HC Deb 14 May 1969 vol 783 cc1600-12

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper.]

1.24 a.m.

Mr. Edwin Brooks (Bebington)

I wish to raise a matter which has excited a good deal of interest and anxiety both in this country and in many parts of Europe—and not least among the leaders of the Soviet Union. To judge from some of the professed anxieties, one might think that the hour is even later than the clock tells us. I refer to the proposal for a gas centrifuge technology for the enrichment of uranium, a sophisticated scheme to be developed jointly by this country, the Netherlands and the Federal Government of Germany.

This is a most important proposal, both in the economic and military sense, and I feel that Parliament is owed a full explanation of the Government's objectives, and an equally full account of the precautions which should properly attach to a scheme of this sort.

I do not pretend to be an expert in nuclear physics, nor in nuclear engineering, but in this House at least I am in good company. This ignorance on the part of politicians and the general public of matters which could affect the lives and prosperity of the whole world is one of the inescapable dilemmas of democratic government in this so-called scientific age.

Nevertheless, if we are to make sensible decisions about these esoteric problems, it is vital that we should make the effort to understand what the scientists are about. Apart from anything else, this might help us to rebut the misrepresentations which can so easily be spread, and which to some extent have been spread about this project.

My questions fall into three main sections: the economic case for the gas centrifuge, the industrial structure of the tripartite venture, and the military potential of the uranium 235 which will be concentrated by the process and made available to the countries concerned.

The enrichment of uranium has been described as a key to the future development of nuclear power. The process is designed to increase the proportion of the fissile isotope of uranium, uranium 235, relative to the much commoner and very slightly heavier uranium 238. Without such enrichment, we are told, the efficiency of future power stations would be handicapped.

On the borders of my constituency in Cheshire lies the older, original technology, the gaseous diffusion plant at Capenhurst, where the gas uranium hexafluoride is pumped through a series of porous barriers and membranes until the required degree of enrichment is attained. Here the fissile material for Britain's thermo-nuclear weapons was prepared. The electricity consumed in such a diffusion cascade is enormous, and Capenhurst, although much smaller than the United States complex at Oak Ridge, Portsmouth and Paduca—which use, I understand, 6,000 megawatts of electricity when on full stream—is probably the greatest single industrial consumer of power in Britain.

Indeed, I understand that about half the price of processing the uranium by the diffusion process is in electricity costs alone. Therefore, a process, such as the gas centrifuge, which promises to use considerably less electricity could have a big influence on the future costs of enriched uranium. Some estimates I have seen suggest a power requirement only 10 to 15 per cent. of that needed for the diffusion plant, while a further bonus is that for a given throughput a centrifuge plant is believed to be marginally cheaper to build.

Against this, the centrifuges, which spin at 50,000 r.p.m. and generate centrifugal forces in excess of one million times gravity, may prove to be expensive and sophisticated devices on the very frontiers of our present metallurgical and engineering skills. I would be interested to know from my hon. Friend how far the obvious problems of such devices have yet been solved—for example, how to pass the gas in and out while the rotor is spinning at these tremendous speeds, the problems of the vacuum seals and the structural integrity of the outer walls of the rotor. Indeed, there is, I gather a risk of a sort of chain reaction among the centrifuges themselves should one split and fly to pieces and bombard the others.

These problems have been described at length in the recent scientific literature, and I am merely summarising the type of difficulty which is implicit in this new project. But as a politician, I feel that we need to have some assurances about the practicability of the engineering before we decide that there are advantages in us participating in a joint protect, involving as it does certain dangers to which I shall refer later.

I very much hope that my hon. Friend will be able to assure us that the concept is not simply a political gimmick, devised to enable us to sneak into Europe via Bonn. I personally do not believe this, having discussed the matter with nuclear engineers during recent months, but I think that we should be told more about the rumoured scientific "break-through" or breakthroughs which are supposed to have occurred recently. I would also like more information about the choice of sites. I have some constituency interest in this, as I am aware that in recent years very substantial investment has taken place at Capenhurst in the Wirral peninsula which has led to reductions in the cost of enriching uranium.

Further proposed investment at Capenhurst has been held back pending clarification of the centrifuge agreement, and I and people on Merseyside are naturally curious to know the latest state of play. Will one of the two proposed centrifuge plants be at Capenhurst? In view of the investment already made there, it is probable that a "hybrid" system would make economic sense.

