HC Deb 25 January 1966 vol 723 cc39-55
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I will make a statement on Rhodesia.

The first aim of the British Government is to bring the Rhodesian rebellion to an end as quickly as possible, without lasting damage to the country. To this end, they will maintain and, as necessary, intensify economic measures with a view to a speedy settlement. But it is equally the purpose of the British Government to help the people of Rhodesia, without rancour or recrimination, in making a fresh start towards establishing—in the words of the Lagos communiqué— a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment". This fresh start must begin with an unqualified return to constitutional rule. It must also engage from the outset the capacities of all Rhodesians of good will in the work of overcoming the fears and antagonisms of the past and of setting Rhodesia on the road to independence in a spirit of inter-racial trust and collaboration.

The illegal declaration of independence and the subsequent actions of the rebel régime have created a new situation. Rhodesia's future course cannot be negotiated with the régime which illegally claims to govern the country. There is no confidence inside or outside Rhodesia that they could be relied on to lead the country forward to an independence in which racial harmony would be ensured. The Governor is authorised to receive from the régime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion is to be brought to an end. But discussion of Rhodesia's constitutional future must be with responsible persons representing all the people.

Rhodesia obviously cannot proceed at one step from rebellion to independence. For all the reasons given by Her Majesty's Government repeatedly inside and outside Rhodesia, and as I said at the United Nations on 16th December, 1965, a return to constitutional rule would not and could not mean an immediate advance to majority rule". That process must be renewed without delay or impediment: but it can come only with time—and time measured by African advancement and achievement.

Once there has been a return to the rule of law and the constitution, the British Government will immediately act to reverse the economic measures taken during the rebellion, in order to permit the resumption of Rhodesia's external trade, the reopening of markets for her exports, the inward flow of essential supplies such as oil and petrol, and the renewal of investment and the planned development of the country. The necessary Statutory Instruments are ready and could be made effective immediately.

This will be the first step in a period of economic and political rehabilitation during which passions may cool, the economic and social strength of the country may be restored and the energies of all Rhodesians may be enlisted in the tasks of reconstruction.

Assuming that there is a speedy and peaceful return to constitutional rule, the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the Governor to form an interim Government of Rhodesians, responsible to him, comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative Government for reconstruction. During this period, the police and military forces will come under the direct responsibility of the Governor.

The first responsibility of this interim Government, as of any Government, will be the maintenance of law and order. This will require not only the normal precautions against domestic disturbance and illegality, but also, in the special circumstances of Rhodesia, guarantees to prevent a repetition of the rebellion and to protect human rights. The British Parliament will need to be assured about the adequacy and effectiveness of these guarantees.

Urgent action will be needed to restore the Rhodesian economy. The British Government will be ready to contribute to the economic needs of the country and, in particular, to assist, in co-operation with other Commonwealth Governments, with schemes for the advancement, education and training of Africans so that they may as soon as possible play their full part in the development of the country' economic and political institutions.

Problems of political rehabilitation will also have to be tackled. Persons restricted or detained for purely political reasons will have to be released provided that they give guarantees that their political activities will be conducted constitutionally. The aim is to create conditions in which, while law and order is maintained, political activities may be conducted in security and freedom from intimidation from any quarter.

How long this period of interim government may last cannot immediately be foreseen; neither can the date at which Parliamentary institutions can be restored. Clearly, the period of interim government will last until conditions can be stabilised and the social and political wounds inflicted on the country can be healed. The views of the people of Rhodesia will have to be sought on the amendments and changes necessary in the 1961 Constitution to secure a resumption of full constitutional government on the basis of the five principles which have been proclaimed by successive British Governments and which, to avoid wearying the House, I will circulate again in the OFFICIAL REPORT. To these must now be added a sixth principle, namely, the need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

The course of constitutional development in Rhodesia after this towards independence must be based on the implementation of these principles and it will be necessary in due course to consider the means of ensuring this, for example, by a Royal Commission in preparation for the constitutional conference which will, in any case, need to be held before independence can be achieved.

