NORTH VIETNAM (UNITED STATES BOMBING)

HC Deb 29 June 1966 vol 730 cc1796-810

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement.

The House will have seen the reports that American planes have today bombed fuel storage areas at the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi and its main port of Haiphong. At 1.30 p.m. to-day a statement was issued from No. 10 Downing Street about this and I thought that the House would wish to know its terms. It said: Her Majesty's Government have noted with regret that United States aircraft have attacked North Vietnamese targets touching on the populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. It is difficult for the British Government, which is not involved in the fighting in Vietnam, to assess the importance of any particular action which the United States Government regards as militarily necessary in this conflict. Nevertheless, we have made it clear on many occasions that we could not support an extension of the bombing to such areas. even though we were confident that the United States forces would take every precaution, as always, to avoid civilian casualties. We believe that the value of each application of force must be judged not merely in terms of the military needs which it is designed to meet, but also in terms of the additional suffering and distress which it inflicts upon innocent people and the effect it can have on the prospects for an early move to a political solution. For these reasons, when President Johnson informed me that the United States Government judged it necessary to attack targets touching on the populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong, I told him that, while we naturally accepted his assurance that these attacks would be directed specifically against the oil installations and that everything possible would be done to avoid harm to the civilian population, we should, nevertheless, feel bound to reaffirm that we must dissociate ourselves from an action of this kind. We remain convinced, however, that the United States are right to continue to assist the millions of South Vietnamese, who have no wish to live under Communist domination, until such time as the North Vietnamese Government abandon their attempt to gain control of South Vietnam by force and accept the proposals for unconditional negotiations which have repeatedly been put forward by the United States as well as by Britain and the Commonwealth. We are also convinced that the North Vietnamese refusal alone prevents these negotiations: and we deplore Hanoi's constant rejection of the path of peace. The opportunity for bringing all the fighting in Vietnam to an end is open to Hanoi; and the onus for continuing it rests there, also.

Mr. Heath

Is the Prime Minister aware that we, too, on this side of the House wish to see a negotiated settlement of this cruel and horrible war and that we regret the need for the bombing of these military targets in North Vietnam? At the same time, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that where the lives of so many Americans, Australians and New Zealanders are at stake in South Vietnam it must be for those Administrations to decide the military necessity of this situation? As the Prime Minister has indicated Government support for American policy in Vietnam—and we believe it is right for the American policy to be supported in Vietnam—for him at the same time to dissociate himself from the implementation of that policy is a completely untenable position to be in.

The Prime Minister

I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman should have felt it necessary to use those words, though I am glad that he has made his position clear on this incident.

It is perfectly possible, reasonable and logical to support a general policy without committing oneself to every action taken in support of that policy. To assume in advance that one will support every action taken in support of a given policy might lead Her Majesty's Government, or even Her Majesty's Opposition, into a very difficult situation.

This was not an easy question to decide, but we had made clear on a number of occasions, indeed orally, to President Johnson last December, that, while we were supporting the general policy in Vietnam, we would not support bombing in Hanoi and Haiphong. This was made clear to him when I was given notice of this probable action some little time ago.

Mr. Heath

The right hon. Gentleman must also be aware that this has been an extremely difficult decision for the American Administration to take and one to which they have given the utmost thought, care and consideration. I ask the right hon. Gentleman, therefore: is it right that he should say that he supports the general American objective and then, when it comes to a difficult decision of this kind, on which they must be the final arbiters, immediately to dissociate himself from it?

The Prime Minister

While recognising, of course—and I know something, even more perhaps than the right hon. Gentleman—the agonies that President Johnson has gone through, not only with this decision, but with many others, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will equally concede that we have given very careful and deep consideration not only to the whole policy question on which I have made statements on many occasions, but to this particular issue. Her Majesty's Government have not only the right but the duty to say whether they support this policy. We have said in advance that we would not support this policy. I think that we are right to take this line. The right hon. Gentleman is perfectly entitled to take a different point of view, and I am glad that he has been so frank about it.

Mr. Zilliacus

While I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister for at least not going so far as the Leader of the Opposition in unconditional support for any atrocities, barbarities and threat to world peace by the Americans, may I ask him whether he realises that his expression of platonic regret, coupled with continued support of the war, falls far short of the very strong emotion aroused in the country by the Government's support?

The Prime Minister

I should like also to dissociate myself from the words used by my hon. Friend at the beginning of his question. My hon. Friend—and I am using that phrase in a platonic sense, as well—who has often expressed his views on this matter, knows perfectly well what is the position of Her Majesty's Government. I do not agree with the general view expressed by my hon. Friend, and I do not agree, as he claims, that he is speaking for the country.

