RHODESIA

HC Deb 05 December 1966 vol 737 cc1053-80

8.54 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about Rhodesia.

Since my announcement of 27th April that informal talks were to be held the House has been extremely patient and has recognised my inability to give information on the progress of the talks, which it had agreed would be confidential. The time has now come when the House must be put in full possession of the facts as they now stand, more than seven months after Mr. Smith indicated to the Governor his desire to engage in informal talks.

Altogether, three series of talks were held in London and Salisbury at official level before the first visit of my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary to Salisbury with my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General in September.

These talks were mainly directed to two main issues. First, the method and conditions of a return to legal and constitutional rule in Rhodesia and the determination of the question with whom official negotiations could subsequently take place. Second, an informal exploration in detail of constitutional problems to see what amendments would be needed to the 1961 Constitution to give effect to the six principles which had been the basis of discussions with the legal Rhodesian Government up to 11th November, 1965.

Practically the whole of the discussion during this period was on the problem of an ultimate constitutional settlement, though the representatives of Her Majesty's Government made it plain at the outset and repeatedly warned that a settlement would have to be reached on the problem of return to legality, and warned, too, that before independence could be granted a fair and free test of Rhodesian public opinion would have to be carried out under a constitutional Government.

Mr. Smith, through his officials, insisted on discussing the constitutional proposals first, indicating that he needed to be satisfied about the ultimate constitutional settlement before being ready to discuss what he regarded as a purely procedural matter of the return to constitutional rule. We insisted that before any settlement could be reached both issues would need to be dealt with.

By the time of the visit of my right hon. Friends, in September, no progress had been made in the constitutional talks. Nor, indeed, though my right hon. Friends' visit was extremely useful in informing a wide section of Rhodesian political opinion of our requirements and proposals for a settlement, was there any advance whatsoever on either the constitutional settlement or on the conditions for a return to legality during my right hon. Friends' visit.

Mr. Smith and his colleagues were left by my right hon. Friends in no doubt of our intention to act within the terms of the Commonwealth Prime Ministeres' communiqué and no doubt at all about the fact that, while adequate time remained for a settlement if the will were there, the programme envisaged in the communiqué did not admit to unlimited time nor to wasted time. It was not, in fact, until my right hon. Friend again took the initiative in visiting Salisbury on November 25th to 27th, just as we were getting very near the operation of the timetable of which Mr. Smith had been informed, that any signs of movement were detected.

My right hon. Friend returned a week ago with a report indicating for the first time a real possibility that a satisfactory agreement might be reached on the constitutional issues which would give full guaranteed effect to the six principles on which we insisted. The report also indicated, very much for the first time, some sign of movement on the question of return to legality. Mr. Smith had, in fact, indicated that he was prepared to consider returning to the legal 1961 Constitution if a satisfactory constitutional settlement could be agreed. This was said last week for the first time. Mr. Smith said, in fact, to my right hon. Friend that, given a satisfactory solution, he would be prepared to consider surrendering what he called his independence by returning to the legal 1961 Constitution—provided that a satisfactory constitution and settlement could be agreed.

Despite all disappointments—and I can put it no higher—of every round of discussions which we, and indeed our predecessors, have had with Mr. Smith and his colleagues, the Government decided that before we finally had to report to the House, with all the consequences that would ensue, that there was no prospect of an agreement, one last effort should be made.

Accordingly, last Tuesday Mr. Smith was informed that my right hon. Friends and I would be prepared to meet him, on the clear understanding that the purpose of such a meeting would be to reach a final settlement, if it proved possible to reach agreement both on the terms of a constitutional settlement and on satisfactory arrangements for the return to legality. He was informed that I should have full power for this purpose and that it was essential that Mr. Smith should have similar powers and should be authorised to reach a final agreement, if the basis for a settlement were seen to exist.

As the House knows, we met him, and the Governor of Rhodesia, who was accompanied by the Chief Justice, for two days of intensive talks in H.M.S. "Tiger" at the end of last week. I will not weary the House with the successive twists and turns of these discussions—[HON. MEMBERS: "Twists?"] I shall be ready to answer any questions from hon. Gentlemen opposite when I have finished—but their outcome was that we both signed at midnight on Saturday, in the presence of the Governor, a working document setting out in detail all the essentials for a settlement.

On the amendments necessary to the 1961 Constitution which would be required to give effect to the six principles, Mr. Smith and I reached complete agreement, as hon. Members will see when the White Paper is available later this evening. The House will see that the requirements of the six principles have been met in full with effective constitutional and external guarantees.

On the return to constitutional rule, again the document sets out in detail what is required. The programme envisaged that an Order in Council would be made immediately to give the Governor the constitutional powers required for setting up an interim Government. He would then have appointed a broad-based interim Government, to be headed by Mr. Smith, and this Government would have been, in effect, on a legal basis by the middle of this week.

Mr. Smith and I agreed, subject to a condition which he laid down and which I will come to later, possible names for the five non-Rhodesian Front Ministers, European and African, who would be included in this interim administration. The existing Legislature would have been dissolved and the Governor would have exercised full legislative authority. During this period the test of acceptability under the fifth principle would then have been carried out and, provided that it had been completed, fresh elections would have been held not later than four months from the date of restoration of constitutional rule.

