§ Mr. Wigg(by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Defence whether he will make a statement on the reinforcement of Singapore and Brunei by the 51st Infantry Brigade and whether he is satisfied that the strength and equipment of this force are of such a character as will enable it to undertake operations.
§ The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)A brigade of the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve has been brought to 72 hours' readiness.
It would replace our troops in Singapore should it be necessary to send further forces from there to Borneo. None of these troop movements has taken place either here or in the Far East.
I am satisfied that all these forces are capable of carrying out the various tasks which the Commander-in-Chief would allot to them.
§ Mr. WiggI should like to ask the Minister a number of questions. When did the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief make a request for these reinforcements? As this involves the cancellation of the move of 247 Gurkha Signals Company to the Rhine Army, what will be the signals position in the Rhine Army? Again, as this is a matter of moving the spearhead of the Strategic Reserve from this country to the Far East, what would be the position if it were necessary in the immediate future to reinforce the Rhine Army?
As to whether the Minister is satisfied about the operational strength, is he aware that the 1st Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers, went some time ago to Brunei 550 in strength; that the 5th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, which is now deprived of its guns—because the Government are short of infantry— and is to take on an infantry role, is 450 in strength? Is he further aware that the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers are less than 450 strong, and that the 1st Devon and Dorset Regiment in this 581 brigade—which, I remind the right hon. Gentleman, is the spearhead of the Strategic Reserve—is so weak that it cannot be sent at all?
Will the Minister give the House and the country a categorical assurance that these forces are sufficiently strong to carry out any operation, remembering that a previous Secretary of State for War, now the Minister of Agriculture, told the House that a strength of 635 had proved to be insufficient in Cyprus, and that the minimum, even for filling in an internal security requirement, was not less than 800? How does the right hon. Gentleman square his present statement with that statement?
§ Mr. ThorneycroftThere have been some reports in the last few days of the possibility of outside interference in the affairs of Borneo, so, in consultation during that period between the Commander-in-Chief there and the Chiefs of Staff here, it was thought proper to take this particular precaution. None of these troops has moved. If and when it were necessary to find some other arrangement about the signals company for the Rhine Army, or something of that kind, the necessary dispositions would be made. This is not removing the spearhead. It is using the Strategic Reserve for the precise purpose for which it is designed, namely, to be brought to a particular degree of readiness if a particular degree of emergency arises. As to equipment, all these forces, here and in Singapore, have the equipment, and are at the strength necessary to carry out the roles which the Commander-in-Chief has in mind.
§ Mr. Gordon WalkerWill the Minister make it perfectly clear that the reports in the mid-day papers that British troops have landed in Borneo are quite unfounded? I was not certain. Will he say a little more about the local situation? Surely something rather graver has happened than the right hon. Gentleman has indicated if these serious steps have been taken. Is it the fact that a year ago an undertaking was given by the Government that 5 list Brigade would be earmarked for B.A.O.R. as an immediate emergency requirement? If it is sent overseas, will steps be taken to replace these people? Otherwise, we are doing a lot of double counting in our reserves, which is something we must not do.
582 If the 51st Brigade went, would the 247 Gurkha Signals Company go with it—the signals company that was due to go to B.A.O.R. to fill in grave signals gaps there? If it does, what steps will we take to fill these very grave gaps that the Gurkha signals company was to fill?
§ Mr. ThorneycroftTo start with, I make it quite dear that none of the troop formations referred to in this question has moved at all—
§ Mr. MellishBut they have been alerted?
§ Mr. ThorneycroftI am answering the question that has been asked.
None of these formations has been moved at all. A squadron of the Special Air Service was moved some time ago to Singapore and has been landed, in the ordinary course of the operations there, in North Borneo. I think that it is of this move that this particular mention may have been made.
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether something grave has happened. Nothing has happened, but it is sometimes prudent in defence matters to make some dispositions ahead of something happening. It was, therefore, thought right on this occasion to bring these troops to that degree of readiness.
As to the allocation of particular parts of the Strategic Reserve to particular theatres, I would not like that argument to be carried too far. The purpose of the Strategic Reserve is to be flexible— indeed, that has frequently been pointed out—and this is an illustration of its flexibility.
Mr. B. HarrisonCan my right hon. Friend confirm that there must have been a reorganisation within the battalion structure when a strength of about 400 is now regarded as adequate for a battalion fighting unit?
§ Mr. ThorneycroftThe question here is the precise rô1e for which the units are required. Perhaps my hon. Friend did not hear my original reply. If these troops did go—they have not gone yet, but if they did go—they would be going to Singapore to replace troops at present on internal security duties, so that those troops could move to Borneo.
§ Mr. ShinwellIs the Minister aware that several weeks ago, in the House, we 583 were informed that the situation in Borneo was under control and no longer caused occasion for worry about the guerillas? Was that information correct or was it not correct? What has happened in the interim to justify the sending of these additional forces to Singapore? Is it in any way linked up with the rumours that have been current in newspapers that 10,000 Indonesians, Russian-trained, are ready to occupy Borneo? Is not this a serious matter, or is the right hon. Gentleman covering it up?
§ Mr. ThorneycroftI am not covering anything up. The situation is under control, and the purpose of these dispositions is to keep it under control.
