HC Deb 02 August 1963 vol 682 cc832-48

1.14 p.m.

Commander Anthony Courtney (Harrow, East)

I am grateful for the opportunity to raise today a question which has been of some concern to me for some time past, namely, the mutual diplomatic representation between the United Kingdom and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. I wish to call attention to certain anomalies which I believe exist within that representation and to suggest to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State ways in which perhaps those anomalies might be corrected.

I say at the outset that in this debate I am inhibited slightly by the fact that I have received much excellent hospitality and made a number of friends in the diplomatic missions of the countries to which I am about to refer. At this early stage I stress the hope that that hospitality will not be in any way mitigated by what I say today.

As an amateur in the art of diplomacy I am depending, as many of my hon. Friends do, on textbooks such as Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice. I think it germane to this discussion to say that this was one of the first diplomatic textbooks which was translated into Russian. Diplomacy in this textbook is defined as: The conduct of business between states by peaceful means. I think we might add, with mutual agreement, that the object of such diplomacy is the improvement of relations between nations. For this purpose, by long usage, certain diplomatic immunities have been established and they are referred to in Satow's book in these words: Diplomatic immunities are founded on common usage and tacit consent … on the understanding that they will be reciprocally accorded. It is further laid down that for the obvious use of the diplomat's operating art it is essential that a diplomatic agent should be able to communicate fully and in all security on matters in which he is engaged.

One might hold that that practice was not necessarily applicable to Governments of fairly recent vintage established by revolutionary action, but to the contrary, the Soviet Union, in its Decree of 14th January, 1927, declared that: Diplomatic representatives in their country, including commercial representatives, enjoy personal immunity on a basis of reciprocity and are not subject to administrative or judicial arrest or detention. I think that one can say with justice that the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries of Eastern Europe look upon the practice of diplomacy slightly differently from Western countries. Those countries, we must note, have one strong thing in common. They have single-party Governments, the basis of which is the Communist Party which owes a great measure of control to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In fact Soviet influence appears to be predominant in all these countries.

The theoretical basis of diplomacy under Communism also has a slightly different slant from that which we have in the West. I think the standpoint has never been lost that Soviet and other Socialist missions in foreign countries—I, of course, refer particularly to the United Kingdom—are useful instruments for the presentation of the Communist image. To put that in general terms, it could sometimes be described as propaganda, which again in turn derives, as I think historians such as the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) would agree, from the very early practical example given by Trotsky at BrestLitovsk of appealing to peoples over the heads of negotiators and over the heads of Governments.

It is quite natural, and perhaps we should not be surprised, that this influence does actually obtain, but there is another and rather more sinister aspect of Soviet Communist diplomacy generally to which I wish to draw attention. It has surely become evident from the events of the past few years that Socialist diplomatic missions in this country are looked upon as useful cover for secret police activities. These can be classified under three broad headings. In the first place, there is published evidence of the attempted recruitment of agents from among British nationals by accredited diplomatic personnel. Perhaps I may mention the name of the Soviet attaché Rogov, whom I knew, and the Yugoslav Pecjak in this connection. Secondly, it is established, again in published evidence, that diplomatic personnel have been used as the so-called "controllers" of existing agents in this country. We had the mention of Gregory in the Vassall case and the reference to Karpekov in this connection in the recent trial of the Italian nuclear scientist.

Thirdly, there is recent evidence of an even more sinister character among these diplomats, namely, the expert conduct of research into the sleazier sections of our society, as exemplified by a naval colleague, Commander Ivanov. Surely, these facts, as I believe them to be—culled from desperately little evidence, I agree—are supported by the fact that since 1949, when it can be said that the Iron Curtain really came down, 17 Soviet and other Communist diplomats have been declared persona non grata by Her Majesty's Government. There are other instances, as the House well knows, of the swift departure of diplomats from these missions shortly before, to use a journalistic expression, the "breaking" of news on security cases.

