§ The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper:
§ Q17. Mr. MICHAEL FOOTTo ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the discussions he has had with Mr. Kosygin about attempts to secure a settlement in Vietnam.
§ Q21. Mr. RANKINTo ask the Prime Minister what discussions he had with Mr. Kosygin on the situation in Vietnam during his visit to London; and if he will make a statement.
§ Q22. Mr. HEFFERTo ask the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the visit of Mr. Kosygin, with particular reference to the discussion on the situation in Vietnam.
§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will now answer Questions Nos. Q17, Q21 and Q22.
I apologise for the length of this Answer but I believe this to be necessary because of its importance and complexity.
346 As I told the House yesterday, Mr. Kosygin and I devoted the major part of our discussions to the problem of Vietnam. Our discussions were urgent and constructive. They were also confidential and must remain so, as must equally my contacts with the President of the United States.
My right hon. Friend and I made a sustained effort to try to secure conditions during the Vietnamese New Year truce period which would make possible negotiations for a settlement. I believe there were moments when this could have been very near.
The tragic disappointment of these hopes for the truce period which became public last night must not, and will not, deter us from pressing on for a solution. As I told the House yesterday "if the present opportunity is missed we must not give up hope; the road to a solution remains open".
That is the position.
I do not underrate the renewed dangers that accompany the resumption of the fighting; and we must all deeply regret that the Tet period, the period of the Vietnamese New Year, was not utilised to create the conditions that were needed for a move to the conference table. In particular, the massive southward movement of troops and supplies in the north, on a scale far greater than in the Christmas, or indeed in any previous, cease-fire, threatened to create a severe military unbalance. It also made it harder for the Americans to believe that the North Vietnamese leaders wished to use the truce for an effort to peace rather than for a further effort in war.
As I made clear yesterday, what is lacking for a settlement is, first, enough of a general realisation that sooner or later there must be a political settlement and, secondly, the necessary degree of trust and confidence on the part of each of the nations fighting in this war about the sincerity of the desire of the other to work for a negotiated political settlement.
North Vietnam will still not seize the present opportunities for negotiation because, presumably, they do not accept the sincerity of the repeated American statements that when negotiations take place they will be unconditional or about 347 American willingness, given appropriate guarantees, to stop the bombing.
Equally—and suspicions have been aggravated by the military movements during Tet—the Americans do not for their part feel able to trust the North Vietnamese to negotiate with genuine intent and to refrain from using a period of negotiations to build up military strength and compel South Vietnamese, American, Australian, New Zealand and other forces to fight with their hands tied behind their backs.
Trust has got to be built up. For my part, if this needs saying, I accept one hundred per cent. American sincerity to negotiate for peace. And I must add this. I believe that the North Vietnamese are also genuine in their desire for peace. They equally are concerned, at the same time, to avoid a situation in which they feel they would be leaving perhaps 100,000 North Vietnamese at risk in the south, denuded of necessary supplies.
It is to bridge what I described yesterday as a very small remaining gap by creating the necessary confidence and guarantees both ways that my right hon. Friend and I have been so active in this past week to do our best to see that the breathing space provided by Tet was used. The deep concern all of us feel that this has not proved possible must not blind us to the fact that peace is attainable now at any time on the basis on which we have been working.
These disappointments should not drive any of us into panic measures, reversals of policy or into the delusion that peace can be secured by dramatic but ineffectual declarations. Those of us who have a rôle to play in this matter have a duty to keep cool and to keep our eyes fixed on the goal we set ourselves last week, to use the influence we possess to prevent the bitterness as well as the fighting from escalating, and to begin again, however difficult the circumstances, to create two-way confidence—and to remember above all that our objective is not to strike allegedly moral postures or to make unhelpful denunciatory declarations—our objective is to secure peace.
§ Mr. Michael FootI certainly appreciate—[Interruption.]
§ Mr. SpeakerOrder. This is a very serious matter.
§ Mr. FootI certainly appreciate the efforts made by the Prime Minister to try to secure a settlement of this dispute, but will he recognise that there is a widespread sense of outrage throughout the country that the United States Government have refused to respond to the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an unconditional and unqualified stopping of the bombing—an appeal which I trust was supported by my right hon. Friend during recent days? Will he now say that he will give unqualified support for that appeal, which has been made on behalf not merely of many members of the United Nations—and probably a majority of nations there—but of vast numbers of people throughout this country?
§ The Prime MinisterMy hon. Friend is quite right to express his feelings and to speak for others about the resumption of the bombing, but on the broader question that he raised I must make this clear: my right hon. Friend and I have been living very close to this subject for the last seven or eight days. I think that we know most of what is going on. I think we know exactly what is required—and it is not a great deal—to get the parties to the conference table. My hon. Friend must make his own decision, but I do not believe that what he has proposed would in any way help to secure a settlement. I am saying this with some knowledge of what it is about. If I thought that it would, if I thought that that were the way, that full association with what U Thant has said was the way to get peace, I would follow that course tomorrow, but I know enough about it to know that that is not the road to follow.