The British Government have maintained throughout that, while Rhodesia is a matter of world concern, it remains a British responsibility and they continue to accept their full responsibility. They intend to discharge their task in the interests of all the people of Rhodesia. The British Government are convinced that there cannot be lasting peace, freedom or prosperity in Rhodesia until constitutional rule is resumed and the country is fairly set on paths leading to a just and democratic society in which full equality of opportunity is assured, racial discrimination is removed and the rights of Europeans and Africans alike are safeguarded.

Every week that passes while the rebellion continues increases the economic and political strains within Rhodesia and makes the eventual task of reconstruction more difficult. It now rests with all responsible Rhodesians who have the true welfare of their country at heart to bring the rebellion to an end before it is too late and to support the representative of the Queen in upholding constitutional law in Rhodesia.

Mr. Heath

Is the Prime Minister aware that on this side of the House and, I believe, also in Rhodesia—the great majority of people in Rhodesia—it is believed that the Government ought to be prepared to talk to any in Rhodesia who demonstrate that they want to return to constitutional development, and that that includes Mr. Smith and any of the members of his group? This is necessarily so, because the objective of the economic measures which have been taken and which we have supported is to persuade people to change their minds and return to constitutional rule. To ask otherwise is to ask for unconditional surrender, which can only increase the bitterness and damage in Rhodesia. I therefore ask the Prime Minister to stop hedging on this point and to say that without qualification.

Secondly, we believe that he should indicate quite definitely and clearly that there will be no question of direct rule from Westminster or through the Governor and, therefore, that the statement in the Lagos communiqué does not hold good.

When the Prime Minister included the sentence in his statement that the initial stage was a return to the rule of law and the constitution, to which constitution was he referring? On the basis of his statement there is no constitution to which the régime can return, and we therefore believe that the Government should indicate that there would be an immediate return to constitutional government with the Governor inviting all those who want to make such a return to serve in it.

Surely we are agreed that it is right that the offer of help for education and economic purposes should be made to Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister

When the right hon. Gentleman talks about "stopping hedging" on Rhodesia, I hope that that is his new year resolution. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the questions."] I will answer all the right hon. Gentleman's questions and I will say what they mean, too. His first question was whether I was aware of a feeling in Rhodesia, in the House and in the country, that the Government should be prepared to talk to anyone, including Mr. Smith, and that anything else looked like unconditional surrender. I think that the right hon. Gentleman would not want to give the impression that what he was proposing was to give to Mr. Smith and his associates by negotiation what Mr. Smith had tried and failed to take by illegal action. If I have him right, what the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting is that we should now legalise the swag of an illegal action.

The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that Mr. Smith is demanding as a condition of talks that we should first recognise the independence of Rhodesia and his Government. That is what Mr. Smith has said. If the right hon. Gentleman wants us to accept that, all I can say is that he is asking the British Government and the rest of the world who are fighting against this illegal action to accept unconditional surrender to those who have started the rebellion. That deals with the first question.

I have made it clear in my statement that the Governor is, and has all along been, authorised to receive any proposals from Mr. Smith and either discuss them himself or forward them to us. If those proposals are for a return to constitutional rule, they can be acted upon immediately. But if Mr. Smith is going to try to dictate from a position of rebellion—not through anyone except the Governor, because only the Governor is authorised to speak to him—to this Parliament and to this Government, to say nothing of world opinion outside, the terms on which Rhodesia can have her independence, or the terms of her constitutional future, that would be a surrender which we on this side of the House are not prepared to accept.

Any proposals on the lines which he keeps airing in public, to say nothing of what he says in private, for a little fiddling with the 1961 Constitution—which he refused to accept in free negotiations, choosing the path of rebellion as an alternative—are unacceptable, because they do not provide a basis on which the future of Rhodesia, under the five principles can be assured.

I certainly agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the issue of direct rule. There may have been misunderstanding before. It was never intended to be direct rule from Whitehall or from Westminster. I think that that is clear from what I have said in the House on a previous occasion, when I said that it might be minutes or hours, depending on the conditions, and that what we had in mind was the Governor and not direct rule. I said that at the earliest possible moment —and I said that it might be minutes—there should be a Government, responsible to him, which was representative of Rhodesian opinion.

