§ Q1. Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Prime Minister what progress he has now made since his visit to Bonn in March in his efforts to obtain from the West German Government binding commitments to offset the foreign exchange costs of British troops in Germany.
§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)I would ask the hon. Member to await the outcome of my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary's visit to Bonn which is now arranged for 28th and 29th June.
§ Mr. Bruce-GardyneDoes the Prime Minister recall that three months has passed since he told us that he regarded this as a matter of urgency? In view of the two postponements of the Chief Secretary's visit to Bonn, can the Prime Minister tell us what has happened to cause the delay?
§ The Prime MinisterWe shall get the full story and how far the West German Government are prepared to meet our requirements, to which we attach so much importance, when my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary goes to Bonn. The reason for the postponement of his visit was the visit by General de Gaulle. We were told that since Dr. Erhard wanted to give his personal attention to this question when my right hon. Friend was over there, it would be better for him to come at the new date. That is a welcome assurance that the Germans are really working very hard on this question.
§ Q5. Mr. Zilliacusasked the Prime Minister, in view of Her Majesty's Government's policy that the economic burden and strain on the balance of payments of British defence costs in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must be reduced, whether he will now draw the attention of the Government of the German Federal Republic to the fact that the collective defence obligation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation applies only in case of unprovoked aggression, and that refusal to recognise and accept Germany's existing frontiers, claims to a share in nuclear weapon decisions and rejection of Her Majesty's Government's proposals for a European settlement through disengagement con- 234 stitute provocative policies releasing Great Britain from her North Atlantic Treaty Organisation obligations and justifying the return home of the British Army of the Rhine.
§ The Prime MinisterNo, Sir.
§ Mr. ZilliacusWhile thanking my right hon. Friend for his very clear and concise reply, may I ask whether he will at least give an assurance that the Government do not consider themselves bound to keep a British Army on the Rhine indefinitely, whatever the policy of the West German Government, and whatever the cost to the taxpayer?
§ The Prime MinisterWith regard to the old question of the force levels in N.A.T.O., I would refer my hon. Friend to what was said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence in the right place where this should be said, and that was at the N.A.T.O. Council of Defence Ministers.
With regard to the cost, not only to the taxpayer but more particularly across the exchanges, this question will arise in the first instance during the visit to Bonn of my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary.
§ Sir C. OsborneAs Soviet policy is no longer expansionist as far as the West is concerned, may I ask what is the real purpose of our Forces serving in Germany and why cannot they be brought home?
§ The Prime MinisterI am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is arguing from what is clearly, as we all recognise, a big change in the Soviet's attitude to the West—we have debated it many times—and saying that that is an argument for scrapping N.A.T.O. altogether or for scrapping the ground forces of N.A.T.O. If that is his argument, I would not follow him.
It is for N.A.T.O. collectively to decide how large our contribution should be or how large the force levels should be, and this is being done. Of course we all look forward to a situation in which we can get agreement with the Soviet Union for a withdrawal on both sides thus leaving the existing balance of military power between the two sides the same. This would be of great value to this country and to peace.
§ Mr. PagetIn view of the fact that this rather long Question appears to involve some anxiety about the future course of West German policy, does my right hon. Friend think that the best way to influence that policy is to withdraw the troops that we have got there?
§ The Prime MinisterI thought that I had made it clear that we were not suggesting any unilateral action of that kind. These matters are partly a question of economics—and I have explained the situation there—and partly a question of the deployment of N.A.T.O. forces as a whole, and that is a matter for multilateral decision.
§ Mr. HoosonWill the Prime Minister bear in mind the fact that if British ground forces were to be withdrawn from Western Europe and our example were to be followed by the United States it would leave German ground forces dominant in Western Europe—which might be a highly undesirable state of affairs?
§ The Prime MinisterI have said that this is a matter for collective decision by N.A.T.O. I am sure that that is right—although I am also sure that the hon. and learned Member would support, as we all would, any hopes there may be of obtaining, over a period of time, a possible withdrawal on both sides of the Iron Curtain.