Here I should like to express a few doubts and to ask a question. Why cannot we have details in this House of diplomats who are declared persona non grata in this way? What prejudice to British interests, if there is such a thing, is involved in not disclosing these matters? Surely, if in the opinion of the country which extends him hospitality a diplomat has been guilty of conduct which requires his removal, the first thing to do, and which is done, is that the Foreign Secretary speaks to the ambassador concerned. Are we, therefore, to assume that if, say, the Polish Ambassador is given such information by the Foreign Secretry, it is to be denied to Members of this House? I should very much welcome a little enlightenment from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State on this subject.

From the weight of evidence available—and a mass of conjecture has rather swamped the facts which have been given to us—it is, none the less, fairly certain that in the opinion of reasonable men embassy contacts in the missions to which I am referring were used for contact lines of communication for such individuals as Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blake and others. I say in parenthesis that this would not apply to a man like Houghton who, some of us think—without much background knowledge, admittedly—was probably working for a different organisation, the G.R.U., and had his extra-diplomatic contact in Lonsdale.

Is it sufficient, furthermore, that if personal contacts exist, as I believe they do, in these cases, they should be left at that? Obviously, they cannot. There must be a physical means of passing the information, where it is bulk information, back to the country where use is to be made of it. An obvious conclusion here must be that the diplomatic facilities accorded in accordance with the ancient practice which I have described are misused and have been misused probably over a considerable period for this purpose.

I think that I have said enough to confirm what must be in the minds of many people who have thought of these affairs, that diplomatic privileges in our sense of the term have been—perhaps, still are being—abused by the missions of the countries to whom I am referring.

Another aspect of this is the treatment by the Governments concerned of United Kingdom missions in their respective capitals. Here again, there are anomalies to which I should like to draw attention. It would seem—this is a long story, but I have had personal experience of these matters—that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe look upon United Kingdom missions in their countries from two main points of view: first, as a convenient post office medium for the exchange of official communications, but, at the same time, as representatives of the United Kingdom who must be debarred from any real contact with the peoples of the countries to which they are accredited. One sees in that the remarkable difference in opportunity of real contact with Russians, Poles and others between diplomatic personnel in Warsaw and Moscow and between visiting businessmen, among whom I include myself.

It is, I am afraid, true that our missions in those countries are subjected in vary- ing extent to a degree of restriction and harassment—I cannot express it otherwise—which applies both physically and administratively and which severely reduces the efficiency of these organisations as diplomatic media. They require, in addition, a disproportionate number of administrative personnel to look after what I could describe in military terms as the "teeth" of our missions, namely, the high-grade diplomatic personnel. At the same time, however, they do not allow the full employment of British nationals, requiring the employment of locally-recruited personnel, such as Mikhailsky, the Pole, who was of such considerable use to the Soviet secret police during his term of employment at the British Embassy in Moscow.

That brings me to my second point in that connection. It would seem that the individuals belonging to our diplomatic missions in these countries are looked upon by their hosts as a target for the activities of the local secret services. We have surely had enough examples recently to bear out this conviction. We have had the seduction of Vassall in Moscow by Mikhailsky. We had the subversion of Houghton in Warsaw. We had the seduction—again, I use the word advisedly—of an air attaché in Warsaw by a notorious and extremely attractive Polish agent-provocateur, all these, incidentally, under the noses of their respective ambassadors.

My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary knows of many other cases, successful and unsuccessful, of action against British individuals in these missions abroad. It is of interest in that connection that over 200 Foreign Service personnel have had to leave their posts in these missions since 1949 before the expiration of their normal term. Seventy-eight of these have left for reasons of misconduct or unsuitability. I cannot believe that these figures do not reflect to a considerable degree the activities of the secret police in those countries. I think that I have said enough to indicate my belief that the principle of reciprocity in diplomatic practice and the same principle in the treatment of respective diplomatic personnel has not been observed between the United Kingdom and the countries to which I am referring.