Agreement was also reached, without conditions and again in detail, about the procedure, as distinct from the timing, for testing the acceptability of the proposals for an independence constitution to the Rhodesian people as a whole. This was to be done by Royal Commission, to be appointed by Her Majesty's Government, after consultation with the new Rhodesian Government. Censorship was to have been lifted and freedom of political association and activity on democratic lines would have been permitted.

We agreed, also, on a procedure to give effect to the requirement laid down in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' cormmuniqué for the release of political detainees. To deal with this, a judicial tribunal was to be appointed by the legal Rhodesian Government, but including a British representative nominated by the Lord Chancellor, to consider the detention and restriction of persons on security grounds.. Such detention and restriction would have been authorised only if the tribunal was satisfied that the persons concerned had committed, or had incited the committing, of acts of violence or intimidation.

It was agreed that if, as a result of the report of the Royal Commission, Her Majesty's Government were satisfied that the proposed constitutional settlement was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, then immediate effect would be given to it by legislation, which we undertook to introduce in this House, the agreement to be further underwritten by a treaty binding both of us to maintain the Constitution. This treaty, as I explained to Mr. Smith, would be registered, as we are required to register it, with the United Nations. And any breach of this treaty, such as a coup d'état, either by European or by African extremists, would entitle us—indeed, I feel, would require us—to seek from the United Nations mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7, sanctions not necessarily confined to economic sanctions.

If, as a result of the report of the Royal Commission, Her Majesty's Government decided, however, that the proposed Constitution was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, there would still have been a legal Government under the 1961 Constitution with whom we could have explored alternative new proposals for an independence Constitution.

After all that has happened, the House will understand the anxiety I expressed to Mr. Smith that in these circumstances, if complete agreement had been reached, Mr. Smith, if the Royal Commission reported adversely, might perhaps again illegally declare independence. Nor did Mr. Smith's reply to my expression of anxiety do anything to dispel those suspicions. This would mean that while we had ended sanctions, as we were ready to do this week if Rhodesia returned to constitutional rule, he might once again return to illegality, an easier operation, you might think, than the reimposition of sanctions. Therefore, I thought it right in these circumstances to leave him in no doubt that if this were to happen we would go immediately and without any preliminaries to the United Nations for effective mandatory sanctions.

Equally, I thought it right to warn him that in conditions of a second U.D.I. he could no longer in all circumstances count on, still less abuse, the assurance I had given before the first declaration, that we would in any circumstances not use force, for example, to reinforce economic sanctions. And in the condition envisaged in a breach of the Treaty to which I have just referred, including a possible coup d'etat, either by European or African extremists, equally we would not consider ourselves bound by our earlier pledge that force would never be used. Mr. Smith understood this.

By 5 p.m. last Saturday it was open to Mr. Smith to sign an agreement with me covering all the issues providing for an immediate return to constitutional rule, the immediate unwinding of our sanctions provisions, and the urgent initiation of all the procedures leading to independence on terms which I would have no hesitation in recommending to this House as fully implementing all the six principles and that of the guarantees, internal and external, that this House has the right to demand, and as equally implementing the terms of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué. This was the position at 5 o'clock last Saturday.

Mr. Smith who had throughout indicated his willingness—within the authority he had been given—to reach agreement on the terms of an appropriate independence Constitution, continued—as he had every right to do—to reserve his position on two points related to the return to constitutional rule.

First, while he was prepared to discuss the procedures for an immediate return to legality—which he had told my right hon. Friend a week earlier he was prepared to consider—he had yet to make up his mind whether he could accept a situation in which he gave up what he called his independence with only the hope and not the certainty that the independence Constitution we had agreed would be shown by the Royal Commission to be acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole. While he was confident that it was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole there was, he felt, the possibility that the final verdict might go against him. He continued to insist that the illegal Government should continue, sanctions being lifted, until he knew where he stood as a result of the Royal Commission's report.

I told him that a fair and convincing test of acceptability would be quite impossible in circumstances where an illegal régime was possessed of emergency powers and executive control including broadcasting and television and that we were not prepared to grant even interim recognition which he demanded, particularly since it was clear—as he made clear—that if the verdict went against him he would insist on maintaining his present illegal powers indefinitely. No British Government and few hon. Gentlemen could have agreed to such a proposal. Equally, though we discussed in great detail the composition of the broad-based Government, including the outgoing as well as the incoming personalities, he said that he had not yet accepted the principle that a broad-based Government should be created.

It was understood that having the document as a whole now before him, he would inform me later in the evening whether it was acceptable in its entirety or not. However, after a delay of some hours, Mr. Smith informed me that he had no authority whatsoever from his colleagues to give his agreement on either of these two points, or even to commend our agreed working document to his colleagues. Knowing his difficulties—and I did not underrate them—I agreed that instead of reaching a final settlement which I had authority to do—and I understood that he had come on the same basis—he should return to Salisbury without any commitment on his part either to sign the document as a whole, or even to agree to recommend it to his colleagues. It was, therefore, agreed that both documents should be considered by the British Government, and by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, on the clear understanding that it must be accepted or rejected as a whole, and a straight answer given, "Yes" or "No", by this morning. It was, therefore, understood and agreed that there could be no question of further amendment of the document which expressed clearly a decision on the principles and issues of policy which have been discussed time and time and time again between the British Government and the Rhodesians for many months—indeed, many of them for many years—and which could not, as we both agreed, be fluffed by any form of words which sought to evade that decision.

