HC Deb 02 April 1969 vol 781 cc485-500
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)

Mr. Speaker, with permission, I should like to make a statement on my visits to Nigeria and to Addis Ababa.

My main purpose in Nigeria was to see at first hand and to discuss with the Federal Government something of the problems which have aroused anxiety in this House and more widely.

As I had previously made clear to the House, I did not go to mediate between the Federal Government and Colonel Ojukwu. This is a conflict between Nigerians and, if outside help is needed, the Organisation of African Unity is the appropriate agency for mediation.

But, on the question of negotiations, I received from General Gowon a clear assurance that his Government are prepared, unconditionally, to sit down with Colonel Ojukwu or his representatives, to discuss a settlement. It remains Nigerian Government policy that they would not agree to any settlement which breaches the principle of Nigeria's unity and territorial integrity, but there are no prior conditions for entering into negotiations.

Secondly, I received an equally clear assurance that the Federal Government stand by the guarantees they have given for the safety and security of all Ibos and remain ready to include in any final settlement such further guarantees as are required, in the shape of observers, for example, from the O.A.U. General Gowon stated categorically that, after the fighting had stopped, the Ibos would not be treated as a defeated people but would enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other Nigerian citizens.

Thirdly, I received most specific assurances about Federal willingness to facilitate the flow of relief supplies to the war affected areas. At a joint meeting I held with the international relief agencies and the Federal Government, I was given the evidence I wanted about that Government's readiness to consider any appropriate route, by sea, land and river, or by air, including daylight flights.

Fourthly, on bombing I expressed the deep concern which had been shown by hon. Members in the recent debate, and, more generally, about the bombing of non-military targets. I have no doubt about the determination of General Gowon and his colleagues, about the strict instructions which have been given, and reaffirmed, that bombing attacks should be restricted to strictly military targets, and about General Gowon's assurances that stringent measures would be taken to deal with anyone found disobeying those instructions. I have more doubt, and I strongly expressed this doubt, about the adequacy of control of air operations, and about the quality and efficiency of some of the personnel entrusted with the bombing.

In lengthy discussions on this issue, I stressed the need for still stricter control and felt it right to ask whether such military advantages as the present bombing operations produced were sufficient to compensate for the political damage to the Federal cause resulting from inaccurate bombing which caused the death of innocent civilians. The question of extending the rôle of observers has been raised in the House. I discussed with General Gowon—as I would have hoped to discuss with Colonel Ojukwu—the possibility of extending to the results of aerial bombing the observer system now operating in Federally controlled areas. There are, however, great difficulties in getting an effective system of observation of bombing operations and when I met the team of international observers they emphasised these difficulties.

I made clear to General Gowon that the bombing issue as a whole might have to be raised again.

For the rest, the observers when I met them stated that they felt their work to be a success and worth while. They drew attention to their regular and unanimous reports confirming that they had found no evidence whatsoever to support allegations of genocide, or, after a few early and localised cases of individual indiscipline, of reprisals against the inhabitants of the areas where the Federal advance had taken place.

On questions of relief and rehabilitation I had, in addition to my own meetings with members of the various relief agencies, as well as with a fully representative group from the Christian Churches of Nigeria, the advantage of a series of reports from Lord Hunt, who accompanied me on my visit in order to follow up the work he did as a Special Representative on relief questions last summer. Besides meeting Federal and State Commissioners and officials, he devoted as much time as possible to seeing the work in the field, in the three areas we visited, which had been the scene of heavy fighting, and to discussing the work on the spot with international and British relief workers and doctors.

I visited, briefly, three relief and rehabilitation centres—one of them 100 per cent. Ibo—in three different States and saw the fine work being done, not least the proud achievements of young British volunteer workers, men and women, working in arduous circumstances and in very difficult climatic conditions. There is still a need in these areas for supplementary food rations for displaced persons, but both Nigerian and international agencies are now placing more emphasis on rehabilitation, and on the need to get displaced persons, and others robbed of their livelihood, back to work. This will mean more concentration on the supply of the tools of production—farming, fishing and simple manufacturing—and on the supply of the equipment needed for education and other social services. In the spending of the money allocated by our own Government, the question of changing priorities will be constantly watched.

