HC Deb 23 June 1967 vol 748 cc2201-12

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fitch.]

4.0 p.m.

Mr. Evan Luard (Oxford)

Neither when I applied for a debate on the subject of anti-ballistic defences some months ago, nor even when I learned last Thursday that I had been successful, could I have had any idea how urgently topical the debate would be. There is no doubt that the explosion by the Chinese People's Republic of a hydrogen-type device last Saturday will have an important effect in increasing the pressures which already exist both in the United States and in the Soviet Union to develop anti-ballistic defence systems of the kind which have been under consideration for a considerable time.

I do not think that I need to dwell for long on the undesirability of that development. There are two main international reasons why it would be deplorable. The first is the well-known one that it would introduce another type of arms race on an entirely new level. It would increase demands for expenditure at an enormous rate. There have been estimates made in the United States of the cost of developing a system of this kind which have varied between 20 billion and 60 billion dollars. If one takes the estimate of Mr. McNamara himself of about 40 billion dollars, the development of a system of this kind would represent the expenditure of the whole of Britain's annual defence budget for eight years in succession. That gives some idea of the order of magnitude and of the enormous expenditure and wastage of resources which would be involved if there were a new arms race of this kind, assuming that no agreement between the two Powers could be reached.

The second major international disadvantage of this development is one which is less well known but which, in the long run, could have even more serious consequences. It would destabilise the existing nuclear balance between the two main Powers. This arises because there is a danger that any Power which developed a full-scale system of this kind—though at the moment the main discussion is not about a full-scale system —might come to believe that it had achieved some kind of invulnerability against the nuclear missiles of the other main Power. The effect might be that it would be tempted to dare certain initiatives which otherwise it would not be prepared to in the state of the existing nuclear balance. It would not necessarily be some kind of nuclear action, and not necessarily military action at all. But it might resort to political threats and other risky action which it would not feel inclined to undertake if it felt itself vulnerable to nuclear attack from the other super-Power, but which, if it once felt that it had achieved invulnerability, it might feel bold enough to undertake.

Those are the two main international consequences which might arise from a decision by either of the two Powers to go ahead with the development of an anti-ballistic missile system. And that goes without saying that if one of the two Powers is to do it, it is certain that the other will do it. However, the main danger on which I wish to concentrate is a third one, and it applies not to the two super Powers themselves but to the other principal Powers involved. It goes without saying that, as the order of expense involved in the construction of such a system is of the sort I have described, it is virtually certain that no other Power on earth, certainly at the present time, will be able to follow suit. Certainly no single European Power would be able to do it.

This has the effect that a development of this kind, far more even than any other development of expensive modern military technology—and almost any such development has this effect to some extent—will have the effect of increasing the military gap between the super-Powers and all other Powers. This is an undesirable development not simply because of narrow nationalism on the part of the lesser Powers but because it means that they become far more subject to threat from the super-Powers than they would otherwise be. It is often observed that the United States is unlikely ever to risk the use of nuclear weapons, or even to appear to the other side to be likely to do so, for the sake of European interests.

If a situation were to arise in which both the main super-Powers had themselves developed anti-ballistic missile systems, the European Powers might well be faced with a choice between either becoming totally dependent on some United States system—for example, they might ask the United States to establish its own anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe, thus becoming dependent on the United States in a way which they are not today—or becoming totally subject to threat and intimidation from the Soviet Union or any other nuclear Power which might arise. This in itself would be an important destabalising factor.

It is clear, therefore, that this development concerns the non-super-Powers far more than it does the super-Powers themselves. It could even be argued that the super-Powers have a certain common interest in the development precisely because it would increase their power in relation to every other Power. However, although the non-super-Powers have the main interest in preventing this development, they have so far had no say in the discussions which have gone on on the subject. I have put down several Questions in the House, and the replies I have had so far give the impression that our own Government are perfectly prepared to see discussions take place exclusively between the United States and the Soviet Union, being ready simply to stand on the sidelines and, perhaps, give an occasional cheer. If that is the Government's view, I regard it as extremely shortsighted. I have sought to show that this is a development which is likely to affect us and any other Power which is not a super-Power, which could not of itself compete in this field, far more than the two super-Powers themselves. We have, therefore, a much greater interest in taking part in any negotiations which take place.