Before he returned to Salisbury, Mr. Smith, in the presence of the Governor, was left in no doubt about the consequences of any refusal or failure to accept the document. He was told that the consequences set out in paragraphs 10A and 10B of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué—on the conditions laid down in those paragraphs—would be set in motion. He was told what this would mean for Rhodesia, and of the immediate dangers for Africa and even more widely, if he and his régime, whose claim to legality has not been recognised by a single country in the world, insisted in continuing on a course which has earned the condemnation of practically the whole of mankind. He was left in no doubt about the action which we would take, and also the action which would be taken internationally. Equally he was left in no doubt about our resolve—however long it might take—to bring to an end a situation which, when he created it, he said would be a nine-days' wonder.

The House knows Her Majesty's Government announced yesterday their acceptance in its entirety of the document Mr. Smith and I worked out together. This evening the House will have heard with sadness that that same document has been rejected by Mr. Smith and his colleagues. They have confirmed that they insist on maintaining their illegality until, in conditions in which no free expression of Rhodesian opinion would be possible, a Royal Commission has reported and independence has been granted.

They have announced that they have accepted the principal changes in the 1961 Constitution which are set out in the document, as a basis for independence. Their refusal to accept the settlement as a whole stems from their insistence on their refusal to return to legality unless they themselves can remain in power while the agreed constitutional settlement is being tested by Rhodesian opinion. The implications of this are obvious, and no one in this House would be ready to accept those implications. Indeed, if reports from Rhodesia which have come this evening are correct, they have also rejected any concept of sharing power with representatives of a wider section of Rhodesian European opinion and they have rejected the proposal that two respected Africans, whose names were agreed between Mr. Smith and myself, should become part of the interim broad-based Government that we have proposed.

At least the House, and the world, have been left in no doubt about the isues which are at stake, after all that has happened since last Thursday. It is clear that power for its own sake and the insistence of retaining that power in the hands of a small unrepresentative minority have dictated the outcome.

I believe that it was right to try to reach a settlement which we could defend consistently with the principles we have proclaimed and consistently, equally, with our honour both in this House and before the bar of world opinion. No one—including many in Rhodesia who have previously put their trust in that group of men—could condone their refusal to accept the settlement which would have provided for them an honourable way out of the situation that not we but the illegal régime created. For us to have accepted what they were demanding would have been a betrayal of the principles on which our own democracy is based and the principles to which the multiracial Commonwealth and the United Nations are dedicated.

When my right hon. Friends and I decided to hold this parley with Mr. Smith, we knew that some might say that we were mistaken to venture on such a task. I believe that we were justified in what we did. The fact that the hand we proffered has been rejected does not alter that conviction. From that rejection certain inevitable consequences must now follow in accordance with the programme that we agreed with our Commonwealth colleagues in September. Mr. Smith was clearly warned of this in terms he clearly understood. He knew that we, the British Government and this House, were not prepared to suffer the destruction of our principles—or of the Commonwealth—for the sake of safeguarding from world opinion the actions of a small and irresponsible minority.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will be flying to New York tomorrow to take personal charge, so far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, of the actions which must follow in the United Nations. My noble Friend, Lord Caradon, has been instructed to ask for an early meeting of the Security Council.

Mr. Speaker, I regret to have had to present this report to the House. [An HON. MEMBER: "The right hon. Gentleman did not have to."] I am prepared to face hon. Gentlemen opposite in a minute, and to face them with the consequences of their attitude. Until then, I have to say that I regret that I have had to present this report to the House. I believe that we could have done no more.

Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley)

The House is grateful to the Prime Minister for coming here tonight and making a statement after the efforts he has been making during the past few days, which, I am sure, the House will believe were fuly justified, and I thank the Prime Minister for making that statement.

The House will realise that the statement is one of the utmost gravity, as the right hon. Gentleman himself has emphasised. It will be a bitter blow to millions of people in this country and far beyond that it has not yet been possible to reach a negotiated settlement of this problem.

The situation, as I think the Prime Minister will agree, is a complicated one, judging from his statement, and it is in many ways, as far as Salisbury is concerned, also a confused one. I am sure, therefore, that the House would wish to consider the Prime Minister's statement most carefully, together with the White Paper which, we understand, is to be produced later this evening.

In the meantime, I ask the Prime Minister to clarify the position in what I think is one vital respect. Is it correct to say that the proposals in the working paper fell broadly into two parts, the first being proposals for the Constitution based on the six principles, on which the Prime Minister's words were "The requirements of the six principles have been met in full, with effective constitutional and external guarantees." If that is so, I think that the House would agree that very great progress has been made, and this is a remarkable achievement.

Secondly, the other lot of proposals deal with the method of the return to legality, and it is here that it has not been possible to reach agreement. May I ask the Prime Minister this question on this vital point, which we have always emphasised ever since his statement of 25th January: what was he proposing should be the legal basis for the interim Government to which he proposed Rhodesia should return?