The right hon. Gentleman asked which constitution I had in mind when I referred to a return to constitutional government. At this moment, the answer must be the present Constitution and the present Constitution is the 1961 Constitution, as amended by some fundamental changes to which this House has agreed. That is the proved and legal Constitution of Rhodesia today. That is the position from which the interim Government would start and I have set out the basis on which I think there should he further talks to get the constitution in Rhodesia under which elections could be held.

Mr. Heath

Is the Prime Minister aware that in his opening remarks he put into my mouth words which I have never used? While we may be accustomed to this, that does not make it any the less objectionable.

Is the Prime Minister aware that in his statement he said that the Governor was authorised to receive from the régime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion could be brought to an end? The point is whether the Governor is authorised to discuss them with people who wish to return to constitutional rule, including Mr. Smith and his colleagues. That is what the Prime Minister has never cleared up and that is what we want a clear answer about.

The present legal Constitution, as the Prime Minister describes it, puts all powers in the hands of the Secretary of State and the Governor and is, therefore, direct rule by the Secretary of State and the Governor, unless the House were to return to the 1961 Constitution, in which case we could have constitutional government, in the Prime Minister's sentence, in its real meaning.

The Prime Minister

There need he no misunderstanding about this. The right hon. Gentleman has just quoted the sentence saying that the Governor is authorised to receive from the régime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion is to be brought to an end, and the right hon. Gentleman asked whether that included Mr. Smith. That phrase has always included Mr. Smith. I have made it very clear on a number of occasions. In fact, I remember using the phrase "nuts and bolts" in this connection. If he wants to discuss the means of bringing the rebellion to an end and arranging what happens about troops, the Civil Service, the police, and so on, I do not see who but Mr. Smith could make such proposals. I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman read out the next sentence, which says that discussions of Rhodesia's constitutional future must be with responsible persons representing all the people. The illegal régime cannot negotiate the future constitutional basis upon which there will be a return to constitutional government.

The last point is that representations from any representative group, covering all opinions, including a member of the Rhodesian Front, provided that he is prepared to return to constitutional rule, would be contemplated. What there cannot be is negotiation exclusively with the Rhodesian Front. Negotiations cannot be on the basis that their racialist ideas will represent the future of Rhodesia. But if there were to be a group representing all sections of opinions, a very wide spectrum, it could include a member of the Rhodesian Front if he had forsworn rebellion and was prepared to agree to constitutional rule, the condition which the right hon. Gentleman asked for. I hope that that is clear.

I was asked "which constitution?" T thought that the right hon. Gentleman suggested that this would have to be the 1961 Constitution for this Government under constitutional rule, more or less from the word "go". I have pointed out the difficulties of the 1961 Constitution in previous exchanges in the House. Under the 1961 Constitution one has an elected Parliament. It is not a representative Parliament, but it is elected. That Parliament today would be totally unfitted for handling the constitutional future of Rhodesia. It has sat in rebellion, it has promoted, perhaps even forced, a rebellion.

One could not have a Smith Parliament providing the legislative side of the new constitution, nor, in my view, would it be a reasonable proposition to say that one should then elect a new Parliament on the basis of the present electoral provisions and franchise, or else this reasonable and representative Government under the Governor may become involved in an eternal clash with a racialist and, as we now know, semi-Fascist Parliament.

The interim Government would have executive power. The legislative power would be non-existent, except in so far as this House transferred legislative powers to the interim Government, which we could do under the Southern Rhodesia Act. I think that the House would want to insist on a tight control over questions of human rights and racial discrimination.

After that, there would be consultations throughout Rhodesia to find upon what constitution free elections could be held, and then a return to full constitutional rule, not only executive but also legislative.

Mr. Grimond

In view of the speculation that there has been about the purpose of today's statement, would the Prime Minister make it clear, beyond all doubt, that this is not what has been referred to as an offer of negotiation, but a statement of the British Government's aims? The statement makes it abundantly clear that, so far as the future of the country is concerned, the Government are not prepared to negotiate with the present régime. Would the Prime Minister also bear in mind, when looking to the future, that the 1961 Constitution gives extremely inadequate guarantees to Africans and that it would be impossible to go back to that Constitution unless it is not only amended, but amended in a very radical way?

