§ 21. Mr. Wiggasked the Minister of Aviation on what date the first delivery of Phantom II's will be made to the Royal Navy; and what is the expected date on which deliveries of this aircraft will be completed.
§ Mr. AmeryI have nothing to add to the Answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) on 18th March.
§ Mr. WiggWould the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to explain why he is so coy about this? For over a year now it has been dangled in front of the Royal Navy that it would get the P1154. Then at public expense and a great amount of publicity the right hon. Gentleman goes off to the United States and buys the Phantom II. Now he cannot tell us either when we shall get it or what the order is. When are we to be given some relevant information on this matter?
§ Mr. AmeryI should have thought the hon. Member would have been the first to wish us to study very carefully all the considerations before we order aircraft, whether foreign or, indeed, British. No commitment will be made until we are satisfied on the technical issues and the costs, and until we have negotiated a satisfactory Government-to-Government agreement.
§ Mr. Farey-JonesIn view of that reply, will my right hon. Friend strictly bear in mind the enormous psychological impact on the aircraft industry of the purchase of these Phantoms, and will he undertake and promise to the House that 456 before any such contract is placed every possible avenue of employment in the aircraft industry will be scrutinised first?
§ Mr. AmeryWe naturally consider the full implications of the Government's decisions, in particular to order the Phantom, on the aircraft industry, and we will see that every possible step is taken to alleviate any difficulties which may arise here. As I have said, there is no commitment yet.
Mr. LeeThere are very serious technical problems which have not been resolved in the case of the Phantom. Will the right hon. Gentleman realise that when I put a supplementary question a moment or two ago which seemed to annoy him it was precisely this kind of thing that I had in mind, that we are spending huge sums of money, but that when the crucial time comes when we have to make an order, whether for helicopters or the Phantoms, we have to go abroad for it? It is this kind of thing which causes apprehension in Britain.
§ Mr. AmeryThere are indeed certain technical aspects of the Phantom solution which have not yet been resolved, and I can confirm this, that it will be some months before we are in a position to say whether they can be economically resolved or not. I was only taking the hon. Gentleman to task for running down the British aircraft industry.
§ Sir J. EdenIs it not a fact that a great deal of care was taken in trying to find a joint aircraft between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force and that this having failed it appeared that the best alternative to that was the Phantom airframe equipped with the Rolls-Royce Spey engine? If the difficulties can be overcome, is it not right that the Royal Navy should get the best aircraft available?
§ Mr. AmeryI would agree with my hon. Friend. The idea of a common aircraft proved to be impracticable. To have developed a special British naval aircraft as a Sea Vixen replacement would have been extremely expensive. If the technical difficulties can be overcome I have no doubt that the Phantom is the best solution. The fact that it will have a Rolls-Royce engine means at least that one-third of the cost is going to British industry, and it may well be that this will 457 have helpful repercussions and consequences in the entire field.
§ Mr. WiggOne can understand the right hon. Gentleman being cautious in a matter of this kind, but how comes it that all these doubts and second thoughts were not made clear by the right hon. Gentleman when for political reasons he came here and made an announcement that he was going to get the Phantom II?
§ Mr. AmeryThe hon. Member is quite wrong in saying that my right hon. Friend said what he said for political reasons. He needed to say we had a decision of intent before we could seriously embark on negotiations affecting both technical modifications and serious detailed discussions on estimates.