LICENCES OR CONSENTS FOR CERTAIN EXISTING SERVICES (Hansard, 19 May 1969)

§ Mr. Michael Heseltine
I beg to move Amendment No. 31, in page 65, line 36, leave out paragraph 4.

§ Mr. Speaker
It will be for the convenience of the House if we take also Amendments Nos. 32, in page 65, line 49, leave out 'under paragraph 4 of this Schedule'.
No. 33, in page 66, line 2, leave out 'that person' and insert 'the holder of the consent'.
No. 34, in line 22, leave out 'continued in force or granted under this Schedule'.
No. 36, in line 42, leave out 'continued in force or granted under this Schedule'.
No. 43, in page 67, line 37, leave out 'continued in force or granted under this Schedule'.

§ Mr. Heseltine
The point dealt with in this part of Schedule 4 is where an owner of a permanent consent granted under the London Passenger Transport Act, 1933, sells or disposes of his consent to a person referred to in the legislation as a successor in title. The permanent consents granted under the 1933 Act were deliberately granted on a permanent basis, with no form of revocation, and in the course of the legislation and the revisions to it it was agreed that permanent consents should continue. Paragraph 4 of the Schedule deals with a situation where permanent consents have changed hands, and it is now proposed that they should not remain permanent consents but should become temporary consents.
This would make it extremely difficult for anybody to sell a permanent consent, which is a legitimate asset of the owners of that consent, because the moment it changes hands it ceases to be permanent, and this must have an immediate effect upon the asset valuation.
The consents were deliberately granted as permanent as part of the deal that was done in the reorganisation of passenger transport in 1933. The consents were given as compensation to those who had to deal with and live with the monopoly situation granted to London Transport. It is totally immoral to introduce legislation which turns permanent consents into temporary consents, and I can see no case for it. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will look again at this, as the Minister agreed to look at the whole question of permanent consents when the legislation was drawn.

Mr. Bob Brown
If the Amendment were accepted, paragraph 4 would be 153 deleted and paragraph 5 would provide that any successor in title must receive a consent in similar terms to that enjoyed by the previous holder. Thus if a permanent consent was involved, the successor in title would himself receive a permanent consent.
Given that the number of permanent consents is extremely small, and given that we have removed from the Bill the provisions relating to the revocation of permanent consents, it might have been reasonable to make this minor change to enable a successor in title to the holder of of a permanent consent to enjoy the permanent rights involved.
As against this, it must be pointed out that where a permanent consent has been granted by the L.P.T.B. under the provisions of the 1933 Act, a successor in title to the holder of such a consent has not at the moment any right to a permanent consent himself.
There appears to be no good reason for being more generous in relation to this particular form of consent under the new arrangements than has been the case under the old arrangement. I ask the House to resist the Amendment.

§ Mr. Michael Heseltine
I beg to move Amendment No. 35, in page 66, line 24, leave out 'one' and insert 'three'.
The Parliamentary Secretary in refusing to agree that permanent consent should remain permanent consents has brought us to this Amendment, which deals with the period for which the consents which replace the permanent consents when there has been a change in ownership should run.
Schedule 4 provides for the new consents to run for a period of a year. This Amendment substitutes for that period one of three years.
I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to consider the effect upon investment of an agreement which it will be necessary for the holder of a temporary consent to make for one year. A one-year consent is not a reasonable period on the basis of which to make a capital decision about an investment in the bus industry. Assuming that a holder is acting in a bona fide manner, it is a prejudice under 154 which it would be unreasonable to expect those who required a permanent consent to operate.
We feel that there ought to be a three-year period in which to plan investment and expect some sort of return. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary, having failed to help us on the major issue, will agree that the detail can be modified in this way.

Mr. Bob Brown
The point is not one of enormous substance, but as a matter of general principle, as the Minister told the hon. Lady in a letter, we hope that the majority of operators in Greater London, rather than relying on the continuation of consent provisions which are merely intended to protect existing rights, will enter into agreements with the L.T.E. which can be for any period.
As a matter of practice, the London Transport Board at the moment grants consents on an annual basis, and operators have learned to manage their businesses accordingly. We feel it best to leave it in this way.

