HC Deb 09 December 1971 vol 827 cc1671-82

11.30 p.m.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fortescue.]

Mr. George Cunningham (Islington, South-West)

The subject I wish to raise on the Adjournment is the responsibility of Ministers for the use of physical and mental interrogation techniques against internees in Northern Ireland.

It is incumbent on anyone rising to speak on any aspect of Irish affairs to say first that whatever his opinion about interrogation techniques, he has no sympathy, as I have no sympathy, with the barbaric thuggery of gunmen and bombers on the streets of Belfast and Derry; and in no sympathy do I raise these issues tonight. There is no incompatibility between what I have said and what I will say in the rest of my speech.

It is important that we should recognise that it is when the State is under the greatest provocation from such people that we are the most likely to permit ourselves to slip into some measure of barbarism to counteract it. There is no chance of the judicial habits of this country falling into the marsh in normal times. It will be only in situations like that in Northern Ireland at present when that may happen, and, if the price of freedom is eternal vigilance, vigilance is especially required when things are happening as they are on the streets of Ulster now.

It is amazing that so little fuss has been made since the publication of the Compton Report three weeks ago about the implications of what is said in that report. When one considers what people in this country have said in the past about My Lai and Hola Camp, and one looks at the lack of response to the atrocities committed by our forces—under Ministerial authority—against internees, this is surprising. One is entitled to ask, "Why has it happened?"

One reason is that Press coverage—this was not so much true of the television coverage at the time—stressed that certain allegations had been disproved instead of stressing that certain allegations had been abundantly proved. When I first read the report, I regarded it as a good report. Disturbing facts are there for anyone to read with eyes to see, but the more often I read it, the more I feel it is fundamentally a dishonest report, extremely naive in its terminology.

Attention has been drawn in past debates to the semantic gymnastics of Sir Edmund Compton in his definitions of cruelty and brutality, but reading again a paragraph in the report, I was more forcibly struck than before by the complete nonsense of his judgment.

He argues that actions are properly defined as cruel only if they display a disposition to inflict suffering and an indifference or pleasure on the part of the inflicter. So if a guard cuts off a man's hand to induce him to provide information, provided he gets no pleasure out of it or feels something opposite to pleasure in doing it, it is not cruel.

That is what Sir Edmund Compton says in the report, and anyone who holds that view of the meaning of words is not competent to conduct that sort of inquiry.

When I mentioned his naivety, I was thinking of the helicopter incident at the end when Sir Edmund Compton refutes the allegation that a man was pushed out of a helicopter six feet from the ground by saying that one reason for disbelieving it is because the rules say that one must not leave a helicopter while it is off the ground. It is as if I complained that someone had pushed me off a bus and it was argued that it was highly unlikely to happen because the rules state that one must not get off a bus when it is moving. Anyone who produces nonsense like that is entitled to have his other judgments in the report severely doubted.

The acts which Sir Edmund Compton has found proved are, however, in themselves deeply serious and in my view they can legitimately be described as torture, although I do not want to be sucked into the business of defining the meaning of words. I believe, however, that if these things had not been found proved in this case, if we were talking about it in the abstract the word "torture" would be freely used in this House by all sides to describe this sort of thing if somebody else had done it.

The rules laid down by Ministers in 1965 and 1967 governing interrogation techniques provide that there should be no violence to persons. I suggest to the Minister that it is simply not possible to argue that obliging a man to lean against a wall for an average of, say, 20 hours, with rests in between—for periods of five hours—is not violence to the person. Nobody does that voluntarily. A person must be forced to do it. One cannot simply ask a man to do that and expect him to do it.

To put a bag round a man's head and tie it is violence to the person. It may legally be arguable that to blast his ears with an electronic noise machine is not violence to the person. The lawyers could have a field day on that, but I would regard it as such. I do not think anyone looking at the actions of others without having a self-interest in the matter could argue that what happened was not violence to the person. The rules also state that behaviour should not be of a humiliating and degrading nature. I suggest, again, that to tie a hood round a man's head for hours on end is decidedly humiliating and degrading.

