§ 1 52 a.m.
§ Mr. Raymond Fletcher (Ilkeston)It is a matter of great regret to me that, after listening to three civilised speeches about civilisation itself, I have to steer this debate into rather different channels and talk about war rather than about the arts and point to dangers real and present rather than hopes. Unfortunately, I have to do this, because it is about war that I intend to speak.
Obviously, I cannot hold Her Majesty's Government responsible for the 30-year war which seems to be before us in the Middle. East and is now entering its third decade. The Government were not responsible for that war and they cannot be made, even by me, to accept responsibility for enforcing any kind of peace from outside. Nevertheless, we are involved in that area, and other Powers are involved there, too.
Because I want to define as closely as I can the precise nature of Britain's responsibility in this widening conflict, I must travel by a rather circuitous route. In other words, I shall have to refer to the actions of other Governments in this area and deal in part with the immediate historical background, because Her Majesty's Government's policy in supplying arms to other States, and in particular to the States in the Middle East, is clearly defined. It is a policy designed to preserve the present balance of power which might, if events move hopefully enough, preserve the present unstable, uneasy peace and prevent it from exploding into a repetition of the hostilities that ended in June, 1967.
Therefore, when making demands on the Government, we must ask ourselves precisely what constitutes a balance of power. Nobody can define what a balance of power is in arithmetical terms, because a balance of power can only be analysed when it breaks down. We now know, over 50 years later, exactly where the pre-1914 balance of power broke down in Europe and why it broke down. So there can be no cold analytical assessment of the various elements which go into a balance of power, and the arithmetical assessment is probably the least satisfactory—100 tanks there must be balanced by 100 tanks there. As every- 1410 body knows, to put it more calmly than I normally do, one division commanded by a genius can chase off the field three armies commanded by idiots. So factors other than the factor of arithmetic have to come into the calculation.
But in this area there is apparently a significant change in the military balance as we saw it in the immediate aftermath of the Six-day War. There is no need to detail all the deliveries or specify the arms which have been delivered, but President Nasser has maintained that the supplies he is getting—and we know where he gets them from—will enable him to reopen the big war in about five years' time.
Another factor which has entered into this uneasy balance is that the guerrilla action, which is ostensibly directed only against the State of Israel and the citizens of Israel, is exploding outwards into the rest of the world. It is impossible to contain the kind of attacks which have taken place against the Israeli airline E1 A1 to that airline; airports being what they are, other airlines are bound to be affected sooner or later. So, in a very real sense, this conflict is exploding outwards, and one of the factors in the new balance of power which is emerging is beginning to hit people who have no more connection with the conflict than the Eskimos of Northern Alaska.
Into this already dangerous situation the French Government have insisted on introducing the most imbalancing factor of the lot, and that is the arms deals which have begun with Libya but which will certainly extend to other states in the area. The arms deals themselves tend to escalate in quantitative terms the more they are discussed. When the Mirages were first mentioned in the public prints, 10 was the figure. Now the French Press talks in terms of 100, and some comment over here has jacked up the figure to 120. We know that an unspecified number of AMX.30 tanks—a rather heavy tank, believe—is possibly to be delivered to Libya, again by the French Government. The figures can be argued about; the fact is there.
Most people are fairly well aware why the French have suddenly become the world's foremost nation of military shopkeepers. It has nothing whatever to do with any ideological commitment to either side in the Middle East conflict. It has 1411 to do with oil and with the embarrassment of having French troops fighting in the Chad area and what can be done to relieve them of that embarrassment. It has nothing whatever to do with any kind of ideological principle—unless the greater glory of the former unlamented President of France is regarded as a principle.
But to supply arms to Libya at this time is dangerous for two very important reasons. The Government of Libya, which I do not propose to insult, is nevertheless a revolutionary Government; and revolutionary Governments throughout history have never been conspicuous for adhering to agreements signed by their predecessors. Indeed, the first acts of most revolutionary régimes are to make a bonfire of all the agreements, all the scraps of paper, signed by their predecessors.
It is also a characteristic of a revolutionary régime to regard practically all the agreements signed by Powers they regard as reactionary as merely scraps of paper. Therefore, when the French proclaim that there are guarantees written into this arms agreement to prevent the transfer of aircraft and tanks to third parties, I am not nearly so impressed as perhaps I ought to be, because one has to take very much into account the revolutionary nature of the new régime in Libya and the fact—and this is obvious and one does not need to be a strategist to assess this, for one need only look at a 6d. atlas to see it—that the new strategy of President Nasser after the failure of the Rabat summit conference is to base himself on groupings in the west rather than encircling in the east, and, therefore, Libya and the Sudan occupy positions of key importance in his strategy.
