HC Deb 25 October 1960 vol 627 cc2189-219
Mr. Fletcher

I beg to move, in page 10, line 2, after "any", to insert "civil".

The Attorney-General

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Perhaps it would be convenient to consider with this Amendment the Amendment in page 10, line 3, to leave out "whether civil or criminal". The two seem to go together.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche)

I believe that the next one is consequential upon the one which the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) has moved.

Mr. Fletcher

I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I agree that it would be convenient to discuss these two Amendments together. It would be difficult to discuss one without referring to the other.

These Amendments give rise to a consideration of a matter which, in our opinion, is one of very considerable constitutional importance—perhaps one of the gravest subjects that arise out of our discussions on this Bill. I believe that it would be no exaggeration to say that if Clause 15 stands in its present form, and if our Amendment is not accepted, then there will be one of the most serious inroads into the most cherished liberties and fundamental safeguards of the subject that even this Government have ever proposed.

There is no need to remind you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that in dealing with habeas corpus we are dealing with something which lies very close to the heart of everybody who cares for the history of civil liberty in this country. The whole of the doctrine, and the whole of the principles which surround habeas corpus, have come to have a very lasting and widespread significance for the free living people of this country and for those whose legal institutions have followed from ours.

For centuries past it has been recognised throughout this realm that once a competent court has made absolute a writ of habeas corpus, the person involved is then free for all time, that there is no appeal from that decision, and that there is no calling back the decision which a competent court has made, just as, in our legal system, an acquittal by a jury puts an end to any question of an individual's guilt—whether he be acquitted on facts or on a technicality. Once there is a decision by the jury or the judge that a man is innocent, he is free from any further attempts by criminal courts to prosecute him. There is no appeal by the prosecution.

In the same way, it has been established that once a person can prove to a competent court that his liberty is endangered, and he has satisfied that court that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, then that is an end to the matter. Clause 15 arises in this way under Section 1 of the Bill we have abolished the Attorney-General's fiat and have provided for appeals to the House of Lords in criminal cases. It has become necessary, however, to deal specifically with matters of habeas corpus, because all matters of habeas corpus have hitherto always been regarded—rightly—as having been on a special and different footing from all other types of case.

Until recently it was regarded as well established law—and was certainly the practice of anybody who wanted to assert his right to freedom, to protest against his detention—to go from one judge to another until he got an order. He could even go to the Lord Chancellor. There may have been some doubt about the origin of this rule, and in the recent series of cases known as the Hastings cases a good deal of doubt was expressed as to how it grew up. The practice is there, however.

It is the intention of Clauses 14 and 15 of the Bill to clarify the position for the future. They would no longer give a person the right to go from one judge to another, either in the Queen's Bench or in the Chancery Division. They no longer give him the right to go to the Lord Chancellor. That is expressly taken away by Section 14. But what they put in its place is the right to go to a judge, and if he can get an order from a judge he is free. If he cannot get an order from a judge, he can go to the Divisional Court, and then—if he cannot get an order from the Divisional Court—with leave he can go to the House of Lords.

With all that we are in entire agreement, but we disagree with this revolutionary change which has been introduced and which gives the prosecution the right, if the man does get an order, to appeal to the House of Lords. There is no precedent whatsoever for that, and, as the Lord Chancellor said in another place in introducing this Measure, he recognised that it was something entirely new and entirely novel. Therefore, I appeal to the House, in all sincerity, to examine this matter very carefully before accepting what the Government are now proposing.

