HC Deb 15 May 1963 vol 677 cc1504-14

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Rees.]

12.51 a.m.

Commander Anthony Courtney (Harrow, East)

Even at this late hour it is a great pleasure to welcome my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) on his first appearance at the Dispatch Box in his new capacity as Civil Lord of the Admiralty. I say this on behalf of many hon. Friends and myself. We wish him well in the very arduous duties that he has taken on and will give him every assistance in our power to produce the best answer for the Royal Navy, which, after all, is the object of us all.

It is in that spirit that I wish to raise a matter tonight relating to a serious gap which I believe exists in the post-war weapon policy of the Royal Navy which has been shown up particularly by recent developments abroad and which in its broadest sense can be described as a lack of development of surface-to-surface guided missiles in H.M. ships. On a small point of order. I suggest that the wording of the title of this Adjournment debate appearing on the Order Paper is incorrect. It should be "in", not "on" Her Majesty's ships.

We are invariably in a difficulty on these occasions in expressing technicalities and going into questions of weapon development which might well be confidential. I hope that my hon. Friend will bear with me if I refer to the well known reference book, "Jane's Fighting Ships"—in which, I assure the House, I have no personal interest—which is looked upon very highly by the navies of the major nations. I believe that the Royal Navy's post-war weapon policy has been dictated by several requirements based, unfortunately for the Navy and the nation, on the need for economy. We have cut in our ships, we have cut in our research and development, and from time to time cut in our dockyards and cut in our manpower.

As is the case after many major wars, the importance of sea power to this island nation has been virtually forgotten. At the same time, certain aspects of weapon development have gone well. We still hold first place among the navies of the world in anti-submarine techniques. I am sure that by comparison with our American friends our operation of large fleet aircraft carriers is second to none. In the "Oberon" class submarine we have perhaps the best type of conventional submarine in the world.

In guided missiles, however, the tale is not quite so happy. We have, it is true, specialised in surface-to-air guided missiles for the protection of the Fleet. We have the long-range Seaslug, now—it is understood—going in for a Mark II, and the short-range Seacat, both of which have been complained about and criticised to a certain extent, primarily on delays in their development, but which do, I believe, represent a very credible deterrent to aircraft attack on the Fleet or on task forces operating offshore in an amphibious capacity.

I am sure that there are two basic reasons why this weapon policy postwar has been allowed to fall into this pit. Setting aside economy for a moment, the Russian surface potential, with which we have felt it might be necessary to deal, has consisted primarily of the "Sverdlov" class of missile with a broadside of 12 6 in. guns based, as the House probably knows, on the "Mauritius" and "Kenya" class of British cruisers, which impressed the Russians so much when they were on board these ships in the later stages of the war.

The second factor which has influenced weapon development and development policy has, in my view, been the fact that we have retained since the end of the war fleet aircraft carriers operating fixed-wing aircraft which were considered by the naval staff to make up for the conscious lack of a developing surface-to-surface guided missile which could match the surface-to-air missiles which we had under development. We have our fixed-wing aircraft for reconnaissance duties. We have them for strike duties with the Anglo-American strike fleet in northern waters. We have them, and must continue to have them, in my opinion, for amphibious operations off-shore where high performance aircraft will inevitably be required in face of armed opposition to amphibious landings. Finally, as a third major role, we have the fixed-wing aircraft for the longe-range air defence of our task forces and of convoys, where necessary, proceeding along the sea routes.

In a sense, one can say that, post-war, our surface-to-surface fighting capability has been split. It is as though the old main and secondary armaments which were incorporated in the battleships, the capital ships of up to a few years ago, have been split into classes of ship—the smaller ships with 4.5 in. or 6 in. guns and a surface-to-air guided missile defensive capability, but with no really capable, efficient surface-to-surface weapon, and the aircraft carrier carrying the fixed-wing aircraft which acted in the main armament role for the Fleet.