The second point that must be made about any arms sales from any country to Libya at this moment, because of the association, actual and potential, with Egypt, is that wherever these guns are placed, in whatever part of the Middle East they may eventually be placed, their target is all too apparent. They will not be trained against any people other than the Israelis, and they will not fit into any strategic plan other than the Arabs' self-proclaimed plan—the liquidation of the State of Israel.
It is for this reason that French actions are producing so serious an imbalance in 1412 what was already a very unstable balance of power, that I feel it right to argue that Her Majesty's Government's policy on the supply of arms to the Middle East must at least be subject to a drastic review and, as a result of that review, be the object of a drastic change.
It is not only the regional balance in this area that must be preserved. Incidentally, in deference to the feelings of so many of my hon. Friends, let me make it clear at this stage that I would prefer a situation in which no arms of any kind were going to the Middle East, to either of the contending parties in that area. The ideal solution would be a jointly organised and jointly policed Russo-American embargo on all arms going to the area; but it is as hopeless to cry for that as to cry for the moon.
Given the situation that we are in, and given the fact that some kind of rough balance of power is the only way in which this situation can be prevented from exploding into something that might be even more catastrophic than the war of 1967 and could engulf a far wider area in its catastrophic consequences, we have to try to preserve such balance as exists.
The regional balance is characterised by one important factor. It is not and never can be a symmetrical balance, because of the non-material factors which flow into it. Once the Israelis have lost a single battle, they have lost a State and have lost a nation. Defeat for them means the end. The Arab nations, for obvious reasons, which again are apparent from a 6d. atlas showing the area, can sustain defeat after defeat and still survive and, very foolishly, come back for more.
In my view they have sustained four disastrous defeats, because I regard the aerial campaign which is virtually concluded in the Canal area as the fourth of the campaigns waged by the Arab States against Israel. Because of the different consequences of defeat for each of the two sides, we cannot say that a symmetrical situation can be achieved. That is one of the calculations that should flow into any assessment of what we ought to do.
Even if we get a rough regional balance of power, however, that balance of power has to fit into the global balance of power. It is quite obvious that things 1413 are happening in the Eastern Mediterranean which are having a profound effect on the global balance of power. They have already been recognised by President Nixon, and I sincerely hope that they will be recognised by the Government here.
Let us take just two things into account. The first and the most obvious, is the Russian naval strength that is at present deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. It does not frighten me. It is not a totally new factor in history. The Russians have been trying to get something going in the Mediterranean ever since 1774, and in 1827 we fought with them to help the Greeks gain their independence. We fought the Battle of Navarino, a quite remarkable battle about which I should like to talk at greater length. The Russians have been there for quite a long time, but the nature of their presence in the Mediterranean has changed profoundly, and we have to take this into account.
Also, one cannot isolate the Middle East into simply a conflict between Israelis and the surrounding Arab States, because in so far as Soviet power, in the form of military advisers, equipment or naval deployment, is in the area, it affects N.A.T.O. and, in particular, the rather weak southern flank of N.A.T.O., and it is something that we have to take into account. I do not suggest that we should shake fists at the Russians or that we should even get angry with them. I merely suggest that it is something that we have to take into account when we formulate policies governing the supply of arms to anywhere in the Middle East.
My second point about the nature of Russian penetration into this area is that there are now 3,000 Russian military advisers with the Egyptian armed forces. In time, if it has not already happened, this will give those Russian military advisers effective control of the Egyptian armed forces and, therefore, a high specific weight in the whole machinery of the Arab States. I remind the House that in 1913 a German general, Liman von Sanders, was in the Middle East with a staff of 70 advisers. Four years later he controlled all the Turkish armies.
This therefore, is the second point: that the global balance of power is being affected by what is happening in the Middle East and that we have to take 1414 into account the maintenance of that global balance of power just as much as, perhaps even more than, the extent to which supplies of arms from outside can lead to a maintenance of the regional balance of power.