Mr. Tapsell

Does the Prime Minister's statement mean that he is going to give the same treatment to the President of the United States that he has given to everyone else with whom he has worked in the past?

The Prime Minister

I do not know what the hon. Gentleman means. If he would like to specify, I will be glad to answer the question.

Mr. Sydney Silverman rose——

Mr. Speaker

Mr. Sydney Silverman.

Mr. Tapsell rose——

Hon. Members

Sit down.

Mr. Speaker

Order. I understand that the Prime Minister invited the hon. Member for Horncastle (Mr. Tapsell) to specify. Perhaps he will do so.

Mr. Tapsell

Does the right hon. Gentleman mean that now that the President of the United States is in some difficulty he is going to double-cross him?

The Prime Minister

I think the hon. Gentleman shows his total ignorance of the whole history of the Vietnamese war if he does not recognise that the President has been in acute difficulty from the beginning and that he has had tremendous agonies of conscience on that decision at every stage. We have made it plain to him throughout that we would support him on the general policy. We have done this, at some difficulty, to say nothing of gibes from hon. Members opposite. Nevertheless, we have made it quite clear on many occasions that if this particular action were taken we should dissociate ourselves from it. This was said to him in advance very many months ago, and orally six months ago.

Mr. Shinwell

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask you whether the term "double-cross" is in accordance with Parliamentary tradition?

Mr. Speaker

Words as strong as those have been used before.

Mr. Sydney Silverman

While welcoming the dissociation——

Mr. C. Pannell

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask you to reconsider the matter of your Ruling on the words "double-cross", which mean an offensive and low-down form of deceit? Even words as mild as "mendacious" or "mendacity" have been ruled out of order here. Taking these sorts of things qualitatively in the modern connotation, I cannot imagine anything more offensive in so far as we all address each other as honourable Members. If there is not the assumption of honour on either side, how can we continue to do so? I would ask you to reconsider your Ruling, Mr. Speaker.

The Prime Minister

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it not possible for the House to realise that the more offensive the terms used about some of us by some hon. Members opposite the more we regard them as a compliment?

Mr. Speaker

I listened carefully to what the right hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) has said, but I do not propose to alter my Ruling.

Mr. Sydney Silverman

While welcoming the clear statement that the Prime Minister has made, dissociating the Government from this further escalation of the war, may I ask whether his attention has been drawn to recent apparently authoritative statements that United States policy has changed, in that it is not prepared for any political settlement on the basis of the neutralisation of Vietnam or anything that does not result in the creation of a separate State of South Vietnam on the Korean model?

Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that the Government will not be misled into the kind of anti-Communist paranoia which has so tragically distorted world affairs for 30 years?

The Prime Minister

I have made it very clear—this has been said again recently, with authority, in the United States and was repeated to me a fortnight ago by Mr. Dean Rusk—that the United States Government are prepared, willing and anxious to enter into discussions, whether at Geneva or anywhere else, without conditions. They are perfectly entitled to say what they would like to see come out of these talks. Indeed, anyone who goes into a conference is entitled to say what they would like to emerge. Nevertheless, I repeat that the United States Government have said that they will sit down in conference without conditions. This is the reverse of the position of North Vietnam.

On several occasions we, apart from others, have tried to get the North Vietnamese to the conference table, but they have stated the most prohibitive and inhibiting conditions. Indeed, in recent months, their conditions seem to have become even more restrictive and more likely to deter anyone from coming to the conference table.

Mr. Goodhart

In view of the support for the American position as reiterated by the Prime Minister, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any British shells or bombs or any other form of conventional ammunition will be sold by this country to the United States without a specific pledge being required that those bombs and shells will not be used in Vietnam?

The Prime Minister

That question was raised last week and answered. It is a separate question. If the hon. Gentleman—or, indeed, the Leader of the Opposition—wants to raise it, I shall be happy to give a clear and specific answer.

Mr. Goodhart rose——

Mr. Dickens rose——

Mr. Speaker

Mr. Dickens.

Mr. Goodhart

Is the right hon. Gentleman——

Mr. Speaker

Order. No hon. Member has a prescriptive right to two questions. Mr. Dickens.

Mr. Dickens

While many of us warmly welcome my right hon. Friend's statement dissociating Her Majesty's Government from the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, may I ask whether he will not go further, dissociate the Government from American policy in Vietnam altogether and take a new initiative this afternoon, with the Soviet Union, designed to call an early peace conference and a cease-fire in that unhappy country?

