CHANNEL TUNNEL

HC Deb 25 July 1969 vol 787 cc2282-303

1.15 p.m.

Mr. W. F. Deedes (Ashford)

My purpose in seeking to debate the Channel Tunnel is mainly exploratory. It follows that my speech will be mainly interrogatory. It may be, however, that, try as I will, I shall be unable altogether to disguise the profound scepticism that I feel for the project. But I shall not waste more time than necessary in simply expressing misgivings.

The fact is—and this is my main indictment of the Ministry of Transport—that one is simply not in a position to express an informed view about the project. In common with everyone outside the Ministry, I am in blank ignorance of the current factors for and against a Channel Tunnel. We have had no reliable data from Government since 1963, when, if memory which is getting a little dim serves me correctly, I assisted the Minister of the day to launch the then joint study. That shows how long ago it was.

If the Minister says in reply to this debate, in effect, "We have not yet got the material that we must have on which to base a final decision, but we propose to acquire it and publish it before a decision is reached", I shall have no quarrel with him. But if he has information to aid present judgment, as I think the French have, he must explain why it is not being made publicly available here.

What we must not have is the withholding of relevant material until the last moment, when we are confronted with a fait accompli. This is a major national strategic decision involving an enormous network of transport a long way from the tunnel, and in reaching that decision a great many people should be very fully informed. It is partly to avoid that risk that I raise the matter today before we separate for 10 weeks or so.

I admit to a local interest. The tunnel, if it comes, will have a profound impact on the region that I and some of my hon. Friends represent. It is already casting a long shadow. What has already been promulgated by the Ministry and the county council about the terminals has had the affect of blighting considerable areas in East Kent.

To clarify this position was to have been one point of the debate, but I concede that the announcement earlier this week in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) has been a contribution to making the position clearer. As I see it, six possible sites for the terminal have been reduced to four, so the area of doubt has been limited.

But a local interest is by no means my sole interest in the project, although it has compelled me to make a rather closer study of the matter than most hon. Members have the time or the disposition to do. I am neither an engineer nor an economist, but I have acquired enough material from both sources to raise many questions in my mind. On the engineering side, I have some evidence that it may be by no means easy going. There may be hazards—costly, delaying and even dangerous. On the economic side, there is even more cause for anxiety.

I fear most that we may be tempted to decide in favour of the project on two main grounds. The first is that at this juncture it would be a helpful gesture towards Europe. It would be a helpful gesture towards France especially, which stands to gain a great deal more than we do partly because of the rich haul of the ports to the North of France. The second is that we might decide in favour of the project because the effect of a tunnel translating a lot of European-bound freight to rail would be wholly in accord with the intentions of the Transport Act. An indirect effect of the tunnel, of course, would be to transfer a great deal from road to rail.

Within this context, I do not quarrel with either consideration. But experience suggests that decisions on major projects like this, reached with strong underlying political or international motives, often turn out to be economic disasters. It is on those grounds that I base the critical questions to which I now turn.

As I understand it, the interim studies already completed offer a picture which is different in detail from but not much less favourable in general than the picture presented in 1963. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will say a word about that. It is reckoned that in the early years about half the tunnel's revenue will come from ferrying cars and other passenger vehicles, about half from rail passengers and about a third from rail freight. It is further reckoned that the services can be provided at about two-thirds of the sea charges and still make a profit. If I am incorrect about that, perhaps the hon. Gentleman will comment on it.

Apparently, these interim conclusions are to be reinforced by a final period of study, which I take to mean a feasibility study. That is likely to start in October. That seems to be very important, because I believe that I am right in saying that it may occupy about two years. If it will, will the Anglo-French decision be deferred until the full study is completed—in other words, until October 1971? There is obviously a point of importance here since it means that the Anglo-French decision could well fall to a Government other than the present one. Therefore, I ask the hon. Gentleman to be as specific as he can about the duration of the study and its relationship to the final decision which must be taken.

If I am correct, no start on the construction is possible until towards the end of 1971, with the finish, given five years' work, at the end of 1976. If that calculation is correct, various factors that we are now considering and that must be related to the tunnel have to be projected forward no less than seven years, assuming that all goes to plan. That strikes me as being a very important consideration.