I hope that this factor is being taken into account as seriously in Whitehall as it evidently is in Washington. If the balance were to be allowed to tilt against Israel over the next five to 10 years, if the Israelis felt that everybody was against them, that nobody would supply them with anything and that they were being isolated militarily as well as diplomatically, certain dangerous consequences could follow. One of them might well be that Israel might make what, in my view, would be a tragic decision, a decision to go nuclear.
I do not doubt—nobody who studies these things in Britain doubts—that Israel could become a nuclear country, if not a nuclear power, as we use the term, very soon. It is producing enough plutonium, so I was told recently by Alastair Buchan, of the Institute of Strategic Studies, to make two bombs a year. This has been confirmed in the 1970 edition of Jane's "All the World's Aircraft", in an article contributed by Mr. W. R. Taylor, the editor, who also maintains that the Israelis could build very quickly a delivery system to carry nuclear warheads into the Arab States.
This is something which nobody wants to happen in the Middle East, but it might happen if the Israelis felt they were in a desperate situation, that they were isolated, that we had deserted them, that others had deserted them, and that the military balance was destined to tilt more and more towards the Arab States, given the proclaimed aim of the Arab States, which is, of course, the ending of the State of Israel itself. This might happen, and anyone who knows the Israelis knows quite well that, rather than surrender, rather than sacrifice this State and this nation, they might even inflict upon themselves—and this would be a disaster for the whole world, because it would spread outwards—a kind of nuclear Massada. This is a danger in the future, but it is something which we have to reckon with in the present. We do not want it to happen.
Therefore, I ask my hon. Friend one or two questions, as briefly as possible, 1415 because I am, as, on this issue, I usually am, in danger of putting myself out of order. I ask him to ask his right hon. Friend to start now a review of this entire policy. In particular, I ask him to reconsider the supply of Chieftain tanks. When the Chieftain deal with Libya was debated in this House all sorts of arguments were presented, but the main one was that the King of Libya was almost as solid a feature of that area as the Rock of Gibraltar. The king, unfortunately, has now departed into the kingdom of the shades and an entirely new situation has arisen in Libya.
When some of us argued in this House and outside that Israel should not be denied the kind of tank which Libya was then on the point of receiving, we were told that this tank was so highly sophisticated a piece of military hardware that it would alter the qualitative balance of power within the area. This argument I now return to my Hon. Friend. Has the situation changed sufficiently, as I argue it has, to support the argument for the supply of this tank to Israel?
I also ask what the Government can do, or intend to do, in association, of course, with other Governments concerned, to implement the policy recommendation of Western European Union on this question of arms supplies to the Middle East. I repeat that the ideal solution, or, rather, the ideal contribution that can be made by outside Powers to a solution to the Middle East problem, is a total arms embargo. I do not think that we can get it, and there is no such thing as a unilateral arms embargo. That is a nonsense, as we have been discussing in relation to the tragic situation in Nigeria. But perhaps we can do something. Perhaps we can start discussions. Perhaps we should try.
So I suggest to my hon. Friend that the foundations on which the present policy was based—that is, an assessment of the military balance of power in the Middle East about a year ago—have now been virtually eroded, that the French arms supplies constitute so important a quantitative factor that they alter the situation radically, and that this changed situation calls for at least a review of the Government's policy with- 1416 out necessarily changing the terms in which it is defined.
I suggest, too, to put it in rather emotive terms, because my sympathies with Israel are well known inside and outside this House, that if by any action at this time of stress and danger we let Israel down in any way we shall earn the condemnation of the entire civilised and democratic world.
§ 2.16 a.m.
§ Viscount Lambton (Berwick-upon-Tweed)All of us regret that there is not a larger House to listen to the arguments put so lucidly by the hon. Member for Ilkeston (Mr. Raymond Fletcher). It seems to me that he has made many unanswerable arguments, even if depressing ones. Perhaps the most depressing thing about the whole situation in the Middle East is that what is happening there seems to contradict the old maxim that history does not repeat itself, because it appears to be doing just that for the third time.
As the hon. Gentleman said, in the last 20 years we have seen the same pattern building up in the Middle East three times. We have seen incidents, increased purchases of arms by either side, followed by incidents followed by a balance of arms being sought by either side as it is now sought by the Israelis, followed by more serious incidents, the picture in the end culminating in war. This penultimate stage has been gone through twice during the last 20 years and it seems to me that we are on the verge again of an outbreak of increased war.