From reports on the tape tonight, it appears that it was being asked that the control of the Armed Forces and the actual appointment of Ministers should be placed under the Governor, and if this were to be under our own Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, this would, therefore, be the direct responsibility in both cases of the British Government at Westminster, as I understand the situation. Is this what was being proposed?

While I fully recognise the point made by the Prime Minister about the request of Mr. Smith as far as their own powers in Rhodesia were concerned, could the right hon. Gentleman clarify the point as to what is he proposing for the future interim Government?

Finally, I am sure that the House would feel that where so much agreement has been reached on the constitutional procedures for the future, it would be a matter of the utmost regret if the dire consequences which are to follow, which the Prime Minister has foretold, were to come about as a result of differences about the return to legality on which the whole House was hoping that it would have been possible to reach agreement between the two Governments concerned which would satisfy the principles and requirements of both.

The Prime Minister

I can reply only by leave of the House.

First, may I say that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the statement which I have made is not only one of gravity, but one of some complexity. There is a White Paper available in the Vote Office, or it will be available in a few minutes. I understand that that will have to be studied. I regret that, for reasons which he will understand, I was not able to send the right hon. Gentleman an advance copy of my statement. It was so late that we got final confirmation. I should have liked to have sent it to him.

The right hon. Gentleman said that it is clear that the argument falls into two parts and that progress was made on the constitutional issue—perhaps surprising progress. That progress was not made, not by one inch, during all the months that we have been discussing the matter since April, until my right hon. Friend's visit, on his own initiative, to Salisbury a week ago. [Interruption.] We have been talking since April and were willing to talk in January. No progress has been made by one inch on the Rhodesian side to a solution. There was no insistence throughout on a braking mechanism that even the right hon. Gentleman would not have accepted. It was not until my right hon. Friend's visit, during the last few days before the Commonwealth communiqué time-table began to operate, that there was this beginning of movement on the part of Mr. Smith and his colleagues.

It is a fact that after some very hard bargaining—we made a number of concessions, too, although none which I could not defend against the background of the six principles—it was only at the meeting this weekend that we were able to reach agreement here. But I think that it is wrong to suggest that we can separate these two, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be trying to do.

In the first place, in my view and that of my right hon. Friends, it is impossible to say that we could operate a free test which is required under the fifth principle which the right hon. Gentleman, my predecessor, insisted on with so much determination against a background of an illegal constitution, armed, as the Leader of the Opposition has said—I quoted this to Mr. Smith—with all the powers of a police State.

But, secondly, it is not only a question of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of making such a test which we argued with Mr. Smith. It is also the fact that if one is to hand over to Mr. Smith and his colleagues, as we were prepared to hand over, the responsibility for a future Rhodesia, this must be based on trust as well as on the test to which I have referred. If he was not willing to agree to return to legality as a condition of that offer—which I know many people have condemned—I do not believe that one would have the conditions of trust which would justify his being given what no Government in this country has given in our generation, and that is the right of independence without majority rule.

We have a very distinguished record in that in successive Governments right hon. Gentlemen opposite as well as ourselves have over many years handed over to their own sovereignty one people after another, and we have always insisted on majority rule first in our lifetime, in the lifetime of most of us. If we have been prepared to hand over to Rhodesia, uniquely, independence without majority rule, I think that it requires some trust and some sense on their part that they are prepared to make some sacrifices. In this case the only sacrifice that we asked them to make was a sacrifice not of independence, but of an unreal dream world of a Walter Mitty independence which is recognised by no one except them.

There is not a Government in the world which recognises the 1965 Constitution. European Governments of various complexions have been expelling Mr. Van der Byl—known to some hon. Gentlemen opposite—because he did not carry a valid passport.

I hope that no hon. Gentleman opposite will claim that the Rhodesians have a legal independence under the 1965 Constitution. All that we were asking them to accept was that they should return to a legal constitution—under the same Prime Minister. That was all that we were asking. That should not have been difficult. Without that, I submit to the House, there is not the trust which would justify handing over to them responsibility for the conduct of the country and of guaranteeing the progress to majority rule over a period of years which was involved in our constitutional settlement.

The right hon. Gentleman asked what legal basis there would have been if Mr. Smith had accepted return to constitutional rule. The answer is, simply and plainly, the 1961 Constitution. That is all—I will come to the military point in a minute—that we were asking of him, though—it is an arguable point but he and I agree—if he returned under the 1961 Constitution it would be appropriate to dissolve the Rhodesian Parliament, which would first require an Order, which would have been done under the 1961 Constitution in this particular. What would then have been involved would have been that the Governor would dissolve Parliament constitutionally, which would mean that the Governor could govern for four months without Parliament. In these circumstances we proposed that the legislative authority would be vested in the Governor, and in this he would be advised by his own constitutional Rhodesian Government

We required, also, that it would not be the existing purported Government with all the same members. I do not think that anybody in this House could have agreed to a Rhodesian constitutional Government including Mr. Dupont, who, during this year, has purported to represent the Queen as quasi-regent in Rhodesia. We would have had to insist on his removal. I would add that in my discussions with Mr. Smith there was no controversy about the removal of some of his colleagues.

Hon. Members

Cheap.