In Science Journal, last February, it was suggested that the initial stages of the diffusion plant could perform the rough filtering, and the centrifuges, also connected up as a counter-flow cascade, would then bring the enrichment of uranium-235 up to the standard fuel figure.

This incidentally, is a much lower level of enrichment than the 90 per cent. plus required for weapons. This suggests that one major use of the centrifuge will be topping-up the capacity of existing filter type separation plants, and I therefore assume that Capenhurst is the probable choice of site. Indeed, it would be good if this could be confirmed tonight. From Merseyside's point of view, this could be most exciting, with a vast nuclear city-complex emerging on Wirral.

The possibilities of growth seems substantial, for one attraction of the centrifuge system is that capacity can be expanded piece-meal. As the Economist said last March: Instead of one big separation plant for the whole of Western Europe, which has been the only alternative up till now to wholesale dependence on the Americans, a battery of centrifuges costing an estimated £6 million can be built to provide the fuel for a 600 megawatt nuclear power station, and another battery installed when the next power station is ordered. There would seem to be undoubted advantages of having such successive centrifuge cascades alongside one another, and alongside the diffusion plant where the so-called rough filtering is carried out. But there seems to be a further prospect of the actual manufacture of the centrifuges being placed alongside as well. This also has great relevance to Merseyside. The scale of output of centrifuges would be very large, since estimates have been made that a production line capable of turning out one million rotors a year will be needed by the early 1970s.

Indeed, estimates of the Common Market requirements alone by 1975 suggest a figure of several million rotors. It has been claimed, and I would ask my hon. Friend to comment on this, that such production of a highly precise piece of engineering would be best sited near the centrifuge cascade, to avoid the possibility of damage being caused in transit over long distances. Capenhurst, on Merseyside, could mean an injection of highly skilled employment.

I am aware that such detailed considerations may lie in the future, but this brings me to my second major series of questions, the business side of the project, its administrative structure and the way in which decisions will be taken over purchases, siting of plant, pricing of the product and so on.

If I can take the pricing first, is it to be the case that uranium will be sold to the member countries at basic costs of production, or will there be a levy to meet the capital costs involved? I ask this because I understand that the operating costs of the centrifuge are relatively low—so little electricity being required—yet the capital investment, plus the research costs at this stage, could be very substantial.

Furthermore, how is the market for the enriched uranium to be calculated and won? The huge diffusion plants in the United States and possibly their successors will presumably be competing with the centrifuge plants, in the E.E.C. countries as elsewhere, and I would be interested to know whether there is confidence that the centrifuge price will prove competitive.

New Scientist, on 20th March last, criticised the administrative arrangements as being "not very sensible", and designed apparently to appease all interested parties: the United Kingdom because of its vast and recently expanded investment in uranium enrichment at Capenhurst, the Dutch because they believe—I base this upon an Observer article of 16th March last—that they have a two-year lead over the other countries, and the Germans because of her growing need for nuclear fuel, quite apart from her hitherto undisclosed work on isotope separation methods.

Could my hon. Friend tell us which organisations and firms are actually involved in the scheme, and on what terms and conditions about profit margins and voice in decision making? In a Press statement issued on 11th March, it was announced that two organisations should be set up—a "Prime Contractor" for the manufacture of centrifuges and the construction of enrichment plants, and an "Enrichment Company" for the operation of enrichment plants. The headquarters of the former, the prime contractor, which will be responsible for research, design and construction of the extremely high performance centrifuges, is to be in Germany. I would like to know a little more about its rôle.

Mr. David Fishlock, in the Financial Times on 13th March, described it as in effect, a central purchasing agency for some very high grade engineering-rotors, bearings, ultra-fast drives and vacuum systems, for example—and should soon find itself placing orders for components for some hundreds of thousands if not millions of machines a year. Those orders will go out to tender in private industry in the three countries, and, if others are admitted, in those countries, too. This is clearly big business, possessing wide powers of industrial patronage.

Are we to have two, or more than two, assembly factories built for the manufacture of the centrifuges initially? Are these to be alongside the centrifuge cascades in the Netherlands and Britain, as I think would be sensible, or will they be in Germany? I am not suggesting that location in Germany would be in any way sinister, but if there are strong industrial arguments in favour of location near the centrifuge plants, can we be sure that these advantages will not be obscured in the Teutonic mists of patriotic fervour?

What would be the position in general terms if a further country sought to join the consortium? Would participation on the part of other E.E.C. countries be desirable? It seems to me that we tend to pay far too much lip-service to the idea that anyone who wants to join in later can do so; but after all, it is not good enough for others to come in once the initial risks have been borne and the costs incurred, and simply help cream off the benefits.