§ Mr. RankinWould my right hon. Friend not agree that the spontaneous welcome accorded Mr. Kosygin in Great Britain last week wherever he went was a reflection of the widespread support of his policy in Vietnam—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—of course it was—and at the same time, an obvious criticism of the policy which is being followed by America in that part of South-East Asia? Does that fact not have some influence on the action which he ought to take at this time?
§ The Prime MinisterI think that my hon. Friend misconceives both the purpose of Mr. Kosygin's visit and the 349 reactions to it. I believe that the great warmth of his reception, as I said yesterday, was due to his own manner and charm in going around the country and to the great desire of all our people, whatever their political points of view on Vietnam or anything else, to see a closer rapprochement between Britain and the Soviet Union, a desire which I believe has been achieved to a very high degree by the communiqué published yesterday. I do not think, therefore—in fact I would very much hate to think—that Mr. Kosygin's reception was limited to support one way or another for a particular aspect of policy, however important.
§ Mr. HefferIs my right hon. Friend aware that his statement this afternoon is very disappointing? Was he told by the Americans before the bombing that it was likely to take place, or was he kept in the dark? If so, how does this leave our so-called special relationship with the United States? Is it not clear that they do not give a fig for the opinions of this Government? Is it not time that we told the Americans quite categorically that we do not go along with them and that we dissociate ourselves entirely from their policy?
§ The Prime MinisterMy right hon. Friend and I were in full possession of all relevant facts, both current and prospective, and they did not apply only to the facts which we got from the United States. The problem here—I will not go into any of the details or proposals which we were working on and which still stand open—is that it was clear to everyone that if both sides failed to take advantage of the opportunity of the Tet truce, there would be a return to the conditions prior to the cease-fire. That was clear to everyone. I have given my account of why things went wrong in that connection.
My hon. Friend is absolutely wrong to suggest that the Americans pay no attention to us. If we were to follow his proposal—he is free to follow it, but I am not—that might have the effect that we would have little influence in any quarter in this matter.
§ Lord BalnielMr. Kosygin frequently made it clear in his public speeches that the Soviet Union is the major supplier of arms to the North Vietnamese forces. 350 Did he, in discussion, also make it clear that the Soviet Union still considers itself as having responsibilities as the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference? Did he suggest any specific initiative to bring the contending parties to the negotiating table? The Prime Minister also said that he knew exactly what is required to bring the parties to the negotiating table. Could he give us some indication of what is in his mind?
§ The Prime MinisterThe noble Lord will understand my difficulties here, including the difficulties of saying exactly what Mr. Kosygin said to my right hon. Friend and myself in these very lengthy negotiations. On the main part of his question, in addition to being, of course, an ally of North Vietnam and a supplier of arms, Mr. Kosygin and his whole Government obviously take very seriously their responsibilities as Co-Chairman.
I think that the result of the examination which we have made in these past few days would suggest that their view is that there must first be a willingness to go to the conference table on the part of the main parties to the fighting. Then, I am certain—in fact I know—that Mr. Kosygin, or, in this case, Mr. Gromyko, would join my right hon. Friend in taking any measures to make these negotiations a reality. There are various ways, which we cannot pursue at this time, in which this can be done, but there is a prior condition required for that kind of activation.
On the question of what proposals might be put forward, it is not a question of proposals being put forward. There is an initiative; there is a plan—I cannot tell the House what it is and I am sure that the noble Lord will not press me for it—which would bring peace tomorrow and would require a very small move to activate all the very complicated machinery which could bring us to peace.
§ Sir C. OsborneDespite the Prime Minister's natural disappointment that his efforts last week should have failed, is he aware that most people hope that he will continue to seek for peace? Does he think that peace can be secured in Vietnam without co-operation from Peking? When conditions become normal there, will he do his best to get all the influence he can brought to bear from that quarter to secure peace?
§ The Prime MinisterI thank the hon. Gentleman for what he said at the beginning of his question. On the second part, he knows the difficulties probably as well as anyone, from his contacts in that part of the world, and, of course, it is not a currently realistic proposal. The hon. Gentleman will remember that, when the Commonwealth Peace Mission was proposed, it was proposed that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers should visit Peking, Moscow and Washington as well as North and South Vietnam.
§ Mr. James DavidsonWhat was the exact source of the information that there were massive troop movements coming south during the truce period from North Vietnam?
§ The Prime MinisterIt is not usual, of course, to give the sources of this information, but I am not aware of anyone who is denying this——
§ The Prime MinisterMy hon. Friends may——
§ The Prime MinisterIt is not usual to give the source in this matter——
§ The Prime MinisterI am satisfied about the details and figures of movements, which were on a very large scale. I still believe that it would have been possible despite that, if we could have had one small move, to have activated the whole peace proposals and for the Tet truce to have continued until we got them around the conference table.