I have given the Minister notice of a specific point which I intended to raise. The Bowen Report on the Aden affair some years ago specifically recommended in respect of Aden—I concede that—that the medical attendants during interrogations should be civilian. That was the third recommendation of the Bowen Report. As I understand it, the medical attendants in Ulster were all, or nearly all, military. The Minister has responded to some of my many Questions to him during the last three weeks by saying that the medical advice which has been taken about the techniques is all military advice; no outside professional civilian medical advice has been taken. I should like to know why the Government have departed from that recommendation of the Bowen Report.

Some people are prepared to argue that what was done to the internees was relatively harmless. I concede at once that there are gradations of torture every degree worse than what was done in Ulster. I do not, however, think that people quite understand that what was done was done with the definite purpose of putting the victim into a state of sensory isolation.

Many experiments have been done on this kind of thing, both in academic circles and by the military in various countries, particularly in the United States. To those who do not know about it, it is probably surprising in how severe a state a person can be placed if he is deprived of the normal input of his senses.

That was what they were about in Northern Ireland: hooding a man to shut off vision, blasting him with noise to cut out any pattern of input of sound and keeping him in one rigid position for long periods to keep out the tactile senses. This is the new conventional wisdom of the torturing interrogation methods which are taught in this country.

It is, in fact, very old hat. It is straight out of Koestler's "Darkness at Noon" and most of the psychiatrists and others who have some claim to be expert in these matters would say that at least a lot of the information one gets that way is likely to be highly unreliable, although I accept that one can get some reliable information that way. Also, it simply is not true that one can do that to a man and not leave scars. So what was done was decidedly serious and many medical men—some who have written to the Press—regard this as a perversion of their profession. I think that the hon. Gentleman and the Parker Committee will hear more from these people over the coming weeks.

How did the Government respond? First, the Home Secretary made clear that in his opinion what had been done was not contrary to the rule laid down in 1965 and 1967, which I question. Secondly, they set up the Parker Committee. But the Parker Committee, judging by the Home Secretary's statement and other statements, seems to be encouraged to find a line between some form of ill-treatment which would be bearable and other forms which would not be bearable. I ask the Government to make clear to the Committee that the job it is supposed to do is defining rules to stop any ill-treatment of prisoners in British hands.

Secondly, and more important, apart from the Parker Committee considering the matter of what we do in future, there is the question of what we are going to do about what has happened. People have, I suggest, committed illegalities. They have committed criminal assaults on individuals in their charge. That cannot be swept under the carpet. In the case of Hola Camp years ago, hon. Members with greater experience than I will recall the speech of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). Investigation then was not just into how we could stop doing these things but into the disciplinary action required against those who had done them.

It would be wrong for disciplinary action to be taken against troops and police who did things which they were trained to do, which they did with the knowledge of Ministers. Therefore, the action which needs to be taken is against the Ministers under whose authority these things were done.

Let us be clear about it. The Ministers were responsible. The Minister of State, in reply to a question by me, stated: Ministers were aware of the principles underlying interrogation in depth— that is the curious term by which we refer to torture these days. He went on to say that they were also aware of the safeguards against violent or humiliating treatment. … They were also aware of the importance of obtaining operational intelligence and that to assist this, detainees were liable to be subjected to a measure of fatigue, isolation and noise. They were not acquainted with the detailed methods that were employed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd December, 1971; Vol. 827, c. 154..] If there is one thing worse than a Minister knowing that people under his control are going to commit assaults upon prisoners in charge, it is that he knows they are going to do it but does not know the detailed methods that are implied.

The hon. Gentleman had not even gone to the trouble at that time to listen to the electronic torture machine, three copies of which are in a secure establishment in this country. But the Minister has now heard the machine. He is the only Minister, he has told me, in the Ministry of Defence who has done so. He heard it on 28th October, just a few days before the Compton Report was formally signed. Why did it take that time for Ministers to work out for themselves what the techniques were that were to be used?

I have no time to go into the legal aspects. The Minister has said that he does not think that illegalities have been committed, but he is not a legal luminary and he has, to say the least, an interest in the matter. The Attorney-General's remarks have been decidedly more cautious. The Times is clear on the point and has argued it carefully. Whether it is right or wrong, it argued the case with many facts quoted.

That is something which the Government have not done, and many balanced, unpolitical lawyers in this country have made it clear to me that they see no way in which this cannot be illegal. If it is not illegal in Northern Ireland, then I want to know whether it is legal in this country, because although Northern Ireland has different laws from us, and the Special Powers Act does not apply here, there is nothing in that Act which constitutes a difference in that respect, and I want to know whether the Minister regards it as legal for these things to be done in this country.