This question of commercial exclusiveness, or secrecy, leads me to the final and politically most explosive aspect of the joint agreement. Recently, I heard the Soviet Ambassador upstairs in this building denounce the project as, in effect, a back-door method for giving Germany nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind that Bonn has so far refused to sign the nonproliferation pact, it is easy to see why such anxieties should be aroused among those who rightly have no wish to forget the lessons of the Second World War.

My own view is that Germany's essential objection to signing has derived from her fear of being excluded in some way from sophisticated nuclear technology. The very fact that she has now embarked upon this highly sophisticated collaborative venture is surely proof that her progress in the field of peaceful nuclear energy need be in no way jeopardised by signing the pact. To refuse to sign the pact in present circumstances seems increasingly hard to understand or justify, and I hope that my hon. Friend will comment on this difficulty, although I realise that it may not be his particular Departmental responsibility.

Having said that, however, I think that a lot of rather foolish things have been published in recent months about the military dangers of the project. In an article in The Times, by a correspondent whose views command attention and respect, Leonard Beaton, on 23rd January, it was implied that we are on to a hiding or nothing: Clearly, he said— if the centrifuge can be made to work cheaply, it creates horrifying problems. If it cannot, its development cannot be justified except as a means of promoting nuclear weapon development. But is not this sort of gloomy and pessimistic approach to the problems of nuclear energy both irrational and unjustified? The basic problem is not the technology, which, in any case, will soon begin to spread elsewhere if it proved to be economically practicable and technically sound; the basic problem is devising a control mechanism internationally for the handling of these dangerous goods.

Mr. Beaton argued that we might consider lining Britain up behind all international efforts to treat the traffic in nuclear materials like the drug traffic, but short of closing down all nuclear power plants it is inevitable that plutonium, at any rate, will be made available to increasing numbers of countries to whom we, and other countries, will sell reactors. This might give us pause in our present negotiations with Greece's fascist régime. Nevertheless, as recent speculation about Israel has made clear, the nuclear genii is out of the bottle for good or ill. He cannot be stoppered up again.

So I do not think that we should oppose this sort of scheme because it makes available yet more nuclear fuel. This is slamming the door on the world's future energy needs, and I sense that it is both impracticable and misguided. But I feel that Mr. Beaton's careful article and similar criticisms need to be pondered much more carefully and thoroughly than I can do tonight, and that the House, and, indeed, in a sense, the world, needs to be satisfied that Her Majesty's Government and the other two Governments have considered this critique, and know the answers.

1.40 a.m.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Technology (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu)

My hon. Friend the Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks) has made not only an interesting but extremely balanced speech on what is a difficult question. I am most grateful to him for it. He has asked a number of penetrating questions which I shall try to answer in the time available, but I ought to make clear to him and the House at the outset that so far no formal agreement yet exists between this country, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands to embark on the collaborative production of enriched uranium using the centrifuge process.

When my right hon. Friends met their colleagues from the two other countries in London on 11th March agreement was reached on a number of principles which would have to govern any collaboration, if it took place, but discussions have continued with the two other Governments and a number of issues have still to be settled before we can even be in a position to sign a formal agreement. I hope that my hon. Friend will understand that for this reason it will not be possible for me to be as precise as he might have wished me to be in dealing with some of the points that he has raised.

In his speech my hon. Friend concentrated on three main themes—the economic aspects of the project, the industrial organisation involved and the military implications—and I propose to try and reply to him in that order.

The first question he asked under economic prospects was related to the likely cost of the enriched uranium produced by the centrifuge process. This is one of those questions on which I cannot be precise, since until we have gone much further in our discussions with the other two countries; indeed, not until after a formal agreement has been concluded will it be possible to estimate at all precisely what the economics of a design using the best ideas from the three countries would be.

However, all three of us are confident, on the basis of work which each of us has done in our own country, that the process is cheaper than the gaseous diffusion method, used at present at Capenhurst, and, moreover, that the tripartite venture will be able to compete with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's enrichment plants—and I hope that my hon. Friend will consider that this also answers the point that he made about the market potential for enriched uranium from the centrifuge project in competition with similar uranium produced by the gaseous diffusion process.

My hon. Friend referred to the choice of sites—with some fervour, as Capenhurst is of immediate concern to him. If agreement is reached between the three countries to collaborate, we envisage that two plants would be built to enrich uranium—one in the United Kingdom, and the other in the Netherlands and the Netherlands have already nominated a site for the plant in their country. We have not yet decided where any British plant would be located. There are, of course, very strong prima facie arguments for building it at Capenhurst, but the final choice has not yet been made—and indeed does not need to be made yet.