§ Mr. MendelsonWhile it is clearly emerging that the most positive part of last week's work was the co-operation between the two Co-Chairmen to try to find a way, is it not equally clear that when Mr. U Thant said yesterday, after the extension of the suspension of the bombing, that he welcomed it and that what is needed now is a quiet period of a few weeks to allow, not declamations, but quiet diplomatic work, is not that the path of wisdom and is it not regrettable that the bombing should have been resumed now? Should not my right hon. Friend give complete support to U Thant's proposal?
§ The Prime MinisterNo one has greater respect for U Thant than I. I think that he is a personal friend of many of us in the House. I agreed with him when he welcomed the suspension of the bombing and the other military activities. That is why it was such a bitter disappointment that we were not able to seize on the urgency of those few days of truce to get a settlement. That is why the task is now harder, because of the danger of bitterness, although I believe that everything which we discussed last week is as relevant today—leading to a cessation of the bombing—as it would have been last week, leading to a decision not to resume the bombing, and it is just as possible, if the will is there. Not much is needed to activate all this. Therefore, with the disappointment which my right hon. Friend and I felt—I know that my hon. Friend shares it—I am also disappointed that these things happened during Tet which fouled the atmosphere and also that we did not have a little more time to get them to the conference table.
§ Mr. MartenIs it not during these quiet periods that the North Vietnamese abuse the offer of a peaceful time? Would the right hon. Gentleman answer the question which I put earlier—without going into details, was there any significant gesture or move by Hanoi during Mr. Kosygin's visit to get the talks going?
§ The Prime MinisterI think the hopes which were built up last week—I have not lost them, despite the disappointment—will be best fulfilled if I say as little as possible of the exchanges last week and the part played by Mr. Kosygin or anyone else in them.
§ Mr. John HyndIn view of the Prime Minister's satisfaction at the fact that both sides—the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese and the Americans—are anxious for peace, in view of the intervention of U Thant and in view of the fact that for the first time we are satisfied that the Russians are anxious to take part in recalling the Geneva Conference, is this not an opportunity for the intervention of the United Nations to provide the necessary assurance to both sides which would enable the Geneva Conference to be resumed?
§ The Prime MinisterI hope that my hon. Friend was not suggesting that there was ever any doubt about the willingness 353 of the Soviet Union to play their full part as Co-Chairman. It is not felt that a Co-Chairman's initiative in that form is the way to start things off. There must be an act of will on the part of the main parties to the fighting, after which the Co-Chairman would, I am sure, go into action in any way that would be helpful to consummate what had been begun. In regard to my hon. Friend's suggestion about the United Nations, as I have said more than once in this House, we all know the difficulties that exist about putting it through the machinery of the United Nations. Obviously the help of the Secretary-General is extremely valuable, but I believe that the lines on which we have been working in the past week are the right lines and, as I have said, those lines remain open.
§ Mr. LongdenWhile sympathising with the Prime Minister in his struggle for peace against so many of his hon. Friends—[Interruption.]—is it hypercritical to suggest that Mr. Kosygin could have helped the end which we all have in view by taking time off from trying to detach us from our allies and publicly suggesting and exhorting his protegé Ho Chi Minh—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down."]—to go to the conference table?
§ The Prime MinisterI wish that the hon. Gentleman, in the manner of his question and in its content, was one-tenth as helpful as Mr. Kosygin and as my hon. Friends. I hope that, despite the hon. Gentleman's cynicism and the Motion which he has on the Order Paper, he is not attributing a lack of sincerity to my hon. Friends. I thought I knew that all hon. Members, on both sides of the House, passionately desired to see peace in Vietnam. There are different ways of achieving it. My hon. Friends have one way, and I have said that if I thought it was the right way, I would be with them tomorrow in doing it that way. I do not believe that it is the right way, although I do not doubt their sincerity in putting it forward. What the hon. Gentleman said does not provide a way at all, except to abuse a very distinguished visitor to this country.
§ Mr. AtkinsonWould not my right hon. Friend agree that it would be right and proper for him now to say whether or not the information which he has about the North Vietnamese movement 354 of troops and supplies during the truce period was gained from one of the belligerents? Would he say whether the source of information was, in fact, the Americans?
§ The Prime MinisterI have said that it is not usual to give information about the source of information, but I assure my hon. Friend that I did not obtain it by pure introspection and that I am satisfied as to its accuracy.
§ Mr. HeathIs the right hon. Gentleman aware that we support him and the Foreign Secretary not only in the work they have been doing but also in the efforts which they have told the House they will continue to make to try to bring about a settlement? Is he further aware that I believe him to be right in that he will not help this process by either condemning what the United States are doing or by calling on them for an unconditional cessation of bombing, although Mr. Kosygin himself in public made this a condition of any successful negotiation? Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the best hope lies in being able to show one side that if the bombing ceases, the other side will be prepared to cease reinforcing, and that from that position of diplomacy, further action might ensue?
§ The Prime MinisterI thank the right hon. Gentleman for the last part of his remarks, in which he put his finger on one of a series of very complicated problems; and, of course, I agree with him. It is right that this must now be pursued as far as possible by private and secret contacts—Government contacts, of course—and not by public declarations.