The Prime Minister

This was a statement of aims, but it was more than that. It was a spelling-out, in greater detail than before, of the way in which we think that these aims should be pursued. I have said much which I have said before. On two separate occasions in December I spelt out more fully how we see the interim Government and this very thorny problem—I think that the whole House must agree that it is a thorny problem—of the question of legislative power.

When the right hon. Gentleman says that we must not negotiate with the Smith régime, this was the point with which I was trying to deal. We cannot deal with an illegal régime anywhere, and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition very fairly said this when he was in Rome last week, and challenged Mr. Smith on this and other points. I do not think that there is any disagreement about this, at any rate.

There can be no negotiations with the illegal régime. We can consider their propositions for ending the rebellion and give quick effect to them, but the negotiations as to the constitutional future of Rhodesia, even under interim Government, must be with a wider-spread and more representative group of persons.

Mr. Shinwell

Does my right hon. Friend not realise that what he has said this afternoon is the most reasonable approach to the resumption of negotiations? Does he further appreciate that no reasonable person, unless hopelessly biased against the present Government in their attitude on the Rhodesian issue, can object to the Governor being authorised to receive representations from anyone in Rhodesia, including Mr. Smith? The only difficulty appears to be whether the Governor, being apparently under house arrest, has the facilities for receiving representations, and, when he does receive representations, conveying them to my right hon. Friend.

The Prime Minister

I think that this is a reasonable statement and it is a statement of the terms for a settlement. It goes hand in hand with the tightening of the economic sanctions which occurred before Christmas and went further last week and which, in due course, will be still further tightened.

Mr. Goodhew

Negotiation under duress.

The Prime Minister

We are dealing with a rebellion, and the word "duress", coming from hon. Gentlemen opposite, is an extraordinary use of the English language. I hope that it will be agreed that this is the most reasonable course. I believe that it is the only honourable course so far as this country is concerned, and more particularly, so far as the world is concerned. Some hon. Gentlemen think that this is a problem only between Britain and Rhodesia. I assure them that this is the biggest delusion under which not only Mr. Smith is suffering, but under which they, too, are suffering.

Mr. Smith can go to Government House at any time he wants, but he will have to get it clear in his own mind that he is going to see the Governor, because he believes that Mr. Dupont is the Governor, or legal representative. He can go to see the Governor whenever he wants, and he has had informal talks with him, through Sir Hugh Beadle. No doubt this will go on.

Mr. J. Amery

Is the Prime Minister aware that it would be quite unrealistic to believe that he will find any responsible body of Europeans prepared to co-operate with him on the basis of the terms which he has just announced? [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish."] Can he clarify the reference he made, in the context of the security forces, to the need for certain guarantees? Can he clarify the statement he made about the need for certain guarantees to be given? He was speaking about the security forces. Is he thinking of the introduction of British troops after the rebellion has come to an end?

The Prime Minister

First of all, I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is unrealistic to feel that any responsible body of Europeans could accept these terms. I am not a defeatist about the Europeans of Rhodesia as he is. Is he really telling us that they are, all of them, a bunch of racialists who will—

Mr. Amery indicated dissent.

The Prime Minister

It was his own leader who joined with other party leaders before Christmas in referring to Rhodesia as a police State. I cannot believe that the majority of European Rhodesians want a police State and want to impose censorship. I cannot believe that the terms upon which they would insist for any breaking up of the rebellion must mean a rejection of these perfectly reasonable twentieth century terms. If that is his definition of reasonableness, then it tells us much about him as it does about the Rhodesian situation.

Perhaps, because I was reading rather quickly, I did not make myself clear on the guarantees. I think that I used the word "guarantees" twice. In the context of security, I said that we should require guarantees from detainees who had been arrested under the emergency regulations, that they would pursue their political aims on constitutional lines and not have recourse to intimidation.

The other use of the word "guarantees" was, I think, in the context that this House would require guarantees about human rights and about racial discrimination. By that I mean that when we delegate what I loosely call the legislative responsibility to the interim Government of Rhodesia, I think that this House would be right in seeking, as a condition of this, full guarantees about human rights, whether by making it an entrenched reserved position, covered only by the British Parliament, or in some other way. It is too early to say, but that is what I mean by guarantees.

