RAILWAYS (NETWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT) (Hansard, 10 February 1969)

§ Mr. Tom Bradley (Leicester, North-East)

The subject I am raising tonight, the size and shape of the British Railways network, has been a matter of great public interest and controversy since the first nationalisation statute of 1947. Naturally, it is a matter of intense interest, particularly to railwaymen whose livelihood depends on a sensible, stable and successful structure.

There have always been those who would reduce the railways network to a mere rump. There are others who advocate the retention of all railway lines however out-dated they may be. In the middle group are people such as myself who accept that there must be some contraction of the existing network because we recognise that some lines—in fact, many lines—do not pay, will never pay, and which have little or no social significance. Nevertheless, I believe that a strong case can be made for a sizeable network which, under enlightened managerial direction, could not only be socially useful, but could also become financially viable.

1084 Because the system had already contracted from 19,000 route miles at the end of 1956 to about 13,000 route miles by the end of 1966, many people had their hopes raised when, in March, 1967, there was published a document entitled "British Railways Network for Development Map". It was issued jointly by the then Minister of Transport and the British Railways Board, and it outlined a system of at least 11,000 route miles for development. The Minister acknowledged his responsibility for many un-remunerative lines within this basic network.

Those of us with close ties with the railway industry knew that, at the time that this map was published, there was in existence a second Beeching Report, which had been prepared but had never been published. It was based purely on commercial considerations and involved a drastic reduction of route mileage to a network of some 8,000 route miles. The new map, then, was the Government's alternative to the unpublished proposals, but it represented at once at least a 40 per cent. improvement.

The map took into account economic and social needs as well as commercial factors, and the fact that it was agreed at a time of economic squeeze and a big railways' deficit in 1966 showed just how strong the Government's commitment was. It deserved its warm welcome as an intention to bring stability into the system.

The House will recall that the map divided the existing route mileage into three categories, each marked differently. First, the lines that, on existing evidence, were not to be included in the basic network were marked in grey on the map. Second, freight lines which were to be included were marked in a thin black line. Third, freight and passenger lines or passenger only lines which were to be included in the basic network were marked in thick black lines. These latter lines were those which were intended to be retained and developed.

Since the publication of the map in March, 1967, a number of grey lines have been closed; for example, Kings Lynn to Dereham. Other lines are going through the closure machinery at the present time. While this is disappointing, many of us always accepted what was made clear by the Government at 1085 the time, that the future of grey lines was uncertain. We have always faced that fact. However, one felt sure that at least those lines marked in thick black would remain for some time.

After all, in a joint foreward to the map, the Minister of Transport and the then Chairman of the British Railways Board said: This map illustrates the basic railway network which the Government and the British Railways Board have decided should be retained and developed so that the railways can play a full part in the country's transport system. … The purpose of this map is to show the stabilised rail network planned to meet social as well as economic and commercial needs. … The best possible use must however be made of the lines which are to continue in being and the network must be developed to enable it to carry the traffic efficiently. Railwaymen were convinced then that, with this basic network, they could look ahead confidently to a secure future. However, the first indication that the map should be treated with some caution came when the Minister revealed that, in connection with grant aids to loss-making passenger services, the Liskeard—Looe line, in Cornwall, should be retained at its present level only until improvements had been carried out to alternative roads in the vicinity.

This line was marked on the map in black, thus indicating that it was part of the plan to meet social as well as economic needs. There was never any indication that the life of some of the development lines was guaranteed only until certain local road improvements had been completed. Indeed, another line whose future is also to be determined by road improvements, namely, Dingwall to the Kyle of Lochalsh, was marked in grey on the map and, therefore, not, included in the basic network for precisely that reason.

The foreword to the map also implied that passenger lines marked for development would not be closed in the foreseeable future, since it stated: The future of some of the freight lines would, of course, need to be reconsidered if the source of the traffic disappeared, or if there should be a major change in other circumstances. Similarly, on passenger lines the Board may have to review from time to time the type and level of services. In some cases this may lead to proposals for the closure of individual stations … My hon. Friend will note that there is no mention there of services included 1086 in the network being withdrawn; only the possibility of closure perhaps so far as individual stations were involved.

The validity of the map was thrown into even greater doubt when the Minister of Transport announced, on 15th November last year, that he had come to the conclusion that no less than 11 passenger lines, which had been included in the map of the basic network for development only 18 months previously, were now so unremunerative and unnecessary that they should not receive a grant as part of his £62 million contribution.

I repeat that I appreciate that the basic network will not, and cannot, remain unchanged for ever, but to be told only 18 months after the publication of the map that the future of a number of lines in it, is in doubt already, must call into question the promises and the assurances made about the future of the railway industry at the time that the map was produced.

What is it that has happened which could not have been foreseen 18 months ago? It is known, for instance, that the Regional Economic Planning Councils were consulted about the proposed network before the map was agreed and that there were additions to the map to meet many of their wishes. Were these councils asked for the comments prior to this revision of policy and did they agree, certainly so far as the 11 services that are now down for closure were concerned?

It is possible that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary may argue that some of the lines which were marked in grey on the network map are to be grant aided. I accept at once that the Minister of Transport stressed that lines marked in grey would not necessarily be closed. We understood that. To that extent the policy of grant aiding certain of these grey lines is not inconsistent with declared Government policy. I would emphasise, however, that the then Minister of Transport who produced the map made it clear at the time that if any grey lines were retained they would be in addition to the basic routes marked in black. It was for that reason that no exact figure was given for the total of route mileage for development, but a figure of 11,000 to 12,000 miles was mentioned.

