HC Deb 19 July 1967 vol 750 cc2169-85

(1) Section 25 of this Act shall apply so Mat a director of a company shall be guilty of an offence under subsection (1) thereof who procures that his or her wife husband infant son or infant daughter not being a director of that company shall do any act which if done by the director himself would be an offence under that subsection.

(2) In this section, 'son' includes step-son and adopted son, 'daughter' includes stepdaughter and adopted daughter and 'parent' shall be construed accordingly, 'infant' means in relation to Scotland, pupil or minor, and a person deemed for the purposes of the said section 25 to be a director of a company shall be deemed also for the purposes of this section to be a director of the company.—[Mr. Grant.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Grant

I beg to move, That the Clause be now read a Second time.

The Clause seeks to rectify an absurdity and inequity created by Clauses 25 to 30. Clause 25 is designed to prevent a director dealing in options of the company of which he may have inside information. This is commendable, because a director should not have an unfair advantage because of confidential information, but we should not be dogmatic about it, because there are many honest and honourable dealings in options in a company and they are desirable incentives to directors. Heavy penalties, of two years imprison-or a fine or both, can be imposed for the offence.

Of course, unprincipled directors would seek to evade this by dealing through other people, such as members of their families. This is the reason for Clause 30, but it is a hamfisted and thoroughly unfair provision, and that is why we have put down the new Clause. I can best illustrate the absurdity by an example. Let us assume that a director of a company has a wife, two sons aged 21 and 20 and two daughters aged 15 and 10. He acquires inside information in the company, and thus, under Clause 25, he should not purchase an option based on that information, but looking at Clause 30 he sees that, if his son aged 21 took up the shares, no offence would be committed.

On the other hand, if his son aged 20 did so, the son—not the director—would commit a criminal offence and could be imprisoned or fined or both. Even more absurd would be the case if his 15-year-old daughter bought the shares: she would become a criminal and could be hauled before the majesty of the law and fined or sent to prison. On the other hand, if he got his 10-year-old daughter or a trustee acting for her to do so, since she is below the age of criminal responsibility she could purchase the options and the Clause would have no effect. This illustrates how absurd it is.

Clause 30 provides a defence, but it is totally inadequate—that the spouse or infant child did not know that daddy was a director, but the one piece of inside or outside information of members of a family is that daddy is a director, so this is a thoroughly useless defence.

To return to my example, the man might get his wife to buy the options. She might be separated from her husband. What if there has been a divorce? She might not have the faintest idea of the company's activities and know only that her husband is a director. Thus, why should she be penalised for honestly and openly buying options in the company? As a matter of law and justice, it is wrong and unprecedented to saddle someone with a criminal liability for an act which in itself is unobjectionable.

It is unfair and wrong to penalise spouses and children as a result of an act which is unobjectionable by virtue of a technical provision of which they have never heard. It is even more absurd if daddy is merely a director of a subsidiary company. He is caught and so are his infant children, provided that they are over the age of criminal responsibility and are under 21. Rarely have directors of subsidiaries more inside information than the senior executives. An infant can be made liable to a criminal offence in which he inadvertently engages even though as a matter of civil law he can repudiate the contract to purchase when he is 21.

The new Clause seeks to rectify the worst lunacies of the Bill by putting the liability precisely where it belongs, namely, on the director who procures rather than on the innocent spouse or child subject to the procurement. This is a sensible attempt to get a little common sense into a ridiculous situation. It is no argument to suggest, as I believe the Minister of State hinted at in Committee, rather laughingly, that only a small number of children deal in options in a company. I do not necessarily accept that. I do not care whether there is only a few. We do not pass criminal laws on the basis that only a few people will break them.

The Bill is a whacking big clumsy sledgehammer designed to crack a peanut. It is so ill-adjusted that it is liable to miss the peanut and to come whacking down on the innocent and probably youthful bystander. The new Clause should be passed so as to bring sanity and common sense into the situation.