Dr. Bray

Is my right hon. Friend aware that his statement will be examined with the greatest interest by many people in Rhodesia who will see it as offering an alternative to the Smith régime, including many former supporters of the Rhodesian Front? Is my right hon. Friend further aware that it goes as far as is practicable while maintaining the support of the African majority in Rhodesia?

The Prime Minister

I hope that my statement will have the effect which my hon. Friend has said. It may well be that there are some who think that it is perhaps early to be making a statement of this kind because while the economic measures are biting very deeply and quickly into the economic situation in Rhodesia it is a fact that they have not yet been felt to any great extent by the general public—with the possible exception of the petrol rationing.

One hopes that this will all come to an end before the sanctions are felt more deeply and make more difficult the job of reconstruction. But there are some who feel that more people will have to be aware of these economic sanctions before that can be accepted. I hope that that is wrong. This was meant as a declaration of the terms on which we can return to constitutional rule. If it is not accepted this week, I hope it will be accepted next week, because each week that passes will make it more difficult politically and economically. This statement glands from today as a permanent invitation to those Rhodesians who want to return to constitutional rule as a means by which they can do so.

Sir G. Nicholson

I wish that the Prime Minister had been with me in Rhodesia earlier this month. He would then have understood the deep distress with which I listened to his words today. Surely his words will be interpreted in Rhodesia as meaning that, unless the Smith régime is overturned by internal action, sanctions will be applied to their ultimate and logical limit, with the complete destruction of the Rhodesian economy, leaving behind a legacy of unutterable bitterness which will never be retrieved or eradicated.

Will not the right hon. Gentleman, even at this late hour, think again and realise, as anyone who has been to Rhodesia will tell him, that if he does not negotiate with the Smith régime now there is nobody who can negotiate with him in the foreseeable future? The right hon. Gentleman, by his words today, has condemned Rhodesia and possibly all that part of Africa to the most ghastly tragedy.

The Prime Minister

I am sorry that my words have caused regret to the hon. Gentleman. It would have been, I am afraid, quite impossible for me to be with him in Rhodesia, because I for one, in common, I feel sure, with most hon. Members—and I am sorry about this, in view of the line which the hon. Gentleman has taken in the past—would never have stayed with a Minister who is a member of an illegal régime while it was in illegal rule.

It is not for me to say what pressures were put on. One gets so many reports from inside Rhodesia. But the message with which the hon. Gentleman came back—it might have been better if he had perhaps remained more at arm's length from this very, very competent brain-washing police State. But the reports which one gets from other Members of this House who went there, and who did not come so closely into contact with this particular Minister but met Mr. Smith, give a very different picture of the situation in Rhodesia.

At least, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is very difficult. I agree with him that passions are very deep there. I must tell the hon. Gentleman that one of the main reasons for that is the systematic censorship, slanting of the news, and control of television and radio over a period of two years by the very men from whom he was getting the arguments which he has used this afternoon.

Mr. Speaker

Mr. Rowland.

Sir G. Nicholson

On a point of order. The Prime Minister has made a personal attack if not on my integrity at any rate upon my sincerity. May I have the opportunity of replying to the right hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Speaker

I listened very carefully to what the Prime Minister said. I do not think that he made any attack on either the hon. Gentleman's sincerity or his integrity. It may have been on his judgment. But this is a matter of political argument between the hon. Gentleman and the Prime Minister.

Sir G. Nicholson

I am very sorry, Mr. Speaker, but, with great respect to you, I cannot accept that. The Prime Minister said that I deliberately submitted myself to propaganda on the part of the enemies of this country. He implied that I made no attempt to see the Governor, Sir Hugh Beadle or anybody else. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker

Order. I hope that when honourable and very respected Members of the House are saying something which is very personal and important to them the House will listen to them in silence.

Sir G. Nicholson

Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker; I am truly grateful. I very much regret what the Prime Minister said to me. I hope that he will withdraw the imputations. I assure him and the House that I kept a perfectly open mind in Rhodesia and saw whom I liked. I was not brain-washed or propagandised in any way whatever.