In fact, when the opening of discussions was announced at the beginning of March this year, President Johnson explicitly said at a Press conference that other Powers would be, or might be, invited to take part. One would, therefore, have expected the British Government and, perhaps other Governments to press that they should participate. Although the opening of negotiations has been announced, I understand that practically no meaningful discussions have yet taken place, but what is known from the announcement itself is that discussions will cover not merely defensive missiles, but offensive missiles as well. This is a logical development.

It has been obvious to many people for quite a time that one of the reasons why the Soviet Union sees an advantage in the development of an anti-ballistic missile system is precisely that in this way she feels that she may be able to redress the balance of advantage which the United States posseses in its overwhelming superiority in offensive missiles. Not only does the United States possess a superiority of something like three to one, but it has announced on many occasions that it intends to retain such a superiority.

In the circumstances, it is not altogether surprising that the Soviet Union should have decided that the only recourse for her to meet that situation is to develop some sort of anti-ballistic missile system. This, in addition, accords with the military tradition of the Sovet Union of being more interested in a defensive system than an offensive system, and in defensive means of defence rather than offensive means of defence.

The fact that the discussions will cover offensive as well as defensive missiles only increases the direct and immediate interest of this country in the result of these negotiations. We are now the only other Power in the world which has an offensive missile weapon capacity of the strategic type, and I would have thought that these negotiations could scarcely be conducted without some reference to our residual strategic capacity. For all these reasons, it seems to me of vital importance that Britain should be closely and directly represented in these negotiations, and I very much hope that the Government will not only seek to acquire such representation in the discussions but will openly announce their intention to do so in the House at the earliest possible moment.

There is one final reason why it is of such importance that some such attempt as this should be made at the earliest moment: this is that these discussions are of the highest relevance to any replacement that may be sought for our existing Polaris missiles. It is fairly well known that the Polaris missile is already virtually obsolescent and, equally, that the United States are now seeking to replace them with Poseidon missiles which have the advantage that they can carry multiple warheads and penetration devices which will enable them to penetrate any antiballistic missile system which may be established.

The Polaris missile has none of these advantages, so that if there is a decision to go ahead with the development of anti-ballistic missile sytems our Polaris missiles will become virtually worthless. That means that there will be increasing pressure from some quarters for the development of a replacement to provide the same kind of advantage that the Poseidon missiles have for the United States.

Virtually the only way in which this could be done is by some division of labour with France, by which we, being relatively more advanced in our technology in the development of submarines and warheads, could concentrate on that aspect of development, while the French could concentrate on the development of the missile, in which they are relatively more advanced. This would not necessarily represent the development of some kind of European deterrent, about which some people understandably have great apprehensions, because it would be possible for a weapon produced as a result of this kind of co-operation to remain totally under the undivided national control of the two countries. This would not be very different from the co-operation that already takes place between ourselves and France in the manufacture of aircraft and other modern weapons.

For these reasons, I do not feel that there is any strong political objection to a development of this kind, but it would have the largest possible implications for the future of this country and would be a development in respect of which one would expect there to be much more discussion than there has been so far. It is extraordinary that the development of an anti-ballistic missile system is a subject on which, as far as I know, there has never been any discussion in the House—except for the Questions to which I have referred, although it is now moving into a very critical phase, in which a decision one way or the other—and the probability is that it will be a decision that is dis- advantageous to us—is likely to be made in the near future.

Mr. Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley)

My hon. Friend suggests that this country should participate in the discussions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Does he think that France and China should also have the right to participate, or does he think that it should be a trio?

Mr. Luard

I would think at first simply a trio, because we are the only Power at present in a comparable position with the United States and Soviet Union, as we have an existing strategic nuclear capacity which neither China nor France has. Certainly, when they are equal in development in future, one would expect and hope that they would be represented, because it is equally important that France—although it could hardly undertake this development alone—and China, which might in the near future, should be represented in talks of this kind.