An example of the effects of what I consider to be a most misguided train of thought by the naval staff and by the Admiralty as a whole has been the present generation of guided missile destroyers, so-called—the "Devonshire" class. They are fine ships, it is true—modern; fast, 32½ knots, I believe, with admirable armaments of surface-to-air guided missiles—Seastug and Seacat—to defend task forces, convoys, or whatever it may be, against attacks by enemy aircraft. They are wholly admirable.

But "guided missile destroyers" is surely a contradiction in terms. They are not destroyers. They are not really, in the true sense, guided missile ships because they lack a surface-to-surface capability which is provided in these fine ships only by 4.5 inch guns, perhaps with a range of 20,000 to 24,000 yards. I believe that a new situation has developed in recent years which makes this thinking, which was already out of date, extremely dangerous in the light of present circumstances.

I would quote three new factors in the world strategic situation, seen primarily from a maritime point of view. In the first place, our potential enemies, the Russians, have developed a powerful class of true guided-missile destroyer—very fast, probably with a limited endurance, undoubtedly at some disadvantage in sea-keeping qualities, and with a lack of accommodation for ships' companies, but with immense hitting power and great manoeuvrability, the hitting power being in a new development of a surface-to-surface guided missile which, I understand, has great accuracy, with visibility ranges of upwards of 30,000 yards, and which, while perhaps not having a very great rate of fire, has a considerable accuracy and carries a weight of projectile, which, as an alternative, can be nuclearised, and which is very much greater than any of the orthodox guns still in service in the Royal Navy.

We have, furthermore, a similar type of surface-to-surface guided missile fitted in small 100-ton or 160-ton motor gun boats of a typical Russian fast short-range class—about 40 knots, perhaps—and mounting, in the larger case of 160 tons, four of these surface-to-surface guided missiles with tremendous strike capacity. It is a sobering thought that even in this smallest class of gun boat the surface-to-surface capability of weapons out-ranges any guns now in service in the Royal Navy.

There is another factor to which I would like to draw attention. It lies in the change-over of the Western naval strategy from the concept of the strike fleet of aircraft carriers with a nuclear capacity to a scattered force of second-strike Polaris-type submarines and the impending withdrawal of the strike force. That has released a large force of Soviet surface vessels of the types which I described which can now be employed in other areas.

I should like here to mention the fact that although the Russians suffer from a grave disadvantage in the separation of their four main fleets, they are able to reinforce their Pacific fleet from the Arctic fleet which contains this mass of surface vessels via the northern sea route round the north of Siberia, which is navigable by the use of ice-breakers for about six weeks at the end of every summer. I believe that we may see a striking reinforcement of the Soviet Pacific fleet in the late summer of 1963, for the reasons which I have given.

The third and immediate factor which is upon us is the prospect of the use of naval power by the Russians in the Far East, perhaps in support of Indonesian action against greater Malaysia, whose support we have guaranteed from 1st August this year. We cannot but be mindful of Mr. Khrushchev's reference to Soviet forces engaging in "just colonial wars." We know of the close interest which the Soviet military authorities take in Indonesian affairs, of the large number of ships which are manned, perhaps by Indonesians, perhaps by Russians, perhaps by mixed Russian and Indonesian crews.

We do not rightly know, but the experience of some of us in the Spanish Civil War shows that, in practice, when the shooting starts it does not really matter very much what proportion of Spaniards, Italians, Germans or Russians is actually laying the mines or firing the torpedoes which sink our ships.

We have, finally, the Russian need to remedy the loss of face, if I may use an Oriental expression, caused to the Soviet navy by the confrontation by the Americans over Cuba in which it was subjected to a major maritime defeat.