But in the area at present controlled by Colonel Ojukwu the first emphasis will have to be on food and medical supplies, and a rotating stock is being built up in federally-held areas, ready for immediate use following a settlement or ceasefire. And, still more urgent is the need to get supplies in now. The alternative routes proposed by the Nigerian Government and international agencies were examined in detail by Lord Hunt, and this is one of the questions I would have wished to discuss as a matter of urgency with Colonel Ojukwu.

Sir, I should inform the House of the attempt to arrange a meeting with him. Before I left London messages had reached me through reliable channels indicating his willingness to meet me. During my discussions with them in Lagos, the Federal Government told me that they had no objection in principle. Accordingly, on Sunday afternoon, I sent a message through Colonel Ojukwu's London representative proposing that such a meeting should take place early this week, and indicating no less than ten possible meeting places. This invitation was repeated in further messages on Monday and Tuesday indicating my willingness to fly back from Addis Ababa to West Africa for a meeting today.

I should perhaps make clear again that Colonel Ojukwu's representative had been told before I left London that I would not visit Biafra. Indeed alternative meeting places were being discussed before I left.

I very much regret that Colonel Ojukwu in the event felt unable to accept my invitation. There was much to discuss.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, as the House knows, I went on from Nigeria to Addis Ababa for meetings with His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. My delegation was received by him with the warmth and deep courtesy which marks all his dealings with representatives of this country.

In our discussions, I gave him full details of the Lagos talks and of my impressions. He gave me a comprehensive account of all his attempts on behalf of the O.A.U. to mediate between the parties to the fighting, and of his marathon effort to reach agreement on the entry of relief supplies to the affected areas.

We analysed all these problems, and I can tell the House that there is a full Identity of view between Her Majesty's Government and the Emperor on this analysis. The O.A.U. Consultative Committee, at its Monrovia meeting later this month, will be discussing the next steps in the Nigerian situation.

I also had a useful and lengthy talk with the Secretary-General and senior officials of the O.A.U.

Sir, while in Nigeria, I took every opportunity to ensure that the Federal Government and their representatives, as well as others I met, were made fully aware of the deep anxieties which have been expressed in the House. Having now seen something of the Nigerian tragedy at first hand, I am more determined than ever that Her Majesty's Government should make every appropriate effort to help those seeking to bring peace to this war-torn land.

Mr. Maudling

We shall clearly want time to consider this very important statement. May I start by saying that I am sure that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House share the Prime Minister's fervent wish to achieve peace in Nigeria? But is it not fair to say that, however good the motives, an ill-planned or ill-considered initiative cannot do any good? Is there not some evidence of this in the dealings with Colonel Ojukwu? I gather that the Foreign Secretary told us on 24th March that the Prime Minister would not be opposed to visiting Biafra, which seems rather different from what the Prime Minister has said this afternoon. Because a visit by a British Prime Minister is a coin of such rare value and cannot be spent twice, I think that we are entitled to ask the right hon. Gentleman to say clearly in what way the cause of peace has been advanced by this unique mission. In what way are the two sides nearer to one another, and have we now any new facts which were not available before?

The Prime Minister

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I should make it plain that there was no ill-planned or ill-conceived initiative to getting peace. As I made clear before I went, as I made clear in my statement at Lagos Airport, and as I made clear in the message that I sent to Colonel Ojukwu, the purpose of my meeting with him was not to mediate. Anyone who knows anything about Nigeria or Africa will know that any attempt to get a peace settlement is for the Nigerians and, if help is needed, it should come from the Organisation of African Unity and not from any country outside Africa. That has been the basis of my discussions with the Federal Government and the Emperor and of my exchanges with Colonel Ojukwu.

