RHODESIA (Hansard, 15 October 1968)

§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)
With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the talks about Rhodesia which were held on board H.M.S. "Fearless" in Gibraltar from 9th to 13th October.
First, I should like briefly to mention the events which led the Government to conclude that it would be right to have such a meeting.
As my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary and I myself have repeatedly made clear in the House, we were prepared at any time to engage in discussions if it seemed that there might be a chance of a settlement and provided it were understood that such a settlement must fully implement the requirements of the six principles which have been laid down.
As the House knows, I have more than once before the Recess expressed the doubt whether, even if Mr. Smith's position changed sufficiently markedly to make talks worth while, there could be any guarantee that any agreement initialled by him would be endorsed by his colleagues. During the Recess there were changes in the membership of his régime, involving the disappearance of intransigent racialists, and we have also had evidence of the firmness with which he dealt with his party congress last month. Hon. Members will also have noted the régime's decision to introduce measures designed to end mandatory death sentences for certain offences. At the same time, reliable reports reached us that Mr. Smith would be prepared to enter into meaningful talks.
Accordingly, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Commonwealth Office was sent to Salisbury on 20th September. He had discussions, first, with His Excellency the Governor of Rhodesia and the Head of the British Residual Mission; and, secondly, under the aegis of the Governor, with Mr. Ian Smith. In addition, he had discussions with other Rhodesians of different races, occupations and political views who asked to meet him.
On his return to London he reported that he found a widespread feeling in Salisbury that the recent changes in the political climate there offered some 208 prospect that a fresh attempt to achieve a settlement might be successful. At the same time, however, he reported that Mr. Smith had not given him any indication of a change of position on the fundamental issues which have over these past five years made agreement impossible. This was particularly the case in relation to certain non-negotiable requirements on which any British Government must insist as the condition of a settlement. Mr. Smith had expressed his readiness, however, for an early meeting.
Further probings were conducted under the Governor's aegis by the Head of the British Residual Mission. We insisted that Mr. Smith should fully understand that, if talks were to be held, there could be no concessions by us which would undermine or weaken the six principles. We insisted, also, that Mr. Smith should confirm that he understood this. He did, in fact, give this confirmation, at the same time indicating that he, in turn, regarded certain matters as of fundamental importance to himself and to those he represented. Despite this reaffirmation of his own position on the six principles, it nevertheless seemed reasonable to assume that he would be unlikely, before coming to the conference table, to show his negotiating hand, and, in particular, to indicate any concessions he was ready to make.
Accordingly, we met at Gibraltar. On the British side, I was accompanied by my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. On the Rhodesian side, were Mr. Ian Smith, Mr. Howman and Mr. Lardner Burke. The Governor of Rhodesia was present in Gibraltar for the duration of the talks.
It would not be helpful to go over the hard-hitting exchanges in 30 hours of talks except to record that they confirmed that there was and remains a deep difference between the two sides, not only on the requirements for a settlement, but even more on the basic political philosophies which underlie the attitudes expressed. At the same time the talks were conducted in a good atmosphere, having regard to all the circumstances, and within the limitations created by the fundamental differences to which I have referred.
209 By Saturday night, 12th October, it was clear to both sides that it was unlikely that a settlement would be reached on board H.M.S. "Fearless"—and that this would become no more likely if the discussions lasted several more days. I decided, with Mr. Smith's agreement, to prepare a statement setting out our proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.
This statement took acount so far as was possible of points made in the discussions. I made clear to Mr. Smith that while there could be no change in the British Government's attitude on the fundamental issues, on other matters there could be further discussion; and that, of course, we should be ready to consider alternative drafts on these non-fundamental matters.