The Prime Minister

Further to that point of order. I made no such imputations against the hon. Gentleman's integrity or his sincerity. I made strong imputations against his judgment. I made strong imputations—and I would do so again—against what I considered to be a most serious error of judgment made by hon. Members in staying with someone who, under our law, is committing treason. We know that this is perhaps one of the problems of the legal situation, but I believe that it was wrong to do that.

I never said that the hon. Gentleman did not see the Governor or Sir Hugh Beadle, because I knew perfectly well that he had seen the Governor and Sir Hugh Beadle. But I believe that when one comes in close personal contact from the beginning with a person as notorious as the one to whom I referred this cloud's one's judgment. Because of my respect for the hon. Gentleman, which I have often expressed in the House, I expressed my deep regret that he should have spoken in this way today. It is a reflection purely on his judgment which, I am sure, will be shared by other hon. Members.

Mr. Heath

Further to that point of order. The Prime Minister clearly referred to my hon. Friend as having been brain-washed by the person with whom he was staying. Should not the right hon. Gentleman withdraw that?

Mr. Speaker

I have already ruled that nothing out of order took place. I let the matter continue so that the personal feelings which arose in the mind of the hon. Gentleman who raised it should be cleared by the right hon. Gentleman. I hope that they have been cleared in the hon. Gentleman's mind. However, no point of order arises

Mr. Rowland

I should like to put two questions. Is my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister aware that any suggestion from any quarter of the House, responsible or irresponsible, that there should be negotiations with Mr. Smith has a profound effect in Rhodesia? In other words, it would encourage Mr. Smith to persist in the policy to which he has committed his country. Any such suggestions have to be regarded in this light. Is my right hon. Friend further aware that, from conversations which some of my colleagues and I had with Mr. Smith, the situation at the moment is that Mr. Smith is interested only in negotiating something which would ratify the independence which he has seized?

Secondly, is my right hon. Friend aware, as I trust he is, that his statement today that any future Government would be comprised of Rhodesians will be treated with the greatest pleasure by large sections of opinion in Rhodesia, not only those opposed to Mr. Smith but what I call the present reluctant patriots who are going along with him because they know of no other course at present?

The Prime Minister

My hon. Friend's first point about statements made by hon. Members is a very difficult one. I tried to deal with it in the debate which we had before Christmas. I think that we all welcome the fact that as many hon. Members as are able to go to Rhodesia should do so, although there is always the dilemma of any hon. Member in making pronouncements there, with whatever degree of sincerity, giving the impression that this House as a whole is less than fully resolved in bringing the illegal régime to an end and, therefore, even taking the risk—I know that it would never be taken deliberately or consciously—of stiffening the régime or supporters of it to remain in this illegal posture longer than they would otherwise do.

I agree that there has been misunderstanding about my hon. Friend's second point. It was right to spell out the intention that the interim Government should consist of Rhodesians and not, as some mistakenly thought, of a covey of civil servants sent from this country.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

If I may ask a question on a rather different point, I think that the objective of us all in this situation is that there should ultimately be majority rule. The Prime Minister said in his statement that the time that this will take will have to be measured by African advancement and achievement. I take it that there is no question of an arbitrary time limit.

The Prime Minister

Yes, that is absolutely right. This is really a repetition, with which I may have bored the House before but it needs to be said again and again, of something which I said on my last day in Salisbury: that one cannot set a date by clock or calendar time. It has to be set by the extent of achievement, particularly the willingness of Africans to come into Parliamentary government and to come into Ministerial government, and the willingness of others to give them a chance to do it, as well as the point, which both sides of the House have so often stressed, of the need for education and training, particularly training in Parliamentary work and in administration.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker

Order.

Mr. Wall

Mr. Speaker, I should like to move the Adjournment of the House.

Mr. Speaker

Not at this stage. The next business is a statement by the First Secretary.

Following are the five principles which were originally circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 718, No. 174, col. 646, on 1st November, 1965:

  1. 1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
  2. 2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
  3. 3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
  4. 4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
  5. 5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.