HC Deb 15 July 1965 vol 716 cc782-92
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance returned from Hanoi yesterday and he has given my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and myself a full report on his discussions there. As the House is aware, my hon. Friend was unable to see any North Vietnamese Ministers or to obtain any undertaking that the Commonwealth Mission would be received in Hanoi. Nevertheless, during his five-day stay he was able to impress on the officials of the Fatherland Front and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with whom he had protracted conversations, the views of Her. Majesty's Government and of the Commonwealth Mission. My hon. Friend tells me that copious notes were taken throughout these meetings and I have no doubt that the arguments which my hon. Friend urged with all his accustomed fluency and persistence will be passed on to the leaders of North Vietnam.

In presenting his arguments in favour of receiving the Commonwealth Mission, my hon. Friend had to struggle against the evident conviction on the part of his North Vietnamese hearers that their prospects of victory were too imminent for it to be worth their while to forsake the battlefield for the conference table. In such an atmosphere it is scarcely surprising that he was unable to bring back any word of encouragement, but I am extremely glad that the arguments, which are not only our arguments but those of the Commonwealth and of much of the world, in favour of peace and negotiations, should at last, and for the first time, have been fully and faithfully expounded to the North Vietnamese in the artificial isolation of their own capital. They may not have exerted an immediate and visible effect, but I believe that the passage of time will reinforce them and that there will be a general recognition of what I believe to be self-evident, that the Vietnam problem will not be solved by military means alone.

As soon as this occurs, as soon as the North Vietnamese are ready to receive the Commonwealth Mission, or as soon as they are prepared to facilitate the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, then, I believe, we shall be on the way to the political solution which alone can bring the fighting to an end. I believe that my hon. Friend has contributed in no small measure to advancing the day when all the parties concerned can get round a table to reach agreement on such a solution.

Mr. Maudling

It appears that in this matter the Prime Minister has been less than frank with the House. For instance, is it not true, as reported in The Times, that when he told the House on Monday about the possibility of the Joint Parlia- mentary Secretary seeing Ho Chi Minh, he had already authorised his return to this country because his mission was abortive?

Secondly, is it not a fact that so far from contributing to the possibility of peace in South-East Asia, this humiliating rebuff to a British Minister, for it is nothing less—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] I shall not—has made it more difficult for the Government to contribute to the cause of peace?

The Prime Minister

The right hon. Gentleman, who, on Monday, was keen on this mission, and who, last week, was supporting it—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] I shall—had better make up his mind which foot he is standing on.

Mr. William Hamilton (Fife, West)

On Sir Alec's, I think.

The Prime Minister

I shall deal, first, with the right hon. Gentleman's question about timing. On Monday morning, having already told my hon. Friend that he should stay just as long as he felt it was right to do so in order to make his mission as useful as could be, I received a message from him saying that he felt It was time to return home, and asking for my agreement to that. I gave him that agreement, but just as I was coming into the Chamber I received a telegram—which the right hon. Gentleman can see if he wishes—saying that the plane which was due to pick him up had been turned back for the reason that I mentioned on Monday. In those circumstances, I naturally could not tell the House exactly when he would come back. We had expected him to come back on Tuesday.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (Mr. Harold Davies)

That is the truth.

The Prime Minister

My hon. Friend should know more about this than the right hon. Gentleman. As long as my hon. Friend was able to stay there, it was natural that he should make use of his time, and he still had not received a reply to his letter to the Prime Minister of North Vietnam asking to see him. So much for that question.

The right hon. Gentleman now says that this visit has harmed the cause of peace. He refers to it as a rebuff. What I want to be clear about is what he felt we should have done. Should we not have sent an emissary to Hanoi? Is that what he is saying? [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition accused my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary of falling into Communist trap. What claptrap this is! What we did achieve—not as much as we hoped for—was that for 16 hours my hon. Friend was able to urge the position which we have taken up in the House and which the Commonwealth has taken up on the North Vietnamese question.