The Government have set out in a White Paper the text of the British statement and the text of the communiqué which was issued in agreement between the two sides. The White Paper also includes yet again the text of the six principles, since we have made it clear before, throughout and since the discussions that there could be no agreement except on the basis of those principles.
The proposals which I gave to Mr. Smith on 13th October incorporate the changes to the 1961 Constitution which were worked out on board H.M.S. "Tiger". In certain cases these changes have been set out with greater precision, particularly as regards the powers of the Senate and the circumstances in which appeals would lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the instrument which, in our view, is the best fitted to provide the reinforcement required to guarantee the fulfilment of the second principle. While, no doubt, alternative instruments to this end could be proposed and considered, I am sure hon. Members would agree that the Judicial Committee would provide the most effective guarantee.
The changes suggested in the 1961 Constitution were, and are, designed to meet the first, second, third and sixth principles. The statement makes clear that, provided that there is at all times a "blocking quarter" of directly and popularly elected Africans as a safeguard against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution, the British Government do 210 not insist on any particular composition for the legislature.
The statement further sets out the basis on which the Government would be prepared to accept, as part of an otherwise satisfactory settlement, new procedures to deal with the problem of the return to legality.
Finally, I would draw attention to three further important features of our proposals. First, and this reinforces the "Tiger" proposals relating to the fourth principle, is our insistence on the importance of a vigorous and extended programme for African education, particularly in technical education, including agriculture. We have said that we would be prepared to contribute to this programme a sum of up to £50 million spread over 10 years on a £-for-£. basis. We regard this as imperative in the interests of the African population and of Rhodesia: it would also have an important bearing on the number of Africans able to qualify for the A Roll franchise. Secondly, arising out of our discussions, we have included the proposal that the Royal Commission to be appointed for testing the acceptability of any settlement to the Rhodesian people as a whole, should be instructed also to inquire into the arrangements for the registration of eligible voters under the widely extended franchise which is proposed, with a view to encouraging greater African participation in Rhodesian political life. Thirdly, the House will note what has been said about the need for a broad-based Government, including Africans, to carry Rhodesia through the whole process of introducing the new Constitution, right up to the election of a new Parliament under that Constitution.
The House will recognise the relevance of these three proposals, as well as certain other events, to the creation of the "substantial change of circumstances" which repeatedly I have said in this House must exist to justify our raising with our Commonwealth partners the question of "no independence before majority rule".
And the House will recognise, too, that we will not agree to the implementation of any settlement that has not first been shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole—the fifth principle, on which all else depends.
As was stated in the communiqué, Mr. Smith said that he would take the British 211 Government's proposals back to Salisbury, without commitment, for consideration with his colleagues there. I said that the Commonwealth Secretary will be available to fly out to Salisbury if Mr. Smith and his colleagues feel that this would assist them in their consideration of the British proposals. Our position at the end of the talks, as throughout these past years, maintains the position repeatedly stated by the Commonwealth Secretary—no sell-out, no slamming the door by us.
We have insisted that our proposals have to be taken as a whole. Any concessions we have been prepared to offer on matters which do not involve the safeguards required for the six principles are available only as part of an agreement which incorporates the clear guarantees on which we have insisted to safeguard those principles. Now, decisions have to be taken in Salisbury. We for our part are keeping the door open. But the key to a settlement is, and must remain, the six principles, which are cardinal to the future of Rhodesia—the future of Rhodesians of all races, for whom the British Parliament stands trustee.

