a period of sea, they are subject to a great deal more small temptations than men serving in the Army and the Air Force. Very often, therefore, summary justice and the imposition of slight sentences fits the crimes far better than hawking men back for court-martial.

The hon. Member for Mansfield (Mr. Concannon) referred to the safeguards of men who are tried summarily at sea. The supplementary memorandum submitted to the Committee, which is to be found in Appendix 22 on page 175, describes … the safeguards, standards of practice and judicial procedures which are observed when a naval rating is tried summarily. It goes on to say that the procedures are governed by Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy. It is clear that men have considerable safeguards, and I draw special attention to paragraph (h) which says: For more serious offences, leading ratings and above may have the right to be tried by court-martial (equivalent to general court-martial in the other two Services). They are told of this right by the Commanding Officer at the end of the investigation and then have 24 hours in which to decide whether to opt for trial by court-martial or summarily. I might add that the great majority of those who have had this opportunity to opt for trial by court-martial have not taken it up. That suggests that the men themselves are not as dissatisfied with the system as has been suggested.

The Armed Forces have been subject to great changes in the last few years. This process has not yet been completed, and I do not think that we should add to these problems when there is no evidence that it would be of advantage to the Service.

For all these reasons—and I hope reassurances—I urge the House to reject the amendment and leave the Clause in its present form.

Mr. John Morris

Since there will not be an opportunity on Third Reading, may I thank all the witnesses who gave evidence to the Select Committee, and particularly the Chairman, the right hon. Member for Harrogate (Mr. Ramsden) for guiding our proceedings; the staff of the Defence Department, led by the Head of the Service Discipline Acts Review Division; Parliamentary Counsel; and the Officers of the House, who gave an incredible amount of assistance to the Committee. There was from time to time robust cross-examination from all members of the Committee, and the witnesses were very patient throughout the proceedings.

The Committee examined carefully, Clause by Clause, many matters which caused concern to us, the concept of active service, some of the punishments, and some of the offences. It was obvious to us that there had been a great deal of give and take from each of the Services in turn, and this obviously will go on.

My suggestion that there should be a common Act for the three Services was rejected by the Committee. However, I am sure that with the effluxion of time, in due course, maybe before the next quinquennial review, a common Act will be brought before the House.

One of the matters that was acceptable to the Committee, which perhaps will do more than any other to bring about comparison between one Service and another, was the Committee's view that the Secretary of State for Defence should consider whether the legal departments of each Service should become a common service.

The hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeenshire, West (Lieut.-Colonel Colin Mitchell) expressed disquiet in the Amendment he moved in the Committee, on the place of punishment, the purposes, and the methods and powers. It is obvious to us all, deliberating as we are on the system of discipline in the Armed Forces, that a punishment which involves restriction of a man's liberty is a waste of resources, whether of the Armed Forces or in civilian life. Therefore, when we look at the purpose of punishment it is important all the time to consider whether our methods of punishment and the means we use to decide upon sentencing are the best possible, and whether they meet the views of sentencing in the 1970s as opposed to the 1870s.

I think that it was the right hon. Member for Harrogate who suggested that I placed too much emphasis on the views of the Vice Judge Advocate General, and that he preferred that of the commanding officers. As I understood it, the Vice Judge Advocate General gave the considered view of his part of the Army Department that he would not wish the powers enjoyed by the Royal Navy commanding officers to be extended to all the other Forces without a large number of safeguards for the personnel involved. That in itself, whether the Committee accepts my views or not, is worthy of examination, is cause for concern, and should be examined by the Secretary of State for Defence with some care in the next five years.

I quoted earlier the figures which we had for the analysis of punishments meted out for different classes of offence. In the division between 28 and 90 days, they were 47 for the Navy, three for the Army and one for the Royal Air Force, and the pattern remains for all the other offences. Having regard to the numbers involved in the Navy, and even on absolute terms, the figures are out of proportion. This matter, too, needs, full examination in the Defence Department.

My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw) did not support me on this matter in Committee. He argued contrariwise, but he has done so on previous occasions in defence matters. He saw administrative difficulties, and pointed out that even in civil courts the majority of people preferred to be tried summarily. A shorter maximum sentence is always attractive to someone in difficulty, but my hon. Friend knows probably better than I that the conviction rate is rather different when one elects to be tried in a higher court. That is one of the counter-attractions. Whilst he argued against my Amendments, my hon. Friend wants the Acts brought completely together in clue course. I took it that he was against sin, but not now.

The hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) said that I wished to reduce the Forces to one colourless whole. I dealt with that in my intervention. I am very conscious of the traditions of each of the Armed Forces. That is why I sought to introduce my Clause in what I thought was a reason- able way, not bringing the Royal Navy into line with the other Services without providing excepting provisions.

I am grateful to the Minister for telling us that all our observations in Committee and during the debate will be considered before the next review. He was very kind to us in his observations during the whole proceedings.

In view of the arguments on the administrative difficulty of introducing a two-tier system for the Royal Navy, I am encouraged the next time we discuss the matter not to provide any excepting provisions, but perhaps to bring the Royal Navy straightforwardly into line with the other two Armed Services—and let that be a lesson to those who oppose me now.

The argument has been interesting. As the Minister has told us that all the matters raised will be considered before the next Review, as I am confident that there will be more rationalisation of the Navy with the other two Armed Forces in due course, and as it may well be that in the next Review the objects I have in mind will be achieved, and the Government of the day will introduce something not unlike what I have suggested now, I do not press my new Clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 48 to 78 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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