I spoke on another occasion of the moral aspect of the matter and the difficulties, if someone is going in for torture, of knowing where to draw the line. It goes without saying that what we have here is a major scandal to which people have not wakened up, and which Ministers are busy trying to shove under the carpet. I promise the Minister that if torture is to be admitted to our techniques, I cannot stop the Government from doing that, but by God they will not do it in silence.

What is needed is for the Attorney-General to make a reasoned statement of the legal position, similar to the reasoned statement that he made about the Simonstown Agreement. There must also be an investigation, the necessary proceedings must be taken against individuals, and Ministers must take the necessary action. One thing which should have happened—and which ought to happen now—is that the Secretary of State for Defence, who held ministerial responsibility for what was done by the troops under his control, ought to have resigned.

During the next few weeks we shall see opinion in this country waking up to what was happening and giving the Government a had time. A committee has been formed, under Professor Wall of University College, which will awaken universities to what they have not realised until now and I hope, because not a little publicity has been given to the committee's appeal for evidence, that people all over the country, with something balanced and professional to contribute, will put their written evidence to the Parker Committee by the deadline of 17th December. I think that the committee, composed of three lawyers, will have good medical opinion put to it and will be given the benefit of the common sense of people in the country.

11.48 p.m.

The Minister of State for Defence (Lord Balniel)

The use of interrogation gives rise to complex and very difficult problems, and it is important that they should be given the most careful thought. I am therefore glad that the hon. Member for Islington, South-West (Mr. George Cunningham) has been able to raise this matter on his Motion for the Adjournment so that we may have another opportunity of examining the many, and sometimes conflicting, considerations which are involved.

In combating terrorism the forces of law and order have a quite exceptionally difficult job. Their opponents are often anonymous; their identities are unknown; they wear no uniforms, and they cannot easily be distinguished from the ordinary mass of the population amongst whom they mingle. There are no battle lines: a terrorist may be almost anywhere.

The difficulties which I have described are greatest in an urban situation, because the sheer numbers of people and buildings make it easy for the terrorist to hide. It makes it easy for him to emerge and shoot, or to bomb or to assassinate, and then to fade back into the surroundings amongst which he cannot be found.

The security forces will never find more than a handful of terrorists when relying on random searches or routine patrols or road blocks. Most of the time the terrorist does not carry anything with him which can incriminate him, and there is nothing which marks him out from being an ordinary member of the population.

In that situation the security forces can begin to combat terrorism successfully, only if they have information about the terrorists, if they know who the terrorists are, who their contacts are, where they hide, what their plans are for attack, assassination and bombing, and where their weapons are hidden. The key to all that is, of course, intelligence. All that is easily stated. What is much more difficult to decide is how the intelligence is to be obtained.

It is not an easy matter. The information will not normally be given freely, because terrorists intimidate the population. They are quick to turn their murderous methods on those they think are giving information about them. For example, two days ago a man was found shot dead. The Provisional I.R.A. said that the man had killed himself accidentally whilst preparing to go out on active service. However, the case is being treated as one of murder. The man had bitten through his tongue before he died. The House can draw its own conclusions as to the circumstances in which the man died.

Experience has shown that the most effective—indeed, the only—way of getting intelligence is by questioning and interrogating suspected terrorists and those associated with them. It is only by these means that the security forces will get information which is accurate and up to date.

The need, though, is to have the information quickly; otherwise, when a terrorist is captured his colleagues still at liberty will change their hide-out: they will change the places where they hide their arms and ammunition before the security forces have caught up with them.

Many suspects reveal what they know during preliminary questioning immediately after arrest. A great deal of information is obtained in this way which can be acted on at once.

There are often a small number of people who are suspected of the deepest complicity in the terrorist campaign and who are thought to be able to give the most vital information but who do not answer in the preliminary questioning. Information cannot be obtained from them quickly except by some form of interrogation in depth, as it has come to be called.

This has been the general experience of the British Forces in many internal security situations in which they have been involved since the end of the war. Interrogation had to be used in the 1950s in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus; and in the 1960s in Brunei, in Malaysia during confrontation, and in Aden; and most recently in Northern Ireland.

