New Clause C.—(LICENSING JUSTICES.) (Hansard, 28 July 1961)

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This new Clause relates to a matter which we discussed a great deal both during the Committee stage and on 869 Report. It arises out of a very awkward situation which came to the notice of the courts, where, in Barnsley, all the licensing justices were members of a co-operative society. It was, therefore, found impracticable to assemble a licensing bench to consider an application by the society in respect of licensed premises which the society had, or for which it might want to acquire a licence, without including magistrates who, on the face of it, had an interest in the application.

This arises from Section 48 (4) of the 1953 Act, which contains a prohibition that any justice cannot act in a case which concerns any premises in the profits of which he is interested. As I say, in the case of the Barnsley justices the Court of Appeal interpreted those words as being equivalent to the profits of the trade or business carried on in the premises, and that concerns licensing justices who were either members of the society or married to members of the society and who granted an off-licence to the society. In fact, in Barnsley it was impossible to find justices who were not members of the society to hear an application from the society.

I am told that although Barnsley was an extreme example there are a number of other towns in which so many of the justices are members of a co-operative society that it is becoming difficult, if not impossible, to arrange for an application by the society to be heard by justices who are not disqualified by the provisions of Section 48 (4) as interpreted by the Court of Appeal.

I should make it perfectly plain that the Court of Appeal was quite clear that in the Barnsley case which it had to consider there was no bias on the part of the bench. Indeed, the application of that reason was not invalidated. On the other hand, once the law had been declared there was no question that it had to be met.

To meet that difficulty when the Bill was introduced it contained a provision that a justice should not be disqualified from acting in a case concerning any premises by reason of his having a beneficial interest in the shares of the company or any other body carrying on business on the premises if the total nominal value of the shares was not more than £500, or one-hundredth of the total 870 nominal value of the issued share capital, whichever was the less.

That was considerably criticised during our Committee stage discussions. Some hon. Members felt it undesirable in principle, because they said that it would allow people to act as judges, or, at any rate, appear to act as judges, in their own cause. On the other hand, other hon. Members considered that the amount of £500 was too high, particularly when it would represent merely the nominal amount of the shares and the actual amount might be very much greater. In view of the feeling of criticism in the Committee the Government withdrew the Clause and promised that at a later stage they would consider how the problem might be met.

On Report, the hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason), who has explained to me why he cannot be here today, moved an Amendment very much on the lines of the provision which the Government had originally put in the Bill, to substitute an actual value of £250 for a nominal value of £500. I gave reasons, which I will not repeat, explaining why that was not acceptable I suggested that there was a very serious case to be met and that a solution might be found on the lines that the Lords have found in the Amendment.

I will deal with the merits of the Amendment. I shall not take much time on this, because we have discussed it at great length on two occasions. We are concerned with two conflicting principles, between which we must find a practicable solution. The first is that it is obviously prima facie undesirable that any adjudicating body should have, or even appear to have, an interest in the decision at which it is asked to arrive. If members of a licensing bench are shareholders in the concern which is the applicant, they will appear to have such an interest.

On the other hand, I pointed out in relation to that principle that the situation at Barnsley, and inevitably elsewhere, was quite unreal. There a number of justices gave up their virtually lifelong shareholding in order to make themselves eligible to sit and so that a bench could be assembled. Anybody appearing before such a bench would know the history of the matter. Still, this is one principle which is put forward by the rigorists.

871 The other principle, which I submit to the House is equally fundamental, is that nobody shall be invalidated from sitting on a bench or sitting as a justice of the peace on the ground alone of his political affiliation. The Co-operative Society is not only a commercial society in which the members join. It is also a political party in which the shareholding is a sign of political allegiance. Somehow, we must reconcile these two principles in the practical way in which we in this country try to solve this sort of problem.

It seems to me that what is contained in the Lords Amendment is the practical and sensible solution. It fixes a lower limit. If the shareholding does not exceed the lower limit, it shall not invalidate the justice from sitting and adjudicating. Nobody would imagine for a moment that a shareholding of £25, or not more than one-hundredth of the total share capital, would provide any practical bias. Indeed, the Court of Appeal found in the Barnsley Justices case that there was no practical bias. On the other hand, it will enable a bench to be assembled in these places without requiring people to give up possibly a lifelong shareholding which they regard as a sign of their political allegiance. I commend this solution to the House.