Was this not worth doing? The right hon. Gentleman, who says that we should do it through diplomatic channels, had better get up at some time and explain how we could have diplomatic connections with Hanoi at a time when we do not recognise the North Vietnamese? This was the only chance, not only on behalf of Britain but of other Western countries, to get a voice in Hanoi, and the right hon. Gentleman's view on this is not the view of our colleagues in the Commonwealth, nor is it the view of the United States.

Mr. Maudling

But will the Prime Minister answer my question? When he made his statement on Monday, had he authorised the return of the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, which he did not tell us at the time, and why did he not tell us? Secondly, is it not a humiliating rebuff when a British Minister cannot even see the Minister of another Government?

The Prime Minister

The mere fact that I told the right hon. Gentleman that the plane was due to bring my hon. Friend back on Tuesday was an obvious statement to the House that he was due to come back on Tuesday. I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman is asking about. I said that the plane on which my hon. Friend was due to travel on Tuesday—surely a clear statement that he was due to come back, and I had authorised his return—had been turned back. I did not know for how long it would be turned back. Therefore, I did not know when he was coming.

As regards the rebuff to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, if anyone here is to try to play the part which I believe we can play to get peace, he has to be prepared to accept rebuffs. I said this last Thursday. I would rather have rebuffs than the attitude of right hon. Gentlemen opposite, who would be prepared to let this war go on for another two years without making any effort. The right hon. Gentleman knows that through every diplomatic channel we have made the effort that we could with the Russians month after month, as has my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. But we have no diplomatic relations with Hanoi. Can I get that into the right hon. Gentleman's head? He does not understand it.

If we do not have that diplomatic relation, the right hon. Gentleman still has to tell us how we could have taken any initiative at all. Let the right hon. Gentleman say clearly how the Opposition would have started any kind of negotiations with Hanoi. We did it by sending my hon. Friend. The Opposition have no answer. If the right hon. Gentleman is to talk about rebuffs and humiliation, I am surprised that he should do so in the presence of his right hon. Friend the Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath), after his experience in Brussels two years ago.

Mr. Grimond

Have the Government of North Vietnam definitely and once again refused to see the Commonwealth Mission?

The Prime Minister

Yes, Sir. They indicated to my hon. Friend that they could not go beyond what they had said in a public statement about their unwillingness to receive the Mission and they explained the reason for it to my hon. Friend.

Hon. Members

Who?

Sir Kenneth Pickthorn (Carlton)

rose—

Hon. Members

Sit down.

The Prime Minister

This is a twentieth century war about which we are talking.

Hon. Members

Cheap.

The Prime Minister

One of the difficulties that my hon. Friend found was that, as the North Vietnamese said quite clearly, it was difficult for them, having announced that they would not receive the Mission, in their discussions with my hon. Friend to go beyond what their own publicity had said; and if I may express a view, with which I am sure my hon. Friend will agree, nothing did more harm to his mission, despite the fact that I think it was useful, than the leak in this country, and the wave of publicity on the very eve of his arrival in Hanoi.

Mr. Peter Thomas

Is it not a fact that the Prime Minister told the House last Monday that he did not know whether his hon. Friend would be seeing Ho Chi Minh, when, in fact, the right hon. Gentleman knew that his hon. Friend would be unable to see him, and, in fact, that it was his hon. Friend's view that the mission was abortive?

Secondly, is the Prime Minister aware that some of us on this side of the House, and, indeed, many people in the country, are concerned that a Government who have publicly proclaimed a particular point of view were represented at Hanoi by someone who has consistently supported an opposite view?

The Prime Minister

The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt have time afterwards to consider whether he thinks that that remark was worthy of him. I do not think that it was. [HON. MEMBERS: "It is true."] The phrase that we had last week was that my hon. Friend would be brainwashed by the North Vietnamese. Having seen the full notes of 16 hours of discussions, let me say that it was my hon. Friend who brainwashed them, as anyone who knows him would expect.

I must deal with the right hon. and learned Gentleman's first question. When I spoke on Monday, it was by no means clear that my hon. Friend would not see either the President or the Prime Minister.

