HC Deb 25 July 1969 vol 787 cc2371-82

5.46 p.m.

Mr. Alfred Morris (Manchester, Wythenshawe)

This is the final debate before we rise for the Recess, but perhaps not the least important. I think that the House will welcome an opportunity to discuss the proposal for an Anglo-French nuclear force, which is causing very real concern to many people of informed opinion. There are hon. and right hon. Members who regard Herr Strauss, the West German Finance Minister, as the author of this proposal, but, in fact, the authorship is in dispute.

At Question Time on 12th June last there were animated clashes between my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath), about precisely what had been said on the question when the Leader of the Opposition met the American Press on 25th May.

The Times had reported the right hon. Gentleman as saying: The European partners must sooner or later have a nuclear capability. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bexley insisted that a full transcript of his statement was available, and it is from that document I should now like to quote.

The right hon. Gentleman was asked by an American journalist, Mr. Dale, How about the proposal made last week by Herr Strauss that Britain merge its nuclear forces with the French forces, or do you favour a continued independent British deterrent? The right hon. Member for Bexley replied: I was very interested in this proposal, because I was over here just over two years ago, giving the Godkin lectures at Harvard, three lectures about Europe, and in one of those lectures, dealing with foreign affairs and defence, I put forward exactly this proposal. The form in which I nut it forward was that the French and British nuclear deterrents should jointly be held in trust for Europe. I think that anyone who read the Godkin lectures as a whole would agree that there is some justice in the right hon. Gentleman's claim that he is the originator of the idea, and that it is not so much a Strauss proposal as a Heath proposal, or, at the very least, that it is a Heath-Strauss proposal.

But there are others abroad who subscribe to the proposal, and I should like briefly to mention what was said at a recent conference of French and British Parliamentarians when I and other hon. and right hon. Members went to France at the end of June under the auspices of the Franco-British Parliamentary Relations Committee. Senator André Monteil, who is the President of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces, made it quite clear in his report to the conference—and I honour him for his frankness—that We French, Government supporters and Opposition alike, see in atomic co-operation between our two countries the real test of whether Great Britain…really is turning towards Europe and abandoning her rôle of brilliant second to the United States of America. Thus, the proposal has been taken seriously in France, and it is worth while considering why it was made and why it attracted the support of extremely influential opinion in France and elsewhere in Western Europe.

My reading of the right hon. Gentleman's Godkin lectures convinces me that he believes nuclear sharing with France to be an essential part of the price for British entry into the European Economic Community.

From the French viewpoint, the proposal has its attraction. France is still very much a lagging fifth in the nuclear league table and has been feeling the economic pinch of increasing so-called defence spending. Indeed, M. Debré, the new Defence Minister, was recently enjoined by the French Prime Minister to cut his coat according to his cloth.

Referring to this in a recent leading article, The Guardian severely criticised the Heath-Strauss proposal for nuclear sharing, and went on to say: The expense and lack of credibility of these two albatrosses that hang round the necks of both the French and the British Governments should lead no one to think that a joint albatross around a joint neck would be any cheaper, more credible, or in any way more desirable. Least of all should it be thought that the pooling of our nuclear resources with those of the French will speed our entry into the Common Market. I agree, and I think that the overwhelming majority of people in this country would agree with The Guardian's assessment; for the Heath-Strauss plan is not only extremely dangerous and against all our present efforts to arrest the growth of nuclear armaments, but, from the British point of view, it would also be deeply cynical to follow this course.

Let us consider how the proposal for an Anglo-French nuclear force would affect the international undertakings entered into in the post-war years by British Governments of both parties. First, there is the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which is better known as the MacMahon Act. It is the view of expert opinion that the implementation of the Strauss/Heath proposal would involve dishonouring our commitments under that Act, for who can say that we should not be making available to the French information which was passed to this country under the provisions of that Act?—or are Herr Strauss and the right hon. Member for Bexley saying that the MacMahon Act should be regarded as a dead letter and ignored?

Secondly, there is the Anglo-American bilateral agreement of 1958 on Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. Article 7 of that agreement lays down clear conditions on dissemination. Would these not be breached by any unilateral decision by this country to communicate classified information, or transfer, or permit access to, or use of, materials or equipment, made available under the agreement?

Third, there is the amendment in 1959 to the Anglo-American bilateral agreement of 1958, with the same conditions on dissemination and the same very serious question arises.