Sir John Foster (Northwich)

Both Clause 30 and our new Clause, I am sorry to say, deal in a framework of nonsense. Ours is a little better than the Government's proposal. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, Central (Mr. Grant) said, the Bill throws the crime on somebody who may be innocent and somebody other than a director while we make the director liable for procuring the people in the special relationship to buy options. Whenever relationships are brought into a sphere which has nothing to do with the criminal law, bastardy tests, blood tests, and so on, situations are bound to arise which remind one of a Shakespearean comedy.

Suppose that under Clause 30 the public prosecutor accuses a son of buying options. The son may say, "But daddy does not know. I am not his son. I have had a secret blood test and I am no relation to him." He would get off. What the Bill should provide, and what our new Clause should provide, is that if the director procures anybody to do such a thing he is guilty of a criminal offence.

5.15 p.m.

The matter does not end there. Suppose that a wife is prosecuted under the Bill or under our new Clause and the director is accused of procuring his wife. He may say, "We were careful to go to the Argentine and to pretend to get married but to save on Income Tax we are not really married and we have separate assessments. So she is not my wife." In those circumstances, everybody gets off. The wife may say, "I am not married because at the time I married my husband he was domiciled in Greece. The personal law of Greece applies to the capacity to marry. There was no Greek pope present". On the decided cases, a Greek marriage is invalid, wherever it takes place, if there is not a Greek pope present.

An adopted person may say, "The adoption is invalid. It is illegal. I am riot an adopted son." The director may say, "He is not my adopted son, although we have pretended that he is." Take the case of someone who may be the common law wife of a director. In the State of New York, the nice question arises in a criminal court as to whether a person is a common law wife and therefore a wife for the purposes of our discussion. These questions arise in disputes about trusts. The point may be raised as to whether a person is a stepson, a son or a wife. But to bring them into the company law is the height of absurdity.

We are reforming an absurdity in the right direction. We seek to provide that the onus shall fall on the director and that it is not left to a wife who is accused to say, "We were validly divorced". The public prosecutor may say, "Your divorce in Reno was not valid. Therefore, you are still the wife of the director and you should not have bought any options." Nice questions will arise about whether, when they were divorced in Reno, the husband was domiciled in the State of New York, in which case the Reno divorce was valid, or whether he was domiciled in the United Kingdom, in which case the Reno divorce was invalid.

One can imagine the contempt into which the criminal law can be brought by reason of these absurdities. A son accused of buying options may say, "But I am not the son. I was brought into the family because the person posing as my mother could not have children and I was brought in on the day that her child was stillborn in order to pretend to the world that she had had a child".

All sorts of combinations of this kind can be imagined. If a person is accused of a crime which carries a penalty of two years' imprisonment, one can imagine that the lawyers will explore every avenue in deciding what the relationship is. The latest legitimacy Act provides that if A and B appear to have a child, if it is an adulterous child, it is a child of another marriage. The first question which a defending lawyer will ask is: "Is there any doubt about the relationship with the director? Are we sure that the mother did not have a lover who might be the father?" It is undesirable that intimate, personal questions of this sort should be ventilated in a Companies Bill.

Both Clauses are unwise. Ours is slightly wiser. The Government's Clause should be scrapped. The Bill should provide that if a director procures anybody to commit this offence he will be liable.

Mr. Corfield

Careful note must be taken of what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich (Sir J. Foster) has been saying. The Clause as it stands, and which is in substitution of the original Clause, is a nonsense and can be amended by making it less of a nonsense. We are arguing that Clause 30 should be deleted altogether and one of the Amendments in this group is designed to achieve that objective.

It is clear that the Government have a good case for enacting the provisions in Clause 25 in relation to insider knowledge in dealings in options and shares, but, as my hon. and learned Friend pointed out, when one comes to extend Clause 25 by Clause 30, one is really making a purely superficial improvement to the basic Clause 25—superficial because there are dozens of other people who may have the same insider knowledge which is not covered. There are, perhaps, hundreds of people who may be in a special relationship with the director in a sense that enables him to have some sort of undue influence over them, and it does not matter whether they are blood relations in this respect.