May I turn to numbers and to the relative strengths of the missions in the United Kingdom and these countries? I think that it will be convenient to the House if I divide them into two, firstly United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and secondly, the United Kingdom and the remaining countries of the bloc. Where career diplomatic personnel bearing diplomatic immunity are concerned, the Soviet Union, by my calculation, has in this country at present 58 individuals. The corresponding figure for the British in Moscow is 39, a balance in favour of the Soviet Union of 19. Of the others, the British and Soviet nationals attached to their respective embassies and living in London or Moscow respectively, the numbers are Soviet 195, British 70—in this case a Soviet preponderance of 125.

When one breaks these figures down into the commercial representation, to which I shall draw special attention in a moment, the Russians have 125 and the British—and this is a rather difficult calculation—have eight, the figure including two or possibly three B.E.A. representatives in Moscow. This gives a Soviet preponderance in commercial representation of 117. There are three commercial attachés diplomatically immune on each side, which makes no preponderance on either side.

According to my calculations, the other Socialist countries have in this country a representation of 255 diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel, with 147 British personnel accredited to missions in those countries, a preponderance in favour of the Socialist countries of 108. Therefore, once again we see anomalies and lack of reciprocity not only in diplomatic conduct but also in numbers of mutual representation. Incidentally, nowhere in the diplomatic textbook, which I know many of us have studied, is the word "espionage" even mentioned.

I am sure that my hon. Friend will say that the reason for the disparity on the commercial side is due mainly to a fact which we all know about and of which some of us have had experience. The Russians and these other countries operate State trading organisations which require a higher proportion of State servants in foreign countries to conduct their commercial affairs. We, on the other hand, by our system of private enterprise, send businessmen over to Russia. I would lay a small bet, if that were in order, that my hon. Friend will mention the large number of Soviet trade delegation personnel in this country as being set against a comparable number of British businessmen visiting the Soviet Union. That is really not quite a valid comparison.

A point which is often forgotten in this context is the very large number of Soviet and satellite technical and commercial delegations who are continually visiting firms and institutions in this country. I prefer to set these last against the numbers of British business men visiting the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries, leaving an unexplained preponderance of over 100 personnel by any calculation which I am able to make. This represents a glaring disparity on any count and an unhealthy state of affairs which can and should be corrected in the interests of ourselves and of these countries themselves.

On the security aspect in which I have taken a certain interest and which I consider to be the most serious side of what we are discussing, it is surely reasonable to say, without any knowledge of this service, that our security service must be overburdened by the sheer weight of numbers resulting from the disparity to which I have drawn attention. I wonder whether I shall be greeted by my hon. Friend—though I think he is too wise—by the old reply to such questions, "It is a very good thing to know who the foreign agents are so that we can keep a file and make sure with whom they make their contacts." If that is so, I suggest that the price we have paid over the last 15 years has been heavy, and much too heavy to make up for any reasons which can be advanced in favour of such a state of affairs. The average of over 10 years during which Burgess, Maclean, Fuchs, Pontecorvo, Vassall, Philby and the rest have worked for our enemies is a high price to pay for the luxury of allowing our security service to be overburdened in this way.

It would be only fair at this stage to refer back and give the Foreign Office credit for what has been done in the past to overcome the more glaring aspects of this affair. As I have said, 17 diplomats have been made personae non gratae since 1949. There has been placed on these diplomatic personnel a rather half-hearted limitation of movement, such as that which requires a Soviet or Socialist diplomat who comes to this country to notify the Foreign Office when he wishes to travel a distance of over 25 miles from London.