I think it desirable to place on record in the language of distinguished Lord Chancellors what has been said on the subject in the past. In 1890—seventy years ago—Lord Halsbury laid down the doctrine quite clearly, and it is worth while the House remembering what he said in the case of Cox v. Hakes reported in 15 Appeal Cases on page 514. Lord Halsbury said: For a period extending as far back as our legal history, the writ of habeas corpus has been regarded as one of the most important safeguards of the liberty of the subject. If upon the return to that writ it was adjudged that no legal ground was made to appear justifying detention, the consequence was immediate release from custody. If release was refused, a person detained might make a fresh application to every judge or every court in turn, and each court or judge was bound to consider the question independently and not to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge. If discharge followed, the legality of that discharge could never be brought in question. Then Lord Halsbury went on to say on page 522—because there was there the consideration that some Act of Parliament might infringe this historic principle— It is the right of personal freedom in this country which is in debate"— and that is what is in debate today— and I for one should be very slow to believe, except it was done by express legislation, that the policy of centuries has been suddenly reversed and the right of personal freedom is no longer to be determined summarily and finally, but it is to be subject to the delay and uncertainty of ordinary litigation, so that the final determination upon that question may only be arrived at by the last Court of Appeal. Lord Halsbury would have turned in his grave if he had heard of the proposition which the Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor are putting before us. Lord Halsbury said that it could only be done by "express legislation". That is what the Government are proposing to do and they are proposing to hoodwink the House and the country into believing that they are doing something innocuous. They are turning back a tide of history in a sphere which has been of such cherished importance to us all for so long.

What did Lord Birkenhead say on the subject? He reiterated the doctrine in no more uncertain or less graphic terms. In the O'Brien case—1923 Appeal Cases, page 609—Lord Birkenhead said: The writ of habeas corpus is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously maintained by courts of law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the Executive at the cost of the liege."— that is what we are discussing tonight— In the course of time, certain rules and principles have been evolved; and many of these have been declared so frequently and by Such high authority as to become elementary. Perhaps the most important for our present purpose is that which lays it down that if the writ is once directed to issue and discharge ordered by a competent court, no appeal lies to any superior court. There we have it from the words of Lord Halsbury and Lord Birkenhead. It has always been adopted and thought of as elementary, as axiomatic and has been written into all the text books. Until this Government came along no one dreamed that anyone would have the audacity to put forward a proposal for this revolutionary and quite unnecessary change.

I must now address myself to the very flimsy arguments which the Attorney-General put forward in Committee in an attempt to justify this provision. If the Solicitor-General will forgive me I will not deal with what he said on Second Reading, but I thought that he seemed to say that the change did not matter—at any rate, he did not seem to think that it mattered very much. We regard it as important that we should maintain the principle that there should be no appeal from habeas corpus.

It would not be so bad—though still rather bad—if this Bill were now before us in the form in which it was introduced in another place because when the Bill was in another place Section 1 then operated. It provided that it was only in cases of general public importance that there could be an appeal by the prosecution, as by the accused, to the House of Lords.

It was pointed out in the House of Lords that even though that might be all right—which a lot of my right hon. and hon. Friends do not believe that it is—in an ordinary criminal appeal, it was certainly all wrong in the case of habeas corpus. Therefore, what is now Section 15 (3) was introduced in another place for the sole and express purpose of giving an additional safeguard to the accused.

5.15 p.m.

When I say the "accused" I mean the person wrongfully detained. Subsection (3) was introduced so that a person wrongfully detained and who had failed to get a rule absolute for habeas corpus could go to the House of Lords and get justice and redress without having to say that his case involved a point of law of general public importance.

It looks to me, therefore, that the appeal to the House of Lords having been widened for the benefit of the person wrongfully detained, the House of Lords, as if by a complete accident, certainly by an oversight and without any arguments in justification, then proceeded to widen still further from its original form the right to appeal now given to the prosecution in cases of habeas corpus. It is that which the Attorney-General attempted to defend in Committee. When the matter was debated in Committee there was then a different form of Amendment. The Amendment which we then proposed was to the effect that there should be no appeal to the House of Lords against discharge, that is to say, against the release of a man, in all cases of habeas corpus.

We had an argument about the distinction between civil and criminal cases. The object of this Amendment is to limit the prosecution's right of appeal to civil cases and to maintain the existing position in respect of all applications for habeas corpus of a criminal nature.

