HC Deb 04 December 1970 vol 807 cc1728-44

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Speed.]

3.37 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Willey (Sunderland, North)

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davies) is not in his place, and as the Minister is in his place ready and anxious to reply to the matter which my hon. Friend proposes to raise, may I take the opportunity to put to the Minister one or two questions arising from a reply the Minister gave me on the same matter. It will be apparent that I am not taking the Minister by surprise.

The Minister gave me corresponding figures to those which he gave my hon. Friend about magistrates' courts in the Northern Region. I have had the opportunity to study them. I want to mention one or two conclusions which I have drawn from the figures and which are a little disturbing.

The figures refer to three categories of case. The first category is that of cases committted for trial on indictment. By 10 out of the 12 courts in the region there was no refusal of legal aid. At Newcastle two applications out of 201 were refused and at Durham three out of 406 were refused—that is, about 1 per cent. of cases. In that category the exceptions do not do more than prove the rule. They show that a certain discretion is exercised.

I rather hesitatingly—not enthusiastically—suggest that, on these figures it would probably be better to make the provision of legal aid in this category universal. At any rate, I cannot complain about the exercise of discretion in this category. I merely make the point that discretion is not exercised in the applicant's favour in so few cases that it would probably be better to make it apply in all cases.

A similar position applies to the second category—committal proceedings. In seven out of the 12 courts there were no refusals. In the other five courts, three refused one application and one, Hartlepool, refused two applications.

Thus, one can say that in this category of case also the position is much the same. The magistrates are exercising their discretion widely in favour of the applicant, and the refusals are limited to about 1 per cent. of cases. On this basis, again, if we want an equitable application of the system, I suggest that we might as well recognise the situation for what it is and provide for legal aid in all such cases.

I come now to one exception in this category to which I draw the Minister's attention, namely, Durham. At Durham, there were 18 refusals out of 363 applications. Thus, the refusals amounted to about 5 per cent. of applications. This is exceptional, because, as I have said, in seven courts there were no refusals, and in the others the proportion was very much the same as that in respect of committal for trial on indictment.

Will the Minister, therefore, call the attention of the Durham magistrates to this state of affairs, so that they may look into it and consider whether it be the case—I can hardly believe it, unless further facts are disclosed—that they feel themselves obliged to find exceptional circumstances which make the position at Durham so different from the position elsewhere in the region?

The picture is entirely different, however, in the case of summary proceedings. Here, I should say that the Northern region is, in fact, two regions, the northwest and the north-east. In the northwest, at Carlisle there was only one refusal out of 159 applications, and at Westmorland only one refusal out of 43 applications. Thus, we have the remarkable position in the north-west that all three categories seem to be treated in much the same way.

The same is not true of the northeastern part of the region. Here, the courts fall broadly into three groups. There are five at which the magistrates have, on average, refused applications in about 4 per cent. of cases in which application has been made. There is a second group showing a greater band of variation in which refusals vary from 7 per cent. in the case of South Shields up to 27 per cent. in the case of Tynemouth, and including my own court in Sunderland where the proportion is 24 per cent.

There is, therefore, a great variation within the region between the north-east and north-west in the practice of the magistrates, and there is also a marked variation between courts at which one would assume, from such local knowledge as one has, that the circumstances are similar.

I come now to the third group, which is Newcastle on its own. Here, there were more refusals than applications granted—300 refusals and 277 granted, which, if my arithmetic be correct, shows that the refusals amounted to 58 per cent.

I think that I have served my purpose and enabled my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, Central to make the more substantive case. By way of preliminary, I would ask the Under-Secretary to look at these figures carefully and to consider at large, if this be the case generally, whether in the first two categories of case it would not be better to make legal aid generally applicable. Quite apart from that, in the light of what the hon. Gentleman has said on previous occasions and in the light of the attitude taken by the Home Office, I hope that he will do what he can to ensure that these figures are fully considered by the courts. I think that it would be a useful discipline if their attention were called to these discrepancies. Then, after a reasonable time has elapsed so that the effect of that consideration can be seen, I will ask him again for the figures.

3.45 p.m.

Mr. Clinton Davis (Hackney, Central)

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) for saving the day. My difficulty was that I was called away to answer an urgent telephone call relating to a case which is germane to this debate.