This is what has been done in the past. I suggest that for the future the circumstances justify a slightly more rigid application of the practice of persona non grata just as soon as it comes to the attention of our authorities that a diplomat is working in a way which excepts him from the normal conduct of diplomacy as defined by our ancient rules. Cannot we take a leaf out of the French book here? The French have turned out over three times the number in the equivalent period. I believe that many of them were Polish citizens. I should be interested to hear what my hon. Friend has to say on that point. Cannot we rectify that disparity of about 20 in the diplomatic personnel between ourselves and the Soviet Union and also pro rata between us and the other nations concerned?

Thirdly, would it not be possible to reduce the very large disparity in non-diplomatic personnel? Cannot my hon. Friend be of assistance to our Soviet guests in particular? Could we not help them to reduce the strain on their administration involved in bringing such numbers over by our supplying them with chauffeurs for their embassy cars, in an exactly reciprocal fashion to the chauffeurs supplied by Russia for British cars—very agreeably and very efficiently in Moscow?

It might, incidentally, help to relieve the traffic problems of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport. I am sure that my hon. Friend could find a section of his Department which could provide the Russians and the others with chauffeurs, in the same way as the Foreigners Organisation in the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs supplies Russian chauffeurs for British cars in Moscow.

Fourthly, on the commercial side would my hon. Friend have another look at the Commercial Agreement of April, 1930, which originally established the Soviet Trade Delegation in London? I have personal friends in this institution. I can testify to the atmosphere of good faith which obtains between the Soviet State trading representatives and British businessmen, including myself. When these establishments are separate from the embassy, as the Highgate establishment is separate from the Soviet Embassy and the British commercial office in Moscow is separate from the British Embassy, why is it necessary that the outlying establishments should retain diplomatic immunity?

Why should our commercial counsellor and the Soviet commercial counsellors necessarily be accredited diplomats? If we are trading in good faith, as I believe we are, it should not be necessary to cast doubt on that good faith by applying immunities which apply for more valid reasons to the main diplomatic establishments of both countries.

This is a subject which interests me greatly. It is a matter on which I do not think that the Foreign Office has advanced very far in the past hundred years, as we had some of the same difficulties with Imperial Russia. I cannot help seeing our diplomatic relations, particularly those with the Soviet Union, in terms of the dance. To me it represents the picture of a slightly self-satisfied elderly gentleman dancing an elegant minuet, quite oblivious of the fact that his partner happens to be doing the twist. I should be most grateful if my hon. Friend would give some attention to these matters, which worry me and many of my colleagues and which I believe command the interest of the country at large. We are all very badly informed and we look to my hon. Friend to enlighten us, at least to a small degree.

1.43 p.m.

Mr. Christopher Mayhew (Woolwich, East)

Before the Minister replies, may I add one or two questions to the very interesting and important questions asked by the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney)? First, is there more abuse than there has been before? The hon. and gallant Gentleman quoted a whole number of instances, and there is no question that there is a problem. But I should like the Minister to give us some indication whether this is because there is an increase in the amount of abuse of diplomatic privileges by Communist representation here, or whether it is simply be cause we have been more successful in discovering cases of abuse in such a way that they are brought to public attention.

My own impression, for what it is worth, is that it is unlikely that there has been an increase in the amount of abuse and that probably the explanation is that more abuses have been brought to light. My impression is that the manners and conduct of embassies and diplomatic representation by Communist countries in this country have improved, certainly since the war. I recall my first visit to the Soviet Embassy in 1936 and many very happy visits to embassies of Communist countries since the war. I have the personal impression that the situation has improved. I should like to have the Ministers views on that.

There is far more social contact of a healthy character between Communist representatives in this country and the British people than there used to be. I remember the struggle early on after the war even to persuade someone from a Communist country to lunch with one. In the United Nations in 1946 I recall setting out to get my opposite number on the Soviet delegation out to lunch with me alone tête-à-tête. After six months of extremely adroit diplomacy and the use of charm I succeeded. This was a diplomatic event. The situation is better today.