§ Mr. PagetIs the Minister of Defence aware that we are not concerned as to the misuse of the Strategic Reserve? Our concern is whether the Government have provided a Strategic Reserve that is usable at all. Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously consider that a Strategic Reserve that involves the withdrawing of its signals from the Rhine Army; that involves using Royal Artillery at under strength, without their guns, in an infantry rôle and that involves using battalions down to a strength of 450 does not seem to us to be the provision of a usable Strategic Reserve? That is where our criticism lies.
§ Mr. ThorneycroftThe Commander-in-Chief on the spot knows precisely what troops are being sent out to him, with what equipment, and what r61e he is to use them for. I would ask the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) to contemplate for a moment that he might be wrong and the man on the spot right.
§ Mr. McMasterIs my right hon. Friend satisfied with our ability to transport sufficient numbers of men and equipment from Europe to Singapore and from Singapore to North Borneo to meet any possible emergency quickly enough?
§ Mr. ThorneycroftYes, Sir, and the necessary air transport dispositions for this purpose have been made.
§ Mr. SpeakerI think that we ought to pass on to other business. Mr. Macleod.
§ Mr. WiggIn view of the unsatisfactory nature of the Minister's reply, I beg to ask leave to move the adjournment of the House—
§ Mr. SpeakerI shall welcome hearing the hon. Member at the appropriate time and I will remind him.
§ Later—
§ Mr. WiggMr. Speaker, I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the commitment of units of the British Army, whose strengths are below their establishment, to an operational area in the Far East.Before bringing the Motion to you, Sir, may I offer my apologies to hon. Members on both sides of the House who are concerned about the important business on the Order Paper today. I would, however, submit that this is an extremely important matter indeed. The House should not allow the Government to commit units of the British Army to the Far East when they are well below their operational strength so that the success of the operation in which they are called upon to take part would be jeopardised.May I also say that the Minister of Defence is as aware as I am that the decision which he announced today means that the whole of the Gurkha force is being withdrawn from this country to the Far East, and he knows perfectly well that the troops, which he says have not started, are in active preparation to be flown to the Far East, so that the matter is one of great urgency.
I am always most anxious to help you, Sir, and the Government by looking up the precedents, and there is a precedent which is most apt. On 20th January, 1942, Mr. Granville sought to move the Adjournment of the House to call attention to the need for reinforcing Singapore. Your predecessor did not find himself able to accept this Motion. I would draw attention to the fact that although the House did not debate the question of the reinforcement of Singapore, Singapore fell to the Japanese only three weeks later, on 15th February, 1942.
In those circumstances, as this country and all that it stands for is threatened by the mounting dangers in the Far East, it 585 is vitally important that at the earliest possible occasion today the House should have an opportunity to keep control and ensure that the Government take the proper measures if reinforcements are, in fact, necessary.
§ Mr. SpeakerThe hon. Gentleman asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the commitment of units of the British Army, whose strengths are below their establishment, to an operational area in the Far East".I take the view that I am precluded by precedent from acceding to that application. I have heard a good many observations in the past about units being under establishment, and so forth, and I have just heard a Minister declare that they are going fit for any role that is to be imposed upon them. That being so—and there are opposing views—I cannot, under the Standing Order, regard the matter as definite. That is the difficulty.
§ Mr. WiggWith respect, needless to say, I have got to accept your Ruling, Sir, but it is within the control of the House, and only the House, that if necessary part of the reserve could be mobilised. With respect, it is clear that you have accepted what the Minister of Defence has said without taking into account some of the events which have already happened.
§ Mr. SpeakerMay I explain to the hon. Member that I cannot enter into the merits or demerits of the argument, on one side or the other. The Chair's difficulty is that when the essential issue is a matter in dispute, the matter is not definite under the rule. That is the point.
§ Mr. Gordon WalkerOn a point of order. May I be clear about this, Mr. Speaker? As I understand, you said that because there was a difference of view between the two sides the matter could not be definite. But there is always a difference of view between the two sides on anything that is raised under the Standing Order. Therefore, there could never be anything definite under the Standing Order if that were the rule. The matter is surely definite enough that a decision has been taken to make ready these units to be sent overseas.
586 This is surely definite, regardless of whether or not there is a difference of opinion about whether they are up to strength and all the rest of it. What I could not understand was your reason for saying that this was not a matter that was definite. This would seem to me to rule out every conceivable matter.
§ Mr. SpeakerI do not think that I depart from practice in this. The gist of this complaint is not of sending the unit, but of sending the unit in that state. What is in issue is the adequacy of the state of the unit to meet what it may be required to do. I have strictly followed precedent in taking that view.
§ Mr. WiggMr. Speaker, as you are basing your Ruling on the Singapore Ruling, may I fervently hope that what happened on that occasion will not happen on this.
§ Mr. SpeakerI do not base my Ruling on anything to do with Singapore. I base it on a particular complaint that the hon. Member makes and which I find not certain.
§ Mr. WiggI was inaccurate, Sir. You based it not on what happened in Singapore, but on the decision of the Speaker when a Member wanted to raise the question of reinforcements to Singapore. I accept your rebuke.
In the circumstances, may I have an assurance from the Minister of Defence that if the issue is in doubt he will not send these units under strength until the House has had time to debate the matter?