The Government should take a leaf out of their own book and give the same answer to this Clause as they have been giving to some much better thought-out proposals this afternoon. They should say that this wants thinking out again and that it will be introduced in the next Bill about which we have heard so much. Accordingly, they should withdraw Clause 30.

If the Government are not prepared to do that, then our redraft is a much better one than the Clause at present in the Bill. We are all concerned with the action of the director—there is no difference between the two sides about this—and the evil to which we should be directing our attention is an act by the director by which he takes advantage of his insider knowledge and gains an advantage over other shareholders or, possibly, members of the public.

To put other people in court because they have been used as instruments by the director for the commission of an offence cannot be right on any moral or legal code to which we in this country are accustomed. It does not make the matter appreciably better to provide a statutory defence which, in effect, says, "In any case the onus of proof is on you, the infant child, to prove that you did not have knowledge"—because knowledge here is the crux of the crime. Thus, one is, in effect, putting a third person in the dock—somebody over whom, by the nature of the offence, the director has a great deal of influence—and is saying, "Now you must prove your innocence".

This cannot make sense. Even if the Government will not admit that Clause 30 was thoroughly ill-conceived, no doubt with the best of intentions—superficially it seems a good idea and we are past expecting this Government to be other than superficial—I hope that they will accept our proposal to delete Clause 30 as it stands and leave it until we get the next Bill about which we have heard so much.

To put an innocent third party in the dock and say "You must prove your innocence" is intolerable. Remember that there will be many close relationships which, in this context, will make the Bill even more of a nonsense than it is. One will have common law wives, illegitimate children and the children of broken marriages whose custody is entirely with other parties who know nothing whatever about daddy's business—whether or not he is a director or what other sort of business he does. Perhaps even grandmothers, aunts, nephews, neices and cousins—to mention but a few—will be affected by this legislation in circumstances in which a man may have every bit as much influence, if not more, over them as over his own children by his own blood.

I beg the Government to accept our proposal and to remove this nonsense from the Bill. After all, we have been told many times that they are anxious to reduce the Measure's length. Let them take out Clause 30 and let us get on with the debate.

Mr. Jay

I remind the House that when we introduced the Measure which was, so to speak, the parent of this Bill, we were pressed to include provisions which would have led to the recording of inside share dealings and the buying of options by directors. We did that in response to criticism of the Bill as it stood. The criticism seemed well founded. But no sooner had we done that than we were advised by hon. Gentlemen opposite that the provisions would be hopelessly ineffective unless we included a provision covering spouses and the young children of directors.

It is impossible to deny that there was some force in that criticism. The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) accuses us of tabling Amendments too late in the day when we accept some of the suggestions of hon. Gentlemen opposite and bring forward proposals. Then, when we do not accept their suggestions, we are told that we are being deaf to reasonable criticism. It is difficult to please the hon. Gentleman both ways.

Mr. Corfield

Would the right hon. Gentleman point to the Amendments to which I objected on the ground that they were late in being tabled—Amendments which have been debated before we got to this stage? I am objecting to Amendments which are concerned with completely new points.

Mr. Jay

The hon. Gentleman was sweeping in his protests when we last debated this matter and when we were discussing his Amendments.

The hon. and learned Member for Northwich (Sir J. Foster) declared that the whole of this provision was set in a framework of nonsense. If so, it is a framework of nonsense into which we have been led by suggestions made by hon. Gentlemen opposite. I bow to the hon. and learned Gentleman's legal expertise. Although he is skilful in defending people accused of various offences in the courts, I felt that he was leading us into a framework of nonsense. I suggest that if there is this extraordinary difficulty raised by these provisions— about how one proves who is one's real wife or real children—that is not unique in this aspect of the law. If the hon. and learned Gentleman were to claim an Income Tax allowance on behalf of his wife, who somebody else alleged was not his wife, all sorts of difficulties would arise and no doubt there would be an expedition to Reno, with all the complications about which he spoke.