1087 So I return to what I consider is a departure from a principle: the non-development of black lines. Can it be that the cost of operating the 11 services which I have mentioned has gone up appreciably since it was decided to include them in the map for development? If that is the case, will my hon. Friend say why? If costs are more or less the same, will he give the justification for not grant-aiding these services? How many more, and which, black lines are to come under the hammer? What importance can we now attach to the map?

Are my hon. Friend and my right hon. Friend satisfied with the system used by British Railways in their costing methods, in their calculations? I have had occasion previously in transport debates to draw the Minister's attention to suspect British Railways' costings. It is certain that under the present management there will be very little effort, no incentive at all, to develop lines on their own initiative if they are expecting grants from the Government. If the Government are not to give grants for lines which are socially necessary, and which were marked in black on the map for development, it is almost certain that the railways will allow them to fall into disuse.

These are disturbing features. I should welcome my hon. Friend's assurance that the 1967 network map is still relevant, that he agrees that there is a need for a substantial railways system, and that the cases which I have mentioned do not represent the start of a reversal of established policy.

§ The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Neil Carmichael)

The subject of the future of the railway system always exercises a unique fascination, both for Members of the House, and for the many users of the railways. I am aware of the particularly knowledgeable interest of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Mr. Bradley) in the whole problem of the future of the railways. I sympathise with the apprehension which may have been aroused by recent announcements about my right hon. Friend's decision on the payment of grant for unremunerative railway passenger 1088 services, and I am glad to have this opportunity to dispel any doubts about the Government's intention to maintain an extensive and stabilised railway system.

I entirely understand that there is concern that 11 services operating over lines shown as thick black on the 1967 Network for Development Map are not to receive a grant under the new powers taken in the Transport Act, 1968. I want to reassure the House as to the overall validity of the map, while, at the same time, pointing out that a realistic outlook must, of necessity, involve an appreciation that no railway network can remain unchanged for ever.

The House will, of course, recall the reasons which led to the publication of the network map. In the 1966 White Paper on Transport Policy, Cmnd. 3057, the Government said that, to restore stability to the industry, they had decided that it was essential to determine the general shape and size of the system.

It was made clear that the Government were convinced that the country's transport system must include a substantial railway network for the foreseeable future. The immediate result was the publication of the network map, which was a joint exercise by the then Chairman of the Board and my right hon. Friend's predecessor. The views of the Regional Economic Planning Councils, of other Government Departments, and of the railway unions were also taken into account. The policy behind the map remains entirely valid, but our thinking about the finances of the railway system, and our knowledge of the financial, social, and economic factors affecting individual services have, of course, developed very greatly over the past two years.

In particular, the Government have had the benefit of a comprehensive report by the Joint Steering Group which was published as the Annex to the White Paper on Railway Policy of November, 1967. Specifically, the group made recommendations about the methods of calculating, paying and controlling grants for unremunerative railway passenger services in accordance with the policy first outlined in the 1966 White Paper.

The Government accepted these recommendations, and as a result, for the first 1089 time, detailed information is now available about the full long-term costs of operating individual unremunerative railway services. As was explained in the 1967 White Paper, it is an essential part of the new policy for the railways that loss-making passenger services should be separately identified and costed, and a decision taken whether the social or economic benefits to be obtained from the operation of a particular service justify the cost of continuing it at the taxpayers' expense. Section 39 of the Transport Act requires my right hon. Friend to consider each case on its individual merits before deciding whether or not it meets the three requirements laid down in subsection (1).

It was as a result of this detailed and individual consideration of services that my right hon. Friend came to the tentative conclusion that grants should not be paid in the limited number of cases referred to in his announcement of last November. He made it clear, however, that where statutory closure proceedings are involved under the provisions of the Transport Act, 1962, he would not take a final decision about the future of the services in question until after a thorough examination has been made of all relevant social and economic circumstances, including the advice he receives from the transport users' consultative committee on any hardship aspects.

It is important to see these decisions in their proper perspective. Out of a total of about 250 services in respect of which the Railways Board made applications for grant, only 11 are currently the subject of closure proceedings before final decisions are made on whether or not to grant-aid them. It is true that all these services operate over lines which are shown as thick black on the network map, but, as my right hon. Friend's statement of 15th November indicated, substantial Exchequer subventions would be needed to maintain them, and this raises doubts whether they would offer real value for money.

On the other hand, there are many other services which are at present being grant-aided and which operate over lines shown as grey and thin black on the map. To be more precise, and to put the matter into perspective, about 120 miles out of 1090 about 8,000 of thick black lines are now being proposed for closure as a result of my right hon. Friend's announcement last November, and 500 or so miles of grey or thin black line will continue for the time being to carry grant-aided services, as a result of deliberate decisions to pay grant instead of proposing them for closure or to refuse consent to closure after publication. Thus, the likely net effect of the decisions recently taken on the mileage of the system as a whole is to add nearly 400 miles to what was originally intended.

I am most anxious that all of us—the Government, the House, the Railways Board, the unions and the public—should continue to regard the 1967 map as portraying the kind of basic railway network which it remains our policy to maintain. The Government firmly believe that the railways have a vital part to play in the transport system of the country. This does not mean that no further changes are possible in respect of individual services.

I am not in a position to give assurances tonight about the future of particular lines since, as explained in my right hon. Friend's announcement of 15th November, in many cases we have not been able to consider services in sufficient detail to take long-term decisions, and my right hon. Friend has, under section 39 of the 1968 Act, the specific statutory responsibility to take a decision on the case for grant for each service on its merits. But this in no way detracts from the Government's view that there is an essential long-term need for a railway system.

I hope that these assurances will serve to satisfy the House that the action which has been proposed and may be proposed in a handful of particular cases does not represent any radical departure from the policy of a stabilised network of which the 1967 map was the practical expression.

The country will need an extensive railway network for a long time to come, and the Government intend to see that this need is fully met.