§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Noble.]
§ 3.3 a.m.
§ Mr. John Tilney (Liverpool, Wavertree)I am not sure what time it is now in the Cameroons, but I am quite sure that it is high time that thought was given by some Ministers and by the United Nations to the very urgent affairs of that territory. I ought, at the outset, to declare an interest in that I am a director of a company which, among many other interests, has for over seventy years operated in Victoria and elsewhere in the territory, albeit of recent years with declining success. It has a venture also in Bamenda.
The battle of the plebiscite is now over. I pay tribute to the men, many of them from the United Kingdom, who have worked hard to make the administration of that democratic decision a success. Though they were unable to put the pros and cons of the results of the choice before the electorate, they tried to make a very nearly totally illiterate electorate aware of what the choices were.
The House will know that the ex-British Cameroons, albeit a small part of the old German Cameroons, is itself divided between North and South. The North itself is divided by a small strip of land belonging to Nigeria around Yola. The North Cameroons, by not a very large majority, has elected to become the thirteenth province of the Northern Region of Nigeria. Haw the Northern Regional Government administers a divided province and whether women there, who in many constituencies outnumber men, will agitate to keep their suffrage, is now not for us in this country to determine. We merely welcome the sound sense of the Northern Cameroonians in deciding to join up with Nigeria, which is such a stalwart member of the Commonwealth.
In the South, however, things have gone very differently. By an even greater majority than expected, a registered voting population of about 350,000 people, or approximately the same as that of Mauretania or Cyprus, has decided to link up with the Cameroon Republic. The South Cameroonian is 273 lucky enough to live in, perhaps, the most lovely country of Africa, varying from the banana plantations of Tiko to the 13,000-ft. Cameroon mountain. Further north, he has a country which reminds one of Norway on a hot summer's day. It is a country which has great potential for rubber and for tea.
Perhaps the Southern Cameroonian made the decision to join up with the Cameroon Republic through fear of the Ibo, or because of lack of finance or lack of leadership by the United Kingdom in the past, for we have tried our best to remain neutral; or was it because he had no third choice offered to him? I am one who loves the territory and its peoples. Mr. Foncha has been to my home, and Dr. Endeley and the late Chief Manga Williams I count among my friends. Mr. Foncha is lucky to lead a country where there is virtually no crime, yet I suspect that the United Nations has given him and the United Kingdom, as the Trust authority, an almost impossible task.
Have the mechanics of handing over power really been thought out? Will the territory enjoy British or Roman law in the future? Will the tongue that unites the many tribes be English or French? It may be said that both could exist side by side, but that cannot be true in the case of, first, currency; secondly, whether the territory is to be in the sterling area or in the franc zone; and, thirdly, whether it is to enjoy Imperial Preference.
An even more vital decision must be made soon. Nearby, in the territory of the Bamileke, just over the border, there is much unrest. Civil war is virtually endemic. What will happen to the border? Will it remain a border? If so, who will protect it? If President Ahidjo's security forces pursue armed refugees into the British South Cameroons and British troops stop them, for how long will the British public be content if our troops are endangered for the welfare of a people who have just voted themselves out of the Commonwealth, who have chosen union with a Government which, according to The Times of last Saturday, are protesting to the United Kingdom about the conduct of the plebiscite?
274 It may, therefore, he that we should go quickly and with good grace. Mr. Foncha may have had great confidence in Britain and may still hope that we, despite everything, will carry on till he is strong enough to get good terms from President Ahidjo, but very soon in this country the cry may go up, "Bring the lads home" and then, I would ask, who will protect the British and Nigerian lives as well as the very difficult frontier?
There is also the problem of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service and of all those on contract and of those who work in the Cameroon Development Corporation which is associated with the Colonial Development Corporation. This is not the time to go into the pros and cons of whether a further nearly £3 million of our public money, with all its currency and balance of payments problems, should be paid to what will be in the future a foreign country, although, of course, it is advisable in some way to help such an underdeveloped land.
It may be wise to hand over our obligations to the Cameroons Development Corporation to the Six. Perhaps the Germans, with their great reserves and as part of their new African investment programme, would welcome a chance to go back and aid their erstwhile territory. I am glad, therefore, that in another place the Minister of State for the Colonies said that
should circumstances then so develop that the state of the Cameroons Development Corporation's affairs is materially altered, the Colonial Development Corporation are in a position to reconsider their commitments." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords; 9th February, 1961; Vol. 228, c. 498.]I would ask my right hon. Friend what the United Kingdom Government arc doing to establish a strong local police force without which Mr. Foncha is naturally very weak. Is anything being done to bring back the militarily trained Cameroonians who are serving elsewhere? Is there any plan for an accelerated police training programme? At present, there is no para-military wing of the police force. There are no mortars and no automatics. Such a force could never match President Ahidjo's forces should be decide to occupy the ex-British South Cameroons, but it should surely be strong enough to keep internal order as soon as British troops leave, which I personally hope will be very soon.275 But before we leave, sovereignty has got to be handed over—to what body? To a joint Government which Mr. Foncha and President Ahidjo set up? But what happens if they do not agree? Do we hand over to President Ahidjo himself, or do we risk British lives in what may be an indefinite wrangle? As well as the security problem let me list the urgent decisions which have got to be taken at once about the Southern Cameroons. Who will represent her in foreign affairs? Will she be accepted at the United Nations or, for the time being, be treated as a colony of the Cameroon Republic? When will British currency cease to be legal tender, and with what shall we pay for bananas which come in the fast ships which I see passing the end of my garden in Liverpool?