The Prime Minister

In my statement I have already answered the point about dissociation from the wider policy being pursued by the United States. No change is envisaged in our position. I remind my hon. Friend that, more than a year ago, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers unanimously called for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and to infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. It was argued then—and it remains my view—that these two things should go together as possible conditions for a cease-fire and peace negotiations.

My hon. Friend referred to the Soviet Union. He will also know that we have repeatedly pressed the Soviet Union to call a conference without conditions, whether in Geneva or anywhere else. It may be thought—and I would not like to express an opinion now—that the situation arising as a result of the events we have been discussing today may make even more urgent a receptive attitude by the Soviet Union to this proposal.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter

Before issuing his statement, did the Prime Minister consult the Government of Australia, the safety of whose troops is involved in this theatre?

The Prime Minister

I do not know what may have been said in the last 48 hours in Canberra, where Mr. Rusk and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, together with a representative of the New Zealand Government, are now at the S.E.A.T.O. conference. Since we had prior and, as far as I know, exclusive knowledge of this operation, we did not feel it necessary to communicate it to any third party, whatever their interest, without the permission of the United States.

Mr. Michael Foot

Does not my right hon. Friend agree that this action by the Americans constitutes a very grave development in the war—as, indeed, is underlined by his dissociation from it? Will he undertake to report to the House in the next few days on the best estimates that can be reached about the casualties as a result of this extension of the bombing and to report further on the political dangers involved?

Will my right hon. Friend undertake to consider the matter in the next two or three days and report on whether it is possible for the Government to continue to support the war when they have declared their dissociation from the major strategy by which it is being conducted?

The Prime Minister

I know that it was the intention, and that every precaution was being taken by the United States Government to carry out their intention, to minimise civilian casualties to the absolute irreducible figure. It is impossible at this stage to know how far that intention has been fulfilled. I will make any information on it available to the House. I know that the Americans went to great lengths to keep civilian casualties to the minimum, even perhaps involving some risk to the operation itself.

My hon. Friend has raised the question of our dissociating ourselves from the general policy of the United States in Vietnam. I have said that it is possible to support a general policy and yet dissociate oneself from individual acts in the execution of that policy. This occurred 15 months ago, when my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made clear, in strong terms, our attitude to the use of non-toxic gas by the United States in Vietnam.

Lord Balniel

Is the Prime Minister aware that we are disturbed by this serious news, which inevitably means an increase in the casualties? But is not the intensification of this terrible war the absolutely inevitable result of the refusal by the Hanoi authorities to come to the conference table? Did I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that he has made this statement without prior consultation with the Australian Government?

The Prime Minister

Responsibility for the worsening of this war rests on those who refuse to come to the conference table. It is a fact—and I do not know how many times we have said it—that the longer the war continues the greater the danger of its escalating geographically and perhaps, indeed, into a more horrible conflict. That has been inevitable from the beginning. Thus, the responsibility lies on those who refuse to negotiate. But that still leaves us free to say that we do not believe in a particular act and that it might make negotiations more difficult. One is entitled to say that.

The hon. Member referred to consultation with the Australians. It will be recognised that, when this action was contemplated, secrecy was particularly important to the United States. We were not authorised by the United States, in advance of this operation, to consult others. I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman was referring to the period between the action and the statement I have made, or before the action was taken.

Lord Balniel

Before the action and the statement.

The Prime Minister

We made it clear to the United States—and the American Government understood this—that if the action were taken we would dissociate ourselves from it. We did not feel free, before the action was taken, to discuss it with any other party except with the approval of the United States.

If the hon. Gentleman is saying that we should not have made the statement until we had consulted Australia and New Zealand, I emphatically reject that. It was agreed that we should make a statement because we have given warnings to the United States concerning our view of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. The position of Australia and New Zealand in relation to Vietnam is different from ours. The statement is perfectly logical in view of our position. Whether others take the same view is a matter for them.

Mr. Arthur Lewis

The Prime Minister mentioned support for the bombing of military targets. Has his attention been drawn to the official report on the B.B.C. News that 50 square miles are now a blazing inferno? Can he say that there were 50 square miles of ammunition dumps that have been bombed?

The Prime Minister

No, Sir. My attention has not been officially drawn to the B.B.C. News. I heard that it had used a phrase of that kind, but I do not think that we can base ourselves on statements of that kind on B.B.C. News. In due course, when the facts are known, we must study them and, if necessary, make any statement to the House that we consider right in the light of them.

Mr. James Davidson

Surely the Government must realise that they have been wrong all along to support the self-defeating policy of the United States, particularly in view of our co-chairmanship of the Geneva Conference? While we welcome the statement by the Foreign Secretary in Canberra on 26th June that we shall not send troops to Vietnam, we also notice that he stated—[HON. MEMBERS: "Reading."]—that he would fully support the United States policy in Vietnam. He also referred to help towards the——

Mr. Speaker

Order. I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman, who is speaking for his party, but he must put his question. He must not read.