I agree with him that if one tries to close loopholes of this kind one gets into difficulties. We must stop our definitions at some point. However, it seems to us that, having gone as far as this, it would be unreasonable to go further and to include grandmothers, brothers-in-law and all the other relations who have been referred to. If we examine the provision as it stands, we see that, to begin with, it is a defence for the wife or child, as the case may be, to prove that she or he bad no reason to believe that her husband, or his father, was a director of the company in question. That is the safeguard.

I am sure that under these provisions if a director were to give an order for the purchase of an option in the name of his wife or child without any authority either from that wife or child, and without her knowledge, the wife or child would not be guilty of an offence and the director would have committed an offence. This is the sort of case which most of us have in mind.

If, on the other hand, authority had been obtained from the wife or child but he or she had given authority but had not fully understood what it entailed—if, in effect, the whole operation had clearly been instigated and prompted by the director—the courts would find that the responsibility rested with the director and not with the spouse or child.

I therefore do not think that these provisions are so unreasonable or oppressive as has been suggested. Nor is this the only aspect of the law where such a situation could arise, and where someone would be formally guilty of an offence although he might have been partially, or more or less, ignorant of the nature of the law when he committed the offence. That would be taken into account to a due degree by the courts when dealing with the case.

5.30 p.m.

Sir J. Foster

The difference between the Income Tax aspect and this is that these questions do arise in Income Tax where people are de facto separated—wives and the like—but I do not think that, in other branches of the criminal law, criminality depends on relationship.

Mr. Jay

Nevertheless, I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that persistent Income Tax claims based on a misrepresentation of facts presumably—and here I speak subject to his knowledge—lead at some stage to criminal proceedings.

I recognise that the proposal made by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite is a real attempt to deal with a real difficulty, but it fails, because if we say that the offence consisted of a director procuring the relative to buy an option, the prosecution would then be in the difficulty of having to prove that there had been actual procurement by the director, but if the relative merely says that the director knew nothing about it, and that he or she had acted off his or her own bat, no offence would be committed.

This would be a loophole almost as wide as the original provisions of the Clause would have left. For that reason I think that when we examine this matter it is necssary to have some protection against this loophole. I do not think that the provision in the Bill as it stands is unreasonable, and although I recognise, as I say, that hon. Members opposite have been trying to find a better way of meeting the difficulty, I do not think that they have succeeded, because the difficulty put upon the prosecution is too great.

Mr. Grant

Before the President of the Board of Trade sits down, can he say why it is a criminal offence for the option to be purchased by a son or daughter under 21 years of age—say, 20—and an offence for which the person can be sent to prison, but that, immediately after the age of 21, the person can do it without going to court?

Mr. Jay

The presumption has to be that there is a certain stage in growing up and going out into the world when the children of the director become independent characters forming their own judgment and not subject to his orders or influence. I agree that in these circumstances it is always difficult to draw a hard and fast line, but we have to draw the line somewhere.

Mr. Corfield

Before the right hon. Gentleman sits down, will he, at any rate, return to a consideration of Amendment No. 77, which goes some way to making the Clause more acceptable in that it switches the onus of proof and makes it the duty of the prosecution to prove knowledge? If that duty is not accepted, we are saying to someone, "You must prove yourself innocent."

Sir D. Glover

I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman not only withdraws his own Clause but does not accept ours, because I do not think that we have got the matter right either. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich (Sir J. Foster) led us along very interesting paths, but it struck me that some unfortunate people who are now in mental hospitals because they think that they are the Emperor of India are probably, under his premise, justified in so thinking. At the same time, my hon. and learned Friend showed the very slippery slope we get on when we bring in the question of relationship.

