HC Deb 05 July 1967 vol 749 cc1764-8

11.45 a.m.

Sir J. Hobson

I beg to move, in page 3, line 43, to leave out 'by such county court judges' and to insert 'in such places'.

This is in the nature of a probing Amendment, designed to discover what the Clause is about and what the need for it is. The right hon. and learned Attorney-General attempted an explanation in Committee which was not quite up to his usual standard of clarity and helpfulness. It threw almost no light—not even a candle beam—on a slightly mysterious and dark place. He said something that anyone reading the first 15 words of the Bill would have known—that not all places would be designated as county courts, and not all county courts would be assigned as divorce county courts. That has nothing to do with the question. Here, we are acting not in respect of courts, but in personam in respect of individual county court judges.

Why is it necessary for the Lord Chancellor to have the invidious power of drawing distinctions between the classes of county court judges which we now have? If we have a designated county court—which will, under the Bill, alone be entitled to exercise jurisdiction in these cases—with a person sitting in it, clothed in the appropriate robes as a judge and qualified to sit as a county court judge in a county court, why is it necessary to go any further and inquire whether or not the Lord Chancellor has disqualified him or withdrawn his divorce licence, as it were—in the same sort of way as a heavy vehicle licence is withdrawn in the case of certain drivers—leaving him to deal with only light cases?

It is a curious position for the Lord Chancellor to be in. Will it be a sweet or a stick for the county court judge? Will the Lord Chancellor now be able to interfere with the independence of county court judges by suggesting to some who do not want to do so that they will jolly well be made to try county court divorce cases—or, in the case of a judge who likes to try such cases, telling him that if he does not do this, that or the other he will be disqualified from doing so?

Were I to hold the position of a county court judge I would always welcome being relieved of this duty, and I might be put in an awkward position if the Lord Chancellor was not willing to grant me the disqualification I required. Is it suggested that in this day and age some county court judges are not fit to try undefended divorce cases? We remember that in the past there were some rather curious characters on the county court bench. I do not think that we have them now.

You may remember one such judge, Mr. Deputy Speaker, who set out upon his appointment with what he considered the ample equipment of a library which consisted of two books. One was "Everyman's Guide to the Law" and the other was "Ruff's Guide to the Turf." His somewhat inglorious career terminated with the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against him in his own court. I do not think that the class of county court judges which the country now enjoys contains anyone who ought to be disqualified from exercising the jurisdiction of trying undefended divorces.

How will the Lord Chancellor make it known to litigants that he has exercised this discretion? Will the Law List contain names with and without stars, so that if one is considered to be a county court judge qualified to try undefended divorces one has a star, and if one is not considered to be qualified one does not have a star? This will be a very invidious distinction to draw in the Law List. Or will it perhaps be published in the London Gazette? How will the parties know whether a judge sitting in the designated court, in the appropriate robe, is disqualified? How will the Lord Chancellor make public to the parties those who are entitled to try such cases?

What has not been brought out so far is the position of deputy county court judges. Any county court judge can appoint a deputy and can choose any person to sit, for up to 14 days. Is it intended that deputy county court judges will be able to try undefended divorces in the exercise of the jurisdiction during the first fortnight of their appointment? Is this power intended to give the Lord Chancellor some control over the deputy county court judges, because he has to be notified during the first fortnight, and he then approves or disapproves, after that period has expired?

We are a little puzzled as to the purpose of this power which the Lord Chancellor seeks, enabling him to draw an invidious distinction between individual county court judges. We wonder whether this power is not really intended to give the Lord Chancellor the power not only to designate county courts, but from time to time to designate the places within a county court district at which the hearings should take place. Is there a geographical and not a personal discretion intended?

The county courts are by definition courts to be held under the 1959 Act for each of the districts of England and Wales. The county court for Lincolnshire, for instance, covers a very wide area and sits in a large number of places. If it is designated just by itself, under Clause 1 as a designated county court, it could presumably sit in any of the courts within its district over the area of Lincolnshire.

May it not be that what was really intended was that within the area of designated county courts the Lord Chancellor should say whereabouts it should sit, not who the judge should be, provided that he was otherwise qualified? This is a probing Amendment designed to discover whether the Attorney-General can enlighten us a little more than he did in Committee as to what the Clause is intended to do.

The Attorney-General

I am sorry that I did not even shed a candlelight of clarity upon the necessity for Clause 5 in Committee. I will endeavour to do so now. The fears expressed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Sir J. Hobson) about the Lord Chancellor being faced with invidious distinctions between county court judges who are worthy of exercising jurisdiction in undefended divorce cases and those who are not, will not arise, nor will any fear or expectation that to be granted that jurisdiction will be a kind of merit award, which might or might not be welcomed by the particular county court judge.

The necessity for Clause 5 arises because under the County Courts Act, 1959, proceedings begun in a county court are normally heard by the judge of the court in which the proceedings had begun and not by the judge of any other circuit. The purpose of Clause 5 is to enable the Lord Chancellor to secure that any county court judge may dispose of an undefended matrimonial cause, or any matter arising in the course of such a cause at any divorce court, whether or not he is a judge of that court.

Under the existing system by which matrimonial causes are tried by county court judges sitting as Special Commissioners of the High Court, most if not all of the judges outside London have at least one divorce town on their county court circuit, at which divorce cases may be tried. There are some circuits on which there is no divorce town, because it is, in practice, more convenient for the judge to sit at a neighbouring centre or another circuit.

In addition the "floating" judges, who have no circuits of their own, do help when help is needed, sitting in divorce cases from time to time at different divorce towns. The intention is that the same kind of arrangements should continue and jurisdiction in undefended divorce cases is given to the county courts. Although it may be that at least one court in every county court circuit will be designated as a divorce county court, so as to enable cases to be taken there, it will not necessarily be desirable for cases to be incapable of being tried on another circuit. For instance, it is thought to be more convenient for Stockport cases to be tried in Manchester, which is on a different circuit.

That kind of arrangement could not work unless the Bill enabled the divorce jurisdiction to be exercised by any judge the Lord Chancellor might direct. As I said in Committee, all county court judges will be qualified to exercise the jurisdiction of the county courts in this respect, but this provision is necessary for the reasons of the overlap which I have mentioned.

As to the position of deputy county court judges, it is true that they will have the jurisdiction when the Bill comes into effect. I am advised by my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor that administrative directions will be given to require a county court judge to obtain the approval of the Lord Chancellor be- fore appointing a deputy to sit in divorce cases. The intention certainly is that judges, and not their deputies, should have responsibility in this important area in the administration of the law.

Sir J. Hobson

We are very grateful to the Attorney-General for this explanation. I quite understand the position, but I am still a little mystified as to why, if county court judges, particularly "floaters", are able to sit now and discharge the ordinary jurisdiction of county courts without being designated in those circumstances, this Clause is necessary. However, I see that there may be reasons, in rare cases, for making this special arrangement, outside the scope of the ordinary ability present to allow a county court judge to sit in almost any court he pleases, and, therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.