Fourth, there is the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, to which the French Government did not adhere, and indeed, they have continued to test nuclear devices in the atmosphere. Perhaps my right hon. Friend could say to what extent any implementation of the Heath-Strauss proposal would affect the attitudes taken by the French and British Governments to that important treaty.

Fifth, there is the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, to which we have adhered and the French have not. Article 1 of the treaty states: Each nuclear weapon State party to the treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Will we not also be clearly in breach of our undertaking under the treaty, in the preparation of which my hon. Friend took such an honourable and leading part?

It may be that the right hon. Member for Bexley regards the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a mere scrap of paper. But he will not carry this country with him in that view, and he should now be pressed to "come clean" about the real implications of his proposal for nuclear sharing. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), with all customary good sense, has pointed out Mr. Heath has no right to go round the world peddling this proposal as though anybody in Britain outside himself supported it. Mr. Heath, who wants to revive all the fears of the nuclear consortium, and include Germany with all that that might stir up on the Russian side, is not speaking for Britain. Moreover, there is great satisfaction that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, in his speech at Barnsley, and elsewhere, has spoken so emphatically against the Leader of the Opposition's views on this matter.

I should be grateful if my right hon. Friend could comment in his reply on the logic, if we were to have nuclear sharing with France as members of the same economic and/or political community, of excluding other West European partners, including West Germany, from the deal. I hope he will agree with me that it would be far preferable for the French now to sign the partial test-ban treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty than for us to be cynically considering a nuclear deal with that country.

Let us ask them now to stop poisoning the atmosphere. Let us place more emphasis on nuclear disarmament than on nuclear proliferation. Let us also make it plain to our friends in Western Europe that there are in this country only a very few fanatical Europeans who would favour the right hon. Gentleman's proposal.

It is time now for the activists for peace and international understanding to give the Heath-Strauss proposal much more detailed study. I know that they will do so with the sombre thought in mind that Western Europe, with its 75 major cities in close proximity to each other, is among the most vulnerable regions to nuclear devastation, and has the most deeply vested interest in nuclear disarmament. In Western Europe there would be unimaginable destruction and loss of life. My view is that we should be taking the most important lead in nuclear disarmament.

Since I am initiating the final debate before the Summer Recess, I should like to take the opportunity to express my warm appreciation to Mr. Speaker, his deputies and all his staff, indeed to everyone who works in the House, which is so eminently well served, and to convey to them all our every good wish for an enjoyable and happy Recess.

6.0 p.m.

Mr. Frank Allaun (Salford, East)

Of all the important issues discussed in Parliament today, this, unfortunately, may turn out to be the most grave. Why is it that Herr Strauss, the tough guy of Germany, is so enthusiastic about the idea of the pooling of nuclear arms by Britain and France? The obvious answer is that this is his way of securing what he has so far been denied—nuclear weapons for West Germany; a West German finger on the nuclear trigger.

Would I trust the West German generals with H-bombs? I would not even trust them with water pistols, and I am entitled to say that because I would not trust our own generals, or any other generals, with such weapons. They are genocide weapons whose use is not justified in any circumstances at all. When one remembers that nearly all the leading generals in West Germany served as officers in the Luftwaffe, or in Hitler's armed forces generally, one's doubts are by no means dispersed.

When Herr Strauss spoke in London to the European Atlantic Group on 19th May, he said: The first step could be for Great Britain and France to pool their nuclear arms, creating the core of a nuclear force. In this initial stage of the community the order to use nuclear weapons could be given only by the existing authorities in whose territories part of the nuclear arsenal were located. I ask the House to note the words, "In this initial stage". That certainly implies that there would be later stages, in which other countries would participate. It has another serious meaning, too, that the time would come when West Germany could order the use of the nuclear bombs on its territory; and there are a large number of such bombs on its territory at the present time. It is significant that in the same speech Herr Strauss was opposed to any arms limitation agreement being reached between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Starting with the original mistake of arming West Germany, it would be madness to go further and give her access to nuclear weapons.

I might add that I am also opposed to the Anglo-Dutch-German agreement for nuclear collaboration, even for peaceful purposes, because of the difficulty of preventing its abuse and the spread of this knowledge and this plant to military purposes. Just at a time when there seem to be some hopeful signs of a détente between the Big Two—and I profoundly hope that I am not speaking too soon—it would be tragic if this proposal for an Anglo-French nuclear force and its probable extension were adopted.

