§ Mr. Ian Percival (Southport)I beg to move Amendment No. 24, in page 21, line 3, leave out subsection (1).
§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Miss Harvie Anderson)I think that it would be for 555 the convenience of the House if we discussed with it Amendment No. 25, in line 23, leave out subsection (3).
§ Mr. PercivalSubsection (1) alters the method of appointment to a substantial number of offices compendiously referred to as minor judicial appointments. But I know that no one present will be misled by that descriptiton into under-estimating the importance of those offices. They are all essential parts in our system for the administration of justice, but they are offices of which much less is heard and much less is known than is commonly known about those judicial officers who operate in public. I have little hesitation in saying that there are some of those offices about which I know very little, and I shall, therefore, confine my observations to the Masters of the Queen's Bench Division, about whom I do know a good deal.
The essential features that we should bear in mind about all these officers is that they are doing very special and very specialised jobs. The Queen's Bench Masters deal with all the intricacies of the procedure leading to trial. Theirs is a highly specialised job requiring very particular qualifications. The question here is what is the best way of ascertaining which of those people who may apply for those offices have the best qualifications? The Lord Chancellor already has responsibility for making an immense number of appointments. After the Bill is in force he will have responsibility for appointing even more.
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No one could expect the Lord Chancellor to know personally the qualities and qualifications of every applicant for every appointment for which he is responsible. It is for that reason that I suggest, even at this late stage, that the present system is preferable to that which is proposed. The present system is that the appointment of Queen's Bench Masters is made alternately by the Master of the Rolls and the Lord Chief Justice. I suggest that they are the most suitable people, because, of the persons holding high judicial office they are closest to the work of the Queen's Bench Masters and are those most likely to have personal knowledge of or to be in a position to obtain information about the persons who apply for these appointments.
556 As I understand this Clause, in future the appointments will not be made by either one of them alternately or at all, but will be made by the Lord Chancellor. The whole of my case—it is nonetheless strong for being brief—is that what one should have in mind here is simply who are the persons closest to the work in question and closest to the people who would be applying for these appointments and, therefore, in the best position to decide which of the applicants is most suitable. I suggest that the answer to that question is the persons in whom responsibility lies now and that, accordingly, there is no case for a change.
Subsection (3) also relates to Queen's Bench Masters but raises a different point. There are eight of them, and at the moment promotion is by seniority, and seniority alone. Whoever is the senior Master in office automatically becomes the Senior Master and Queen's Remembrancer. It is necessary to remember the particular nature of their work and the fact that there are only eight of them. This small body must work in close harmony and give mutual help to one another. They are thus in a situation where trust and understanding between them are of first importance.
It may be that those who have never worked in a little set-up like that may find that difficult to understand, but I hope not, because it seems to me that all I am doing in making that observation is introducing human nature into what otherwise might be considered just an administrative exercise. Human nature being what it is. I suggest that one of the most vital elements in a small establishment like that is that they should be able to enjoy complete mutual trust and understanding amongst one another.
But what would happen if the seniority rule were departed from? If an outsider were brought in, is it not inevitable that this would give rise to feelings of disappointment, whether legitimate or not, whether they were strongly or not so strongly based, and that this might very well lead to unrest, disquiet, and lack of that mutual trust and understanding which, I hope, everyone will appreciate does matter? If one must depart from the seniority rule, then I hope that I shall hear from my right hon. and learned Friend that the one thing which 557 is further from anyone's mind is the bringing in of someone from outside.
The other possibility is that one of these eight might be promoted above the heads of the others. It is not difficult to picture what a difference that might make to a small team like this, inducing for the first time the thought that if someone causes the powers that be to think, whether it be true or not, that he is a more suitable person for promotion, he may get promotion that much more speedily than would otherwise have been the case.
I dare say that I shall be told that promotion out of order of seniority would be only on grounds of merit. That sounds all right; but can we be sure that the powers that be are always in a position to make such a fine judgment of merit? May it not be that either by accident or by design, someone might so act as to bring his own prowess to their attention, might create an impression of great activity which might be mistaken for merit? It is a dangerous horse to ride. It sounds all right in theory, but it is much more difficult to apply in practice. What can be the harm in sticking to the present system, well understood, not suggested by anybody ever to have done any serious harm, a workable system?
It is for these reasons that I put forward these Amendments to leave out both subsections. I have been here long enough not to be so optimistic as to hope that both will be accepted, but I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will be able to give a very firm assurance, as I expect he probably will, that there will be little difference in practice in the appointment of the Masters. I expect him to say that the Lord Chancellor would certainly take the advice of those who at present make the appointments and would be unlikely to do other than accept that advice. Some assurance on those lines would give great comfort to the persons concerned, as it would to me.
I hope that the Attorney-General will go so far as to say, likewise about subsection (3), that it would not be contemplated that an outsider would be brought in and given the senior job over the heads of the others save in the most exceptional circumstances, and that what has worked so well in the past will be adhered to 558 unless at any particular time there are strong grounds for departing from that rule. I beg to move.
§ The Attorney-GeneralThere are three things on which I can agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southport (Mr. Percival): first, that a case is no less strong for being brief; secondly, that he has been here long enough not to be confident or optimistic at this stage that Amendments will be accepted; thirdly, and most important, that the Masters are persons of great distinction who carry out a very important part of the judicial process.
We have been grumbling about the inability of the previous and present Administrations to implement the Morris Report, but it will indict many Administrations that it was in 1915 that it was first recommended that the appointment of all Masters and Registrars should be conferred on the Lord Chancellor because he was a Minister with responsibility to Parliament, but it is only now, in 1971, that that is being effected. It is time that the change was made. It is right that such an important appointment should be made by a Minister responsible to Parliament. The independence of the Masters, no less than that of the judiciary appointed on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, is not affected by the faot that he has made that recommendation, and it will remain exactly as it has been—entirely unaffected.
I can assure my hon. and learned Friend that my noble Friend has given undertakings to the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls that in the appointing of Queen's Bench Masters in future he will, as is the case with other judicial appointments, consult the heads of the divisions concerned.
Since the 1939–45 war it has been the trend for the Lord Chancellor to make the legal appointments. Many used to be in the hands of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary but more and more they have come to be in the hands of the Lord Chancellor. Opportunity is now being taken to effect this with regard to these distinguished members of the judiciary.
As to Clause 26(3), I appreciate the point raised by my hon. and learned Friend. This would be a matter for my 559 noble Friend. Merit ought to be predominant when making a Senior Master.
The Amendments generally deal with a general trend whereby appointments should be made by the Lord Chancellor, who is a Minister responsible to Parliament. I hope, in view of the undertakings given by my noble Friend to the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, that my hon. and learned Friend will consider withdrawing the Amendment.
§ Mr. PercivalHaving regard to the statement made by my right hon. and learned Friend in relation to Amendment No. 24, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment. In the circumstances, it is better that I say nothing more about Amendment No. 25.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.