What precisely does this final study aim to do? As I understand it, it will take two years. I am hostile to the project, so that in my opinion the longer it takes the better. But two years requires a word of explanation and, since we have been conducting inquiries into the project for some time, it postulates a puzzling lack of urgency. Am I to understand that there will be no final decision until the end of this period? If not, will preliminary engineering works start before that point, assuming that engineering works are required in connection with the studies? In effect, if the study is to be protracted, it will prolong the uncertainty in this part of England for a considerable period.

If I am right about the study, what will it aim to prove? Perhaps I might venture a few suggestions of my own as to what it ought to try to show. The first of them concerns inflation, which is now rising in terms of this sort of work by about 7½per cent. a year and must be taken as read. I know that the Minister takes exception to my published estimate that the final cost of the project will be nearer £600 million than £300 million. I note with interest that I am now publicly supported by a Mr. Douglas Young, art economist working on the project at the National Economic Development Office. He is reported in The Times of 21st July as saying: … if past experience of large projects is any guide the final cost of the tunnel and associated works is likely to be £500 million to £600 million rather than the recent official estimate of £240 million. I do not expect the hon. Gentleman to comment on that, but it is pretty close to what I said some time ago and got into trouble with the Minister for saying.

Will the study include a forecast of port development, the progress of containerisation and the progress of roll-on, roll-off methods by 1976? That is the time scale. Incidentally, are these developments, broadly speaking, to be encouraged or discouraged? One of my anxieties is that once we are committed to a Government prestige project of this kind, other enterprises which may be revivals are apt to find permission for projected developments difficult to obtain.

My third suggestion concerns air freight, and this is a personal view. In my opinion, air freight is one of the biggest factors involved here. The advent of the jumbo-jet spells a huge advance in moving low-bulk high-cost freight, which to some extent is already going by air. By 1976 this will be a major factor. Will the study take that into account?

My final suggestion involves consumer choice. What do car users want? What will road haulage costs be by 1976 compared with rail costs? Is that a matter which the study will consider?

If I am right, what the Minister is undertaking to study must, if it is to be reliable, take us no less than 13 years—from the last published estimates in 1963 to 1976—in an era of intensive transport revolution. Is that intended? if so, I cannot quarrell with such intentions. I am asking for more information. However, the time now taken has curious implications for the project.

What will the study cost, and are the Government covered by the financial outlay which will be involved?

Can the hon. Gentleman say a word about the state of play with the consortia? At one time there were three consortia entering bids against each other. Then they were encouraged to become one. Where has all this got to?

I end by mentioning the two strongest reservations that I have about the idea. Both must be met by any further study which is to be made and published. First, it is intended to replace a diversity and a flexibility of sea and air routes which now carry about £1,500 million worth of trade to Europe annually by a single tube which is jointly held with the French. I have no wish to speak foolishly or irresponsibly about this, but it has to be judged against the background of the last six years. I find it curious that we should be joining with the one country which has done more than any other to keep us out of Europe. However, I will not dwell on that. It is simply a matter for consideration by others who will be concerned with the final answer.

My second reservation is that we shall expose what will become a vital line to the hazards of modern industrial disruption. In terms of freight, this line to Europe will become a jugular artery. It would be very unfortunate if it came to be considered like the Suez Canal. One of the most disturbing aspects of modern technology is the power it places in the hands of a few to inflict disaster on a scheme. In my view, we are not getting modern technology in return for this risk, but an outmoded form of technology. This concentration of power in the hands of a few represents grave implications.

If the Government are confident that they can meet these problems and provide the answers to them, I wish them all the luck in the world. However, some of us may be forgiven for having considerable doubt about this project. I express my doubt not from the parish pump standpoint but from the point of view of the broadest national interest. My view is shared by many who are much less prejudiced and far more qualified and informed than I am.

In view of the pregnant appearance which this project is beginning to have and its exceptionally long period of gestation, I have thought it right to raise these doubts before we Recess, to ask questions and to give the Minister a chance to answer them, if he can.

Several Hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving)

Order. I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) for the restraint he showed in keeping his speech brief. I remind the House that only one hour has been allowed for this debate. If hon. Members exercise restraint and are brief, all hon. Members who wish to speak on the subject will have an opportunity of doing so.

1.31 p.m.

Mr. A. P. Costain (Folkestone and Hythe)

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) on his luck in the draw and I assure you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that I shall be as brief as possible.