The Prime Minister

This is not cheap. This is a statement of fact.

I would hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite would insist that someone who had purported to be the Governor without the Queen's authority could not be a member of a legal and constitutional Rhodesian Government. If any of those hon. Gentlemen opposite who have enjoyed his hospitality, and have encouraged him in the course that he has followed, believe that he should have been a member of a legal constitutional Government, I hope that they will have the guts to stand up and identify themselves.

I return now to the other point raised by the right hon. Gentleman. It would have been under the 1961 Constitution, as it would have been under the powers of that Constitution, that the Parliament would have been dissolved. But, under the same Constitution, that would have required an election in four months, during which we hoped that the Royal Commission would have completed its task. There would have been no question—and I know that this has worried the right hon. Gentleman for many months, and I have not been free to deal with it because of what I have said—and there has not been any question in any of our discussions with Mr. Smith from May onwards of direct rule, whether direct rule from Whitehall or direct Governor's rule. As I say, I know that that worried the right hon. Gentleman. I only wish that I could have made it clear. He knows why I could not.

As regards control of the Armed Forces, I hope that, now that there has been this break tonight, we shall not start using the facilities which Mr. Smith has for uncorrected means of disseminating information through Government-controlled radio and television and a Government-censored Press, to falsify the facts. We shall publish tonight in a White Paper the document which he and I agreed. I will tell the House now in advance—and hon. Members can study this for themselves—exactly what was involved in the control of Rhodesian troops.

There was no more in the document than that, while the Governor is and always was the titular head and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and while he would act as advised by his legal constitutional Government, we would have agreed with Mr. Smith—and he raised no difficulty about this—the appointment of a Defence and Security Council which would consist of the Governor, of the Ministers in the legal Rhodesian Government responsible for defence and for law and order, of the heads of the Armed Forces, who are Rhodesians, of the chief of police, who is a Rhodesian, and of one representative of the British High Commission.

If that is now being presented to Rhodesia so soon as being taking control of the Rhodesian Armed Forces, then I think that I am justified in some of the things which I have said about misrepresentation of the facts.

That would be for four months only—from now until independence. It would only be for this limited period while the Royal Commission was doing its task and while this House, if the Royal Commission so reported, was carrying through the independence legislation. After that, the only reference to defence in the document—and we have agreed this—is that we would enter into discussions for a defence agreement between two sovereign countries.

How that can be represented as control over the Armed Forces, as I understand he is reported to have said tonight, I cannot myself comprehend, though we must always bear in mind, in the overheated atmosphere in Rhodesia, the possibility of being misreported, not least as I gather that he was addressing from outside his offices a crowd of exuberant and perhaps rather extremist supporters.

The right hon. Gentleman came finally to the point where he said that there are dire consequences resulting from this decision. I agree. That is why I so much deplore the fact that, when settlement was within our grasp, we could not get it because they insisted on a constitutional settlement based on "Heads I win, tails you lose". They had to give up their posture of illegality and enter into a legal constitution, and they said that they would not do that until they knew that they were to have legal independence on their own terms. That really is the point. They refused to accept the test of acceptability by the Royal Commission, and said they must hold on to what they have, or what they think they have, so that they could hold on to it for ever if the Royal Commission reported against them.

I am in no doubt where responsibility lies for this break, but I would say to the right hon. Gentleman that it is making too small a thing of this to suggest that we had agreed on all the big things about the Constitution and disagreed over a quibble about the return to legality. The question of the return to legality—[Interruption.] I was not suggesting that that is what the right hon. Gentleman said, but I think that it might have been deduced, from some of the noises from behind him when he said it. I know that he is not easily persuaded by those noises, but it is important that he should not be—[Interruption.] There is no doubt about the response given by some hon. Members to that statement by the right hon. Gentleman.

I am sure that when the right hon. Gentleman has had time to consider this—and it is only fair that he and the House should have time to consider it—he will feel that this is not a quibble over protocol. It is essentially a matter of principle that this House could not possibly justify handing to those who have voluntarily, for their own purposes, entered into a condition of rebellion, the fact that they should be free to end that rebellion, and end it only on conditions when they got what they wanted.

Mr. J. Grimond (Orkney and Shetland)

Is the Prime Minister aware that many people will have heard with deep regret of the determination of Mr. Smith to persist in his illegal course of conduct? May we have it quite clear that he has refused all supervision from outside over the return to legality?

Further, may I ask the Prime Minister whether, now that he is taking the serious course of sending this matter to the United Nations, he is in a position to assure the House that if the United Nations agree to mandatory sanctions, they will be effective? I ask that because many of us feel that if we are to have sanctions we should be assured that they will this time be effective.

The Prime Minister

Yes, Sir. I am not sure to what the right hon. Gentleman is referring when he says that Mr. Smith has rejected all possible terms for outside supervision. The position is as I stated it. We were proposing to act in the mast constitutional way in accordance with the Constitution. We did not ask him to go and say to the Governor that he had sinned against the Constitution. We just wanted to authorise the Governor to say that since Rhodesia has no Prime Minister, or no Minister at all, the Governor on noting that vacuum should invite Mr. Smith to fill it on some of the conditions laid down. There was no outside supervision. The only outside supervision would have been, I think I am right in saying, the supervision of the test of acceptability of this proposition to the Rhodesian people as a whole, where Mr. Smith not only agreed, but suggested, that a Royal Commission should be appointed by Her Majesty's Government.