§ Mr. Heath
The House has heard with regret that it was not possible to reach a settlement during the talks in H.M.S. "Fearless", but we are glad that, as I understand, the talks have not been broken off and that the Commonwealth Secretary stands ready to resume them whenever Mr. Smith and his colleagues wish.
At the same time, I think that the House would feel that there were encouraging features about the talks—the fact that the atmosphere and conduct of the talks generally was so much better than on the previous occasion and that the Prime Minister was able to discuss the question of moving on to a new constitutional legality rather than going back to the old, and to explain the circumstances in which Nibmar would no longer be the policy.
We shall, of course, want to consider the White Paper carefully and perhaps I could suggest to the Prime Minister that we might have a debate on this matter when hon. Members have had a chance of studying the White Paper. We could, perhaps, discuss the timing of the debate through the usual channels to take ac- 212 count of any movements of the Commonwealth Secretary which he may want to make in response to Salisbury.
Secondly, during the debate, if it is not set out in the White Paper, could the Prime Minister explain to us the different means and methods which were discussed of implementing the first and second principles against regression and to ensure movement towards African rule and the part which the Privy Council would play in this matter, and the arguments that were put up against them? To have a debate, we would like to know what were the detailed proposals and the various arguments so that we could weigh the balance.

§ The Prime Minister
On the early part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, when he set out his understanding of the position, may I say that the way he expressed it exactly corresponds to the facts as I see them to be today.
Obviously, the House will wish to debate this whole matter. It should, as the right hon. Gentleman suggests, be discussed through the usual channels with a view to finding a convenient time for all hon. Members. It would probably be convenient if this were associated with the debate which is required at this time of the year, in the event of any substantial change in the situation, in relation to the Southern Rhodesia Order, which has to come before both Houses.
In reply to the other point raised by the right hon. Gentleman, I will certainly consider what more explanation can be given. The White Paper which is now available in the Vote Office, or should be at about this time, deals in some detail with our proposals. It sets out in full what were our proposals to Mr. Smith and I think that the right hon. Gentleman will find some information there. He is quite right, if I may say so, in putting his question in a form which links the first and second principles together. They are closely connected, and, right through, all British Governments have insisted that there should be guaranteed, unimpeded progress, and no regressive amendment of the Constitution. We have since that time, when my predecessors were responsible, sought to get guarantees both by internal mechanisms such as the blocking quarter and by external mechanisms.
213 I think the right hon. Gentleman once suggested a treaty which we discussed on the "Tiger" and, of course, the role of the Privy Council as the highest court in construing Rhodesian affairs. I think that one really needs a double-barrelled means of giving the guarantees required for the first two principles. I will not disguise from the House that this has been by far the most difficult of the many difficult problems we had aboard "Fearless". Great progress was certainly made; encouraging progress was made; but I would be misleading the House if I suggested that at the end of the day we had reached an agreement on adequate, copper-bottomed guarantees which would ensure there would be no regressive amendment of the Constitution.

§ Mr. Winnick
Since the Rhodesian Front believes in maintaining and extending racialism in Rhodesia, is there any possibility at all of an honourable, negotiated settlement between Britain and the illegal régime? Is the Prime Minister aware that many people in the country, and certainly in the Labour movement, would rather see an intensification of sanctions than continuing concessions and talks with the régime which bases itself more on the principles of racial supremacy than on the six principles?

§ The Prime Minister
There have been no concessions to the régime. What we have done is to indicate the kind of concession we will be ready to make as part of an overall settlement which could end the five or six years of very unhappy relations between the two countries, the last three of which have been additionally clouded by the illegality of the action taken three years ago.
Of course we deeply deplore—and they understand this—many of the actions taken. At the same time, we should, I think, note that there have been one or two recent moves in the right direction. I have mentioned one piece of legislation they are introducing. In the past year there have been one or two moves of a regressive character. We have to take all these things together before deciding whether to talk.
We have always said that we need sanctions on the basis and to the extent that they carry home a message to the people of Rhodesia that will put them in a position where they will be more 214 willing to talk. We have seen willingness, but have not yet bridged the gap between us.

§ Mr. Thorpe
While the whole House and the whole country would welcome an honourable settlement of this issue, may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman is aware that many of us feel that in the interests of a durable solution we should prefer him to come back without a settlement rather than with an agreement which involved jettisoning any of the six principles involved? Would he confirm that the last 30 hours proved that continuous calls for talks are not in themselves a substitute for a policy still less a solution to the problem?
May I also ask the right hon. Gentleman whether this is an indication that there is likely to be an acceptance in principle by Mr. Smith, but not in detail, to consider the possibility of a joint working party being set up, bearing in mind all the publicity which is attached to the visit of a Cabinet Minister, and the difficulty, thereby, of getting down to close, detailed negotiations?

§ The Prime Minister
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the way in which he began his question. There never was, and, throughout these discussions, equally there has not been, any suggestion of an agreement which was not four-square within the six principles. This was fully understood.
With regard to future progress, I think we must now wait to see what Mr. Smith and his colleagues say. The Commonwealth Secretary stands ready to go out there. This may be necessary and I would very much welcome it if this were agreed. There will be a need for a joint working party. This has been proposed, and following any settlement there would have to be a joint working party to work out details of the constitution. But we have said to Mr. Smith that this statement on these fundamental issues represents our conception of what would be reasonable in the light of our talks last week. We would obviously be prepared to consider alternative drafts.

§ Mr. Whitaker
As Mr. Smith is reported to have accepted the constitutional part of the "Tiger" proposals, how is it that he objects to the first two of the six principles now? Secondly, as a test 215 of his sincerity is he prepared to accept the offer of help with African education immediately and in any event?