When I was fortunate to secure an Adjournment debate on 20th May, 1968, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford and my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch) came to my support. The main purpose of that debate was to ask the Minister of Transport to conduct a preliminary inquiry, regardless of whether or not the tunnel proceeded, in an effort to stop the overall blight on land in my constituency. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford pointed out, this week the Minister has given the results of that inquiry, in which all concerned had an opportunity to express their views.

The results of the inquiry have, unfortunately, added to the imponderables rather than eliminating all of them. Regretfully, in my view, the Minister has decided to leave the option open to the freight yards. I would have thought that the freight yard option problem was one of the simplest to solve. Unfortunately, however, we do not know whether the main freight yard will be in Ashford or in my constituency.

It seems that in our consideration of the tunnel project we have chosen the pram but not made up our minds whether to have a baby. In other words, we have chosen the possible site, but have not decided whether to have a tunnel. Since we are discussing a problem which affects the very heart of my constituency, I have, naturally, taken a vivid interest in the matter for the last 15 years. In the earlier stages I was extremely enthusiastic over the idea of a tunnel, and I made no doubt of my view. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford was equally unenthusiastic about it.

During the intervening years technology has advanced at a tremendously fast rate. Indeed, its advance has been so fast that we may not need a tunnel at all. Goods may soon be sent via the moon. With the passage of each year the' need for a tunnel must be questioned more and more, particularly since we cannot get adequate information from the Ministry.

Because of this lack of information, I cheekily used my constituency paper Right, which has a circulation of 12,000, meaning that about 20,000 people read it, to conduct my own Gallup poll. I set out what, with my limited knowledge, I thought to be the advantages and disadvantages to be derived from a Channel Tunnel from both the national and local points of view. I will not weary the House by spelling out the results of the replies I received, except to say that from 12,000 copies we received 10 per cent. replies. For an amateur Gallup poll costing nothing and with no prizes to be won at the end, that was not bad.

Of the replies I received, 88 per cent. were against the tunnel, with 12 per cent. in favour. I had deliberately set out what I thought to be the national and local advantages and disadvantages because I wanted my inquiry not to be a parish pump affair. I did not want my constituents to consider the matter from a narrow point of view. I was surprised to find that about 3 per cent. of those who replied were in favour of the project nationally, but were against it locally.

After my local inquiry was conducted I was invited—my hon. Friend the Member for Truro (Mr. Geoffrey Wilson) came along—to a conference in Lille to see what Europe thought about the idea of a Channel tunnel. The conference was held by the Chamber of Commerce of Lille and Pas de Calais, which had a fantastic amount of information on the subject.

The French were extremely enthusiastic about the tunnel idea. They explained how North France was at the delta of the Rhine and how the axis of communication would be completely altered by the tunnel. Calais and Boulogne were enthusiastic, so much so that the French Government had given them the latest up-to-date information. Boulogne had built a new port, rejoicing in the fact that the tunnel would result in much more trade using the area. I was amazed to hear about the larger percentage of exports going from Boulogne Port to the rest of France than from Boulogne to England. I was equally amazed to see the import figures into Boulogne, for they were ten times higher than the import figures into South Africa from Britain.

These various steps had been taken by Boulogne and Calais because they had been given all the necessary information by their Government. Regardless of whether a tunnel would be built, they were able to take counter-measures and, basing their measures on a decision about the tunnel being taken either way, they were and are on a good wicket.

We were given some interesting figures which, for some reason, have still not been published in Britain. For example, we were told that Channel crossing foot passengers were increasing at the rate of 1.5 per cent. a year, that Paris-London air traffic, which, in 1967, totalled 1,235,000 passengers, was increasing by 9 per cent. a year and that the tonnage of merchandise being carried was increasing by 4 per cent. a year. The most startling figure of all was the fact that motor car traffic was increasing by 14 per cent. a year.

This brings me to the crux of the problem. Regardless of whether or not a tunnel is built, if vehicle traffic is to rise at the rate of 14 per cent. a year, action must be taken because the road system of Kent is already inadequate. A number of my constituents are genuinely worried about this. I cannot reassure them because I do not have the information. In other words, if the tunnel is not built the Kent road system will worsen because of the rise in traffic, and if it is built it will deteriorate more rapidly because of the extra demand that will be placed on it.