The reason why, in an attempt to reach a satisfactory compromise with the Government on this vital issue, we have made this concession is that we concede that there is some difference between civil cases of habeas corpus and criminal cases. There are civil cases of habeas corpus in which the liberty of the subject is not directly involved. For example, there are cases of the guardianship of infants, or a dispute between husband and wife whether an infant should be with one parent or another or should be taken out of jurisdiction. Those matters often are adjudicated on habeas corpus application, and I concede that where the custody of an infant is concerned, I cannot pretend that the liberty of the subject is involved in the same way as in the classic cases of habeas corpus on which the foundations of personal freedom in this country have been built.

It was habeas corpus which enabled this country to assert the rights of slaves. Slaves were brought here to be free men. Habeas corpus has been used to justify and enforce the rights of political asylum for which we are justly renowned. I therefore appreciate that there is a distinction between civil and criminal cases.

If there is an appeal to the House of Lords in civil cases by the prosecution, then earlier Clauses of the Bill protect and safeguard the individual from detention, but there are no similar safeguards where the prosecution decides to take an appeal to the House of Lords in a criminal case. In such cases, in which a divisional court has said that a man is wrongfully detained and should be set at liberty, and in which, for hundreds of years, he would have left the court a free man, under the Bill he will no longer be free because the prosecution can appeal to the House of Lords and keep him in custody while that appeal continues. This is not only novel and revolutionary, as the Lord Chancellor said, but it is contrary to our basic and fundamental concepts. It is quite unnecessary and, in addition, is anomalous.

Hon. Members will find from Clause 15 that if a person goes to a single judge and asks for a writ of habeas corpus, and the judge, having examined the case, studied the law and heard the evidence, says that he ought to go free, there will be no appeal at all. By making that concession the Attorney-General must face the extraordinary anomaly of arguing that a decision by a single judge, fallible though a single judge may be, should be final and should regularise the freedom of the man concerned for all time, yet if the judge declines to issue the writ and the matter goes to a divisional court and is heard by three judges, their decision is open to appeal.

Three judges may be less infallible than one—I do not know; but the fact remains that if those three judges, having examined the case, heard arguments about the law and studied the evidence, say that the man has been wrongfully detained and should go free, then the Attorney-General wants to take the case to the House of Lords and to keep the man detained while he takes it there. That is the position if the three judges decide, in Lord Birkenhead's words, This is an illegal usurpation of power by the Executive. This is how we are reversing the custom of this country over the centuries. The more I think about this the more I am appalled by it. I have re-read the speech which the Attorney-General made at the second sitting in Committee. He seemed to argue that whereas one judge was unlikely to make a mistake, three judges might make a mistake. I could not follow the logic of that argument. Surely the duty of the single judge and the duty of the divisional court is the same—to examine the case and to decide whether a writ should be issued. But if the single judge decides that the man should go free, then he goes free, whereas if the three judges so decide, then there is an appeal by the prosecution.

The reason that the Clause is so obnoxious and offends our sense of justice is that it is desirable that there should be some finality about these matters. Where a man's freedom is at stake, once a competent court has established a decision to free him, that should be an end to the matter, just as when a person is acquitted by a jury at the Old Bailey.

The Attorney-General then said that in the interests of clarifying the law it was desirable that the prosecution should have a right of appeal, otherwise the divisional court might have reached a wrong decision and this might stand. But that has been the case for centuries and it has not produced an injustice, inconvenience or embarrassment. In fact, it has been a good thing.

Even if there are cases in which it is desirable to clarify the law and to test a divisional court decision when it decides to set a man free, there is no guarantee that the Attorney-General will always clarify the law. Or are we to assume from his remarks that whenever a divisional court grants a writ of habeas corpus and sets a man free, the Attorney-General, in his zeal for clarifying the law, will always contest that opinion of the divisional court and take the matter to the House of Lords? If that is the situation, it is a pretty kettle of fish. That cannot be a good reason to justify this mischievous provision.