§ The Prime Minister
It is not for me, I think, to explain to the House exactly the arguments by which Mr. Smith reaches certain conclusions. It is the fact, of course, that he does not like the six principles. He has never pretended to do so. It is also a fact that he does not like the prospect of majority rule in the foreseeable future. He is, however, sufficiently realistic to recognise that there will be no agreement with any British Government of any party that does not give effect to the six principles.
In these circumstances, it is a question how far he is prepared to stomach the repugnance which is involved in our proposals to get a settlement which will be of great value to Rhodesia and to Rhodesians and which will also help to avert the very great dangers which are lurking in the fairly near future. Some of the dangers, of course, result from the measures of his own régime and are at present in cold storage, awaiting application.
It could well be said that the acceptance of a crash programme of African education would be a good test of sincerity. That was not the only reason we put it forward. I was reasonably encouraged by the attitude on this question.
Another matter to which I drew attention in my statement is the question of a crash programme for registration, because under these proposals there will be up to 1 million Africans enfranchised on the B Roll. Very few of these already registered are enfranchised. We have, therefore, to provide machinery for ensuring what can be done to speed up registration of any African who would like to have the vote, and is entitled to it.

§ Mr. Wall
While congratulating the Prime Minister on the businesslike conduct of the negotiations, may I ask him when he expects a full report from Salisbury on the two questions of the first and second principles.
On the question of educational aid, would he not agree there is also need for economic aid since there is not much good in training people if there are not jobs for them to go to?

§ The Prime Minister
On the first question, I cannot say when we expect the reply. I made it clear that we are not pressing Mr. Smith for undue haste. We would rather wait for the right reply, and we would rather have the right reply than speed. There are many difficulties before him and we recognise that. It is not just the reply on the first of the six principles on which some progress, but not enough, was made. It is a reply to the document as a whole. I do not know when that will be. It may be that he will wish to accept my suggestion that my right hon. Friend should go out there before he even forwards a complete reply.
Education is, of course, very important, and it is equally important that there should be jobs for Africans when they are trained and that they should be available on a non-discriminatory basis as between colour and as between races. The biggest impediment, of course, to the expansion of Rhodesian industry and to development of a country of such rich resources—what has been holding it back for three years—has been the existence of the illegal régime and the fact that it is the centre of great international controversy. This was what we were trying to put right last week.

§ Mr. James Johnson
While welcoming the Prime Minister's Herculean efforts to get an honourable settlement, may I ask would he not accept the fact that in African history the white community, whether French or English people, have not willingly given up their economic or political previleges? Therefore, what basis has the Prime Minister for thinking that a referendum of Rhodesian white people would not give support to action taken by Mr. Smith now?

§ The Prime Minister
I think that that is too gloomy a view of the situation. I have been encouraged. My right hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Sir G. de Freitas) has already talked to the House about the situation in Kenya following the transfer of power, which we have always said could be an encouragement to Europeans in Rhodesia. I agree that it will not be easy for them. Anyone who saw the television interviews with some allegedly representative Rhodesians last night will not be very encouraged.
The people of Rhodesia will have to recognise the great value to Rhodesia of 217 a settlement and all that follows from it, including the end of sanctions, and they will have to decide whether they are prepared to pay the price. We believe that the price they insist on is totally wrong. We reject the racialist views so often expressed. They will have to decide whether to surrender those racialist views in order to get a settlement.

§ Sir T. Beamish
Since any constitutional settlement must be based on the good faith of both signatories, will the Prime Minister take careful account of the fact that independence qualified by a leading rein for the Privy Council would be unrealistic and a paradox? Will he at any rate give the House an assurance that this is not what he described in his statement as one of the non-negotiable requirements?

§ The Prime Minister
I said that the question of the blocking quarter and some guarantee other than the vote in the Rhodesian Parliament are both required to give effect to the first and second principles. I would not call it a leading rein. The hon. and gallant Member will notice, when he reads the White Paper, that in our proposals for an external guarantee we are ready to put a limited term of years upon it. We want to see this question go through the very difficult period of the movement that has to be undertaken by Rhodesia over the next few years if there is to be a settlement.
The hon. and gallant Member will recognise that any discussions such as those last week which could lead to the grant of independence without prior majority rule would be totally unprecedented in the lifetime of any of us in this House. Therefore, in so far as it is unique, to that extent it carries with it great dangers, especially after the controversies inside and about Rhodesia, and I hope that he would agree, on consideration, that with this unique agreement an extra guarantee might well be required.

§ Mr. Hector Hughes
As the constitutional problems involved affect the Commonwealth as a whole, will my right hon. Friend consider summoning or inviting a Commonwealth conference, so as to bring the weight of the whole Commonwealth to a solution of these problems?