Even Mr. McNamara, who up to now has bravely resisted the strong pressures in the United States Senate and elsewhere to go ahead with the development of the Nike X system, has now said that it is possible that the United States will decide to go ahead with a so-called "thin" system, a much smaller system which would be a valuable defence against the primitive Chinese missiles during the next ten years. But in practice it may then be difficult to distinguish between a thin and a thick or full-scale system.

If the United States goes ahead with this, preparations which have already been taken in the Soviet Union near Moscow and elsewhere are likely to he intensified. This is a critical situation and it is important that one of the non-nuclear Powers which has a close and immediate interest in preventing this development should be represented in the present talks. I hope that the Minister of State will today be able to announce that some such effort will be made by Her Majesty's Government.

4.17 p.m.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Frederick Mulley)

I welcome the opportunity afforded by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Luard) for a brief discussion on anti-ballistic missile defence, which as he says is vital, and I have no doubt that the House will return to it, although this is our first debate on the subject. As my hon. Friend said, interest and concern about the possible deployment of these weapons has been given new point and urgency by the recent Chinese hydrogen bomb test.

The Government have for some time been concerned about the disturbing possibilities which we believe were presented by the development of A.B.M. systems. No one can forecast the consequences of such deployment, but we have feared that a new and costly dimension would be added to the nuclear arms race by the competition to acquire these weapons and that each side would seek to build up its offensive nuclear force to overcome the A.B.M. defence. In this way, disturbing new uncertainties would be introduced into international affairs and the East-West military balance.

In such a situation, our hopes for making progress on measures of arms control and disarmament—particularly on such key aspects as a comprehensive test ban and curbing the nuclear arms race—would face new difficulties, and the repercussions might well be felt even more widely. So my hon. Friend will agree, I think, that there is no difference between us about the analysis of the importance and seriousness of the situation posed by the development of the antiballistic missiles.

Ministers have drawn attention to these dangers on several occasions in the last year in public speeches and at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. We have also discussed these matters with both the United States and Soviet Governments and have explained our misgivings in some detail. We might claim, I think, that we were active and alerted to these problems as early as any of the Governments concerned.

I now turn to the deployment of these weapons. First, it has been public knowledge for some months that the Soviet Union has been undertaking certain limited A.B.M. deployment activities. My right hon. Friend will be aware of the information which has appeared in the Press. The United States Government has declined to follow suit, and has de- ployed no A.B.Ms. In his Budget Message to Congress at the beginning of the year, President Johnson explained the American position. He said that no action would be taken at this time to deploy an A.B.M. system, although research and development were continuing. He also said that he was seeking discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting A.B.M. deployment.

This brings me to the key question of how progress can best be made towards an international understanding on these weapons. We must start by recognising that the United States and the Soviet Union carry a very special responsibility in regard to nuclear weapons. The offensive nuclear forces which they maintain constitute the backbone of the alliance on either side. These two countries are consequently in a class of their own.

Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union are the only Powers developing, or at present capable of developing, A.B.Ms. We consequently warmly welcomed President Johnson's announcement early in March that the Soviet Union had agreed to discuss with the United States the means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles. This was an important development for it indicated a willingness on the part of both super-Powers to consider moving towards an understanding covering the whole field of strategic nuclear weapons and offensive nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as the A.B.Ms. with which we are particularly concerned this afternoon.

Although it was made clear in that announcement that the United States Government would discuss their attitude towards these matters with her allies, I understand that there was no suggestion that the talks to be set up with the Soviet Union should be on a wider basis. With respect to the views of my hon. Friend, I think that it would be difficult to have a widening of the two super-Powers meeting initially without it being on a wider basis than he envisaged—ourselves and the other two super-Powers. We cannot lay down how these super-Powers concerned with the problem now will discuss it between themselves.