In my innocence I had thought that a tunnel would be built to encourage the use of the railways. I had understood that the Government—they have never come out into the open about this—would encourage traffic to use the railways and discourage road transport. The previous Minister of Transport was, we understood, in favour of the tunnel, because it would do more harm to the private lorry industry than even the last Transport Act, and the damage that that has done is difficult to assess.

Why cannot we have a White Paper setting out the full national and local advantages and disadvantages to be derived from a Channel Tunnel? My amateurish affair produced incredible results, but a thorough inquiry should be conducted on a national basis. We should be told if a tunnel would help our export trade and would warrant its cost. Can we be told the cost of transporting goods through it? The promoters say that it will save between 30 and 50 per cent. If that is so, it is a strong argument for going ahead.

Before disruption of this area takes place, we must be sure of the facts. If the facts are produced then it is the business of the House to decide what is to be done and to ensure that, if any person is to give up his property for the building of the tunnel, he should be adequately compensated. We must ensure that all proper consideration is given to all the factors involved before we give the "go ahead".

1.40 p.m.

Mr. David Crouch (Canterbury)

I am against the Channel Tunnel, but I hope that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary will bear in mind that the constant indecision by the Ministry produces a blight not only on buildings and development and people's intentions and values in the area of Kent affected, but on road development in East Kent, which is one of the most crowded areas in England—as was acknowledged by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister in answer to a supplementary question from me a few days ago.

The idea of a Channel Tunnel is not new. It is 160 years old. In 1868, a Channel Tunnel Committee was formed. The idea had been thought of 60 years before that and it was blessed by Stephenson, welcomed by Brunel and thought to be possible by Hawkshaw, who built the Severn Tunnel. Of course, these gentlemen welcomed it. It was an idea of their times, of the 1860s. We live in different times now—the days of Cockerill, Concorde and container ships. In my opinion, the tunnel has no reality today.

A very dear friend of mine died recently—the great consultant engineer Sir Owen Williams, a man distinguished by great achievements in this country, not least the planning and the building of the M1. I discussed with this old and distinguished engineer the question of the Channel Tunnel and he gave me his views clearly and robustly. He thought that it would be a strategic mistake and, from the engineering point of view, would be a bottleneck for all our traffic to the Continent because we would be creating a magnet for the majority of our traffic and trade to pass through. He pointed out that it would also attract more trade, traffic and tourists to and through Greater London, already the greatest concentration of building, industrial development and population in the country. He thought that, in the context of the country as a whole, it would be a strategic mistake of the greatest order.

I contend that our planning should be to spread our dense population and industrial activity more evenly across the country rather than take any steps which might concentrate it into one area. I believe that this tunnel, this idea of 160 years ago, this dream in a politician's eye and sometimes that of the older engineers, would act as a dangerous diversion from the planning which we should be doing for the rest of this century and for the next.

Nor do I think that this diversion would be primarily to Britain's advantage. At present, our heaviest traffic and the greatest development in the export trade to Europe is to Europe across not the Channel, but the North Sea to Belgium, Holland and Germany. That is the growth area, and it is that route which best serves the industrial Midlands and the North, with no problem about taking such traffic across Greater London.

With the building of a Channel tunnel, this traffic would be diverted into France, inevitably, and France would become the main beneficiary of the tunnel. No wonder the French are so keen on it, as they demonstrated at their recent conference in Lille. I remind the House of the figures published by the Ministry in 1967, forecasting possible Channel tunnel traffic starting in 1975. They are very revealing. They do not Drove to me that the tunnel is really such a viable and interesting economic proposition.

The forecast of the number of passengers thought to be crossing the Channel by all routes in 1975 is about 8½million, of which about 3½ million would, it is thought, use the tunnel. The figures also look forward to the year 2005 with an estimate that the total number of passengers crossing the Channel by all routes then will be about 14 million. The tunnel is forecast to have attracted by then only another 1 million people, to a total of about 4½ million.

Is the tunnel, then, to attract most of the goods traffic? Not according to the Ministry forecast. It is estimated that 11 million tons of goods will cross from Britain to France overall in 1975 and that the tunnel's share would be about 4½ million tons. For the year 2005, it is estimated that the total weight will be 38 million tons, of which the tunnel would carry less than half—about 15 million tons.