Why spoil the prospects for peace? For immediately the Soviet Government would shy away from East-West co-operation. Her fears of West German militarism are even greater than ours. The Nazi invasion cost her 20 million lives. Only yesterday Mr. Kosygin emphasised the importance of having a West German signature on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a signature which is still missing.

Unfortunately, as my hon. Friend said, it is not only Herr Strauss who wants an Anglo-French nuclear force. The Leader of the Opposition, and many of his Conservative supporters in this House, and the French Prime Minister, have all recently given encouragement to the idea, the latter no doubt because of the fact that France is several years behind us in her nuclear military developments, because of the enormous cost of catching up, and because of France's new economic difficulty.

Our own Prime Minister has resisted the proposals, but, unfortunately, he said in the House on 22nd July: If France were to come within the nuclear planning group, that might help to create a new situation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July, 1969; Vol. 787, c. 1490.] Many hon. Members on this side are opposed to any spread of nuclear weaponry, either outside or inside N.A.T.O. It would be greatly reassuring if the Minister of State could give a categoric undertaking that there will be no Anglo-French nuclear force of any kind. That would more than justify this debate.

Possibly the greatest danger of a third world war lies in war by accident. It could start through the misreading or misinterpretation of a signal, through the intervention of an unbalanced commander somewhere along the line of control, or through the unintended launching of a nuclear bomb. The more Governments possessing the bomb the greater is the danger of such an accident. Today, there are five such Governments; God help us if their number grows. Our object should be a reduction to two and then to none.

The geni is half out of the bottle. The task for humanity is to stuff it back again. To allow it to get out further is to do the devil's work, for which the price may be nothing less than the extinction of mankind. To take such a risk merely to get into the Common Market would be both tragedy and farce. For many reasons I am opposed to our entering to the E.E.C. One is that I fear that the E.E.C. is intended in some ways as an economic basis for a military pact. To worsen the prospects of peace is a price we should not pay, even if we approved of entry into the Common Market.

It would be an intolerable price; it would be worse than selling our soul for a mess of potage; it would risk selling our children's lives for a load of tripe. The constructive alternative is a European security pact with mutual reductions of forces by N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact alliances and the replacement of East-West antagonism by East-West collaboration.

6.4 p.m.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Frederick Mulley)

I am sure that I speak on behalf of all hon. Members in asking you, Mr. Irving, to convey to Mr. Speaker and to accept, with your fellow Deputy Speaker, and all the officers and servants of the House, no matter how humble their capacity, our grateful thanks for their great services this Session, which has been particularly demanding in time and in other ways. We would like to express our gratitude and wish you all a very happy Recess.

It would also be our wish for you to convey to Mr. Speaker our very good wishes for his forthcoming journey to the United States and particularly to say how pleased we are to know that he is to be present on the historic occasion next week, the 350th anniversary of the Parliament at Jamestown, the oldest Parliament in the New World. This and many other activities of Mr. Speaker at home and abroad are of immense service in bringing Parliament and people closer together.

If I may now turn to the debate, in a sense I am rather superfluous here today because, as I understand my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Wythenshawe (Mr. Alfred Morris), his main complaint was with the Leader of the Opposition and not with the Government and, perhaps understandably at this unprecedentedly late hour on a Friday, the Leader of the Opposition is not present to reply himself. I am sure that my hon. Friend would not except me to undertake that duty.

Equally, I think that I am a little superfluous in the sense that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has dealt so often and so effectively with these issues both at Question Time and in speeches inside and outside the House that I can do little more than summarise and repeat the points which he has made.

The first point which I want to make very clearly is that a debate about an Anglo-French nuclear force is an wholly hypothetical issue. No official proposals have been made for such a force or for Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in defence matters. The French Government have only recently taken office. No doubt they will spend some time yet considering their attitude towards N.A.T.O. and European defence matters generally, including nuclear questions.

However, it may be useful to repeat some of the points upon which the policy of Her Majesty's Government is based. If I may, I will make one point to my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) about his reference to the current tripartite centrifuge negotiations in which I have been personally involved between the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and ourselves. From the very first meeting, it was made clear that any collaboration would be strictly within the international obligations of the three countries and that there would be appropriate safeguards to ensure that this was so. It is a collaboration for civil nuclear energy.