§ The Prime Minister
Before I announced that we were going to Gibral- 218 tar, my right hon. Friend's Department discussed this with the High Commissioners in London and I think that my right hon. Friend has arranged for them to be fully informed about what has happened since our return. In addition, I was in touch with a great number of Commonwealth Prime Ministers during the talks. As the House knows, a number of my right hon. Friends inside the Government and senior officials were entrusted with the job of discussing this with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Presidents while actually in Gibraltar. Further, as he knows, there is to be a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in a few weeks' time.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor
If agreement is reached will the Government remove sanctions forthwith? What will be the position with respect to mandatory sanctions if the United Nations does not give any such agreement its blessing?

§ The Prime Minister
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will want to study the White Paper on this point. The linking of the agreement with a settlement, together with the carrying through of the acceptability test by the Royal Commission, is linked with the beginning of the dismantling of sanctions. The question of sanctions arises when these things have been done and there is agreement on the Constitution. We have been carefully into the position of the United Nations. I do not want to make things more difficult, but I do not foresee the difficulties that the hon. Member has referred to.

§ Mr. Paget
Is my right hon. Friend aware that while I have been critical of the Rhodesia policy in the past, on this occasion, in respect of the manner, the patience, the courtesy, the friendliness, and the sticking point, which is a matter of principle and not legalistic, and also the educational proposals, linked with economic development, my right hon. Friend has my most wholehearted support?
I would like to say to those in Rhodesia that in my view, at any rate, no British Government of any party who wish for continued co-operation between our two countries can offer substantially better terms than these. The South African alternative will be unhappy in the short run and unworkable in the long run.

§ The Prime Minister
I should like to thank my hon. and learned Friend both for the tone and the manner of what he said at the opening of his question, and for the wise advice which he is seeking in his last few words to pass on to the people of Rhodesia.
There may have been—there have been—deep differences in the past on this question, but I think that my hon. and learned Friend is right in saying—and I think that the Rhodesians understand—that there is no good now in their trying to play on differences, real or imagined, between the parties in this House or between individuals within any given party. They now have a chance of an honourable settlement. It remains open, and this is giving them plenty of time to consider the position. We all hope that they will accept.

§ Mr. Hastings
How does one appeal to the Privy Council after a possible settlement? Can the Prime Minister say whether this proposal was known to Mr. Smith before the talks began? Are there precedents for such an arrangement with any other independent Commonwealth country?

§ The Prime Minister
Was it the Privy Council to which the hon. Member was referring?

§ Mr. Hastings
Yes.

§ The Prime Minister
Yes—because the Privy Council was in the "Tiger" proposals, so was the external treaty between ourselves and Rhodesia. That was with or without other countries guaranteeing it. There was no question of this being new to Mr. Smith. In the visit of the Commonwealth Office official, as well as in the probings which followed his return, this was highlighted as one of the essential matters on which a settlement would have to be reached.

§ Sir Dingle Foot
Did my right hon. Friend and his colleagues represent to Mr. Smith the great importance of immediately releasing those African leaders who represent far more Rhodesians than does Mr. Smith and who have been locked up without trial for the last four years?

§ The Prime Minister
As my right hon. and learned Friend will be aware, both in the "Tiger" proposals and in the new document there is provision for the prob- 220 lem of those in detention and those under restriction. We have emphasised throughout, both in our talks on various occasions and in this House, that the test of acceptability could not be a real test unless there were proper machinery for dealing with the problem of detainees and the freedom of expression in Rhodesia during that period. Compared with "Tiger", censorship has been abolished and there will have to be—and I think there would be—a reasonable allocation of broadcasting time and other means for putting different points of view about the acceptability or otherwise of a constitution.

§ Mr. Ronald Bell
Since all the six principles are conditions laid down by the British Government for agreement, and not moral principles, is the Prime Minister satisfied that it is wise to place such emphasis on the two conditions about movement to majority rule when so little use is made by the independent countries of Africa of that system of Government?

§ The Prime Minister
A proposal under the first or second principle for a blocking quarter is not a moral principle; it is a technique to give effect to essential principles which themselves derive from the moral attitude of every party in this House. The six principles which have been worked out jointly over the years by successive Governments and endorsed by all parties in this House are an attempt to give practical expression, in constitutional terms, to deeply-held moral principles. I do not disguise the deep differences between Mr. Smith and ourselves on the moral principles which underlie the constitutional techniques. That is why I have said that however repugnant to them it is, it is essential that they should stomach their repugnance and accept these proposals because that is the only way to reach a settlement.

