New Clause No. 8.—(FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENTS TENDERED IN EVIDENCE.) (Hansard, 26 April 1967)

§ Mr. Taverne
I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

§ Mr. Speaker
I understand that we are to discuss at the same time Amendment No. 57, in page 49, line 40, to leave out Clause 64.

§ Mr. Taverne
The new Clause and the Amendment concern an undertaking given in Committee to reconsider the penalty for making a false statement tendered in evidence under Clause 2 or Clause 7. This was reconsidered by the Government and we decided to reduce the maximum sentence to two years. As the offence is one of giving false evidence in judicial proceedings, it should be considered as akin to perjury, but as it will not concern statements on solemn oath in court, it also seemed right not to make the penalty seven years.
As it was intended to keep the offence akin to perjury, subsection (1) reflects the wording of Section 1 of the Perjury Act, 1911, in that it is an offence for a witness wilfully to make a statement material in those proceedings which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true. Subsection (2) makes the offence one under the Perjury Act, and thus attracting the ancillary provisions of the Act which deal with such offences.
For example, the requirement of Section 13 for evidence of corroboration will apply to the new offence. The evidence of at least two witnesses as to the falsity of a written statement will be a prerequisite of a conviction.

§ Mr. Hogg
I am grateful for this Clause, which is the result of a concession to a view which I expressed in Committee. I hope that it will not seem ungrateful if I ask one further question.
1674 It seems desirable to bring to the notice of the maker of a statement at the time he makes it the danger that he may be prosecuted under the Perjury Act for the new offence. It is most unusual in the criminal law to make such an action an offence not at the time that it is committed but only contingently, if somthing happens later over which the person concerned has no direct control. This will become an offence not if a wilful wrong statement is made by someone to the police but only contingently, if, for reasons which the maker of the statement could not control, it is used as a statement in criminal proceedings in lieu of evidence.
It is, therefore, desirable, if this new offence is to be created—I accept that it is a necessary improvement to the Bill—and the police intend to use a statement in the way which the Bill permits, that they should, as a matter of routine, begin the statement with some such words as: I fully understand that this statement may be used in judicial proceedings as evidence and that, if so, I shall be liable to the penalties of the Perjury Act. This may be said to put too great a burden on the police, but there is nothing in that argument. The police are constantly familiar with taking statements from potentially accused persons and it is as a matter of absolute precaution, to defend themselves, that they cause certain ritual words to be inserted at the beginning and end of every statement for the accused to sign. There is no harm in requiring them to do so for potential witnesses if they have it in mind to use their statements as written evidence.

§ Sir D. Renton
I am profoundly unhappy about this matter, not only for the reasons given by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), but also because of the practice which now prevails when statements are given to the police and because it will obviously have to continue.
A case came to my knowledge recently of a woman who was asked to go to a police station at 3 o'clock in the morning—when she was already very tired—because her husband had been stabbed in the street by another man. The police asked her to make a statement, which, as it happened, contained a number of inaccuracies. It seemed right to the police to write it down. Because it contained inaccuracies, that woman, under 1675 the Bill, will render herself liable to two years' imprisonment, and I cannot believe that this is right.
The hon. and learned Gentleman may say that these matters will be carefully considered before being put in evidence and that it is only if they are tendered at the new type of committal proceedings that she will become liable. But it is a position which we should not have reached. I welcome the improved proceedings, but I wonder whether some further thought could be given to this matter. We are exposing people to too drastic a penalty—people who might not have intended to make a false statement but who, perhaps through nervousness, tiredness, or the importance of the occasion, have become led into such a position.

§ Mr. Taverne
I agree that the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) has made an important point, although I suggest that it is substantially met in the Bill as it stands. Clause 2(2,b) refers to a statement containing …a declaration by that person to the effect that it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief and that he made the statement knowing that if it were tendered in evidence, he would be liable to prosecution if he wilfully stated in it anything which he knew to be false or did not believe to be true". It would, therefore, have to be a wilful statement and not an accidental one. Attention would have to be drawn to the fact that the person was liable to prosecution.

§ Sir John Hobson (Warwick and Leamington)
All these matters having been drawn to the attention of the person concerned, why should that person not then commit a criminal offence?

§ Mr. Taverne
This point was argued in Committee, when it was pointed out that one wanted to make this as akin as possible to perjury. It was also pointed out that there would not be an opportunity to withdraw. In fact, there might well be pressure on people not to change their statements before the trial. Those objections were raised and I accept that they still stand, but they are not the subject matter of the new Clause.