I wish that the contacts were wider. They are still too narrow. We would all agree that the contacts of Communist representatives in London still tend to be narrow. The case of Mr. Ivanov and his efforts during the Cuba crisis showed in a most vivid way the extraordinary misjudgments of which the Communist representatives here in London are capable. They still seem too often to see Britain and British life through the eyes of the Daily Worker. This is a tremendous characteristic of Communist representatives. We may regard it as strange that this should be so; but, after all, if there are many British people living here—about 30,000 of them—who, having lived their whole lives in Britain, still see Britain in terms of the Daily Worker, we cannot be surprised if representatives of the Communist countries also see the same in London.

That is my first question. Are things getting worse, or is it simply that we have been successful in bringing abuses to light? These abuses do go on. I have, as has the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden),been very much engaged in cultural exchanges with the Communist countries. I have known the most lurid cloak and dagger methods intrude even into cultural exchanges. The Minister may know of one or two of the instances I have in mind. Nothing is more ludicrous in East-West relations than when the cloak and dagger get mixed up with the ballet costume and the balalaika, but it has happened in the past and it might happen again.

Secondly, would the remedies suggested by the hon. and gallant Gentleman work? This is where I have some doubts. Would reciprocity in diplomatic personnel really help? I cannot think that the opportunities for espionage are greatly dependent on the number of one's representatives who have diplomatic immunity as against the number who have not. Once there is one man with diplomatic immunity, there is a freedom of information, there is the security of the bag and all the other things which are laid down now in the Convention on Diplomatic Immunities of the United Nations. I should not have thought that cutting down their number would be a great check to espionage.

Equally, I doubt whether cutting down the number of Communist representatives in this country would help. After all, if we go by numbers and by counting heads, more British people visit the Soviet Union than Soviet people visit Britain. I hope we shall not suggest that all the people who come here from the Soviet Union help to overburden the security service. I hope very much that we shall get thousands and thousands of Soviet citizens over here, and the security services certainly will not be able to keep a check on them.

Commander Courtney

I was not talking of visitors, who are welcome in their flocks. I was talking about accredited diplomatic and other embassy personnel.

Mr. Mayhew

I rather doubt whether, on balance, it is in our interests to reduce the number of them. I share the hon. and gallant Gentleman's anxiety, but I think that there is something to be said, on the other hand, for giving a wide section of Soviet officialdom a first-hand understanding of this country. There is the security risk, but there are factors on the other side which we should weigh. Myown feeling is that we want more contacts, even if some of them are official. After all, I am sure that the average Soviet official and the average Communist Government have a mass of facts about Britain, probably all the information they want.

In the light of the incidents of espionage which the hon. Member quoted, one would think that they were better informed about Britain than some of us, but it is the judgment that is missing—the experience and judgment of our life which leads them, in many cases, to misunderstand it. For that reason, other things being equal, I would not be averse to large numbers of officials in this country.

We never like diplomatic immunity in principle. Good democrats are chary of giving it to anyone, of putting anyone above the privileges of ordinary citizens. It is for these reasons that I have asked my two questions: first, whether things are getting worse, and secondly, whether the remedy proposed by the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East would work.

The hon. and gallant Member raised one other point, the restrictions on diplomats in London and, reciprocally, the restrictions placed on our people in Communist countries. Will the Minister make a new effort, in the improved atmosphere that now exists between East and West, to obtain an agreed abandonment of these restrictions on both sides? Would it not be a good thing for initiative of this kind to be shown at this time?

1.51 p.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus (Manchester, Gorton)

Is not the disparity in the size of missions due partly to the simple fact that we are a nation of 52 million people while they have a population of 220 million? Would it not be best, if comparisons are to be made, to make them with the size of, say, the American mission in this country and the other Western missions? Are not the evils about which the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) spoke the by product of the cold war, and are they not also Western problems in roughly equal quantity? Do not an equal number of those who are personae non gratae have to leave the respective countries in cases of espionage? Do these problems not apply to both sides and not just to one?