Mr. James Davidson

I was just about to put the question, Sir. I wanted to ask the Prime Minister what political objectives of the United States are supported by the British Government, and, also, whether it is the intention of the Americans to limit their ground offensive to south of the 17th Parallel.

The Prime Minister

The hon. Gentleman referred to our position as co-chairman under the Geneva agreement. Co-chairmanship under the agreement, as I have frequently argued, does not involve neutrality; it does not involve not being free to express support for one side or the other. Our fellow co-chairman not only is anything but neutral in its expressions and statements, but it is actually involved on a major scale in shipping arms into North Vietnam. We both have a rôle to play, but that does not mean that we cannot have views or express support for one side or the other in the fighting in Vietnam.

I think that the general question of the objective in the fighting has been dealt with so often and at such length in debates that it could hardly be answered in answer to a question, but I should be very glad to refer the hon. Gentleman to the carefully considered statements which I have made on behalf of the Government on the subject. The objective is to get Vietnam to a state of peace, free from attack from outside by anybody. That is our objective. One can only achieve it by getting people to the conference table, and it is those who will not go there who are responsible for the fighting continuing. That must be understood.

With regard to the statements by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, with whom I have been in the closest consultation during all the days and weeks leading up to this event, nothing I have said this afternoon is in any way incompatible with what he said in expressing the views of the Government while he was in Canberra.

Mr. Winnick

Does the Prime Minister remember my question of last week—[Laughter.]

Mr. Speaker

Order. I think that the hon. Member had better put his question of this week.

Mr. Winnick

Some Members, Mr. Speaker, consider this to be a very serious issue. I ask the Prime Minister whether, in view of the very serious new situation, he would now reconsider the possibility of flying to the United States? I also ask the Prime Minister whether he would not agree that, without in any way exaggerating the position, it is quite likely that the new American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong could be the beginning of another world war?

The Prime Minister

I have always said, as I have again this afternoon, that the continuance of fighting always carries the danger of escalation. This event is one of a number of events, but only one, many of them stemming from the other side, including the recent intensification on an enormous scale of military infiltration into South Vietnam from the North.

I am not quite sure which Question of last week my hon. Friend was referring to. I thought that it was about whether I would go to Washington, as I then announced that I was going. I am not sure whether he is now suggesting that I should go earlier——

Mr. Winnick

Yes.

The Prime Minister

—or not at all. I am quite serious. I do not think that it would be possible to go earlier, but the possibility that this event would take place was one of the things in my mind, although not the only one.

I think that it is necessary to have a pretty full discussion now on all aspects of world peace and it is also important, as has been suggested, that we intensify our pressure with our Geneva co-partners [Interruption.] I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman takes this question seriously. I was about to answer it. He may think that this subject is too long, but I think that what I was going to say was worth saying. The question now is whether we should not intensify pressure on the Soviet Union for calling a Geneva conference.

Mr. Doughty

The Prime Minister, in his statement, used the expressions, "touching on Hanoi" and, "touching on Haiphong". Those words were not very clear to the House. As oil installations are generally not put in built-up areas, and if these targets are outside any built-up area, what is the objection to bombing a military target outside a built-up area?

The Prime Minister

I have seen the maps. It is a difficult question to answer. I should be grateful if the hon. and learned Gentleman could perhaps give me notice of it. I cannot reproduce from my memory all the maps in answer to the question, but the position is that they are certainly within the Hanoi-Haiphong area. It is true that they are not in the middle of a housing estate, but I should prefer the hon. and learned Gentleman to put a Question to me. I think that one is only two miles from the centre of the city.

Mr. Shinwell

Does my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister realise the strong feeling about this matter in all parts of the House, even in spite of what the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said? Although a very large number of us, including myself, applaud his decision to dissociate himself from the latest incident, may I ask whether he has taken account of the possibility of retaliation by, say, the Chinese Republic, or possibly the Soviet Union, coming to the aid of Hanoi? Will he take that into account in making representations to President Johnson?

The Prime Minister

I am well aware, as my right hon. Friend knows, of the very strong feelings in the House and the country on this question. That is why for the last 18 months we have done everything we could to try to get the parties to the conference table, and sometimes we were jeered at for some of the proposals we made. We do not mind that. The possibility of retaliation is always there. Any one of us would feel that this would enormously intensify the dangers, and we trust that there will be no question of it. I very much hope that the Soviet Union, to which my right hon. Friend referred, will realise, as we do, what is implied by being a co-chairman under the Geneva agreement.