But where the figures are revealing, as my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) has said, is that the tunnel is seen to be the magnet for the cars, because it is there that the tunnel is envisaged as capturing the great majority of traffic. This will surely be a disaster for Kent. The whole of Kent would be affected by the decision to build a tunnel. It would have vast side effects across the whole country, particularly in Kent. We would be creating the biggest traffic jam throughout Britain, throughout the year, day and night. We would be creating an enormous goods yard, far bigger than anything hinted at so far. It would be on a vast scale, as one realises by thinking now not only of what would happen in 1975 but of all the development thereafter if the tunnel should come about.

The way into Europe is not an underground matter. It is by political and economic planning that we decide whether Britain takes part in a European community. The tunnel project is an extravagant sideshow and a diversion from the real considerations. It would be a planning mistake, an economic joke, and I hope that such a joke will not be supported by the Government and Government money, even though it is proposed at the moment that the construction costs will not come from the Government. I say strongly and sincerely that this is not a case where the Government should give any guarantee. We do not want to see another project like the QE2.

I hope that in his examinations which are to take place the Parliamentary Secretary will find out whether the British Railways Board favours the idea of a concentration of traffic in one area. What we should be doing about the future is not concentrating in one area to the neglect of others, but developing our ports and our opportunities for exports and communications for export through airports and through seaports by creating new areas around our coasts at the best strategic points. By concentrating in this area we should not be choosing the best strategic point but neglecting the opportunity for properly developing a much wider and more diverse series of opportunities for export.

1.50 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson (Truro)

I hope that the House will not too readily accept the scepticism of the Kentish Members, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) and my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch), This is an emotive subject I suspect that the Kentish Members, not-withstanding denials, are influenced by their constituency interests and by the -anxieties of people in Kent.

What the Kentish people fear is a gross exaggeration of anything that is likely to happen. It is contrary to the whole history of the development of transport for any new form of transport completely to supplant a previous form. What usually happens is that the newer form is added to the previous form, which continues for limited use. There are not the slightest grounds for the suggestion that the Channel Tunnel would divert all traffic from one form of transport and away from all the other forms of transport.

It is a mistake to believe that a large amount of road building in Kent would be inevitable. I do not believe that there would be much industrial development in Kent. There is industrial development around a port because the highest charges in transport are transfer charges, and a consignee will try to get his factory or his warehouse as near the point of transhipment as he can. But traffic on a liner train going through a tunnel would not have to unload at the point where the tunnel emerged. It could easily go another 50 or 100 miles without any great increase in costs.

Much of the opposition to the Channel Tunnel is due to the conflict of two political trends which are spreading round the world like an influenza epidemic. On the surface, in the Iron Curtain countries, in the newly-emerging countries and in the old democracies the trend is towards local independence in smaller and smaller units and the demand for people to manage their own affairs—Czechoslovakia, Biafra, Britanny, Quebec, and there are Scottish, Welsh and even Cornish nationalists. Much of the opposition to the runnel comes from the belief that "wogs begin at Calais"—some of my constituents think that "wogs" begin at Plymouth. Below that feeling there is a political trend towards wider economic unity in larger areas, and hence we have moved towards the Common Market, the Communists' trade pacts and talk of an Atlantic Community, and so on.

Nothing impressed me more at the conference in Lille than the fact that there were many businessmen and university professors from France, Germany, Belgium and Holland, all of whom not only substantially agreed about the Channel Tunnel but believed that North-West Europe stretched from the Ruhr to the Channel and was projected over into industrial England. They regard it as one unit and believe that it will inevitably be continued into England.

Mr. Costain

I am sure that my hon. Friend does not want to mislead the House. Having been at the conference, he will recall that they talked about the sunny South of France and the awful North, because the North is industrialised and the rest is kept for holidays.

Mr. Wilson

One of the delegates pointed out to me that Acton and Slough were nearer Lille than was the Ruhr and that Manchester was nearer Lille than was Hamburg. They were thinking of industrial co-operation between England and what they called North-West Europe. What is more, one of the Dutch representatives was contemplating that there would be some diversion of ocean traffic from Rotterdam which would be transferred to London and thence by rail to Europe if there were a Channel Tunnel, but he still thought it worth while to have the Tunnel.