It concerned a young Iranian girl of 15 who was arrested last Friday on a charge of theft. She was brought before the Highgate Juvenile Court. She was not permitted to have bail—

Mr. Speaker

Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not dealing with a case which is sub judice.

Mr. Davis

It is not sub judice, because the magistrates' court has disposed of it.

I understand that she was refused bail because she could not produce sureties. She was not told of her entitlement to apply for legal aid. I am informed that she had no previous convictions.

She appeared on Tuesday and, through an interpreter provided by the prosecution, intimated that she proposed to plead not guilty. She was properly asked by the clerk of the court whether she wished to avail herself of the service of a barrister or solicitor, and she indicated that she wanted the case to be dealt with as quickly as possible. She was not in so many words asked whether she wanted legal aid. More particularly, she was not told about this on the Friday, which I would have thought was the important date.

Here was a young girl alone in this country, with no relatives, and she was not told about this simple entitlement. After a long hearing, she was convicted, and it was recommended that she should be deported.

That is as far as that case has gone, but, in my view, it indicates clearly that there is a requirement to inform defendants of the importance of their right to apply for legal aid.

I believe that there is an overwhelming desire on the part of most people to ensure that we have an effective and efficient legal aid system. There are criticisms, and they are sometimes expressed in this House by the hon. Member for Pudsey (Mr. Hiley), whom I informed about this debate yesterday and who has alleged that many experienced magistrates consider the legal aid system to be grossly abused. I do not accept that. What concerns me is that a minority of courts do not apply the proper criteria when they are considering legal aid applications.

The present system grew out of the Widgery Report and was embodied in the Criminal Justice Act, 1967. Regrettably, the proposal in the Widgery Report to include the £25 advice system was not adopted, nor is it likely that we shall see it in the near future. That is a matter for regret. However, the Widgery Report set out the criteria which should be applied by magistrates' courts and other courts when considering applications for legal aid. These criteria were elaborately set out; five major points were made. They were:

  1. "(a) That the charge is a grave one, in the sense that the accused is in real jeopardy of losing his liberty or livelihood or suffering serious damage to his reputation;
  2. (b) That the charge raises a substantial question of law;
  3. (c) That the accused is unable to follow the proceedings and state his own case because of his inadequate knowledge of English,"—
that is very relevant to what I have just said— mental illness or other mental or physical disability; (d) That the nature of the defence involves the tracing of witnesses or expert cross-examination of a witness for the prosecution; (e) That legal representation is desirable in the interests of someone other than the accused, as, for example, in the case of sexual offences against young children when it is undesirable that the accused should cross-examine the witness in person. So these recommendations, which do not have the force of law, were designed to ensure that an accused person should not be prevented by lack of means from defending serious charges or mitigating on the question of sentence as effectively as he can, and to ensure that the system was uniform throughout the country, as far as possible.

Are these criteria applied at the moment, and if not, what criteria are applied by magistrates' courts? There are very wide disparities in the incidence of grants or refusing legal aid. I have the figures for London. We have the appalling situation that, at Great Marlborough Street, in summary proceedings, 32 per cent. of the applications are granted and 68 per cent. are refused. At the sister court of Lambeth, only 29 per cent. are granted.

There is a contrasting situation at Bow Street, which virtually adjoins Great Marlborough Street, where 83 per cent. of the applications in summary proceedings are granted. What is the reason for this? They deal with very much the same sort of case. They have as many demonstrators and as many drug cases at Bow Street as at Great Marlborough Street.

In committal proceedings, Great Marlborough Street and Lambeth are at the bottom of the list. Only 70 per cent. of the applications are granted at the former and at Lambeth, a very low figure, 80 per cent., are granted.

This is true of the country as a whole. At Bootle, there is an astonishing situation. Out of 65 applications for legal aid last year, 61 were refused. There are fantastic percentages of refusals for a whole number of courts. At Swansea, 56 per cent. are refused in summary cases. At Hastings the figure is 54 per cent., at Birmingham 58 per cent., Birkenhead 49 per cent., Blackpool 62 per cent., and, as I said, Bootle 94 per cent.