But whether or not a centrifuge plant is erected at Capenhurst it will supplement and not supersede the gaseous diffusion plant there. As my right hon. Friend told my hon. Friend during Questions on 16th April that plant will continue to supply enriched uranium for many years to come. Both facilities will be needed to meet the growing need of the nuclear power programme of this country—and, we hope, of other countries too—for enriched uranium in the 1970's.

My hon. Friend asked a number of questions about the industrial organisation of the centrifuge project. Obviously, again, since we have not yet concluded a formal agreement I can only give an indication of the lines along which we are working and which are agreed by all the three countries involved. There are two distinct functions that the industrial organisation will have to perform: one is to develop and supply the centrifuge plants, and the other is to use the plants to enrich uranium. We think that two distinct international companies, jointly owned by the Government and/or industrial interests in the three countries should be set up.

One of these will be an enrichment company which will own and operate the enrichment plants. The other, which has been called the "Prime Contractor", will carry out research and development on the centrifuge and will design, develop, manufacture and construct complete enrichment plants ordered by, and to the specification of, the enrichment company.

These two international companies should have as much autonomy as possible in their day-to-day operations if they are to operate on a sound financial basis. They would, however, be supervised by a committee composed of representatives of the three Governments, which would decide on questions arising in the course of their business, concerning security procedures, the safeguards on the use of nuclear material, relations with other countries and similar matters.

As regards participation in the project by other countries, the communiqué issued after the Ministerial meeting in London on 11th March stressed the readiness of the three Governments to associate other European countries with the proposed collaborative venture after its establishment, and went on to point out that a special working party was being set up to examine what form of co-operation might be envisaged.

I think that it is clear, therefore, that all three Governments would welcome the participation of other European countries in due course, but the discussions that have taken place up until now have been solely on a tripartite basis because the three countries concerned believe that they are the only ones in Europe who are in a position to exploit significant work on the development of the gas centrifuge process.

I come to the question of the military implications of the project. I can well understand the anxieties expressed by my hon. Friend, and by others, anxieties which I shared when I first heard of the project. First, consider the question of where the enriched uranium will go, and under what safeguards. There is an enormous growing demand for enriched uranium and for nuclear power stations, particularly in Europe. There is, consequently, a pressing need to create an independent European capacity to produce this enriched uranium at a reasonable price and independently of overseas suppliers.

We in this country have done more than any other country to convert nuclear resources to power purposes and we have, therefore, the strongest interest in maintaining a leading position as fuel suppliers to the power reactors of today and of the future.

When my right hon. Friends met with their colleagues from the other two countries on 11th March they were fully agreed on the necessity to include in the proposed collaboration agreement appropriate mutual undertakings on non-proliferation and provision for appropriate safeguards to be applied in relation to these undertakings. They also agreed that one of the tasks to be given to the Inter-Governmental Joint Committee, to which I have referred, was this question of safeguards and I am sure that my hon. Friend will understand why it is not possible, therefore, pending the conclusion of negotiations, for me to say precisely what form these safeguards will take.

My hon. Friend asked about the position of Germany in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I think that the whole House knows that Her Majesty's Government attach the highest importance to the treaty and hope that it will come into force on as wide a basis as possible and as soon as possible. We should, of course, welcome the German signature on the treaty, but, inevitably, this is a matter for the Federal German Republic.

But Germany is, nevertheless already committed under the revised Brussels Treaty not to manufacture nuclear weapons on her territory, and nothing in any possible agreement on centrifuge collaboration can change that. I believe, therefore, that the position of the Federal German Republic on nuclear weapons is absolutely clear, when one surveys the commitments that they have entered into over the years. As for our position, we shall, of course, ensure that any collaboration agreement is in full conformity with our position as a country which has ratified the treaty.

Finally, a comment about the anxieties of the Russians, to which my hon. Friend referred. Soviet propaganda has been asserting for many years that we would be willing to give the Germans access to nuclear weapons in return for German co-operation; for example, for their help in our entry into the European Economic Community. They have pointed to the centrifuge talks as another example of our efforts in this direction. There is nothing new in these arguments and, equally, there is nothing true in them. Nor should we forget that the Russians are very active in export markets for nuclear material. I believe that—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the Debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at six minutes to Two o'clock.