HC Deb 04 March 1970 vol 797 cc406-8
34. Sir Ian Orr-Ewing

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for modernising Great Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Healey

None, Sir. The effectiveness of the Polaris weapons system is, however, under constant review.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing

Would not the Secretary of State agree that as the running costs of the Polaris Force are only 1¼ per cent. of the total defence budget it is exceptionally good value for money? As his hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy said in an earlier reply that those responsible were constantly seeking means of improving Polaris, is the rumour published by Chapman Pincher in last Saturday's Daily Express that the Government have refused to modernise the Polaris missile true or untrue?

Mr. Healey

The House will not expect me to comment again on a statement of that particular correspondent, whose unreliability is notorious—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—but what I can say is that the Polaris system has always been developed to carry multiple re-entry vehicles, and when first we learned that the Soviet Union might be deploying an anti-ballistic missile system we took such steps as we regarded as necessary at that time to improve its penetration capability. We are watching the situation very carefully—and the S.A.L.T. talks may well have some influence on the problems we have to meet—and we will consider what further steps need to be taken in the light of developments as we assess them.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins

Has the Government representative at S.A.L.T., Sir Solly Zuckerman, seen the United Nations report on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, which included statements that it would be undesirable that the effectiveness of these weapons should be increased because they are already too effective for the peace of mankind? Will my right hon. Friend resist any suggestion that these weapons should be increased, and that their effectiveness should be increased, as it has already far too much for us?

Mr. Healey

With respect, I think that my hon. Friend is confusing two aspects of effectiveness. One is the destructive power of nuclear weapons, which certainly does not need to be increased, and that is what the United Nations report referred to. The other aspect is the ability of nuclear weapons to penetrate defences so that they remain an adequate deterrent, and that is the responsibility of any administration, which accepts the need for nuclear deterrence, as all Governments until this moment have.

Mr. Rippon

Dismissing the right hon. Gentleman's rather unworthy observations about a distinguished defence correspondent—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—may I ask whether he will state quite plainly that the Government have not taken a decision not to strengthen the Polaris warhead? Will he accept from us that we will be grateful to him for an assurance that the Government are taking whatever steps are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the Polaris force for as long ahead as possible?

Mr. Healey

I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has—I hate to say it—listened to what I said earlier, but he has not hoisted in its meaning, otherwise he would have recognised that we have already taken such steps as we believe are required in the light of information about possible A.B.M. deployment. Whether further steps are required is a matter under constant review, and one factor is the possible effect in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks on the deployment of A.B.M. weapons by either side.

Mr. Shinwell

In view of the frequent declarations which have been made by members of the Government, including my right hon. Friend, that it is not our intention to use these nuclear weapons—that they are merely a deterrent—what is the point of improving them? Also, why does my right hon. Friend speak about more active penetration?

Mr. Healey

I think that my right hon. Friend, who held my responsibility at a time when the whole of Western Europe was totally dependent on the efficacy of American nuclear weapons for its defence, will recognise that a deterrent will be a deterrent only if a potential aggressor knows that it could achieve its purpose if it were ever used. So long as he knows that, it is most unlikely that it will ever require to be used at all.