We need urgent action to remedy these shortcomings, and I ask this evening for two assurances from the Government, if they can be given by the Civil Lord. The first is that the Admiralty should initiate urgent steps to develop an efficient type—or to acquire from abroad, perhaps from the French, perhaps from the Americans—of surface-to-surface guided missile to fill the gap which is existing in the extent to which other nations have gone ahead of us in this respect, The second is for the Government to give an assurance that they will not only retain the force of fleet aircraft carriers, of which we have four in operation at the moment with fixed-wing aircraft, but will take early steps to build and to initiate a replacement programme.

The Royal Navy is desperately short of weapons. There is a serious gap, I believe, in our surface-to-surface defensive power. We cannot remain in an inferior weapons position today, risking serious disaster, particularly in the Far East. It is perhaps 150 years since Lord Nelson said, "Close with a Frenchman or a Spaniard, but outmanœuvre a Russian." It is no good dealing at sea with a Russian unless one has weapons comparable to his own. I ask the Government to look at this question with urgency.

1.8 a.m.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. John Hay)

I should, of course, begin the remarks that I have to offer to the House on this somewhat technical subject by expressing my appreciation of the kind, good wishes with which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) began his speech.

You will no doubt have noticed, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that during the course of the last few years I have been obliged to come to this Box on quite a large number of occasions to answer Adjournment debates. Some of my hon. Friends thought that my translation to this new position would mean a temporary respite from this duty. The fact is that I have acquired two Adjournment debates after only three days in office, which shows that it was a completely wrong conception. However, I hope that all those hon. Members who wish to raise subjects on the Adjournment, to which I shall have to reply, will do so with the same moderation and cogency that my hon. and gallant Friend has shown tonight.

I realise that the task of acting as spokesman for that great Service, the Royal Navy, in this House presents difficulties to someone who has not been actively engaged in Service matters for a good many years. But I shall do my best. I can at least promise my hon. and gallant Friend that I shall study "Jane's Fighting Ships" with even greater interest. One of the few perquisites which have fallen to me is that I can actually have a copy of this valuable volume of my own—something which I have always wanted ever since I was a small boy.

There is a threat, on paper at least, from Russian missile firing ships to our own naval forces. It is quite natural for my hon. and gallant Friend to ask, as others have asked, why we in Britain have not developed a similar surface-to-surface missile system, since our possible adversaries already have one. In trying to answer this question, I shall, first, remind the House of the entirely different strategic position which the Soviet Navy has compared with the Royal Navy, or, indeed, the United States Navy, which also is in question here. There is no surface-to-surface guided weapon system in N.A.T.O. of characteristics similar to those in use, we believe, by the Soviet Union.

The Royal Navy has world-wide commitments, and these commitments require us to have an ability to operate our ships at a very great distance from their main bases or, indeed, from friendly territory. In addition, these commitments call for an ability to undertake a very wide variety of individual tasks. My hon. and gallant Friend mentioned only some of them. There is the defence of the sea lanes against submarines, against surface attack, against air attack. There is the support of our forces, either landing or actually operating ashore. There is attack upon enemy bases and enemy shore installations. Last, but not least, there is the great traditional rôle of the Navy, the destruction of enemy surface naval forces. With such a wide variety of tasks, it is, obviously, necessary that we have the most flexible weapons system possible.

The Soviet Navy is in a very different position, although it seems that the Russians are acquiring certain different types of commitment which do not permit them the same freedom in using their internal lines of communication, as they have done hitherto. Basically, the rôle of the Russian Navy is conceived as one not for the protection of shipping, but for its destruction and for the defence of Russia's own coasts. In comparison with the task falling upon the Royal Navy, this is a highly specialised business and one for which highly specialised weapons systems are very much better suited.

Having mentioned the general strategic position, I turn now to the effect that it has on the requirement for a surface-to-surface missile system. The Royal Navy requires fixed-wing aircraft to carry out its rôle in a number of different ways. There are several different tasks which are put upon the Navy's shoulders. There is reconnaissance, because, in the present state of the art, only the manned aircraft can search out and identify the target. There is surveillance by airborne early warning systems.