It was much easier for the hon. Gentleman to pose the questions and the difficulties, as he did so ably, than it is to give answers as to how the problems can be met. I think that often we make the mistake of believing in this House that many questions are soluble. I cannot help thinking that at the moment this question is insoluble, anyhow by any actions of the British Government. One must also face the depressing fact that no nation which has ever wanted arms has ever failed to be able to buy them.
I come now to the question of the balance of power and the sale of the French fighters, for which the hon. Gentleman has so savagely criticised the French Government. There was great 1417 force in his argument that this again upsets the balance of power in the Middle East and returns us to the pattern I spoke of earlier—imbalance in one direction being redressed and tilting the other way. Already Mr. Nixon has said that the United States will perhaps supply Israel with a number of fighters to make up for it.
We must look at this in two ways. First, does Libya want these fighters for herself and if so, for what possible purpose? Who will man them? As far as I know, there are no pilots in Libya capable of flying planes of this degree of modernity. The suspicion voiced by the hon. Member that these planes are not primarily for use in Libya, but for use by Egypt or her allies against Israel at some future date, must be seriously considered. This is a matter of considerable regret.
We cannot omit, too, the fact, and this is dangerous, that there is not in Egypt either, so far as I am informed, an adequate supply of pilots to man these planes. One of the dangers is that in order to have these planes serviced and flown properly, and ensure that the wastage is not as high as on some other Egyptian arms, there will be an increase in Russian and other foreign personnel in Egypt and Libya.
I return to the rather depressing point that this is not leading anywhere except back to the pattern I have referred to. It is also impossible to separate the Middle East into various patterns. It is fair to ask the Minister whether this shipment of arms to Libya, and the consequent upsetting of the balance of power in the Middle, East plus Soviet infiltration, does not make our planned total withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 even more undesirable. Should not the Government consider a slowing-down of our withdrawal, since there are no signs that the Federation there will be an efficient unit by 1971? With increased Russian power in the area, it would be a pity if our withdrawal was total and irrevocable by 1971.
At the bottom of the trouble caused by the entry of arms to the Middle East lies the conflict between Israel and the Arab countres. We on this side have always felt that any settlement between the two sides must depend on a firm foundation of understanding of the terms upon which peace could be built. Will the Minister 1418 elucidate the phrase in the U.N. resolution of 1967 calling upon Israel to withdraw from territories occupied? Will the Government say whether they mean all territories occupied or merely some of them? Unless this is cleared up, both sides will go on believing that they are in the right and peace will be pushed even further away.
I wish to comment how depressing I find this debate. On both sides of the House we are almost powerless to do anything to prevent events marching on to the climax which they have twice reached before. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to regret the upsetting of the balance of power by the sale of this considerable force of planes to a country which cannot, so far as we know, have any method of using them herself and which does not need them for her own protection.
§ 2.36 a.m.
§ The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Evan Luard)My hon. Friend the Member for Ilkeston (Mr. Raymond Fletcher) has raised a problem of vital importance, a matter which concerns many people in this country and elsewhere. The conflict in the Middle East in itself is a problem of great magnitude which so far has defied all attempts at solution, and which periodically erupts in the violent engagements recorded almost daily in our newspapers.
The question raised is: how far is this situation exacerbated by the supply of arms to the area from outside sources; and what are the principles on which the Government base their policy on these matters?
Before I comment on some of the specific questions raised by my hon. Friend and also by the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton), I will try to explain in general terms our policy in relation to arms supply in this area and the principles on which it is based.
First, I would recall the fact that at the time of the June war of 1967, from which all the present troubles stem, and immediately after that war, the British Government several times called for a general embargo on the supply of arms to all countries in the area, and, indeed, we ourselves for a time unilaterally applied an embargo of this kind. But, as my hon. Friend pointed out, a unilateral embargo of this sort cannot of 1419 itself be of great value unless the example is followed by other countries.
We would have been willing to take part in an agreement either to stop altogether the supply of arms to the area, or at least to limit the supply of arms in specified ways. Unfortunately, all these efforts, which we have repeated a number of times, have not been taken up by some of the other Governments principally concerned. As a result, we have remained ready to consider specific requests for arms from Governments in the area so long as these meet the principles which we have laid down for supplying such arms. I will now try to describe those principles.
We have many times made clear that one overriding consideration in meeting these requests is the effect of any particular transaction on the chances of securing a peaceful settlement in the area. This means considering above all the balance of arms in the area at the time in question, and not merely the numerical balance of arms; we must also be concerned about the overall balance of strength, of military effectiveness in the area. This means that it is not simply a question of counting the tanks or the aircraft, as my hon. Friend pointed out. Certainly, we do not wish to leave any country in the Middle East at such a disadvantage that some aggressor might be tempted to take advantage of it.