I join with my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) in thinking that now is the time, in the new and improved atmosphere that exists between East and West, for pressing for a relaxation of existing restriction—for restoring the freedom of movement of diplomats in this country and for urging them to do the same on their side—and for allowing greater freedom for lecturers and speakers generally, even for Press and cultural attachés,here? Instead of tightening things up at this precise moment should we not try to give a lead in further improving the relaxed atmosphere by ourselves taking somewhat more liberal action?

1.53 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Peter Smithers)

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) is a distinguished former intelligence officer and has great knowledge of these matters. He is respected for this by all hon. Members. I have listened with attention to his remarks and I think that I know his views on this subject.

I can best answer his speech by saying at the outset that I believe that he is thinking of diplomatic relations altogether too much in terms of intelligence and security, though this is important and it is natural that he should be interested in this aspect. I would like to try to put the nature of our relations with the representatives of the Communist countries into a somewhat different perspective.

As to the efforts of any embassy, the collecting of information by legitimate means is an important part of its duty. It is particularly important in Communist countries where, on the one hand, what is regarded as legitimate is much more restricted than it is here, but where, on the other, any information we are able to obtain is, naturally, of particular value to us. A whole range of matters is freely available in this country to anyone who reads the newspapers, matters which are regarded as security matters in Communist countries. Thus, first, there is a difference in kind between the attitude of both sides towards this question of information. And as to the attitude of their embassies, I do not think that the two are directly comparable in terms of the figures of personnel engaged.

I remind my hon. and gallant Friend that there are other exceedingly important aspects of embassy activity, for example, the tendering of advice, advice about the ideas and intentions of Governments. The House will recall how difficult it was, in Stalin's day, to know what the Soviet Government were thinking about. Today, the atmosphere is quite different. Mr. Khrushchev and other prominent Soviet personalities are readily accessible and are ready to discuss their opinions, if necessary at great length and sometimes in a witty and entertaining manner. These are relatively new conditions and extremely welcome ones. In these circumstances, our diplomatic representation in Communist countries, particularly Moscow, although it may, naturally, have attached to it security and other staffing problems to which my hon. and gallant Friend referred, is really of very great utility.

I think that our cause has been particularly well served by the series of extremely able ambassadors that we have had in Moscow, who have profited from the new atmosphere which has prevailed since Stalin's day to obtain a much closer understanding of the character of Soviet policy and the intentions of the Soviet Government. In diplomacy, whether one is dealing with an ally or an opponent, half the battle is fully to understand the people with whom one is dealing and their attitude. This is all the more so if one hopes, one day, to turn what is a difficult relationship into a more cordial and co-operative one.

I also remind my hon. and gallant Friend, in the context of security matters, of the nature of our policy towards the Communist States, because this differs radically from the nature of their policy towards us. For this reason, also, I do not believe that direct comparisons between our diplomatic missions are particularly relevant. Our policy has both a negative and positive aspect. The negative is to defend ourselves against attack or subversion. Here the security services have a very great part to play in seeing that proper security is maintained, both in our embassies abroad and at home in relation to foreign embassies in London. The positive aspect of our policy is, while defending ourselves against attack and subversion, to bring about a position in which ultimately the Communist Powers will abandon their projects of dominating other nations—this country and others—by Communist doctrine and will be brought to co-operate in a more orderly world in which there is a sense of common purpose. This is an objective upon which all hon. Members will be agreed. For this purpose the maintenance of the best possible diplomatic relationship is absolutely necessary. The instruments of diplomacy are essential to the carrying out both of the negative and positive aspects of our policy.

Regarding the Communist missions in London, my hon. and gallant Friend has noted that there is a discrepancy in the figures. It is not a very large discrepancy, and, as I have said, I do not think that it is necessarily relevant to what we are discussing.