Quite apart from any political arrangements about the Common Market or anything else, there will be a great increase in the flow of goods and passengers over the Channel which existing facilities will not be able to meet. It is not a question of the tunnel or other facilities; we will need all the facilities we can get. By 1966, the volume of cross-Channel traffic had already reached the upper estimate of the 1963 report mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford, which it had predicted for the year 1985 and it is still growing. The 1963 report also envisaged a levelling off of general goods traffic from that date, but it is still increasing.

Much too much stress has been placed on the Channel as a motor-rail ferry service of accompanied cars between the Tunnel terminals. It was originally suggested that that traffic would amount to one third of the total and that two thirds would be concerned with goods and passengers. I expect it to be less than one third. Roll-on roll-off traffic will not all go through these terminals. We all know from the popularity of the long-distance service between London and Scotland and London and Cornwall that many people find it convenient to put their cars on the train and go on a long journey that way, particularly overnight. I envisage a motor-rail service through the tunnel starting in say Edinburgh and finishing at Paris, or starting at Manchester and finishing at Lyons, and much road traffic would not start or stop at the tunnel terminals at all, but would go through to other destinations.

For this reason, I do not agree that a vast amount of road-building in Kent would be needed because of the traffic coming through the Channel Tunnel.

Mr. Crouch

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay)

Before the hon. Member intervenes, I remind the House that this debate must conclude at 2.15 p.m. and that the Minister still has to reply and that there may be an Opposition Front Bench spokesman.

Mr. Wilson

I am drawing my remarks to a close.

The car-owning population in this country is increasing rapidly. Last Wednesday, some of us went to the Road Research Laboratory, where it was pointed out that there were 5½million private cars in 1966 and that it was projected that this number would be 17½ million by 1975 and 31 million by 2,000. Professor Proudlove put the figure a good deal higher than that when he talked to us a day or two ago. He said that traffic would double every six years until 2,000. If this is so, there is plenty of traffic for all facilities.

The Channel tunnel company has repeatedly indicated that is believes construction could be financed by British and Foreign private capital without imposing any burden on public funds, because it has confidence that the tunnel would pay its way. The guarantee referred to would only be required to meet the requirements of American law and thus bring in American capital which would not otherwise be invested in this country. If this is true, the choice is not between the tunnel or other developments, but other developments on the tunnel plus other developments. In such a case it would be foolish not to take this opportunity to have these additional facilities.

2.0 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Neil Carmichael)

The hon. Member for Truro (Mr. Geoffrey Wilson) said that this was an emotive subject. The speeches we have heard, while they have not been emotional, have shown clearly the divergence of views on this topic. It would be best, if because of the many aspects of the project, I review, rapidly of necessity, the whole subject.

In covering that much ground, I may not have time to do full justice to all the interesting points raised by hon. Members during the debate. If there prove to be significant omissions of this kind I will, of course, be glad to give more detailed replies on individual points to hon. Members who write to me.

I will begin with the nature of the project and the basis on which it is being pursued. These two things are well known to those closest to the project, but may not be sufficiently clear to those who are not. Basically, the Channel Tunnel is a simple continuous loop of railway stretching roughly 35 miles between points near Folkestone and Calais, with links to the two main railway networks. These links would allow through freight, motor-rail and passenger trains, including night sleepers, linking the main centres in this country and in Continental Europe and helping to relieve congestion on the roads.

The loop itself would, in effect, be a high-speed, high-capacity roll-on/roll-off ferry for road vehicles of all types. The ferry trains would be enclosed and there would be room for people to get out of their cars and stretch their legs. There would be special ferry trains for large commercial vehicles.

At peaks, there would be a car ferry train every four or five minutes and a ferry capacity of well over 3,000 cars per hour in each direction—though we do not expect demand to reach that level on many days before the end of the century. The 35-mile journey in the ferry train would take 35 minutes—a block speed of 60 m.p.h. The terminals would use the latest techniques available and passage through them would be quick and easy.

Initially, we expect about half the tunnel revenue to come from the accompanied passenger vehicles, about a third from freight and the rest from through rail passenger services, but with the passage of time freight could become an even more important factor than the ferry.