The same form of interrogation had to be used during confrontation in Malaysia and in Aden—when the right hon. Gentlemen opposite were in power—for precisely the same reasons—to get quick, reliable information about terrorists who were attempting by means of murder and other acts of violence to overthrow the legal and established government of the day.

But it has always been recognised that, no matter how urgent the need to obtain information quickly in order to save lives, it would be morally unacceptable, and indeed self-defeating, to depart from certain basic standards of behaviour.

The general rules which at present govern the conduct of interrogation were codified in 1965. These rules are set out in general terms in the Compton Report.

Although these rules have always been observed whenever interrogation, and particularly interrogation in depth, has been used, allegations of torture have inevitably followed.

This happened for instance in Aden in 1966 when a number of allegations were made about the treatment of detainees by British Army interrogators. The previous Administration asked Mr. Bowen, Q.C., to enquire into the procedures then governing interrogation, and his report was published with an introduction by the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown. One of Mr. Bowen's main recommendations was sthat there should be a daily examination by a medical officer and medical examinations on arrival and at departure from the interrogation centre. This is now standard practice.

I turn now to the recent use of interrogation in Northern Ireland. All of those brought in after arrest were subjected to preliminary questioning. In addition, it was decided to interrogate in depth a small number of them who were known to be likely to have a large amount of very valuable information about the I.R.A.

Mr. George Cunningham

We have read the report.

Lord Balniel

This interrogation was authorised by the Northern Ireland Government with the knowledge and concurrence of Her Majesty's Government. Inevitably the same pattern as before emerged, and allegations of brutality and torture by the security forces carrying out the interrogations began to appear, and the Government rightly asked the Compton Committee to investigate them. I regard the Compton Committee as completely impartial and in no sense as the hon. Gentleman described it as dishonest and producing nonsense.

The House will be interested to know that the Government have decided that it would be right to set up a standing machinery to deal with complaints, subsequent to those considered in the Compton Report, about the treatment of individuals at the hands of the Army or police from the moment of their arrest until they are handed over to the prison authorities.

The Compton Report confirmed that the methods currently authorised for interrogation contain no element of cruelty or brutality, but more generally it drew attention to the problem of implementing the rules in detail in circumstances in which it is vital to carry out intensive and urgent interrogation.

We face the same difficult issue of what methods of interrogation are acceptable in our society for the purpose of defeating a ruthless campaign of terror and violence and so saving the lives of innocent people. No doubt right hon. Gentlemen opposite when they had the same responsibility had to ask the same questions.

The job of Sir Edmund Compton's inquiry was to establish the facts. It did not have the incredibly difficult task of weighing up the methods and the intensity of interrogation against the desperate need to save lives. The Government have decided that the procedures at present authorised for interrogation should be reviewed, and we are very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Parker and Lord Gardiner, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) for their willingness to undertake what I think all would regard as an incredibly difficult task.

Fourteen men out of 1,500 arrested have been interrogated in depth, and the information which was obtained was of great value and has enabled the security forces to make significant progress in campaigning against the I.R.A. organisation. It is important to understand that the benefit does not end with the immediate and direct results leading to arrests and arms finds. More information is obtained from those who are arrested. This leads to further arrests, leading in turn to further successes for the security forces. This snowball effect has brought a continuous flow of fresh, accurate information about the terrorists, and the process is still going on, because information generates information.

I have given the House before a considerable number of statistics about the arms, ammunition and plans found and the people arrested as a result of the information. A great proportion of the arrests and the finds of ammunition and arms since 9th August has flowed directly or indirectly from this interrogation, which was regarded by the Government as being very necessary. I cannot be more specific, because the danger of I.R.A. retribution in Northern Ireland is very real and very grim. I am sure, though, that the arrests and arms seizures made on the basis of the operational intelligence obtained from interrogation has saved many lives and without any question has saved many people from suffering fearful injuries. The questioning of detainees has played a major part in achieving the increased effectiveness in recent months of the security forces.

It is unfortunately true that a handful of terrorists can carry out major shootings and bomb attacks and that outrages will continue, as we have seen from the horrific examples of the past week.

Mr. George Cunningham

What about the civilian medical officers?

Lord Balniel

But as we know more and more about the gunmen, based upon the information we are obtaining, so the security forces will gradually tighten their grip on the I.R.A. gunmen and gradually restore law and order in that most unhappy Province of Northern Ireland.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twelve midnight.