§ Q3. Mr. Dribergasked the Prime Minister if he has now consulted the President of the United States of America about the possibility of making available to delegates at the Geneva disarmament conference the reports on the monitoring of underground nuclear tests prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey; and if he will publish these reports, together with other recent scientific data on the detection of tests, as a White Paper.
§ The Prime MinisterAs I have said, my conversations with President Kennedy are confidential.
The report to which the hon. Member refers is also a confidential United States Government document. It could not therefore be published in this country. I do not consider that the publication of a White Paper would be practicable at this stage.
§ Mr. DribergWould the right hon. Gentleman agree that as the processes of detection and identification become more and more exact and reliable, verification becomes less important? Is he aware that these reports, one of which at least, I think, has been released in the United States, although as surreptitiously as possible, indicate that these processes are much more reliable than has been generally put out?
§ The Prime MinisterI think that the hon. Gentleman meant to state this accurately. Curiously enough, if the instruments are further away in more distant countries, the number of unexplained incidents is likely to rise rather than be diminished. Therefore, identification on the spot may, in the present state of knowledge, become more important and have to take place on a larger number of occasions.
§ Mr. MasonWhy does the Prime Minister place so much emphasis on verification? Is it not a fact that our instruments for nuclear detection have developed to such an extent that we can detect nearly all explosions, particularly stratospheric, atmospheric and those just above the ground, and that the only ones in doubt are the low-yield tests exploded underground? Would it 1207 not be worth while now to take a risk to get an international test agreement with just those escaping and with the possibility of a second stage later of neutral bodies examining, if necessary, tests of that doubtful nature on verification?
§ The Prime MinisterThat is another point. It is a point as to whether we should try to concentrate, not on having a comprehensive agreement, but on some part of the nuclear testing. On the point of underground tests, as I have tried to explain before, what the instruments do, wherever they are located, whether on American territory, on Russian territory or jointly, is to reveal that an explosion has taken place which is not, or may not be, from the character of the report, of a natural type. In that case, investigation on the spot is necessary.
§ Mr. S. SilvermanWould the Prime Minister explain what exactly is the relevance of the dispute about underground tests and about verification of them to the explosion of atmospheric tests on the scale and to the number that the United States is now committed? Is it not rather absurd to go on testing where agreement has been reached because there is a small area of the field in which agreement has not been reached? Would the Prime Minister further explain whether there has been any verification whatever of the view of American scientists that no harm is being done by the present series of tests?
§ The Prime MinisterWith regard to the historical account which the hon. Member gives, I must repeat that I think that it is very biassed. For three years we abstained from tests. The Russian Government then made them on a very large scale. We then offered, if we could not get full agreement concerning the underground tests and the whole arrangements for international verification, to have a ban on atmospheric tests. That was refused. There have, therefore, now been the two last great series of tests conducted by the Soviet Government. After the statement I made in November with the President and after the advice which we both received from our scientists, as I told the House quite frankly, I did not feel it right to press, even if I could have done so successfully, against the holding of tests which we believe at this stage to be necessary if 1208 we are to maintain the full value of the deterrent.
§ Mr. GaitskellIn all this, is not the real difficulty that it is hard to find a way to ensure that further preparations for tests, atmospheric or underground, are not being made? Was not a large part of the insistence upon the acceptance of verification the desire to have some kind of indication by the Soviet Government that they were prepared to accept international control in disarmament?
§ The Prime MinisterYes, Sir. I think that that puts it very fairly. We were very disappointed indeed that after this point, which was granted as long ago as 1959 when we even got to the question of discussing the number of visits, the Russians should now altogether refuse.
§ Mr. DribergWith respect, I think that the right hon. Gentleman misunderstood my first supplementary question. Would he at least agree to make inquiries about these reports, to find out whether they do not show that detection and identification even of underground tests—which are less important scientifically than atmospheric tests—are now much more sophisticated than the right hon. Gentleman suggested?
§ The Prime MinisterI am not saying that. I repeat that what it does is to identify that an explosion has taken place which may not be from natural causes. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] It does. I have it from many discussions with our scientists on this. I am not saying that the science is all the time advancing. Let us say that it reveals that it is an artificial explosion. What then? Is the treaty then to be repudiated on the ipse dixit of one authority? Surely the only way to confirm the good faith of either side is that there should be at that point verification.