The Government have not got the matter right in Clause 30, nor have we got it right in our new Clause. What we ought to say is, that any effort to procure anyone to buy an option when there is prior knowledge is an offence. If I am a director and do that, I am the guilty person, and it does not seem to me to make the slightest difference whether I get my wife to buy the option, or my bank manager to buy it in my name as a nominee, or a friend, or anyone else. It is my guilty knowledge, and it is my pressure that I bring to bear on the person buying the option, and it does not matter one hoot what the relationship between us is.

It is wrong to bring in relationship, pure and simple. There are enormous numbers of people with a close relation to a person whose financial advice they automatically accept without any argument when they have any investment at all to make. They would not query it if he told them on the 'phone to sell their shares and buy an option, and told them to do the opposite the next day. Such a person is the related family adviser, and to put those people in a criminal position because they are presumed to have guilty knowledge will lead to many cases of harsh injustice.

We have all so far shown that we do not understand the personal relationships that exist in a very great number of families, where people would never think of querying the financial advice they got from a person. I would not think that they had in any way entered into an illegal or evil transaction just because they never questioned these matters, and to open things up in this way would put in danger of criminal proceedings a great many people who should not be put in that position.

What we have to get right is the real responsibility. We have to ensure that the person with the knowledge can be prosecuted for using that knowledge to procure the purchasing of an option, either on his own, or through relatives or anyone else. As it is, we have not got the provision right, and I am rather glad that the Government think of bringing in another Bill, because I hope they will withdraw their Clause 30 and have a go at this subject in the next Bill.

Mr. Gower

I ask the President of the Board of Trade to consider one aspect that he may not have considered at as great length as he has other parts. The present wording is even more objectionable than has as yet been suggested. Let us take the example of a father who is a director of a company and who, on the 21st birthday of his son, suggests that he will give the son something, and the son, in effect, obtains an option. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will recognise that in many families such a son would merely feel a sense of gratitude to his father, and would not question the nature of the gift. The fact is that under the present wording in the Bill he would be guilty of a very serious offence.

I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, Central (Mr. Grant) will recognise that, because of the difficulties of amending what is already not merely an imperfect but a very imperfect Clause, he has contrived to produce something that is also somewhat imperfect. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Sir D. Glover) that neither the Clause nor the proposed new Clause is entirely satisfactory, but I certainly hope that the right hon. Gentleman and the Government recognise that the Bill as it stands is not merely objectionable but really—

Dr. Bennett


Mr. Burden


Mr. Gower

One of my hon. Friends says that it is ridiculous and the other that it is outrageous, but it is neither. It is contrary to all the principles that we believe to be principles of British law and, in the case of a minor, a dependent in a family, it is highly objectionable.

Mr. Michael Shaw (Scarborough and Whitby)

We are all obliged to my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, Central (Mr. Grant) for putting forward this new Clause because it raises our very serious doubts about Clause 30. I was interested in his exposition of the varying liabilities of a person at various ages. It seemed a new interpretation of the three ages of man, showing when he could and when he could not be allowed to accept options in a company of which his father happened to be a director.

The discussions we have had have disclosed a great deal of disquiet about the rightness of Clause 30. The more I listened to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich (Sir J. Foster) the most confused I got as to the possibilities and ramifications which could be disclosed when inquiries were made under this part of the Bill. The point which has been raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Sir D. Glover) occurred to me. It concerns the increasing habit of transferring one's affairs in stocks and shares into the hands of trained management, such as merchant bankers. I know from experience how very often this is done.

When a family company sells out, goes public, and is bought by a big combine, the proceeds are distributed among the family. It is usual to advise them to put their affairs in the hands of trained experts to look after their stocks and shares. It is perfectly clear that the companies which look after those affairs will not in every case inquire of the child whether or not the options they may recommend should be purchased, options in a famous name which happens to have as one of its subsidiaries a company of which the father happens to be a director. All this is unrealistic. As the Clause stands, quite unwittingly, children can be put into an impossible and entirely unwarrantable position.