The hon. Member for Woolwich, East asked whether there is more abuse than there was before. This is the sort of question which one cannot answer with a "Yes" or "No," but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is right in saying that the diplomatic relationships between our countries, both here and abroad, are infinitely better than they were and that the whole process of diplomacy is more correctly and more efficiently carried on between us. This is certainly nothing but gain.

The hon. Gentleman went on to ask whether, if we insisted on a kind of mathematical reciprocity, this would work. I share his doubt about whether it would. I doubt whether we would stand to gain anything particular from it. In fact, I very much doubt whether it is strictly relevant to the issues at all. The question really is: are diplomatic staffs behaving in a proper manner, and are our security services adequate to detect a situation which is unsatisfactory when it occurs?

In any case, even if we were to take extreme measures to reduce the size of diplomatic staffs, of which my hon. and gallant Friend disapproves, I am doubtful whether this would have any great effect on the security situation. I must, however, point out that in addition to the security risks which attend all diplomatic operations, in a greater or lesser degree, there are great advantages in having diplomatic representation of the Communist countries here in London.

Again, I must take the House back to Stalin's day, and remind my hon. and gallant Friend of one of our principal worries at that time. It was whether Stalin really knew what went on in the outer world. This was a constant source of anxiety. We never knew when, through ignorance or misunderstanding, he might make a ghastly blunder which would cost us all a fearful price.

We are now in a different atmosphere. Mr. Khrushchev has travelled in this country, in the United States, in France, and in many others, and I would be extremely surprised if he were persuaded that the West was about to collapse, or anything of that kind. On the contrary, I think that he has a very realistic view of the outside world. In these circumstances, in which the Soviet Government do, I think, take a realistic view of world affairs, it is our hope that the existence of the Communist embassies in London results in a better understanding of the nature of affairs here.

As my hon. and gallant Friend pointed out, it is true that, whereas in Moscow and other capitals contacts by diplomatic staffs with the general public are strictly limited, here in London there is nothing to prevent the staffs of Communist embassies from contacting ordinary members of the public.

This is a discrepancy, but, on the whole, I think that it is to our advantage that such contact should take place. For if a man is a reasonably accurate observer and talks freely to people in this country, I hardly think that he is likely to be convinced that we are going to be subverted to Communism in the near future. Indeed, I think that the more one learns about this country the higher the opinion that one holds of it.

My hon. and gallant Friend asked why cannot we give full details of all diplomats who are declared persona non grata? I do not believe that this is really a security question. It is rather one of very delicate negotiation and delicate relationships. The whole question of representation, about which, as the House knows, there are quite different approaches between ourselves and the Russians, is a delicate one and it must be handled in confidence if such relationships are to redound at any rate to our advantage. I do not believe that it is ever a good idea to put oneself in the position in which, while negotiating with somebody or discussing with somebody a delicate matter, one is obligated to tell the public what one is doing as well as tell the person with whom one is negotiating.

Finally, my hon. and gallant Friend the hon. Member for Woolwich, East referred to restrictions on the movement of diplomats. The only restriction of which I know is that at present imposed here on the movement of Soviet diplomats, which corresponds with a restriction on the movement of our diplomatic staffs in Moscow.

The House knows that tomorrow the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be leaving for Moscow for an important ceremony, in circumstances which, I think, have generated throughout the world a restrained but modest optimism that we might make further progress in improving relations between the democracies of the West and the States of the Communist world. In these circumstances, I do not think that the House would expect me to make any particular pledge that we shall do any particular thing in Moscow, but I can say that my noble Friend and those going to Moscow with him hope that we are looking forward to better relations and better times, and that any contribution which can be made to these better relations by the improvement of our diplomatic relationships would be extremely welcome.

Mr. Mayhew

Can the House rely on the Minister putting to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the points that we have made about taking the initiative in removing diplomatic restrictions?

Mr. Smithers

I shall be seeing my noble Friend this afternoon, and I shall certainly tell him what has been said in this debate.