That, briefly, is the project. Why has it been pursued and developed by the British and French Governments in preference to other forms of fixed link? There are three main reasons. First, the alternative fixed links, whether road tunnels, bridges, or combinations of the two, would cost a great deal more than the rail Tunnel without attracting proportionately more traffic. So they do not offer such good prospects of economic return, still less of proving commercially competitve with existing means of transport.

Secondly, there are serious problems of ventilation with road tunnels of the necessary length and traffic capacity. Thirdly, we could not obstruct international waters with a bridge or a bridge tunnel without obtaining international agreement and even then there would be both local and international problems of marine regulation and safety in the Channel.

The only practical choice, as we see it, lies between the rail tunnel, on the one hand, and continued use and development of the existing means of transport by sea and air, on the other. I will come back later to the question of how we hope to make this choice. First, however, I will turn to the organisation for pursuing the project, and the place of Parliament in that organisation.

There are two major factors influencing the organisation for this project. First, the project is Anglo-French. This means that all major decisions must be taken jointly and announced jointly by the British and French Governments. This is obvious. What may be less immediately obvious to hon. Members is the practical restriction which this fact of collaboration imposes upon the impromptu or ad hoc release of information or opinions by either side.

Frequently, we are accused of not saying enough: sometimes one side is accused of saying less than the other side. Both sides, in practice, do their best to make useful information available within an agreed framework and, equally, on both sides of the Channel. In fact, hon. Members would find that the British Government have kept the House better informed than the French have the National Assembly.

Of course, if a British official reads an academic paper on the subject to a learned society, his French colleagues may not read the same paper on the same day in France, and vice versa: the two Administrations are in very close collaboration, but they do not and should not stand on each others' toes. There was a symposium at Lille, in May, and another at Cranfield, in July. Both had been planned for some time and the timing was in the hands of the private bodies who organised them.

Secondly, in conformity with its status as a public utility linking the road and rail systems of Britain and the Continent, the tunnel would be operated, under control of the two Governments, by a public operating authority. But the Governments have agreed that it should be financed, and its construction arranged, by an organisation in the private sector which, for convenience, we call the Construction Company. Shareholders in this company would be remunerated on a basis related to the commercial success of the tunnel.

So we have four main parties: the two Governments, the private sector construction company, international in nature, and the Anglo-French operating authority. Before the project goes ahead, it must be shown to be consistent both with the national interests of Britain and France and with the commercial interests of the construction company. These all depend upon the likely demand for the use of the tunnel: and that, in turn, depends upon the attractiveness of the services it will provide and the charges it will make for them, by comparison with services and charges in other forms of cross-Channel transport. How will the choice be determined?

The two Governments have already made two massive assessments, in 1963 and 1966, of the tunnel's economic and commercial prospects. Both of them rated them highly, the second more highly than the first. It has been alleged recently that the 1963 study, which was published as a Command Paper, was in some ways not up to the expected standards. In fact, it was about the most comprehensive investment analysis using modern cost-benefit techniques to have been published in the country at that date—and say this in the full knowledge that it was published under a Conservative Government.

But, of course, the 1963 study is out of date in certain respects. So is the 1966 study.

Mr. Crouch

So is the tunnel out of date.

Mr. Carmichael

This is the point at issue. In particular, they both rather underestimated future traffic growth and in so doing underestimated the tunnel's prospects. However, there are other factors to be reviewed, which may pull the other way. Will newer forms of marine transport, like the hovercraft, the containership, the multi-purpose roll-on/ roll-off vessel, spoil the tunnel's competitive position in this growing cross-Channel market? Of course, their proponents think so and sometimes loudly say so. But, so far, they have not produced any detailed evidence to support their case.

Nevertheless, the two Governments and the private interests accept entirely that the tunnel's prospects must be reviewed in detail before the final decision to build is taken. That will be the purpose of the two-year study period which will begin when a financing group has been chosen.

The studies will be technical, commercial and economic. They will have to complete the detailed definition of the project in operating and engineering terms and, in so doing, to reassess the costs. These new cost figures, together with new and comprehensive studies of cross-Channel traffic and of demand for future services, will be the basis for the new economic and commercial assessment on which the final decision whether or not to build must be based.

The studies will, of course, take account of new development such as hovercraft and other forms of cross-Channel link. The Ministry has consulted widely—including the Chamber of Shipping, the National Ports Council and the road haulage and motoring organisations—on the scope and design of these studies and we are grateful for the many helpful suggestions made.