§ Mr. Judd
Does not my right hon. Friend agree that by definition independence implies that a country is in a position to do what it wishes with its constitution, and that entrenched clauses are worth no more than the paper on which they are written, and that, therefore, Nibmar has always been and remains the key to the substance of the six principles?

§ The Prime Minister
My hon. Friend is too gloomy about this matter. When he says that independence must be absolute, without any arrangements for safeguarding the entrenched clauses, that is an argument that I have heard perhaps rather too much of in the past week. I am sorry to see my hon. Friend identifying himself with that point of view, which I do not accept. There have been many cases throughout history, especially during the transitional period—and a very difficult transitional period—where there must be guarantees, external as well as internal. Even some of the most senior and experienced Commonwealth countries that had a long record of local self-government voluntarily accepted some kind of control and guarantee which would fetter their otherwise totally unfettered freedom of action.

§ Sir D. Walker-Smith
The House will want further time to study the proposed functions of the Judicial Committee, as set out on page 9 of the White Paper. But is it not a fact that, whether or not they are good, they are without precedent and constitute a departure from the normal British constitutional principle of the sovereignty of Parliament? Supposing the Privy Council exercised this jurisdiction, how would it enforce it?

§ The Prime Minister
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right. These functions are at any rate almost without precedent. There are near-precedents, but perhaps not absolute ones. They mean restricting the sovereignty of Parliament, and this would no doubt be a unique situation, but we are dealing with a unique situation. The situation in Rhodesia is unique partly because it involves independence before majority rule, and partly because the whole world is deeply suspicious of what has been going on in Rhodesia—the lengths to which they were willing to go in order to maintain their position. Because of this, we are entitled to ask that for a transitional period, and a transitional period only, there should be an external guarantee as well as the guarantee within the proposed Rhodesian Constitution provided by the blocking quarter.

§ Mr. Michael Foot
Does my right hon. Friend recall that one of the main controversies following the "Tiger" talks was the question of how long it would 222 take under those constitutional proposals for majority rule to be established in Rhodesia? Therefore, could he tell us his calculation of when majority rule would be established in Rhodesia if his proposals were now accepted in their entirety, and confirm that whatever representations he may make to the Commonwealth, the Nibmar pledge which was given to the Commonwealth will stand?

§ The Prime Minister
With regard to the time taken under our constitutional proposals for majority rule to be reached, I should find it extremely difficult to give an authoritative answer to my hon. Friend. There are many estimates on this, many of which have been put before the House. Some were as short as one or two elections—seven to 10 years; some were 12 to 15 years. A great deal depends on how many of the Africans who qualify under the 1961 Constitution for the A Roll take up the right to vote by registration. It depends partly on their attitude and partly, we suspect, on the extent to which they are helped to register, which is dealt with in our proposals.
Our educational proposals, which we put forward at great cost to ourselves, great cost to the British taxpayer—this should be understood—will have the secondary effect of increasing the number of qualified Africans and those who would be able to exercise the vote. It would be very difficult to make a clearer estimate than that. We have never proposed immediate majority rule, and I do not think that anyone in the House has. For reasons I prefer not to go into, African nationalist leadership there, and the chances given to Africans for political participation there, compare unfavourably with what has happened in other parts of Africa where there was direct British rule and then local self-government under British rule.
On Nibmar, the position is unchanged. I have said that if there were a change of circumstances we should go to the Commonwealth about it. Some of the things in our proposals relate specifically to what is required in the shape of changed circumstances.

§ Mr. Alexander W. Lyon
Did my right hon. Friend ask Mr. Smith when he was on "Fearless" whether he was prepared to explain why, last month, he has twice confirmed that there would 223 never be majority rule in Rhodesia in his lifetime, or in his child's lifetime, if he were genuinely prepared to accept the first principle?

§ The Prime Minister
I do not think that it would help if I tried to tell the House everything that was said between us in 30-hour meeting. I assure my hon. Friend that everything relevant was said, more of it looking to the future than to the past on both sides. I have not disguised from the House today, any more than at any other time, that Mr. Smith does not like the first and second principles, or most of the others for that matter. That results from his very different viewpoint on what we have called moral issues on all these questions. What I have raised is the question whether he is prepared to stomach his repugnance in order to accept an agreement that will bring great gain to Rhodesia—to all races in Rhodesia—and help avert some of the very serious dangers threatening Rhodesia from inside and outside.

Several Hon. Members
rose—

§ Mr. Speaker
Order. We must come to the business of the day.