These are the main principles which, in the light of the general political situation in the area, we have to apply, and have applied, in considering requests for arms from Governments in the region. We have received a considerable number of requests from Governments on both sides in the conflict. In the light of the principles that I have referred to, on a number of occasions we have had to turn down requests from one or other Government of the region.
As my hon. Friend said, these are not easy principles to apply in practice, and a number of difficulties arise over them. Military strength cannot always be calculated easily in exact terms. Certainly, it cannot be measured according to the exact number of arms alone, without having regard to the capacity to use those arms. The exact quantities which exist at any one time are not always precisely known, though we have fairly reliable 1420 estimates. Finally, it is necessary to consider not only the balance at any one time, but what it may be at some time in the future as a result of new supplies which may be made at some point to one side or the other.
My hon. Friend has drawn attention to another difficulty, which I intended to mention in any event. There may be new supplies of arms by some other Government to one or other of the countries in the area which may have an effect on the balance of arms in the conflict which we are considering. That is one difficulty, and, clearly, we have to take account of any new supplies of this kind which may be made to one side or the other. I think that my hon. Friend omitted to take account of the fact that there have also been supplies of arms on the opposite side of this conflict of a higher grade of weapon than perhaps is available on the other side. We have to take account of both new developments of this kind in considering our policy.
Another change which may come about and which again may affect the consideration of the military balance is a change in attitude or alignment of Governments on one side or the other, due perhaps to a change in Government. This, again, may alter the previously existing balance of power. All alterations of this kind are, clearly, relevant in considering the kind of balance that I have been describing, and they are all significant factors to be taken into account in reaching any decision on matters of this kind.
My hon. Friend called specifically for a drastic review of our policy on these matters as a result of the kind of factor which he described. I must tell him that we keep matters of this kind under constant review, and have no set policy which we follow blindly regardless of changes which occur in the balance of the area. I can assure him that we are reviewing, and have consistently reviewed, our policy in the light of the factors to which he drew attention and those which I described.
I will deal with some of his specific questions in a moment, but he made another point about a review of our policy. He said, as did the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, that in any such review we must take account not merely 1421 of the balance between the main parties to the conflict, but of the global strategic balance between East and West. I hope I do not need to reassure them that Governments in the West, naturally, are concerned about the global strategic balance, and changes which may have occurred in it through the increase in Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean certainly have not gone unnoticed by Western Governments.
However, the global balance is a matter which must be separated from the balance between the Arab States and Israel. Our prime consideration in considering a request for arms either from an Arab Government in the area or from Israel must be the effect on the balance between those sets of countries. Although the other consideration may not be altogether ignored, it will, clearly, not be the main factor in our minds in considering requests of this kind.
These are the general principles which govern our decisions.
I now turn to the particular question of Libya, which was raised by my hon. Friend and was also mentioned by the noble Lord. As the House knows, we are at present engaged in discussions with the Libyan Government about the whole of our future relationship. These discussions will certainly cover, among other things, the possibility of the future supply of arms from this country to Libya, if only because there was already a question of the supply of arms from this country to Libya before the change in Government took place.
I can assure my hon. Friend that in conducting these discussions, which are beginning to take place now, we are conscious of the very factors which he raised and, above all, of the possibility that any weapons which we supplied to the Libyan Government might finally be used against Israel. We have indeed already asked for certain clarification from the Libyan Government on this very point. We have noted some of the public statements by Libyan leaders relative to this consideration, and certain reports which have appeared that it is possible that Libyan forces might be sent to the front to join those of other Arab countries. We also agree that supplies of arms by third countries to a country such as Libya—for example, the aircraft which France is now to send—are a rele- 1422 vant consideration in this respect in so far as they may alter the balance.
I should like to refer to one or two of the points that were mentioned in this connection. Obviously, one of the crucial points is whether these aircraft are likely to be used in the conflict between Israel and her neighbours. Concerning these aircraft, it is apparently a firm condition of the contract that the planes should not be sent to the front to take part in the fighting against Israel. I believe that the aircraft will not be supplied immediately all in one batch to Libya; so it will be possible to get some idea whether this condition is being abided by before the contract is completed. This is one point to be considered.