The only other element of supervision would have been the appointment by my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor of one member, and one member only, of a tribunal otherwise appointed by the legal Rhodesian Government to supervise the release from detention of detainees whom it was considered safe to release and who were not there on any criminal charge.

It is our intention that the mandatory sanctions should be effective. I hope to have a chance of saying—I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, but I think that it is important to say this—that we have now, in accordance with our undertaking, proceeded, or shall be proceeding, to move in the Security Council for selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. I am confident that, given their acceptance by the Security Council, all members of the United Nations will fulfil their obligations and will loyally apply the sanctions in question. This does not involve any of the issues which have been the subject of recent public comment.

The first step is to lay down the effective sanctions. If, and it is entirely hypothetical, any country were to decide that it could not conform with the United Nations' decisions, this would create a new situation, which in due course would no doubt be raised. It has not been raised yet. It is not raised this week. But the House must be clear that at the Commonwealth conference I had the fullest support from and understanding of my colleagues, particularly leading African statesmen, that we are committed to selective sanctions against Rhodesia only.

Moreover, they agreed with us that not only must we proceed step by step—and this is a lengthy process—in dealing with this situation, but also, as we said, and they agreed, that this must not be allowed to develop—they understood this—into a confrontation whether economic or military involving the whole of Southern Africa. As the House will join my Commonwealth colleagues in recognising, such a confrontation, economic—and economic might lead to military—could have incalculable consequences for Southern and Central Africa going far beyond the issues raised by the Rhodesian problem. Indeed, as I told my Commonwealth colleagues, it could rapidly dwarf the Rhodesian problem, and nothing would ever be the same in Central Africa again, whether in Rhodesia or some of their own States. Certainly in these circumstances anyone in this House might predict the consequence that my Commonwealth colleagues accepted at this Conference, that in these matters we must continue to be in control of the situation.

Mr. Robert Maxwell (Buckingham)

Can my right hon. Friend say what rôle South Africa played in these negotiations? Does he expect South Africa to comply with selective mandatory sanctions? Further, can he tell the House, now that we have regrettably had to hand this matter over to the United Nations, whether the United Kingdom is to bear alone all the economic consequences of these sanctions, and what steps Her Majesty's Government propose to take to alleviate the cost of these sanctions, which are inevitable?

The Prime Minister

So far as South Africa's actions in the last few days are concerned, I have no direct knowledge of these. We have been in touch with a number of countries—both inside and outside the Commonwealth—which might be affected, but I have no knowledge of what action or line they have taken. As for the future, it is entirely hypothetical to assume that South Africa will or will not take a particular line.

As for the bearing of the burden by this country, the burden that we have been bearing has been exaggerated—perhaps rather damagingly from the point of view of the impact on Southern Rhodesia. I had to point out to Mr. Smith that we had lost about £35 million worth of direct exports over the last year—very serious, and we all regret this—but, on the other hand, our exports have risen by £350 million in total in world markets—so it is possible to exaggerate the effect—although I have left out particular invisibles and certain other things.

As for our bearing the whole burden of economic sanctions, the purpose of making them collective and universal is to ensure that some countries which have been quietly cashing in—or nationals of friendly Governments who have been quietly cashing in—will now have to conform with the general situation. More effective sanctions will be possible, and a much fairer sharing of the burden.

Mr. Sandys (Streatham)

The Prime Minister's statement is a very grave one. I should like him to clarify one point, which he stressed. He said that the proposal was to return to the 1961 Constitution and that there was no question of asking for agreement on direct Governor's rule. I cannot reconcile that with the Prime Minister's statement that during this period the Governor was to have complete legislative power and that the interim Government were to have purely advisory functions. That, surely, is direct Governor's rule. It is the normal kind of rule which comes about in a Colony before it is established with full internal self-government. I should like clarification on that point.

All I would say is that the Prime Minister has told us that there was—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker

Order. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will ask questions at this stage.

Mr. Sandys

I did not hear what you said, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker

I asked the right hon. Gentleman if he would ask questions at this stage.

Mr. Sandys

On a point of order. I understood that we were on the Adjournment. I was making a very short speech. I can try to put it in the form of questions, but I did not think that it was necessary. Are we not on the Adjournment?

Mr. Speaker

Do not let me take away valuable time. We are on the Adjournment, but I think that we get a much wider expression of opinion if we have a number of questions.

Mr. Sandys

Is the Prime Minister aware that he has told us that complete agreement was reached on the basis for a future constitution for Rhodesia which fully satisfied the six points? Does he realise that the British people will need a great deal of convincing that he was right to throw that away on account of disagreement over the procedure during the four months' interim period?

The Prime Minister

On the right hon. Gentleman's first question, the answer is, yes, it would be a return to the 1961 Constitution. Parts of that are already suspended by Orders approved by this House. We would have to reinstitute, for example, the power of the Governor to appoint the Prime Minister and other Ministers. The fact that there will be no Parliament is permissible under the 1961 Constitution. Parliament is currently in abeyance. Mr. Smith was rather keen on this as we were. The Governor would dissolve Parliament and within four months there must, under the Constitution, be an election. In those difficult circumstances it would be better for the broad-based Government not to have the particular Parliament which has been there up till now. This was no matter of controversy in H.M.S. "Tiger". It might be for the right hon. Gentleman, but if he is to the Right with Mr. Smith, he must get up and tell us.