How does this happen? The Home Office says that there are substantial differences in the types of case which form a preponderance of work in the different courts. But that is not consistent with the facts. I have already illustrated the position between Great Marlborough Street and Bow Street, and another example is Woolwich and Greenwich, which are very close. In Greenwich, 100 per cent. of applications are granted in summary proceedings; at Woolwich, the figure is 54 per cent.

So we are entitled to know why there are these disparities, but we cannot know because the court does not give grounds for refusal, and justice clearly is not seen to be done. Moreover, there is no right of appeal. The truth is that different policies are pursued.

I have a letter here in relation to a case at Great Marlborough Street which is not sub judice. The magistrates had an application for legal aid concerning the theft of Giro checks. The letter says that he … directs me to say that on the charges at present before the court he is not disposed to grant legal aid. If other charges are added and your client consents to summary trial and pleads not guilty, it is possible that he will reconsider the application. In my view that is a wrongful exercise of discretion.

I submit that some courts do not exercise their discretion properly, having regard to the criteria which Widgery spelt out. Some courts refuse to grant legal aid in committal proceedings, except in particularly grave cases. They refuse to grant it in drug cases and in relation to offences affecting public order. The Law Society is on record as saying that the refusal to grant legal aid in certain cases is too consistent and repetitive to prevent one reaching the conclusion that there is a policy tending to fetter a discretion vested in magistrates. I am asking today for guidance to be given to magistrates by the Home Office.

As for committal proceedings, I argue that legal aid should be granted as of right, as was recommended in Professor G. J. Borrie's recent report "Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (A Regional Survey)". If committal proceedings mean anything, a defendant should be advised by somebody who is competent to give that advice as to whether witnesses should be called and cross-examined. And, of course, we have the Section 1 alibi procedure, which is equally important. Under this procedure one must give notice of an alibi within seven days of the conclusion of the committal proceedings, so that if legal aid has not been secured up to the time when the man is committed, it is difficult to produce and give notice of the necessary alibi evidence within the allotted time.

As for sentencing, legal aid should be granted as of right, particularly in important cases and especially at quarter sessions. Yet there is a considerable reluctance for this to be done on the part of a number of courts. This is in line with the comments of Widgery on this subject.

People should be more widely informed about their entitlement to legal aid. I have been in court on a number of occasions when, in quite serious matters, the magistrates, and stipendiary magistrates at that, have not deigned to advise defendants of their entitlement to apply.

The police have a duty in this matter. It is not enough merely for it to be stated on the back of the charge sheet, "You are entitled to apply for legal aid", because many defendants cannot read and many others are not in a condition to understand the small print in which that information is given.

I argue strongly in favour of there being a right of appeal against a decision to refuse legal aid. More particularly, I argue for the right of a man to know why he is being denied legal aid. The court should be accountable for the exercise of its judicial functions in this regard.

I must, of course, comment on the subject of bail, a matter in which I know the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Money) is rightly interested. One cannot get legal aid to apply to a judge in chambers for bail, and the procedure of going to the Official Solicitor or applying for civil aid is too cumbersome to be satisfactory.

The application form for legal aid is far too cumbersome. I have found great difficulty in completing it myself—not for myself but for clients—and particularly the question whether £450 or less has been earned in the previous year. It is sometimes difficult to say "Yes" or "No" to that question and people find it difficult to complete this form. In any event, there is no check on the information that is provided. If the contribution system means anything, these matters should be carefully checked.

Legal aid is today regarded by a number of courts in the way that some courts used to regard psychiatrists not so long ago—as an unnecessary interference with the processes of the law. That is a totally mistaken view of legal aid, which is aid of immense importance, and I hope that this debate will go some way to advertising the fact that legal aid is available and should be more widely available.

3.59 p.m.

Mr. Ernle Money (Ipswich)

May I echo what has been said by the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis). May I ask my hon. Friend to bear two specific cases in mind. The first is the position of visiting magistrates in prisons who can pass loss of remission which in effect amounts to a 12-month sentence, without any legal aid representation. The second is the question of bail applications to a judge in chambers. Over and over again a defendant is told that he has the right to go to a judge in chambers when it is quite beyond his means. It is a complicated process by affidavit and the smallest figure that I have been given is that it would cost a person 60 guineas.

It being Four o'clock, the Motion for the adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Speed.]