Another point—and here I must take up a point made by the noble Lord and also by my hon. Friend—is the suggestion that these aircraft in themselves, if they were to be used in the conflict against Israel, would be bound to overturn the balance and tip it against Israel. I suggest that a consideration of the situation in the area, especially in the air, as it has been revealed in the last two or three months, scarcely suggests that there is at present any danger of the balance being tipped very rapidly against Israel. I think that we must all have observed that Israel seems to enjoy a total superiority in the air in the area. This may not be unrelated to the fact that there have been recent supplies of aircraft to Israel. I entirely accept that were these French aircraft to be used in the conflict against Israel this would be a new factor in the situation which would affect the balance, but we should not necessarily conclude that it would immediately tip the balance to the disadvantage of Israel.
§ Viscount LambtonThe point that I wanted to make was that it has already resulted in a promise from America to consider sending more aeroplanes to Israel. Therefore, this does generally step up the amount of effective modern arms introduced into the area, which I think should be deprecated.
§ Mr. LuardI think that the noble Lord has made a big assumption there: that this deal by France with the new Libyan Government caused the recent statement by President Nixon to which he refers. I should not necessarily 1423 accept that there is a direct relation between these two facts. But I entirely accept the point that there is a danger that any new deal of this kind will cause an escalation in the general supply of arms to the area, and this, as I have already indicated, is a factor which we always bear in mind in considering questions of this kind.
I cannot, naturally, comment on any particular transactions which may finally be made—for example, with Libya—as a result of our present negotiations. In any case, we have not reached the stage when particular transactions are discussed, and no commitments have as yet been entered into. But even if they had, as my hon. Friend knows and accepts, it is not the policy of the Government —and it would be an impossible policy —to divulge the details of any such deals. I am simply asking my hon. Friend to be confident that we are by no means unaware of the sort of considerations that he has raised. It will continue to be our policy in dealing with these matters to try to ensure that a fair balance of military strength is maintained in the area.
My hon. Friend referred to the supply of Chieftain tanks to Israel, and asked us to reconsider this question. He referred in particular to "the qualitative balance of power in the area". I think that I have by implication dealt with that in what I have said. These questions are continually under review by Her Majesty's Government in considering the supply of arms to the area. No firm and irrevocable decisions have been taken, or will be taken. Every decision is open to reconsideration, and, clearly, in considering this possibility we shall have to take careful account of the balance of arms in the area.
We shall also take account of the type of arms available in the area. By using the phrase "the qualitative balance of power in the area" my hon. Friend raises this question in a specific form: we shall have to consider whether there are in the area tanks of precisely the same capability and power as those to which he referred. This is the kind of point of which we shall have to take account.
My hon. Friend also referred to the recent W.E.U. resolution and suggested 1424 that we should enter into discussions with other friendly Governments on this whole question. I assure him that we are continually in touch with friendly Governments on matters of this kind. It would not be right for us to be bound by the attitude or decision of every such Government, but we have had exchanges of views within the last day or two with the French Foreign Minister on questions of this kind, and raised many of the same type of questions as my hon. Friend has raised in the debate today.
Although I cannot see how this is relevant to the debate, the noble Lord again asked a question which he has asked me more than once. He referred to the reference in the Security Council resolution passed in 1967 to "territories occupied in the recent conflict" and asked whether that meant all territories occupied in the recent conflict. I must repeat what I have said before, that it is not for me, personally, to interpret the somewhat ambiguous and sphinx-like words of the Resolution. As the noble Lord knows, discussions are taking place in New York between the four Powers on new guide-lines for Ambassador Jarring to return to the Middle East and seek to use his influence to bring about a settlement of the conflict. That phrase is one of the things that will be considered, but it would not be helpful for me to try to give an individual interpretation of what is meant by those words.
I hope that I have been able to clear up some of the points which have been raised during the debate, and to make clear the principles which guide our policy in relation to the Middle Eastern problem, and, in particular, to the supply of arms. Our policy is designed to bring nearer the day when a settlement may be possible. Meanwhile, we shall do nothing, either in supplying military equipment, or in refusing to supply it, which may increase the possibility of renewed conflict, or make more difficult the chances of arriving at a peaceful settlement, which we all desire.
§ Mr. SpeakerOrder. I remind the House that we are about to begin the ninth of 23 debates which are to take place during this long sitting. I have appealed from time to time for reasonably brief speeches.