What sort of court of appeal will there be from now on? When will the customs tariff be changed to that, presumably, of the Cameroon Republic, thereby, incidentally, probably raising the cost of living? What instructions have been given to stop Imperial Preference? In 1958, this affected 82,000 tons of bananas, worth at that time to the Southern Cameroons as much as £600,000? And, most important of all, what plans have we received from President Ahidjo, other than his decision not to become part of the French community, thereby losing, presumably, any chance of benefiting from the expanding European Market?
I am worried because I think that the electorate voted blind as to the implications of their vote, and since, in the words of Nigeria's Prime Minister,
…they expect as of right to live in peace, to cultivate their farms. in peace, and to receive the same justice which has been provided for them until now, they may risk losing everything.I am worried, too, that this has been a problem of many Ministries, and it is a problem caused by the limitation of choice by the United Nations, a choice limited to incorporation into one of the two big neighbours on either side of the South Cameroons. I am worried that no thought has been given to true independence, and thereby we may in the future face another and minor Congo.I am grateful to the Minister of State for coming to answer me at this late 276 hour. I would like to put it to him that once Mr. Foncha has achieved the end of trusteeship, surely it is up to him and his Government to decide the future of his country. It may be that he would prefer independence to incorporation. He may have second thoughts about union with his neighbour. I believe the South Cameroons could be viable, certainly in ten years, once its future is settled.
Let us say openly that, provided Mr. Foncha, should he be urged to independence by his own African friends, decides on that policy, we would help him, especially if he wished to remain a member of the Commonwealth. If need be, let us have another plebiscite. I fully understand how impossible it was to promise further aid last year. But if he decides to break off relations with President Ahidjo, the United Nations cannot force him to unite with his neigh-bour. The trump cards are in Mr. Foncha's hand, and if he decides to play them let us back him.
§ 3.18 a.m.
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. David Ormsby Gore)My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) has a considerable advantage over me in this debate, as he clearly knows the country very well. My knowledge of it is entirely second-hand, but I was very much impressed by his description of it, and the idea of a warm summer's day. I found it rather attractive on a cold winter's night in London.
The connection of the United Kingdom with the Cameroons began as a result of the First World War, and our responsibilities derive from a League of Nations Mandate which was replaced after the Second World War by the 1946 Trusteeship Agreement between the United Nations and United Kingdom. We have throughout held these territories in trust and it is for the United Nations to decide when that trusteeship was terminated.
We still have some months at least ahead of us before it can be brought to an end, and I should not like to leave my hon. Friend with the impression that as a result of the plebiscite which has now taken place we shall be handing over our responsibilities tomorrow or in the very near future. As long as our trusteeship continues we shall continue 277 to discharge our responsibilities in the Cameroons to the best of our ability. I want to make it clear from the start that we shall make every effort in the period left to us before the end of the trusteeship to ensure that the Cameroons are able to face the future in as strong and economically healthy a position as possible.
This debate centres round the future of the South Cameroons. In the North, as my hon. Friend said, the people have indicated by a clear majority their wish to be part of the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria. It is, naturally, a matter of satisfaction to us that they should have decided to throw in their lot with the newest member of the Commonwealth.
As for the South, I must remind my hon. Friend that there has been for a long time a strong current of opinion in favour of the reunification of the Cameroonian peoples. These aspirations are embodied in the programme of one of the main political parties of the territory—that led by the present Prime Minister, Mr. Foncha, before and after it came into power. When it was known that Nigeria would shortly become independent, the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations had to consider how to enable the people of the territory to express their wishes about their future status.
The Trusteeship Council took the view, which, I think, was widely accepted at the time and which is widely accepted even today in many quarters, that the South Cameroons would not be viable on its own. An indefinite continuance of trusteeship could not be expected to commend itself internationally at a time when independence was increasingly becoming the order of the day in West Africa. This left two choices: unification with the French Cameroons, destined for independence as the Cameroun Republic, or unification with the Federation of Nigeria.