Mr. Harold Davies

Hear, hear.

The Prime Minister

My hon. Friend knows, and I know this. I have offered to show the right hon. Gentleman the telegram. My hon. Friend had been promised that he would see him. [HON. MEMBERS: "By whom?"] Promised by the people to whom he was talking in North Vietnam. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who were they?"] Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker

Order. The House is being rather unwise. I am allowed to permit only a limited number of questions on a statement and the more noise there is, from one side or the other, the more it reduces the possibility of my allowing any questions.

The Prime Minister

In a letter, as well as verbally, my hon. Friend had asked to see Mr. Pham Van Dong. This happened on the Saturday. He sent a telegram to me which arrived on Monday and said that his plane was due to pick him up on Tuesday and saying that he thought that he should return if they had not seen him by that time. I authorised him to return.

As I have said, just as I was coming into the Chamber I was told that the plane was delayed, which might have meant—in fact, it did not—delayed for another day. From the time he communicated with me—my hon. Friend probably sent the telegram on Sunday night—my hon. Friend still had hopes that in the day and a half left of his visit he would see Pham Van Dong. We had no information that he would not be seeing him, but we had, on the other hand, a contingent promise that he would.

Mr. Sydney Silverman

Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that all of us on this side of the House, including many who have been critical of some earlier aspects of Government policy, congratulate him on the initiative which he has recently taken and appreciate that it was a valiant attempt to get negotiations going and believe that a step forward has been made in a constructive sense?

On the issue of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, is not the basis of the negotiations that there is, in fact, an authority which exercises real authority in North Vietnam and does not this establish the basis of de facto recognition which might permit diplomatic negotiations to take place?

The Prime Minister

Of course, we do not recognise the authorities in North Vietnam. That is why our consular post there is not a diplomatic channel through which we can approach the North Vietnamese authorities. That is why unconventional methods have to be used if we are to say anything to them. I still believe that it was extremely valuable that for the first time someone from the West, expressing the Government point of view, was able to express in North Vietnam the views which my hon. Friend was able to express there. I thank my hon. Friend for what he said at the beginning of his question.

This matter leaves me with the position whether right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are not anxious to take every step available to peace, or whether their resentment is due to the fact that they are not there themselves to take those steps.

Mr. Soames

The Prime Minister appears to be somewhat surprised that the North Vietnam Government did not see his hon. Friend. Can he tell us what it was that led him to believe that the North Vietnam Government, which had already refused to see him, would receive his hon. Friend?

The Prime Minister

The North Vietnam Government had not given any of us any reply at a Government-to-Government level to the request that the Commonwealth Mission should see it. There was still some doubt on that question. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about Gordon Walker?"] The question was about the Commonwealth Mission and not about Mr. Gordon Walker. Indeed, regret was expressed to my hon. Friend that they had not received Mr. Gordon Walker.

So far as the Commonwealth Peace Mission is concerned: the mere fact that we did not have diplomatic relations with the North Vietnam Government meant that it did not receive the message handed to it by Her Majesty's Consul-General. Equally, an earlier American message sent through Her Majesty's Consul-General was returned because of the absence of diplomatic relations.

In these circumstances, I believe that we were right to try any method to try to get to them. We thought that my hon. Friend would be received because he had been told in London, on the authority of the North Vietnamese authorities, that he would be received by their Ministers. I believe that the reason he was not received was that when he got there he spoke so toughly in support of the line we have taken that they decided that there was nothing to talk about.

Mr. A. Henderson

Will my right hon. Friend assure us that he will not be diverted by the querrulous and niggling criticisms of the Opposition from continuing his efforts to bring about talks or negotiations with a view to bringing an end to the terrible conflict in Vietnam?