That is the executive power. Regarding legislative power, it was thought it would not be likely that any legislation would be required during the period we are talking about. In case legislation was required—and I can see circumstances where it might be; for example, to deal with the work of the Royal Commission, the setting up of the Commission on tribunals, and things of that kind—we said we were prepared to clothe the Governor with legislative power by Order in Council approved by Parliament that the Governor, in exercise of that legislative power, would, apart from one or two exceptions, be advised by the legal 1961 Constitutional Government.

I think the right hon. Gentleman, when he studies this, will feel that it is, for all practical purposes, a return to the 1961 Constitution. We did insist that it should be a broad-based Government. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman would have done the same. He knows some of the personalities involved. We have to re-create trust and confidence in that country, including the trust and confidence of the vast proportion of the population who had no vote or voice in choosing the Government that committed U.D.I.

Regarding the second question of the right hon. Gentleman, he was trying to suggest that while we reached agreement, as basically we did, on the Constitution—Mr. Smith has said so, and so it would appear to be so—he said that we threw away the possibility of an agreement by insisting on the conduct that was required in the next four months. If the right hon. Gentleman treats so lightly the issue of the return to legality, which is a matter, however he may disguise it, in constitutional terms of rebellion against established authority—[An HON. MEMBER: "What is the penalty?"] It is not for me to apportion the penalty which he, if I may say so, with great distinction upheld for so many years at the Commonwealth Conference; if he now suggests it is a light matter that anyone taking account of it is throwing away a vital issue, he is sinking a long way from the position which he occupied only two years ago.

With his knowledge, and with my confirmation of that knowledge, he insisted with so much courage on these principles which we have been upholding, that for him to say that they could be carried out on the basis of an irresponsible illegal group of men who rejoice in their irresponsibility and illegality—[Interruption]—who have nothing to lose by accepting our invitation to return to legality, then I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman's argument. The position was that I had the authority, the Governor had the authority, and Mr. Smith had the authority to accept this. Before he left H.M.S. "Tiger" on Saturday night, he could have accepted the Governor's invitation to become the Prime Minister of Rhodesia on the terms I have said. If the right hon. Gentleman says that on those terms I threw away the chance of a settlement, it means that the right hon. Gentleman has lost all sense either of the constitutional argument or of everything he has upheld as a Privy Councillor.

Mr. Archie Manuel (Central Ayrshire)

With reference to what has been said by the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), is my right hon. Friend aware that I believe that the great majority of hon. Members on both sides of the House, and the vast majority of the people in the country, will support my right hon. Friend for his unceasing efforts since last April to get Rhodesia to return to constitutional Government? Is he further aware that we applaud his last effort, and that many thousands of people in this country will be very sad tonight that he did not obtain the success he deserved?

Is my right hon. Friend aware that we recognise that sanctions are now the last stage, that many innocent people will be hurt by them, but that we are, nevertheless, delighted that he is sending my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to ensure that these sanctions are strong? And I hope that they will be as complete as possible in the circumstances now facing us vis-à-vis Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister

I particuarly welcome what has just been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel). He expressed doubts a fortnight ago about the visit of my right hon. Friend to Salisbury and it is generous of him now to say what he has said about my right hon. Friend's visit, and my own. It would not have been possible to have come near to agreement but for the visit of my right hon. Friend, as the whole House recognises, a fortnight ago, and I thank my hon. Friend for what he has said.

With regard to the fear that there will be widespread suffering as the result of the rejection of chances of settlement, I hope that my hon. Friend is wrong, but I fear that he may be right. Mr. Smith is in no doubt of the possible consequences of the action he has taken. I have always taken the view about Mr. Smith—some would say, contrary to all the evidence—that he allows himself to be pushed around by some pretty evil men. I still like to think of him as wanting this agreement to go through, but that he did not have the weight or the courage, or however one wants to put it——

Sir Cyril Osborne (Louth)

Did the Prime Minister give him enough time?

The Prime Minister

I hope that the one thing that we shall not hear about now is time. In the first place, we were closeted together in H.M.S. "Tiger" for as long as we needed to reach agreement—for 48 hours—and on Saturday morning we could have pursued this. But he had told me—I thought that he had come with authority——

Sir Robert Cary (Manchester, Withington) rose—

The Prime Minister

I am answering my hon. Friend, and dealing with interruptions as I go along.

I had hoped that he had come with authority, but he told me that he had to go back——

Mr. Mark Woodnutt (Isle of Wight)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It appears to me that the Prime Minister is making speeches. He has just said that he will deal with interruptions as he goes along. Can you explain precisely what the form is?

Mr. Speaker

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I hope that the Prime Minister will be brief, as I want to allow more questions.

The Prime Minister

By leave of the House to speak again, the position about time—[Interruption.] If the House does not want to hear me—[Interruption.] If some hon. Members prefer to wallow in ignorance and prejudice they may do so, but I think that the rest of the House wants the facts.