In October, 1959, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that a plebiscite should take place in the South Cameroons before 31st March, 1961, to enable the people to choose between these alternatives. As the hon. Member knows, these were the only two alternatives which the United Nations decided should be put to the people. 278 Subsequently the date was fixed as 11th February. The plebiscite has taken place. The people of the South have voted by a large and unmistakable majority—that is 70 per cent. of the votes cast and 57 per cent. of the electorate—in favour of unification with the Republic of Cameroun. We are confronted by what appears to be a clear expression of the national will. This is the situation with which we are faced.
In order that the results of the plebiscite in both North and South Cameroons shall be implemented, we expect the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, Dr. Abdoh, to present his report to the Trusteeship Council about the end of March. It will then be considered in the Fourth Committee and in the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly. Implementation in respect of the North Cameroons should be quite straightforward, for it means, in effect, re-establishing the position existing before October, 1960, when it was part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, while retaining the new arrangements for local government that were then introduced. We are about to enter into discussions with the Nigerian Government on the detailed administrative questions which will have to be settled.
In the South the question, as my hon. Friend has said, is a much more complex one. The Cameroun Republic itself became independent only on 1st January, 1960, and it was difficult for this new Government, with many internal problems of their own, to put forward precise terms for the unification of the two territories. However, we did what we could to facilitate contacts between the two Prime Ministers so that the people of the South Cameroons would be aware of the implications of a choice to join the Cameroun Republic.
As a result of these contacts the two leaders agreed that the territories should be united on a federal basis, of which the outline was sketched. They made clear their intentions that the federal State would have power to deal, among other matters, with foreign affairs and national defence; and that a federal court of justice would act as the highest court of appeal. But, certainly, a great many details now have to be filled in, and the answers to my hon. Friend's questions have yet to be worked out.
279 As I mentioned in my opening remarks, several months remain before the federation of the Southern Cameroons with the Cameroun Republic takes place, and we hope all these problems will be resolved. For the most part, as my hon. Friend knows, they fall within the province of my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, and I have particularly in mind such matters as the training of the police force and the ensuring of proper security in the territory.
We hope to address ourselves to the Government of the Cameroun Republic in order that preliminary discussions may be started as soon as possible. The internal security of the Southern Cameroons will certainly be one of the questions to be considered. We expect that in due course there would be a conference consisting of representative delegations of equal status from the Republic and from the Southern Cameroons. We would expect to be associated with the conference as the administering authority, and that the United Nations would also be associated with it.
We are, of course, aware of the many practical difficulties that await the fusion of these two countries, as indeed would anyone be who has studied the problem at all. Administratively, it would clearly have been simpler if the people of the Southern Cameroons had elected to rejoin Nigeria. But perhaps, unfortunately, political feelings are not always ruled by the convenience of administrators. In any case, we cannot believe that these difficulties are insuperable if they are approached with good will by all concerned. For our part, we will do all we can to help them to be solved as smoothly and as quickly as possible.
The federal structure which is proposed should enable the Southern Cameroons to retain many of the methods to which it has become accustomed. Others it may have to change. But in this respect I think we should bear in mind that as recently as 1916 it was, of course, under German colonial rule.
We have not got an easy task ahead of us in the remaining period of the trusteeship, but the general principles on which 280 we must rest are clear. We must abide loyally both by the decisions of the United Nations, to which, as administering authority, we are responsible, and by the wishes of the people of the country as expressed in the recent plebiscite.
It is, in fact, impossible for us to do otherwise at the present time. Naturally, we shall try to see that the drain on our resources is no greater, and lasts no longer than it need. Suitable economic help from outside—and the hon. Member mentioned the possibility of some help from West Germany—will no doubt be welcome, but we cannot wash our hands of our responsibilities until the job with which we were entrusted has been done.
We are all anxious to prevent any repetition of recent events in the Congo. It seems to us that our best hope of doing this is to continue firmly on our present course. There are always dangers when new countries are born—always the possibility of something going wrong—but these dangers would have been greater if we had tried, or were now to try to enforce reunification with Nigeria in a way contrary to the United Nations mandate and against the wishes of the people.
If it is suggested that Her Majesty's Government should have attempted to retain their trusteeship—perhaps almost indefinitely it would be difficult to see how we could have reconciled this with our support of the United Nations and our record of promoting independence in West Africa. It would certainly not have involved any less expenditure of British money and troops.
We may have a difficult mission to fulfil in the Southern Cameroons, but I believe that our duty is clear. We have a duty to the people of the territory, and a duty to the United Nations from whom our trusteeship derives. There is only one possible course of action open to us at this time, which is to assist the United Nations to give effect to the verdict of the plebiscite as loyally, as efficiently and as expeditiously as possible.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at twenty-eight minutes to Four o'clock a.m.