The Prime Minister

The answer to that is that we shall not be diverted by this kind of thing. Indeed, other measures are already going ahead to try to get a dialogue with those responsible. [HON. MEMBERS: "What is the difference?"] The difference is that we on this side of the House believe that this is a dangerous war and want to bring it to an end, and are prepared to take rebuffs in the course of this. Knowing that there is, no diplomatic channel, right hon. Gentlemen opposite say that we should not take any action at all. They and Chou En-lai have a lot in common.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

In view of the Prime Minister's remark a few moments ago, perhaps he will allow me to say, and perhaps he will accept, that we on this side of the House will always support any genuinely conceived initiative which will further the cause of peace. I would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friends would be the last to complain of the support we have given him for his policy on Vietnam.

May I just take this a little further? While we will always give this support in the case of a genuine initiative, as the Opposition it is our duty, if we think that an initiative is ill-conceived and doomed to failure from the start and will, therefore, prejudice an initiative in future which could be properly timed and have real impact, to say so.

The Prime Minister

If the right hon. Gentleman says that it was ill-conceived and that we were wrong to try this, he has a duty to say that as well. That was not his position last Thursday. Last Thursday his chief concern was to see whether we had got the permission of the Americans. I can now tell him that this was most warmly received by the American Government, not only in private but in public. There was a public statement to that effect. I am able to say that we were in the closest connection with them while my hon. Friend was there—and that was the only point which the right hon. Gentleman made last week. On Sunday, he said that the Foreign Secretary had fallen into a Communist trap. This really is a return to the old stuff which we used to get from him—Communists under the bed all the time.

But the right hon. Gentleman has another duty as the Leader of an alternative Government. It is to say whether he would take initiatives in this situation, recognising that Hanoi is the key, and whether he would take initiatives to have a dialogue with Hanoi. We have had no answer to that question from him.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

rose—

Mr. Speaker

I think that we have had enough of this—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I point out only that we have business to do and that the House will, I hope, have an opportunity to probe these matters further next week. However, if the Leader of the Opposition desires to ask one more question, I will permit it.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

Perhaps it would be better—

Mr. Shinwell

On a point of order. [HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down."] I will not sit down for you.

Mr. Speaker

Order. I hope that there will not be any undue din, because it might become hot. At present, I am trying to hear a point of order addressed to me by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell).

Mr. Shinwell

I will sit down for you, Mr. Speaker, but not for any hon. Member opposite. With great respect, that is all I was saying.

My point of order is that I understood you to rise a moment ago when you intended to put an end to the questions and answers on this subject. Will you be good enough to say why you are allowing the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition to put another question?

Mr. Speaker

I am sorry, but I do not feel disposed to submit to cross-examination. I think that, if the right hon. Gentleman refers to the last words used by the Prime Minister—it is difficult to carry these things in one's head—he will understand that anyone would have thought it proper in the circumstances to allow one more question from one individual. That is what I am doing.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

I think that it would, perhaps, be better if we returned to this in the debate on foreign affairs on Monday. I have just one question to put to the right hon. Gentleman on a very important factor in this situation. Apparently, the co-chairman-ship with Mr. Gromyko has been allowed to lapse over the last year. Will he try to ensure that it is revived?

The Prime Minister

The right hon. Gentleman is about six months behind the times in that question, if I may say so. I have reported many times to the House that, although there was a period during the winter when it appeared that the Soviet Government considered that the co-chairmanship was no longer operative, this had completely changed again in the spring.

I have reported this to the House—[Interruption.] Yes, in respect of the whole of Indo-China—and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary had a week of consistent talks with Mr. Gromyko on this when Mr. Gromyko was in London. I could not count the number of times—I shall look it up—that we have raised with Mr. Gromyko the question of activating, through the two co-chairmen, the 1954 conference. The Soviet Government raised with us the question of calling a Cambodia conference, proving that the co-chairmanship is active, and very recently my right hon. Friend has raised it again with Mr. Gromyko.

I said in my statement on Monday, and I said again last Thursday, that I hope that any question of discussion with Hanoi will lead to reactivation of this conference by the two co-chairmen, but Russia will not move without a move on the part of Hanoi. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition will, in the debate next week, tell us how he would have got things started in Hanoi without diplomatic recognition if not by the means which we have used.

Several Hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Speaker

We must pass on now. Does the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) wish to raise a matter?