4.1 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Mark Carlisle)

I am not sure whether the House should be grateful to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House who, by his generous statement on an earlier Bill, has allowed us longer than is normal for an Adjournment debate, or to the right hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) without whose quick thinking this debate would never have taken place. I am glad that we have been able to get a little longer than is normal because it gives me not only an opportunity to listen to the views expressed by the right hon. Member and the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Money) but the time to answer the points made by the hon. Member for Hackney, Central who has taken such a continuing interest in these matters since coming to the House, as well as allowing me to say something generally about legal aid.

Before dealing with the points that have been raised may I say something about the legal aid scheme and perhaps answer the earlier part of the speech of the right hon. Member. I have no doubt—and this is certainly the view of the Government and probably both sides of the House—that in general the legal aid system in criminal courts is working well. It is providing a system of justice for the individual of which we can all be proud. It is succeeding in ensuring, as a right, proper representation before the criminal courts of those who without such assistance could not afford to be represented. The system which has been in operation for a number of years ensures that people charged with an offence receive a fair trial with an opportunity to representation irrespective of their financial condition.

Before dealing with the argument about discrepancies in magistrates' courts I would like to take up what the right hon. Gentleman said and deal with the effectiveness of this system in the higher courts. He rightly pointed out that in the cases committed for trial on indictment, taking the northern area of this country, the grant rate was 100 per cent., while in Newcastle and Durham the refusal rate was 1 per cent. He was right to say that that is a case of the exception proving the rule.

If we take the country as a whole, in the year 1969 98.9 per cent. of all applications made to magistrates for legal aid in cases going to trial at higher courts were granted, compared with 94.4 per cent. in 1967. The refusal rate was 1.1 per cent. but it is worth remembering that when a person is committed for trial he has the opportunity to apply for legal aid at the court of trial. In 1969 there were 4,410 such applications made of which only 550 were refused, which is a refusal rate of 12.5 per cent.

Mr. Money

Would my hon. Friend not agree that in terms of judicial time and public money this is basically a wasteful system because a trial has to be postponed or adjourned, solicitors have to be instructed or a member of the Bar brought in? Would he not agree that the total cost is much greater than if the application had been granted in the first instance?

Mr. Carlisle

That may be so, but of course, of the applications made in the magistrates' court—I cannot deal with applications which are not made—only 1.1 per cent. are at the moment turned down, and one does not have to wait until the day of trial to make further application to the court to which one has been committed in these cases. As a result, therefore, of the applications made in the magistrates' court and the applications made to the court of trial and the fact that all but 550 of these were granted in the year 1969, the overall figure is that, of over 40,000 people appearing for trial at either quarter sessions or assizes in 1969, only 887 were unrepresented.

I suggest that the majority of those 887 is made up of people who have declined either the offer of legal aid or, indeed, have declined to apply for it, together with cases where the court has taken a view of the facts, has decided that what it intends to do to the man does not require his representation in that it is not going to interfere with his liberty, and therefore does not believe that the grant of legal aid could assist him in any way. It is remarkable that as a result of our legal aid system only 887 out of over 40,000 cases heard last year were unrepresented, and I suspect that in the vast majority of those the cause was that there was no need for representation.

Mr. Clinton Davis

The hon. Gentleman has been immensely courteous to me in helping me get this information. Is there not a distinction between the numbers he is referring to here, those who have pleaded guilty, and those sent to sessions for sentence? Are the latter included in the figures? Is there not great significance in the fact that, in those courts which have the worst records of granting legal aid for summary proceedings, there is a parallel situation with regard to applications for committal proceedings?

Mr. Carlisle

I think that the figures show those sent for trial. I will check up on whether they cover those sent for sentencing. But the figure there is so small, even where applications are refused, that the exception proves the rule. I do not think that it follows from that that legal aid should be granted as of right. One must realise that there are certain cases in the higher courts where legal aid is not granted or is not applied for because the person's financial position does not require it. Therefore, I think that the very working of the system where application is made shows that it is working well, and I would not suggest that there should be a universal service applicable to everyone irrespective of need.

