§ Mr. WilleyI beg to move Amendment No. 102, in page 82, line 30, after 'fails', to insert 'without reasonable excuse'.
Again, this fulfils an undertaking that I gave in Committee.
§ Amendment agreed to.
1411§ Mr. AllasonI beg to move Amendment No. 229, in page 82, line 33, at the end to insert:
(3) It shall be a reasonable excuse under the last preceding subsection that the information was acquired by the person so required to give it in the course of acting as a solicitor.I am glad that Amendment No. 102 has been accepted, inserting the words "without reasonable excuse". This is a step in the right direction for the protection of communications between solicitor and client. But we feel that it is necessary to go a little further, and that is the purpose of the Amendment. Communications between solicitor and client should be frank. I am not speaking as a member of the legal profession. This is in the interests of the client rather than the solicitor, because the whole object of the solicitor's life is to serve his client. It is essential that the client's interest should be properly served, but how can a solicitor act for a client if the client, in turn, cannot be frank with him?If the solicitor tells his client, "You tell me all the facts of the case, but I have to warn you that I am subject to be subpoenaed in order to explain to the other side the facts that you have given me". In that case the client may well say, "This is a rum sort of do. I am not sure how much I can tell my solicitor", and he may well leave the reputable solicitor who has told him that and go to someone else who is able to assure him that he can give him some useful advice when he is not qualified to give it. That is thoroughly unsatisfactory. It is necessary to ensure that the claim that a solicitor should disclose his client's affairs should not be supported
This principle is well recognised in the case of Crown privilege. It is well known that if all the communications between civil servants were liable to examination in public they would all go below the counter. Instead of files being properly minuted and passed round there would be little scraps of paper with the words, "Destroy this after reading", on them, which would later find their way into the wastepaper baskets, and perhaps afterwards into the Sunday Press. It is clear that there should be privilege so as to have free discussion. It therefore seems necessary to make this Amendment to ensure that a solicitor cannot be compelled to disclose the private affairs of 1412 his client if that client does not consent to their disclosure.
§ 9.15 p.m.
§ Mr. SkeffingtonWe had a very interesting discussion in Committee when a similar Amendment was moved to make it clear that professional privilege was not breached by a solicitor being forced to disclose confidential information about his client's affairs. My right hon. Friend agreed to look at this matter further, which he has done, and I think that he wrote to the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) on 24th October.
I ought, first, in fairness, to point out—members of the Supreme Court will know this—that there is provision in the Town and Country Planning Act, Section 215 (2), which is of much more ancient lineage than that, which deals with this very point:
Any person who, having been required in pursuance of this section to give any information, fails to give that information, or knowingly makes any misstatement in respect thereof, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five pounds.Of course, the previous part deals precisely with a relationship of this kind and with matters of this kind.The Amendment was withdrawn on the undertaking that we would consider this matter further. We are advised that the effect of the Amendment would be that the solicitor receiving directly rent for his principal, who receives it indirectly, would have to make disclosure. He would say that he had no interest in the land, but that his client had an interest, the nature of which he would specify. But all the solicitor need tell the Commission is the name of the person on whose behalf he receives the rent and to whom he accounts for the rent. The Commission could then seek the information from the principal as being the person who is receiving the rent—indirectly—for the land. If the matter is approached in this way, disclosure can be required by the solicitor of his clients' affairs.
The Amendment is, therefore, unnecessary and would depart from the precedent of Section 215, which has not been a subject of dispute between the profession and the authorities. For these reasons, I hope that the Amendment will not be pressed.
§ Amendment negatived.