Mr. Luard

Would my right hon. Friend agree that at the very least some participation by the United Kingdom, either on a formal or informal basis, might have the effect of inducing these Powers to show greater urgency in the attention they give to the problem than they seem to have done so far? The announcement was made at the beginning of March and I understand that there have been no effective negotiations since then. Within the past week or two Mr. McNamara has made the statement that America may be going ahead with a "thin" system. Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the other Powers have an important rôle in inducing a sense of urgency in tackling the matter?

Mr. Mulley

Not only have they a rôle to play, but I suggest to my hon. Friend that we are discharging our responsibility in that direction by our talks which I have mentioned with both Powers. As a former member of the Foreign Service and a great student of international affairs, my hon. Friend will realise that the important question is to get the decision right at the end and not the Press conferences which are held while discussion is going on. If we make public statements every time we talk to either an American or Russian statesman or official about the subject matter of the discussion, any kind of talk with any kind of person would quickly come to an end. I think that he will realise that when we make representations, as we have, and have discussions about the urgency of the matter with both Governments they must be confidential on both sides, for otherwise this kind of international discussion will not be possible at all.

Mr. Hooley

Have we initiated any discussions with Powers other than the two super-Powers on this subject?

Mr. Mulley

It has been raised many times in Geneva, but our main representations in recent months have been to the Governments of the United States and Soviet Union. In our view, the best prospects for progress must lie in direct exchanges between the two Governments particularly concerned, although we can and do put forward our views. We have been kept informed by the United States Government of their thinking on these matters, and various aspects of the question have already been discussed in detail within the N.A.T.O Alliance, particularly in the N.A.T.O. Nuclear Planning Group, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence told the House on 12th April. My hon. Friend will know that it was referred to in the communiqué issued after that meeting; and, as I have said, the discussions which we have must be on a confidential basis.

As to solutions to the A.B.M. problem, what could we do, within the arms control context? I recall that one of the Government's main objectives in the disarmament negotiations is to work towards agreement on measures of real disarmament, particularly in the crucial category of nuclear weapons. Important proposals have been put forward. For example, President Johnson's proposal for a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, both offensive and defensive, could provide a starting point, and an effective means of dealing with the dangers that would be presented by the deployment of A.B.M.s.

As my hon. Friend said, it is not merely a problem of the A.B.M.s themselves. Their coming along may, in all probability, start a new spiral of the existing nuclear offensive weapons on both sides. The Americans have made it clear that if progress could be made with the freeze, they would be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in these weapons. Initially, as I said, we hope that the United States and Soviet Union will be able to work towards an understanding along these lines. Clearly, any such understanding would bring in other countries, including ourselves, as progress was made, but we think that, in the first instance, the procedures and talks must be on that basis.

I am glad that my hon. Friend made it clear—and I certainly endorse his remarks—that there is an enormous responsibiltiy on these two Powers to avoid a further serious upward twist in the awns spiral, with all that that implies to prospects of better international understanding. Their responsibility is extremely heavy. On the other hand, if they are successful, we should then have reached a real turning point in the disarmament negotiations.

To be realistic, we must recognise that progress in any part of the disarmament sphere has been extremely disappointing. It is four years since the partial test ban treaty. I came back yesterday from Geneva, where I hope and believe that there is a chance of getting a non-proliferation treaty; but it will depend on the next weeks. The next step, as I strongly urged in my speech yesterday, is to get the Soviet Union and the United States Governments to table their joint draft proposals; and if we cannot make progress in this limited field of non-proliferation, which has been examined so thoroughly for such a long time, then, while I commend my hon. Friend for bringing this subject to the attention of the House, he will realise that, with all the good will in the world, Her Majesty's Government cannot achieve in the A.B.M. field the sort of progress he wants.

The urgent thing is to get a nonproliferation treaty if we can. This matter was given priority by the United Nations First Committee last October and certainly it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in these negotiations in Geneva, to do all we can to resolve the many considerable problems that remain.

Unless we get the draft treaty from the American and Russian co-Chairmen in the next weeks, I think that even this prospect may dim. Unless we get nonproliferation—not only for its own sake, although that is important, but also as a step in the direction in which we want to go—and unless we make this progress this year, I see future progress in this sphere being more and more difficult.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Four o'clock.