HC Deb 27 June 1968 vol 767 cc936-7

PRESUMPTION AS TO PUBLIC INTEREST

Mr. Dell

I beg to move Amendment No. 16, in page 10, line 12, at end insert: (3) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) of section 22 of the Act of 1956, leave to make an application under that section for the discharge of a declaration or order of the Restrictive Practices Court made before the commencement of this Act may, if the applicant proposes to rely on the amendment of section 21 of that Act effected by subsection (1) of this section, be granted upon prima facie evidence of the relevance of that amendment to the application. This is really a clarifying Amendment. Under Section 22 of the 1956 Act it is open to the parties to a condemned agreement to ask the Court to reconsider its decision or to vary any order made against them. But the provisions of Section 22(4) make it necessary to obtain the leave of the Court in order to proceed with such an application, and go on to say that the requisite leave shall not be granted: … except upon prima facie evidence of a material change in the relevant circumstances. There must be some doubt, in the absence of any express provision, as to whether the parties to any agreement condemned before the commencement of the Bill can seek any review of the Court's finding in relation to the condemned agreement or any variation of the order made against them by reference to the new gateway set out in Clause 10(1).

The Amendment makes it clear that the requisite leave can be obtained by any person who can produce prima facie evidence that the new gateway is relevant to his case. The sort of situation in which this provision will be relevant is one where the parties wish to make an agreement to the like effect as an agreement already condemned by the Court and feel that they ought to be allowed to do so because, in their opinion, the new agreement does not materially affect competition.

Amendment agreed to.

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