When the right hon. Gentleman has had time to study my statement, which he has undertaken to do, I think that he will feel that the main purposes of my going to Nigeria and the four main matters which I discussed there and on which I have some very clear assurances were fulfilled by this visit, and it was necessary to voice the anxieties which have been expressed in this House by right hon. and hon. Members who have very different views about the Nigerian tragedy. Those were the purposes of my visit, and they have been fulfilled.

Mr. James Griffiths

Speaking as one who does not always share my right hon. Friend's view, I deeply appreciate his efforts in Nigeria and pay tribute to him for what has been a very difficult task.

I want to put two points to my right hon. Friend. First, I regret deeply that there was no meeting between him and Colonel Ojukwu. He has told us today the terms or suggestions offered by the Federal Government. It is very important that these should be discussed with Colonel Ojukwu. Would my right hon. Friend consider inviting Colonel Ojukwu to this country or, alternatively, asking one of his colleagues to go as his personal representative to discuss them with Colonel Ojukwu, since it would be a great pity if this led to any recriminations?

Secondly, my right hon. Friend confirmed today what he said in Nigeria, that this is an African problem which must be settled by African people. Does he not think that an African settlement would be very much easier if there were a ban on all European arms going to both sides in the conflict?

The Prime Minister

I thank my right hon. Friend. His intervention reminds me of a further point that I should have made in answer to the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling), who seemed to think that the pre-planning of the visit was deficient in relation to a meeting with Colonel Ojukwu. From his own experience, I am sure that he would be the first to realise the necessity for consultation with the Federal Government before an invitation was sent to Colonel Ojukwu. It would have been improper to have attempted to finalise arrangements or discuss them more thoroughly than they were. They were discussed on a contingency basis subject to Federal agreement.

As regards my right hon. Friend's proposal about attempting to set up a further meeting with Colonel Ojukwu, based on my right hon. Friend's feeling that the important statement of General Gowon should be conveyed to him immediately, the right place for this is the meeting of the Consultative Committee at Monrovia in a fortnight's time. I reported what General Gowon told me fully to the Emperor of Ethiopia, and I have taken the steps to see that the President of Liberia, who will be in the chair at the Consultative Committee, has been put fully into the picture. I think that that is the right place and the right time to carry on what was said by General Gowon, and I have seen that that will happen.

With regard to my right hon. Friend's second question, in which he endorses the view that these matters should be handled by Africans, if one could get an effective arms embargo it would make a big difference to the suffering in Nigeria. Having gone into this thoroughly, I take the view that it would not be possible to have an effective arms embargo imposed from the supplying countries. It would not stop the arms supply. Indeed, what arms supply there was would be highly imbalanced. The only arms control possible would be one on the spot, policing airports, ports and other areas with independent observers. That would be impossible without a cease-fire. Therefore, a cease-fire and an arms embargo must go together, and negotiations are necessary to achieve that.

Mr. Hugh Fraser

The whole House feels that the Prime Minister has tried to do his best in this matter. On the planning position, will he explain why, on 25th and again on 26th March before he left, the Foreign Office offered to the Biafran representative here a two-day truce, during which time Colonel Ojukwu could meet the Prime Minister? I hope that that will be made clear?

Secondly, would not the Prime Minister agree that, after this mission, he has been able to add far less to our information than the article which appeared last week by the junior senator from New York who wrote the most terrifying report of what goes on in Biafra, which still alarms and fills us with anxiety? To that, nothing has been added.

The Prime Minister

On the right hon. Gentleman's first question, there was no offer from the Foreign Office or from anyone else of a two-day truce. The only people who can conclude a two-day truce are the parties to the fighting, which means the Federal Government and Colonel Ojukwu. There was no such offer of a two-day truce, nor was this in any way essential to a meeting. It would have been possible, in any one of the 10 meeting places suggested, for Colonel Ojukwu to come out. He did not need it, but we would have been prepared to offer British help with helicopters, planes or anything else to transport him. It would have been possible to have a meeting.