There is long range air defence of task forces beyond the reach of surface-to-air guided weapons. There is the strike at the coastal target in support of amphibious landings. There is the strike on the land target in close tactical support of troops. Then there is the strike on the inland target. I have not mentioned the requirement to attack enemy surface ships, which is, practically speaking, the only rôle which could also be undertaken by a surface-to-surface guided missile system.

Although it is conceivable that a surface-to-surface guided weapon may match the abilities of strike aircraft in this single limited rôle in some respects, it does not come up to the strike aircraft in every way. In particular, aircraft have a much greater maximum range and, within that maximum range, are infinitely flexible in the operations which they can carry out.

What is, perhaps, even more important than range is that strike aircraft have the ability to locate and identify targets before they actually commit themselves to an attack. This problem is important in the operation of a surface-to-surface guided weapon system and it is most easily solved by the use of manned aircraft to obtain the necessary data about the target and to ensure that the right target is selected and that it is in the right position for a missile attack.

When, as the Russian Navy does, one operates close to one's own coast, co- operation from shore-based aircraft is an adequate way of achieving the objective. For a navy such as our own, however, which has to operate over all the oceans of the world, often at long distances from bases or friendly territory, it is obviously impossible to rely on shore-based aircraft. Therefore, even for the operation of such a system, the presence of some kind or form of aircraft carrier is needed.

As I have explained, however, the surface-to-surface guided weapon, if we had it, would be undertaking only one of the many rôles which carrier-borne strike aircraft can carry out. Such a weapon could not operate at any great distance from the target without carrier support. Thus, as the situation stands, the surface-to-surface guided weapon would, to a great degree, be duplicating the function of the strike aircraft, which, for the reasons I have explained, is already a necessary part of the fleet.

As my hon. and gallant Friend is, no doubt, all too well aware—indeed, he was kind enough to commiserate with us upon the fact that we have to economise and do not have all the money that many of us would like—the resources available for the Navy are limited. It therefore follows that the justification for any major development or any major new construction programme has to be carefully examined.

To produce two systems to carry out the identical purpose would be very wasteful of our resources. Therefore, we have had to choose what we conceive to be the most flexible system, namely, the strike aircraft, and make it as good as we possibly can. We have not been able to justify the development of the more specialised surface-to-surface guided weapon as well as the strike aircraft. That does not mean that we would not like to have a surface-to-surface guided weapon system. It means simply that given our existing surface strike capacity, other things are more important.

My hon. and gallant Friend asked for two assurances. He asked, first, that the Admiralty should develop or acquire a surface-to-surface guided missile at once or as quickly as possible. He can rest assured that we will certainly keep abreast of the surface-to-surface guided weapon concept and the techniques which are developing in respect of it and also of any developments which may occur and which might require some modification of our position. So far, we have no cause to doubt that the course we have chosen is the right one.

My hon. and gallant Friend asked for a second assurance that we would retain fleet aircraft carriers and, indeed, add to them by way of replacement as soon as we can. I can only tell him that this matter is very much in our minds and that I cannot tonight forecast exactly what will happen. I cannot give the assurance in precisely the form that my hon. and gallant Friend would like, but I can tell him that already, in my two or three days in this post, this problem has been brought forcibly to my notice, and I can assure him and the House that I will give it a great deal of attention in the months that lie ahead.

1.20 a.m.

Mr. E. G. Willis (Edinburgh, East)

We are grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow. East (Commander Courtney) for raising this matter, and I join which him in offering good wishes to the Civil Lord in his new post. Can the Civil Lord say when the Government are likely to be able to make a decision on aircraft carrier replacements?

Mr. Hay

As I have said, I have been in this office only a few days and I cannot answer that question "off the cuff". No doubt, if he wishes to pursue the matter, the hon. Gentleman will put down a Question. We are trying to announce a decision on the matter as soon as we can, because we are aware of the need.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty minutes past One o'clock.