§ Mr. Michael Heseltine
I beg to move Amendment No. 37, in line 45, after 'consent', insert— 'including any provision, whether or not expressed as a condition, relating to the route of the services to which the consent relates'.

§ Mr. Speaker
With this Amendment the House can take the linked Amendments No. 38, in page 67, line 2, after 'variation', insert— '(other than a variation of route)'. No. 39, in line 4, after 'are', insert' 'on the same journey'.
No. 40, in line 16, at end insert— 'but this sub-paragraph shall not apply to a variation of route certified by the Executive, in the notice given under sub-paragraph (1)(b) of this paragraph, to be urgently necessary'. and No. 41, in line 17, leave out from beginning to end of line 26.

§ Mr. Heseltine
The Parliamentary Secretary, in urging that the holders of consents should renegotiate and replace them by a form of agreement with the L.T.E., must know that the tenure of the agreements is in no way satisfactory to the owners under agreements 155 as is the situation whereby the present operators might own permanent consents.
This brings us to paragraph 10 of Schedule 4, which deals with the situation which would arise where the owner of a consent wished to vary the route of service.
Paragraph 10 is very tightly drawn. Variations in routes can take place only if they are of a minor nature. Were it anything other than of a minor nature, it would be necessary for the consent to lapse and presumably for some form of agreement to be negotiated to take its place. It is an extremely harsh situation if, as traffic routes change, the holders of consents are forced to move to the far less satisfactory position of having to negotiate agreements.
The purpose of these Amendments is to delete paragraph 10 and give to the executive the power to deal with variations in routes under paragraph 9, under which it can deal with other matters. In equity, I should have thought that the matter should be dealt with in that way. To do otherwise would strengthen the hand of the executive, to which owners of consents would find it necessary to yield regardless of the terms that they were offered in replacement of their consents.

Mr. Bob Brown
There is some fundamental difference between us here. Clearly, on the arguments of the hon. Gentleman, we could have a situation existing where a service from, say, Kings Cross to Brixton could go via Slough or even Reading, and I do not think that would be very desirable. The Amendments would clearly mean that anyone running an existing little service could extend it to routes which are covered quite adequately already by the L.T.E. I think that is the hon. Gentleman's purpose.

§ Mr. Michael Heseltine
I am sure unintentionally, the hon. Gentleman has misled the House on this matter. Under paragraph 9, it is entirely within the discretion of the executive to accept variations in routes. However, it is a fairly general power. Under paragraph 10, the discretion is drawn tightly. We on this side of the House are happy to leave the 156 power with the executive, but it should be allowed to exercise discretion in the way that it handles it.

§ Mr. Michael Heseltine
I beg to move Amendment No. 42, in page 67, line 27, leave out from beginning to end of line 35.
The purpose of the Amendment is to restore the permanency in respect of agreements which at the moment attaches to consents. I will not repeat what I have said already about the historical reasons why the consents were made permanent, but there was a legitimate act of policy which has been preserved and respected since the 1933 Act giving this degree of permanency to them. This legislation will mean that these permanent consents will have to be renegotiated with the executive and replaced by agreements. The moment agreements are negotiated, they are no longer permanent but remain in force for only a short period of time. One suspects that the executive will use its power to ensure that they are essentially of a short-term nature.
As these were permanent consents, when they are re-negotiated in the form of agreements they should have exactly the same value and permanence as the consents which they will replace.

Mr. Bob Brown
The short point is that the Government regard the provision of Schedule 4 as doing no more than preserving the rights of existing operators in respect of their services running at the vesting date. As a matter of principle, the executive should have control of the pattern of operation in its area and should, therefore, have it within its discretion to decide what new services are to be run by operators other than by itself or its subsidiaries.
The general proposition that the consent system with rights of appeal should continue to apply to new services proposed to be operated in Greater London is completely unacceptable. The consent procedure is to protect existing rights and, if agreement is entered into, the consent should lapse.