I think that it is clear that, in those cases where persons are committed for trial, at the committal proceedings the applications for legal aid grant are fairly high. The right hon. Member for Sunderland, North specifically referred to Durham. I am not quite sure what the answer is on that point, but I remind him that there is some difference in that the grant of legal aid in committal proceedings is dependent on whether the prosecution chooses to avail itself of the opportunity of a Section 1 committal under the Criminal Justice Act, by serving a notice of intention on the defendant in advance. This can have some effect on the question whether the defendant is represented. I believe that, for committal proceedings as a whole, the proportion of applications granted throughout the country is very high.

Because of the type of cases dealt with in the magistrates' court—careless driving, speeding, and the like—the proportion of applications made there is small in comparison with the overall number of cases. In 1969 there were 88,200 applications as against 1,700,000 cases dealt with on summary trial in magistrates' courts. Of those 88,200, 73,700 were granted. That means that in 1969 only 16.4 per cent. of all applications for legal aid in those courts were refused. If we exclude applications made in committal proceedings, only 18.7 per cent. of all applications on summary trial were refused in the country as a whole. With such a figure, compared with over 21 per cent. in 1967, I do not think that it can be suggested that legal aid in the magistrates' courts is not working well.

I accept that the figures show a substantial variation in the grant of legal aid on summary trial between one magistrates court and another. It varies between under 1 per cent. in Carlisle, amongst others, as mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman, to over 90 per cent. in Bootle, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Hackney, Central, but here I must make two general points.

It is perhaps unwise and unfair to base too much reliance on a percentage in a single year. This can convey a completely erroneous impression. The hon. Gentleman has referred to Bootle, but there were few applications. To take an extreme example, if a court had only one application made to it in the year and that application was refused it would come into the statistics for that year as 100 per cent. refusal. One should not therefore lay too much stress on a percentage answer based on one year, and the year in question is the only year since the working of 1967 Act for which figures are available.

There is no doubt that there are wide variations in the types of cases being tried in different courts. Although it obviously is not the whole answer, one must remember, when considering variations between courts of a similar type in a rural area and in a city centre, that there is likely to be a higher proportion, for example, of the drunkenness type of offence in the city area, which may be one of the reasons for there being a higher refusal of applications in courts in such areas than there is in those in the county areas.

Although I accept that this substantial variation in practice occurs I must emphasise that the question whether or not to grant legal aid in a criminal case is entirely a matter for the court, and the Home Secretary has no power to intervene in a court's consideration of an application for legal aid, or to interfere with its decision. I do not, therefore, think that it would be right for me, as a Home Office Minister, to comment further on statistics relating to any particular court. In every case it is a matter for free judicial decision.

The criteria have been referred to by the hon. Member for Hackney, Central. Those criteria were laid down by the Widgery Committee. We have no reason to be aware of any substantial body of disagreement with the criteria, nor do we have any substantial reason to believe that they are not fully known to the different courts. To the extent that there is any lack of knowledge of or disagreement with the criteria, the very fact that we are having this debate will draw the attention of the courts to the criteria and to the way in which they are applied throughout the country as a whole.

I do not think that I can go further than that except to say that the practices of the various courts in inner London in the granting of legal aid were recently discussed at one of the quarterly meetings of London's stipendiary magistrates with a view to achieving greater uniformity.

On the whole, it is the general practice of the police, the Prison Department if a person is committed in custody, and the magistrates' court to advise people about the availability of legal aid, and I have little doubt that it is well known. The hon. Member mentioned a case about which he told me immediately before the debate, very fairly saying that he had not had the opportunity to draw it to my attention previously, as it had only recently been drawn to his. I will look at it, but on behalf of the Home Office I must say that I clearly cannot accept without question the facts as he has stated them. I am sure that the record of the Highgate Juvenile Court is exemplary and that the right of the individual are as carefully considered there as in any other court.

It has been suggested that magistrates should be required to give reasons for refusing legal aid. The variation is not a basis for saying that a court should be required to state its reasons for refusing legal aid. It would be out of line with the attitude which we take in the exercise of any other judicial discretion. In certain circumstances, we require the courts to state reasons. An obvious example is when Parliament has laid down a general restriction on doing something but says that nevertheless the court may do it, provided that it states its reasons for doing so. Sentencing to imprisonment those under 21 whom Parliament has said may not be sent to prison unless the court thinks that there is no suitable alternative, when it must state its reasons, is an example, and magistrates sending a first offender to prison under the First Offenders Act, 1958, must state their reasons.

