HC Deb 23 July 1968 vol 769 cc443-5

No evidence which has been obtained by unauthorised intrusions into the privacy of the individual against whom the evidence is sought to be used shall be admissible in any civil proceedings.—[Mr. Alexander W. Lyon.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

This Clause deals with an aspect of the law in which I have taken considerable interest over the last two years. What is required, I suspect, is a completely new enabling Act to indicate what is unauthorised intrusion into privacy, but I raise the point upon this Bill because of discussions I have had with many people about the right to privacy and because of particular cases such as the one in the Divorce Court only a year or so ago, when a private inquiry agent had had a "bugging" device installed in an hotel bedroom in order to obtain evidence of adultery and the Divorce Court judge strongly criticised this method of obtaining evidence.

Because of the rule that no evidence can be excluded simply because it was improperly obtained he was bound to accept the evidence and to rule in favour of the petitioner. In such cases one would have no redress unless there were a rule rather like this in relation to the method employed to obtain evidence.

For instance, if it were ever enacted by the House that there was such a thing as a tort of intrusion into privacy, and that damages could be awarded, it would still be worth the risk for a private inquiry agent to "bug" a hotel bedroom. If he were then mulcted of damages, they would be added to his bill to his client. This is apparently the attitude of one such agent who uses these devices frequently in his work. He has no fear of criminal or civil proceedings over invasion of privacy, because it merely becomes an expense upon his ultimate account to his client, who would be only too willing to pay, provided that he got the evidence which he was seeking.

In such circumstances, the mischief could be cured only if the evidence were not admissible. Since we have not yet created such a tort, it will be difficult to accept the new Clause, but I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will at least be able to give us some assurance that the Government have this in mind and will do something about it.

Sir Peter Rawlinson (Epsom)

I have some sympathy with the hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon). In Committee, we discussed the question of the "fruit from the poisoned tree", as it has been called elsewhere, and agreed how objectionable it was to obtain evidence in these ways. We must face the fact that this will soon develop even more, and I agree that we must try to restrain it. But I foresee, as did the hon. Member, the difficulties of trying to import it into the Bill. It would also have to be in the criminal law and in a different form than the hon. Member proposes. But he is right to draw attention to this matter, which will be one of the gravest subjects which we will have to face in the administration of the criminal and civil law in future.

Therefore, although I sympathise with the hon. Member, I agree that it would not be a good idea to import it into the Bill at this stage.

The Solicitor-General

I share the view of the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) that the new Clause raises, in a different form, the issue of the "fruit of the poisoned tree" which we debated in Committee on an Amendment which he moved, when the arguments against introducing this doctrine into English law were fully deployed. The arguments were, first, that the question is of great importance in criminal than in civil law, and that the recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee should be awaited; and, second, that the proposal was a far-reaching one which has not yet been fully considered and which should not be implemented at a late stage of the current Bill without an opportunity for detailed examination.

On these grounds, I cannot accept the Clause, but I certainly do not seek to counter the argument that this is an important matter and raises a subject which we should watch carefully.

The recommendation I make that the new Clause should not be accepted is not founded on any lack of recognition of the importance of the subject, to which my hon. Friend has given much thought and attention. This does not seem to us to be the appropriate point at which to introduce the principle; and I repeat that in all likelihood the importance of this question is greater in criminal than in civil law and that the recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee are awaited.

Question put and negatived.

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