Mr. Maude

Is the Prime Minister aware that, while we all recognise the delicate position in which he finds himself, we cannot ignore the fact that the Vietcong, and the commanders of the regular D.R.V. forces involved, have never hesitated to subject the civilian population of South Vietnam to the most brutal acts of mass terrorism? Is it not possible that by trying to tie the hands of our allies, however great the military need in respect of the targets attacked, we may make the position of the total civilian population of Vietnam as a whole worse in the long run?

The Prime Minister

I have always said that a war of this kind will involve very serious suffering and, in many cases, from the very nature of things—and here I am not, of course, referring to United States troops—will lead to barbarities and atrocities such as have occurred, as we know, both by the Vietcong on law-abiding peaceful citizens and, of course, on the other side, by some of the South Vietnamese. I would have said that this is inevitable. I cannot, however, accept the implication of the hon. Gentleman's suggestion that our dissociation from this particular action, from which we have dissociated ourselves for the reasons which I have given, is likely to prolong the suffering, to prolong the war, or increase the risk of barbarities of that kind to the peaceable population, or that part of it, in South Vietnam.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon

Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of us on this side view with great surprise the suggestion from the Opposition that support for the general policy inevitably means that we must support every detail of the military measures which some people regard as being necessary to support the general policy, apparently even the use of the nuclear weapon?

The Prime Minister

I think that my hon. Friend puts it aright, though I do not assume that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was committing himself to all possible circumstances or possible methods, including the use of the nuclear weapon, which I do not think he mentioned.

Mr. Ramsden

Is the Prime Minister saying that, when he was in touch with Washington about the terms of his statement to-day, as he must have been, he did not take the opportunity to get clearance for similar consultations with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand whose troops are involved?

The Prime Minister

They were not called for in this situation because this action was not being taken by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand. Had we felt it necessary, or even possible, that we might be dissociating ourselves from actions of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, we would, naturally, have been in consultation with those Governments. This was an action communicated to us in the greatest confidence and secrecy by the United States Government, an action for which the United States Government were taking sole responsibility. They did not tell us—it would not have been right for us to press the point—whether they had discussed it with the Australian and New Zealand Governments.

Mr. Mendelson

In view of the Prime Minister's statement about the humanitarian aspects involved in this military strategy, and of the large scale of the extension of bombing close to major population centres, without any legal title whatever in any status in this war, will the Prime Minister support any move which might be made in the United Nations to brand this as an act of aggression, as an act of inhumanity, and give full British support to any such move?

The Prime Minister

The answer to that question is, "No, Sir". There are very many people in different parts of Vietnam without any title who have committed acts which I would certainly consider to be atrocities, for the reasons I have often given to the House. The United Nations, tragically, has not been able to involve itself in this matter, for reasons we all understand. This is why the Commonwealth took the initiative last year. But that initiative foundered, as all others did, on Hanoi.

I certainly would not be prepared to take any unilateral view of this situation as my hon. Friend suggests, but I would go along, as I did last year, with a proposal that we should ask for the ending of bombing in North Vietnam—all bombing, not just of the populated centres—and also of infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

Mr. St. John-Stevas

As the Prime Minister admitted in the first part of his statement that he lacked the information to assess the military reasons for this American action, was not he lacking one of the basic prerequisites of his very, very grave statement, and would it not have been better to wait until he had this information before rushing into making a statement of this kind?

The Prime Minister

I did not say we lacked all the military information. I have a great deal of military information on this. I said that it is difficult for us to take the decision, to assess the importance of any action which the United States Government regard as militarily necessary. I had a great deal of military information about it, and, despite that military information—looking at it in a purely military sense, this was a justifiable action—our opposition to it is for quite other reasons.

Several Hon. Members rose——

Mr. Speaker

Order. The President of the Board of Trade. Statement.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would I be in order, in view of what he has said today and the very many important issues which have been raised, in asking the Prime Minister whether he will give us a debate in the House on the very earliest possible day?

The Prime Minister

If you allow that to be in order, Mr. Speaker, may I say that this is, of course, a question for my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, but I had a discussion with him this morning, before this news became known. I know that he is anxious to have a debate on foreign affairs, in agreement through the usual channels, and, if it is possible—he cannot give a guarantee on this—before I go to Washington.

Mr. Goodhart

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The Prime Minister said earlier that he would be glad to clarify the Government's position on the sale of arms to America if a specific Question were put down. Last Thursday, I put down a specific Question on this subject for answer on Monday. I have received no answer about it. Could we, therefore, have a statement?

Mr. Speaker

That is not a point for the Chair.