My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) has the right answer. We certainly intend to press this Clause. We admit that there are deficiencies, but coupled with the new Clause are two Amendments, both of which we strongly support. Amendment No. 77 seeks to transfer the onus of proof. Clause 30 says that many of these children shall be deemed also for the purposes of this section to be a director of the company. Therefore they are assumed to have exactly that knowledge. It seems that the proof should be the other way round. In our Amendment No. 77, which we are discussing with this new Clause, we point out that it shall 'rest with the prosecution to prove that any person charged, by virtue of this subsection, with an offence under section 25 of this Act, had reason to know and did in fact know'. Unless the prosecution can prove as a fact that this information was known, the prosecution should not be successful in bringing its case.

In our discussions we have proved, I believe beyond doubt, that there is dissatisfaction all round. The right hon. Gentleman is dissatisfied with our Amendment. We certainly are dissatisfied with the Clause as it stands. The right way would be for us to allow Clause 30 to be taken away and considered for the next Bill which we have been repeatedly assured will come forward during the lifetime of this Parliament. If the right hon. Gentleman were prepared to do this, our confidence in the statement that he seriously intends to bring forward another companies Bill in the lifetime of this Parliament would be greatly enhanced.

So far it seems that when new ideas or fresh thoughts on this Bill have been thought up by the right hon. Gentleman, the proceedings on the Bill have had to be delayed until the drafting has been done in order to bring forward the necessary Amendments, but when we have thought of useful and constructive ideas the answer has been, "There is too much in the Bill already and there is no time to draft these ideas in the way the Ministry wants." This is a very one-sided affair. If the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to take back the Clause,

we should show our feelings on this matter by voting for the new Clause.

Question put, That the Clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 139, Noes 210.