With regard to the article by the junior senator, which I have read, we have all read scores of articles, and their combined effect is to create the anxieties which right hon. and hon. Members have expressed. Many of the articles, resulting from a somewhat partial approach to the question, are particularly horrifying, no matter from which side they are written. I heard, not only from the Federal Government but during my visits to States formerly within the Eastern Region and populated by non-Ibos, several accounts of horrifying atrocities. Being a war fought with all the ferocity of a civil war, naturally one discounts some of those stories without seeing any evidence to support them, and I think that right hon. and hon. Members should be prepared to show similar discount to atrocity stories from the other side.

Mr. Shinwell

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, despite the carping and prejudiced criticism from the Opposition Front Bench, he deserves the congratulation not only of hon. Members of this House who have been concerned about affairs in Nigeria, but of the whole country? Is he also aware that it is obvious that pressure exercised in all parts of the House forced him to take the initiative, and, wisely, he took it? Finally, may I ask whether, when my right hon. Friend was in Nigeria, he obtained any information about the source, or sources, from which the Biafran régime is obtaining armaments?

The Prime Minister

I was not really aware that the Opposition Front Bench was approaching the Nigerian question in a spirit of carping criticism. Indeed, I think that the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) in the debate on Nigeria made some extremely wise and statesmanlike expressions on this question. He will know how much his statements, as well as those of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, were appreciated not only in Nigeria but in other parts of Africa.

I thank my right hon. Friend for what he has said. I think that it was necessary to undertake this visit. It was undertaken not so much because of pressure in this House, but equally because of the anxieties felt by every member of Her Majesty's Government, as well as those who spoke in the debate.

Concerning arms supplies to Biafra, I think that there is fairly general recognition in the world about where these supplies are coming from. Statements have been made that no arms have been shipped from one or other particular country to Biafra. This I believe to be true, but there are such things as roundabout routes.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

The Prime Minister will understand that we want time to see his statement. It was not his fault that it came late.

When the Prime Minister says that the Federal Government's acceptance of a negotiation was unconditional, we must take it that this was qualified by the fact that the settlement must be within the legal framework of the existing Nigeria. We must take it, too, that any unconditional acceptance that the Biafrans make must be within the framework of secession. These two are obviously irreconcilable.

There are certain doubts about the capacity of the Organisation of African Unity, although very desirable, to handle this matter. I think that even the Biafrans accept that the British may have a contribution to make. I am rather against the Prime Minister probing in person, but the right hon. Gentleman will recollect that somebody like Mr. Malcolm MacDonald might conceivably help in this matter. He is a very experienced fellow when dealing with Asians and Africans—[Interruption.] He is. He is a man who establishes extraordinary sympathy with all Asians and Africans. I should not discount his use.

Finally, will the Prime Minister press the Foreign Secretary perhaps to pay more attention than he seems to have done to the case of an embargo on all arms supplies from outside? The argument that this would lead to a black market is not really good enough.

The Prime Minister

First, on the question of unconditional willingness to sit down, I think that this was an important statement by General Gowon. In the past there have been statements by both sides at various times saying, "We will only sit down if the other side, before we sit down, will accept our principal case." In one case that is unity of Nigeria and in the other case the nationhood and secession of Biafra. What is important in what General Gowon made clear this week is that he is prepared to sit down unconditionally. He holds firmly to the objectives of the negotiation. That is where the help of mediators, such as the President of Liberia and the Emperor of Ethiopia, can be of great importance. There is a big difference from the position in which neither side would sit down unless there was a concession on principle, as the right hon. Gentleman will remember from so much of his own experience.

Secondly, regarding a possible follow up and the right hon. Gentleman's reference to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald who, I think, certainly enjoys a unique affection and respect in Africa. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald was with me on this mission. He was present at all my meetings with General Gowon. He carried through a number of important talks on his own during the visit. He was also present at the talks with the Emperor of Ethiopia. Obviously if there is any possibility that Her Majesty's Government can in any way help, not directly, to reach an agreement—not to mediate, but to help those seeking to mediate—the services of this very valuable public servant would be available.