The Channel Tunnel Planning Council will be set up under the Transport Act, 1968, to take part in the studies as forerunner, on the British side, of the public operating authority. A similar organisation will be set up in France. Most of the cost of the studies will be borne by the private financing group, which will set up a study company for the purpose.

I have said that the final decision to build must await the results of the final study period, which will last about two years from the choice of financing group. But the overriding control over that final decision, of course, rests with Parliament because enabling powers must be sought before work can begin. And, as my right hon. Friend has promised the House on many occasions, he intends to place the results of the studies before hon. Members before asking them to give the final go-ahead.

In the meantime, as my right hon. Friend announced on 22nd July, we have decided on the sites which must be safeguarded for terminal requirements in this country so that detailed planning of the terminals and road links may continue. We are grateful to the Kent County Council for the help it has given. Hon. Members may have noticed the Press statement made by the Kent County Council the other day.

The choice of Cheriton, near Folkestone, as the ferry terminal should more than compensate for any employment lost in Folkestone from the withdrawal of cross-Channel shipping services.

The next move will be the selection of a financing group. This is the subject of detailed negotiation at present and it would not further those negotiations if I gave details here. When the financing group is chosen, however—I hope before the end of the year—my right hon. Friend will certainly consider, with his French colleague, the need for a joint release of information on the agreement reached, the basis for conduct of the study period, and other relevant information, whether as a White Paper or in some other form.

I have given, perhaps rather rapidly, the background to the state of play concerning the Channel tunnel. However, because of the shortness of the debate, and the way in which I have had to rush through my speech, if hon. Members have any other points which they would like me to deal with we shall be only too pleased to deal with them by correspondence.

2.12 p.m.

Mr. Michael Heseltine (Tavistock)

I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for giving me the opportunity to make one or two observations on his remarks. From the point of view of the strategic development of the British economy, this is one of the most crucial debates which we could have. I could not help being amused by a cutting from the Financial Times dated 29th October 1966, which said: Channel Tunnel by 1975—cost may reach £170 million. That was regarded then as a high figure. We are now talking about the figure of £200 million. This is a warning to us. We are now considering, not figures which seemed relevant at the time, but far higher figures for the cost of building the tunnel.

One point about which the Parliamentary Secretary was not as forthcoming as I would have wished him to be, concerns the question of delay, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) referred. The Ministry is not keeping to the target which it has published. It issued a Press release on 18th October, 1968, in which it said that it was hoped that agreement could be reached with a selected group in the next few months. That was eight months ago. Today, the Parliamentary Secretary said that he hoped that agreement could be reached before the end of the year. He merely "hoped" that agreement could be reached. It is possible that agreement to proceed with the detailed study will not be reached until the beginning of 1970. That puts back the schedule, with a two-year investigation period followed by a five-year construction period.

Therefore, we must talk about a Channel Tunnel coming into operation in 1977 or 1978, with the immediate effects which it will have on any cost projections, but it would be helpful if the Ministry could inject into this early negotiating stage a degree of urgency. My hon. Friends have rightly pointed out the effects on this part of England, with planning blight and the possible consequences for the transportation system of the United Kingdom which will follow from a negative or positive decision. It is, therefore, urgent that decisions are reached. It is obvious that no meaningful decisions can be made until the study period has been entered into.

I hoped that the Parliamentary Secretary would be a little more helpful in saying how the information would be published once the study period begins. He was clear that the information would be published. Is it to be published in the form of a White Paper? Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would think about that. However, plainly we would want a clear indication about how quickly the facts and figures which will be updated are to be made available to the House. Obviously, a view as to whether this is an economic proposition cannot be formed until that information has been produced.

The Parliamentary Secretary said that the tunnel would be financed and the construction managed, by a private sector company. I should be interested to know whether the Government expect to give larger undertakings to a private sector company than was perhaps envisaged in the early days. Will undertakings be necessary on behalf of British Railways to underwrite the revenue of the tunnel company in the event of, for example, industrial unrest, which could have most dramatic effects on a nerve centre of this sort? I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will consider that and will give us the latest views on the guarantees which will be required before an investment of this size is forthcoming.

This has been a useful debate on a very important subject. My only regret is that we are faced with even more delay than was envisaged earlier.