It would be wholly contrary to principle to require a court to state its reasons for the normal exercise of a judicial discretion left to it by Parliament. It is within the complete judicial discretion of the court whether to grant legal aid, and it would therefore not be appropriate to require it to state its reasons. Such a decision would lead to delay while the reasons were formulated and add unnecessarily to the burden of the courts' work.

There would be no purpose in asking a court to state its reasons unless one were to allow appeals against refusal. The advice which I would give the House coincides with that of the Widgery Committee which recommended against allowing the right of appeal against the refusal of legal aid.

I quote from what the Widgery Committee said: If an appeal against a refusal of legal aid is to be of any value however, it must exist as of right. The effect of such a right of appeal would be that an applicant who was refused legal aid could insist that all further proceedings be stayed until his appeal was pursued. It is unreal to hope that the application would always have been made so early in the proceedings that the appeal could be undertaken without disrupting the calendar of the trial court; in many cases the exercise of the right of appeal would mean a waste of time on the part of the court, officials and witnesses who had been warned to attend for the trial, and problems as to custody, bail and the like would accumulate. There are overwhelming practical arguments against allowing a right of appeal against the grant of legal aid, because it would inevitably lead to substantial delay.

In practice, in more serious cases a right of appeal already exists. In any case that goes for trial to quarter sessions or assize there is a right to apply again to quarter sessions for legal aid if it has been refused. If a person who has been refused legal aid in a magistrates' court has been convicted and wishes to appeal against conviction, he can apply to the higher court for legal aid to pursue that appeal.

There is no grant of legal aid for a bail application before a judge in chambers, but most of such applications are done in writing. If a solicitor acting on a legal aid certificate assists in the preparation of a written application for bail to a judge in chambers, or applies for bail in a magistrates' court, account may be taken of that work in the assessment of his fees. Any assistance given in putting down a written application for bail is covered. What is not covered is the actual appearance before the judge in chambers on an application for bail. The Official Solicitor in 1969 acted on behalf of 9,160 applicants for bail.

If there were serious evidence of injustice being caused because there is no legal aid for applications for bail to a judge in chambers, I would consider it, but at the moment we have no evidence that such injustice exists. In saying that, I give the House two warnings. First, the cost would not be insubstantial. It is estimated that for the existing number of applications it would cost £500,000 a year. The second and far graver objection is that it might lead to a flood of completely unmeritorious applications to appeal against refusal of bail. There would be nothing to lose, and everyone might promptly appeal against refusal of bail on the basis of being entitled to legal aid to pursue the appeal. This might hold up the hearing of meritorious appeals by persons having a good case against being kept in custody.

The Law Society has recently set up a working party to look into the system of applications for bail to a judge in chambers. The Home Office will consider with care any representations made by the Law Society as a result of these deliberations. The hon. Member for Hackney, Central, who is a member of the Law Society, could presumably make representations to the body which the Law Society has set up.

I must resist what my hon. Friend said on the question of bail before visiting magistrates. I have looked into the matter and do not think that it would be suitable to arrange for legal aid for those in prison charged with disciplinary offences before visiting magistrates. It would take me too long to explain the reasons, but I know the hon. Gentleman's interest in this matter. Although I accept that the loss of remission can be equivalent to a period of imprisonment, there are practical difficulties in doing what he suggests.

I think that with the additional time allowed to me I have managed to cover all the points that have been made. I am grateful that we have had the opportunity of this debate. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hackney, Central for his kind remarks in his intervention about the assistance he has received from Home Office officials in making various researches into this matter. I hope that this debate will draw the attention of the courts to the figures and to the discrepancy that exists and will remind them of the criteria that have been laid down.

Mr. Clinton Davis

Would the hon. Gentleman deal with the point I raised about the letter from Great Marlborough Street Magistrates' Court, which appears to indicate a clear policy as distinct from the exercise of judicial discretion? This is not the only letter of that sort which has been received, but is one of many which have been sent to many of my practising colleagues.

Mr. Carlisle

It would be wrong for a Minister at this Box to comment on the exercise of the judicial discretion by an individual magistrates' court. I can only repeat what I said before, that the stipendiary magistrates at their last meeting considered the question of divergence of numbers within the courts.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes past Four o'clock.