Concerning arms from outside, I have gone into this and we will pursue it further. We remember the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman. In the first first place, I think it is inconceivable that we should get it through the Security Council. We might get the comfort of a veto, for what that is worth, but I see no likelihood that it will get through the Security Council.

Secondly, I have referred to the vast amount of black market supplies, of which I was given abundant evidence when I was in Nigeria.

Thirdly, there is the difficulty that some States assert unequivocally that they are not sending arms to one side or the other. Yet somehow those arms seem to get there from those countries by routes which I do not intend to speculate about in the House because there is no need to do so. I just wonder how we could enforce an arms embargo in that circumstance. That is why I think that an arms embargo would have to be on the ground at the points of reception.

Mr. Barnes

Can my right hon. Friend say whether it is true that Colonel Ojukwu agreed to meet him in Abidjan on the Ivory Coast, which was one of the places on my right hon. Friend's original list, and that Colonel Ojukwu suggested either 4th April or today? If this is true, can my right hon. Friend say what happened to make such a meeting impossible?

The Prime Minister

One of the many messages received suggested that Colonel Ojukwu would be willing to meet in Abidjan, which was not on my list. The list that I sent was: Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Entebbe in East Africa, Monrovia, Yaounde, Accra, Lome, Dakar, and even the Ascension Islands or a meeting on a British warship outside Nigerian waters in the West African area. I should think that was a pretty fair choice for anyone who wanted to have a meeting.

Mr. Cordle

Does the Prime Minister agree that General Gowon is not just simply the titular head of the State, but is in full control and has supreme command of the forces, that there is no stalemate in the fighting, and that he still has the initiative?

Does the Prime Minister also agree, following these helpful talks, that the reason for the policy of going slow by the advancing forces is General Gowon's genuine concern to see that civilian casualties are minimised?

The Prime Minister

I certainly confirm that General Gowon is, in every sense, the head of State and the head of the Government of Nigeria. There is no question about that.

I do not think that it would be right for me to speculate on the military position or on the motives of those conducting the military operations. But it is fair to say, after some of the things which have been said, that in a desperate war—and, as I have said, a civil war is always the most ferocious of all—General Gowon has responded to world opinion and to the arguments adduced by Her Majesty's Government, from our somewhat special position, in the sense that, for example, he has been prepared to weaken a direct military effort by breaching his blockade to allow food supplies through, even knowing, in so doing, that he was letting arms supplies through. I think that, and his concern for civilians, is something to which more tribute ought to be paid. If he were not taking this view, it might have been possible, with great ruthlessness and cost, to advance the end of the fighting. He is very concerned that nothing should be done to make a reconciliation after the fighting more difficult.

Mr. Frank Allaun

Did the Prime Minister ask General Gowon to consider Colonel Ojukwu's offer of an immediate cease-fire without pre-conditions? If not, will he consider asking him even now, before a second million human being are wiped out.

The Prime Minister

I did not put that question to him—I got his statement about his willingness to sit down in negotiations—because I believe that a cease-fire which did not provide for arms control would be unacceptable and unworkable. I believe that it would be extremely one-sided, and that those on the Federal side who suspect that Colonel Ojukwu's motives in proposing it was to get more arms supplies and in order to regroup his forces which have been under considerable pressure, as the Federal forces have, would feel that this was not an acceptable proposal. It would mean observers for arms control. This is something that I have put forward. I believe that arms control without a cease-fire is unworkable, and a cease-fire without arms control is unacceptable. Both together would be a most valuable step forward, and we would need facilities to ensure that both of them were kept, and during that period they could open up the supply routes by land, by air, or in any other way, which are so urgently over-due.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke

As a result of his tour, is the right hon. Gentleman now in a better position to assess to what extent the promises of mineral concessions to the French were Biafra to succeed strengthened or weakened? In the light of the experience that the right hon. Gentleman has gained, is he in a position to give further instructions to Mr. Christopher Soames?