It should be stressed that we have not yet reached a final agreement, and I would ask my hon. Friend to wait and see the final outcome—

Mr. Frank Allaun

It will be too late then.

Mr. Mulley

It would not, in any case, be a matter of providing one country with a knowledge of enriching uranium which it otherwise would not have. The basis of the collaboration is that each of three countries will be able to produce its own enriched uranium by centrifuge means. If there was not a tripartite international arrangement, there could be three separate national entities. So my hon. Friend's point about proliferation is not soundly based if he meant that proliferation was coming from the centrifuge arrangements. Certainly, there is no intention on the part of any of the other parties to proliferate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty sense.

As I have said, Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in defence raises complex issues. It cannot be considered in isolation as a purely Anglo-French matter—or even as an exclusively European affair. Proposals of this kind are inevitably linked to wider international strategic and disarmament questions. Not only do we have to bear in mind the importance for us of N.A.T.O. but also the provisions of the relevant agreements with the United States.

In short, it is clear that any discussion with the French in this area would be more fruitful if we had previously established a clear view and a closer understanding of our common interests on fundamental questions of foreign and defence policy.

We have always favoured much closer co-operation on defence matters among European countries, not least between France and ourselves. This, in our view, is best done within N.A.T.O. so that it strengthens rather than divides the alliance. Hence the support that we have given to the development of defence discussions among the European members of the alliance. We would greatly welcome French participation in these discussions and closer French association with N.A.T.O. generally. However this is, of course, a matter for France to decide.

As regards nuclear discussions, N.A.T.O. also offers the most appropriate forum—

It being a quarter past Six o'clock, five hours after the hour at which Proceedings on the Motion had been entered upon, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fitch.]

Mr. Mulley

As regards nuclear discussions, N.A.T.O. also offers the most appropriate forum, the Nuclear Planing Group, which was set up specifically for this purpose. France, of her own choice, is not a member of the N.P.G. It is open to her to take appropriate steps to associate herself with the N.P.G. at any time.

If France were to approach us with proposals for nuclear collaboration, which so far has not happened, we should of course listen carefully, as we would to anything which the new French Government may have to say to us. We are prepared and always have been prepared to discuss at any time with the French Government mutual questions of interest in nuclear weapons. However, as the Prime Minister told the House on 17th July, we would want to be extremely careful about anything in the weapons sense, in a bilateral sense or in any sense outside N.A.T.O."—[Orion REPORT, 17th July, 1969 Vol. 787, c. 879.] My hon. Friends have raised the question of the possible linking of these suggested arrangements with an application to join the Common Market, and I remind them again of what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said on 22nd July in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. My right hon. Friend, referring to Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, said: In my view, it would be extremely unwise to link this with negotiations for entering into the Common Market. I have seen no disposition on the part of the Six to attempt to extract from us a deal of that kind, linking two things which are very different indeed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July, 1969; Vol. 787, c. 1490.] I hope that my hon. Friends accept my right hon. Friend's statement. I am flattered in thinking that they want my views after they have heard those of the Prime Minister, but I am happy to say that my views and his are identical, at least on this question.

We would also, of course, be mindful of our obligations under, for example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Wythenshawe (Mr. Alfred Morris) for his kind references to the part I was proud to play in getting this treaty signed and agreed. What we want very much, for all the reasons my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) gave, because proliferation is a serious danger, is to see the treaty brought into full effect as soon as may be.

Any collaboration would have to be consistent with our status as a power which has both signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is a good deal of talk about a European nuclear force and the like. I repeat what I told the House on 8th July, 1968, and which I repeated in November when we ratified the treaty, about the position of the treaty in respect of these rather loose, woolly proposals about a European force.

The treaty allows for the succession of a federated State to the former nuclear status of one of its components. However, a federated State would have to control all of its external security functions, including defence and all foreign policy matters relating to external security. This covers the possibility, which we should not wish to rule out, that one day a politically and economically united Europe might have weapons of its own, including nuclear weapons. But I think that we all agree that this is not an immediate issue.

I hope that my hon. Friends will accept that my reply will permit them to go away for the Recess and enjoy it, and to feel that a good deal of the oratory and writings about an Anglo-French nuclear force are on a hypothetical basis. As far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, no official proposals have been made. If they were made, we should endeavour to respond to them on the lines that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has so often put before the House and, much less adequately I have tried to summarise today.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty minutes past Six o'clock till Monday, 13th October, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.