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there was enough time. Mr. Smith made it very clear that he knew all the issues, understood the issue; that it was a question of whether his Government, as he called it, would or would not accept the issue. There was nothing more to argue about, or come to a possible compromise. We all tried—there was not one. Therefore, time would not have made any difference.

I can assure my hon. Friend that the sanctions will be thoroughgoing, that they will be effective, and that they will be selective.

Mr. Reginald Maulding (Barnet)

One question that seems important is that of the interpretation of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué. Is it now the position that all offers are withdrawn, and that the Government will not in future contemplate any proposal for independence before majority rule?

The Prime Minister

The position is—and, again, Mr. Smith understands this—that, as we said in the communiqué, if, and only if, we have the support of our fellow Commonwealth countries on the question of sanctions—not merely in introducing them, but in limiting them in the way we feel it right to limit them—we are prepared to go ahead on mandatory sanctions, and make that declaration. Mr. Smith has been under no illusions. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman emphasised to him when in Rhodesia that this will be the position. Mr. Smith has since had three months to make up his mind about the kind of settlement he would accept. It really is no longer our responsibility. I had to tell him that we were not prepared at the end of the day to risk the very existence of the Commonwealth in September by demanding the right to have a last go at reaching a settlement with Mr. Smith. The Commonwealth very nearly broke up; it was very near indeed.

I am not prepared to recommend to this House that we let the Commonwealth break up for the sake of a very small group of people in a country whose electorate is only one-tenth of 1 per cent. of the population of the Commonwealth as a whole unless I feel that that small minority is right. Nothing that has happened in the last 72 hours persuades me that it is.

Mr. Stephen Hastings (Mid-Bedfordshire)

In spite of the main disappointment, is it not undeniable that the Prime Minister has made very real and precious progress? In that case, and in view of the vast dangers which lie ahead if he takes this matter to the United Nations, I put this to him as a perfectly serious suggestion. Would not be possible to appoint the Royal Commission, which presumably would contain Rhodesians as well as people from this country, and let it go out there and be the judge of the free expression of opinion? I put this to the Prime Minister as a serious suggestion of a way out, even at this hour.

In the course of the Prime Minister's first statement, it seemed to me—perhaps I heard him wrong—that he said he had told Mr. Smith that in certain circumstances he would see fit to back up sanctions with appropriate force, or some such phrase. Will he explain to the House what he meant by that?

The Prime Minister

On the first question, the hon. Member, who, I think, has had some contact with Rhodesia himself in the last year, will agree that it would not be possible for a Royal Commission to do this task against the present background in Rhodesia, where there is no freedom of political expression. I do not think that the Royal Commission would get any more balanced a picture of Rhodesia than the hon. Member has if it tried to operate in those conditions.

I feel also that it is not much that we have had to ask the regime in Rhodesia—not to give up anything of value, not to give up independence, because it has no independence, but to give up a titular independence which they and they alone believe in. It is a delusion from which they suffer. That was all that we asked. For that, they could have had immediate constitutional power in Rhodesia. They could have had the chance of proceeding to independence on terms never previously granted.

They could have had the chance of a peaceful, democratic Rhodesia. They would have had guarantees against premature African rule. They would have had the chance of an economically prosperous Rhodesia. They have thrown all that away because they refused to end what does neither them nor anybody else any good—this illegal claim to independence.

On the question of military force, I said that if Mr. Smith accepted our terms and then turned back to a second U.D.I., in those circumstances our pledge not to use force to get a constitutional settlement would be ended.

Mr. John Lee (Reading)

Will my right hon. Friend accept that some of us on this side, hearing how near the Commonwealth came to breaking up, feel a sense of relief at what has happened? If sanctions do not succeed, is my right hon. Friend now prepared to use military force in backing them? Secondly, may we be assured that we will never again have any more negotiations with this man Smith? Thirdly, may we ask that although, up till now, my hon. Friend has refrained from considering direct rule from Whitehall as a possibility, he will now reconsider this in view of the latest break?

The Prime Minister

I said that the danger to the Commonwealth arose from my demand that I should have one last chance with Mr. Smith; but once it was conceded, after a very difficult conference, that the Commonwealth was committed, as I was, to allow this to happen, I do not see that the Commonwealth was in danger if that particular thing had succeeded.

I think that some of the other points raised by my hon. Friend are a bit unreal. We are now in a very difficult situation as a result of this refusal today, and it would not help if I were to go further in saying what we will and will not do.

Sir Lionel Heald (Chertsey)

Although this is an Adjournment debate, I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and will ask a question in the hope that I may have an answer and not a ninth speech. Is the Prime Minister aware——

It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment lapsed without Question put.

Sir L. Heald rose——

Mr. Speaker

Order. I am sorry, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman has lost his opportunity. Sir John Hobson.

Sir L. Heald

On a point of order. I began my speech on the Adjournment debate, having been called by you, Mr. Speaker. Am I now told to sit down?

Hon. Members

Sit down.

Mr. Speaker

Order. Noise does not help. I am sorry to appear discourteous to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. He had just the opportunity to put his question. Unfortunately, when we reach ten o'clock the Adjournment Motion is talked out automatically. I am ever so sorry.