The Prime Minister

I believe that the basic cause of this fighting is the deep inter-tribal feelings, not only between the Ibos of the eastern region and other parts of the country, but also within the old eastern region between Ibos and non-Ibos. I do not think that one needs to look for any economic interpretation of history to find the other causes. Where there is the possibility of conflict, where there are huge profits to be made, as there are in the case of the rich oil resources of the southern part of the old eastern region, the part which is now in the Rivers State, particularly in the south-eastern state, obviously there is a temptation for people who are looking for quick gains. I heard a number of suggestions about £10 million being involved which would not be disconnected with the future control of oil supplies. I made some inquiries, but I got no real confirmation of it. My view, having seen something of the spirit of the people in the Rivers State of the South-Eastern State, is that anyone who advances £10 million on that investment looks like getting his fingers badly burned.

Mr. James Johnson

Is my right hon. Friend aware that hon. Members on the benches behind him, and the vast majority of the members of the O.A.U., believe that he has done a first-class job in mending any fences that needed mending in Lagos? About four million Ibos are within Federal territory. Did my right hon. Friend find evidence of these men and women being advanced to senior positions in the Civil Service, in the Army and elsewhere? I believe that this is the only way in which we can convince the five million Ibos inside the Ibo bunker of Umuahia that Ibos in the Federal territory are getting a square deal.

The Prime Minister

I think it is right to say that the position which the Government and the House have taken has done a great deal to advance the standing of this country in Africa as a whole not just in Nigeria, That was the view I heard expressed in Addis Ababa, not least by the O.A.U., which has not always been the most enthusiastic supporter of things done by Britain.

I saw a great number of Ibos on my visit to the east central State, including those in displaced persons' camps and elsewhere. The administration of that State is carried out by a distinguished Ibo who is in complete authoritative control of the State. In other ways I saw evidence of the advancement of Ibos. At the Military Academy an Ibo has received the Sword of Honour. I could give other evidence to the House, but only at the risk of wearying it.

Sir C. Taylor

The Prime Minister will recollect that I put certain proposals before him about Nigeria. As Colonel Ojukwu would not meet the right hon. Gentleman, will he have another look at those proposals to see whether they might be able to do some good?

The Prime Minister

In the light of experience gained by my visit we would be ready to consider any proposals. The most constructive proposals were those put forward by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary towards the end of his speech, and that was the basis of my discussions.

The position now is not so much that of finding new and perhaps still more ingenious proposals. The basic thing is to give what encouragement we can to African leaders of great distinction, such as some of those whom I have named, in their efforts to get the two sides together to see whether this almost insoluble problem, this vast gap, can be bridged.

Mr. Winnick

I appreciate what my right hon. Friend has said on the subject. Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is the gravest anxiety in Britain about the bombing which has caused a tremendous number of civilian casualties? Would my right hon. Friend be willing to make further representations to the Nigerian Government, because this is one of the issues about which so many British people are deeply concerned?

The Prime Minister

That was one of the anxieties that I expressed in strong terms to Colonel Gowon, and when my hon. Friend reads the terms of what I said he will see the basis of the argument that I used. He will also see that I said that should it be necessary we should not hesitate to raise the matter again with Colonel Gowon.

Sir D. Walker-Smith

The right hon. Gentleman referred to difficulties within the Security Council, and the risk of the veto. Surely that does not preclude the taking of an initiative by the British Government? What is there to lose, and why do not the Government do it?

The Prime Minister

As I have said, and as my right hon. Friend has made clear, we do not rule this out absolutely. Such inquiries as have been made suggest that the chances are pretty slim, and I do not think that there is much point in going forward with it or putting all our money on that proposition. Although there is little likelihood of success, we are prepared to continue soundings to see what the prospects are. I got the clear impression from some of those to whom I talked, for example the O.A.U., that there would be no African support for such a proposal that any arms control should be policed from the other end.

Several Hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Speaker

Order.