Division No. 477.] AYES [5.45 p.m.
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash) Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds) Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead) Grimond, Rt. Hn. J. Page, Graham (Crosby)
Astor, John Gurden, Harold Page, John (Harrow, W.)
Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n) Hall-Davis, A. G. F. Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)
Baker, W. H. K. Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) Peel, John
Balniel, Lord Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.) Pounder, Rafton
Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye) Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Bell, Ronald Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere Pym, Francis
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) Hawkins, Paul Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Got. & Fhm) Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Bessell, Peter Hill, J. E. B. Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Biffen, John Hirst, Geoffrey Ridsdale, Julian
Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel Holland, Philip Robson Brown, Sir William
Brinton, Sir Tatton Hooson, Emlyn Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter Hunt, John Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) Hutchison, Michael Clark Royle, Anthony
Bruce-Gardyne, J. Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye) Russell, Sir Ronald
Bryan, Paul Johnston, Russell (Inverness) Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M) Kaberry, Sir Donald Smith, John
Bullus, Sir Eric Kimball, Marcus Stainton, Keith
Burden, F. A. Kirk, Peter Steel, David (Roxburgh)
Campbell, Gordon Kitson, Timothy Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M. (Ripon)
Cary, Sir Robert Knight, Mrs. Jill Summers, Sir Spencer
Cooke, Robert Lancaster, Col. C. G. Tapsell, Peter
Cordle, John Langford-Holt, Sir John Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)
corfield, F. v. Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Costain, A. P. Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone) Temple, John M.
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Sir Oliver Loveys, W. H. Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Cunningham, Sir Knox Lubbock, Eric Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
Currie, G. B. H. McAdden, Sir Stephen Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
Dalkeith, Earl of Maclean, Sir Fitzroy Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John
Dance, James McMaster, Stanley Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)
Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.) Maginnis, John E. Walker, Peter (Worcester)
Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.) Maude, Angus Ward, Dame Irene
Dodds-Parker, Douglas Mawby, Ray Weatherill, Bernard
Elliott, R.W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.) Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J. Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Emery, Peter Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C. Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Errington, Sir Eric Mills, Peter (Torrington) Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Fortescue, Tim Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) Winstanley, Dr. M. P.
Foster, Sir John Montgomery, Fergus Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Giles, Rear-Adm. Morgan Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Worsley, Marcus
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.) Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh Wright, Esmond
Glover, Sir Douglas Nabarro, Sir Gerald Wylie, N. R.
Cower, Raymond Neave, Airey Younger, Hn. George
Grant Anthony Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Grant-Ferris, R. Nott, John TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Gresham Cooke, R. Onslow, Cranley Mr. Jasper More and
Mr. Reginald Eyre.
Allaun Frank (Salford, E.) Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Alldritt Walter Bowden, Rt. Hn. Herbert Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Allen Scholefield Braddock, Mrs. E. M. Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard
Anderson, Donald Bradley, Tom Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Archer, Peter Brooks, Edwin Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Armstrong, Ernest Broughton, Dr. A. D. D. Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.) Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper) Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham) Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan) Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Bagier, Gorden A.T. Brown, Bob (N 'c'tle-upont-Tyne, W.) Dell, Edmund
Barnett, Joel Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury) Dempsey, James
Baxter, William Buchan, Norman Dickens, James
Beaney, Alan Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) Doig, Peter
Bence, Cryil Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.) Driberg, Tom
Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood Cant, R. B Dunnett, Jack
Bennett, James (G'gow, Brigeton) Carmichael, Neil Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)
Blackburn, F. Carter-Jones, Lewis Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)
Blenkinsop, Arthur Coleman, Donald Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)
Boardman, H. Concannon, J. D, Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Booth, Albert Conlan, Bernard Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Ellis, John Lever, L. M. (Ardwick) Pentland, Norman
English, Michael Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.) Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)
Ennals, David Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)
Ensor, David Lipton, Marcus Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)
Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.) Lomas, Kenneth Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)
Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley) Loughlin, Charles Price, William (Rugby)
Finch, Harold Luard, Evan Probert, Arthur
Fitch, Alan (Wigan) Lyon, Alexander W. (York) Rankin, John
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Foley, Maurice McBride, Neil Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Ford, Ben McCann, John Robertson, John (Paisley)
Forrester, John MacColl, James Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)
Fraser, John (Norwood) McGuire, Michael Rose, Paul
Galpern, Sir Myer Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen) Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Gardner, Tony Mackie, John Rowlands, E. (Cardiff, N.)
Garrett, W. E. Mackintosh, John P. Sheldon, Robert
Ginsburg, David MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles) Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)
Gourlay, Harry McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.) Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)
Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth) McNamara, J. Kevin Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Gregory, Arnold MacPherson, Malcolm Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Grey, Charles (Durham) Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.) Slater, Joseph
Griffiths, Will (Exchange) Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg) Small, William
Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Mallalieu, J.P. W. (Huddersfield, E.) Snow, Julian
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.) Manuel, Archie Spriggs, Leslie
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Mapp, Charles Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)
Hart, Mrs. Judith Marquand, David Stonehouse, John
Haseldine, Norman Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.
Heffer, Eric S. Mason, Roy Swingler, Stephen
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret Maxwell, Robert Taverne, Dick
Hooley, Frank Millan, Bruce Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)
Horner, John Miller, Dr. M. S.
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test) Thornton, Ernest
Howie, W. Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire) Tinn, James
Hoy, James Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) Tomney, Frank
Huckfield, L. Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) Tuck, Raphael
Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.) Moyle, Roland Urwin, T. W.
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.) Murray, Albert Wainwrlght, Edwin (Dearne Valley)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Hunter, Adam Newens, Stan Wallace, George
Hynd, John Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon) Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh) Norwood, Christopher Wellbeloved, James
Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak) Ogden, Eric White, Mrs. Eirene
Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas Orbach, Maurice Whitlock, William
Jones, Dan (Burnley) Orme, Stanley Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.) Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn) Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham) Owen, Will (Morpeth) Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West) Padley, Walter Winterbottom, R. E.
Kelley, Richard Page, Derek (King's Lynn) Woof, Robert
Kenyon, Clifford Paget, R. T. Yates, Victor
Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central) Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Kerr, Russell (Feltham) Park, Trevor TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Lawson, George Parkyn, Brian (Bedford) Mr. Harold Walker and
Lestor, Miss Joan Pavitt, Laurence Mr. Joseph Harper.
Lever, Harold (Cheetham) Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)