The Attorney-General put forward another curious argument. At one stage he seemed almost driven to say that this provision was being inserted solely for the benefit of foreign powers and that the centuries-old traditions of British justice were being uprooted in the interests of foreign powers. He talked about extradition rights—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Member but I find it very difficult to relate this argument to the Amendment, which relates purely to civil cases.

Mr. Fletcher

It relates purely to criminal cases. As the Bill stands, an appeal will lie in any proceedings, whether civil or criminal. In my Amendments I propose to delete the words "whether civil or criminal" and to insert the word "civil". The result will be that there would be an appeal in civil proceedings against the order to release, but the position as it stands at present would remain intact in criminal cases.

I am sorry if I have not made myself clear. I am concerned to preserve the position exclusively in criminal cases. On the other hand, I prefer not to pursue what I intended to say about extradition, because that subject will more appropriately arise on the next Amendment.

On these Amendments, I conclude by saying that, for the reasons that I have given, I regard the proposal as it stands as monstrous, a travesty of British justice, and a quite unnecessary and unjustifiable invasion of the fundamental right of liberty in this country.

5.30 p.m.

Mr. David Weitzman (Stoke Newington and Hackney, North)

May I say, quite shortly, that I very strongly support what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher)? I raised this matter in detail on another Amendment. I do not propose to repeat what I said then except to say that I regard this as a very dangerous innovation and I hope that the Amendment will be accepted for that reason.

The Attorney-General

I have listened with interest to all that the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) has said in support of these two Amendments. He repeated every one, I think, of the arguments that had been advanced on Committee stage; in fact, he incorporated in his speech large quotations from the speech made in Committee by the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman). I am sorry that he did so without acknowledgment to the hon. and learned Gentleman. The hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North has repeated his support of these proposals without repeating the argument which he advanced very clearly in Committee. This is, in fact, the third occasion on which this point has come up for discussion in the course of the passage of the Bill in this House. It was raised by Amendments in Committee by the hon. Member for Islington, East, as he has raised it today. In reply, I made a fairly long speech explaining, as fully as I could, the reasons why we were unable to accept the proposed Amendments. I am sorry to find that the hon. Gentleman appears not to have appreciated my argument fully.

The same point was raised on Report in this House by the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North when he moved an Amendment to Clause 5. He then explained the intended purpose of that Amendment and of these two Amendments, and I replied to that debate. I have read again all that was said in each of those debates and I should say at the beginning that I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Member for Islington, East and the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North, and their friends who have expressed their support for this proposal, by saying that we do not think that it would be right to accept these Amendments.

Having dealt with this matter fairly fully on one occasion and more fully on another, I can only repeat the reasons which I have already advanced for our attitude. It would, I think, be discourteous of me not to remind hon. Members of our reasons, and I do not want to be or appear to be in the least discourteous.

The hon. Member for Islington, East, in moving this Amendment, used strong language about it. At one stage he talked about our attempt to hoodwink the House. There is no justification whatever for that statement because we fully explained, as I have already indicated, on more than one occasion what we were doing and our reasons for doing it.

The hon. Gentleman said that this was an Amendment of very considerable constitutional importance and that if Clause 15 stands it would make a most serious inroad into one of the fundamental safeguards of liberty. That is strong language and I replied to that fully in Committee. In my opinion, it is entirely unwarranted language. It has been made perfectly clear that those who advocate this Amendment seem to believe that we are infringing a high constitutional principle. We completely part company with them on that. They assert that it is a fundamental principle that no one released as a result of a habeas corpus application in a criminal matter should ever be liable to lose his liberty if the decision of the court which ordered his release is subsequently on appeal held to be wrong. That is the contention. In my submission, the contention is ill-founded.

Passages from Lord Halsbury's speech in the case of Cox v. Hakes in 1890 and Lord Birkenhead's speech in O'Brien's case in 1923 have been cited more than once. When one is considering Lord Halsbury's speech and the weight that should be attached to it, two matters should be remembered. First, Lord Halsbury was speaking in relation to an appeal from a refusal to order the applicant's discharge on a habeas corpus application in a civil matter, and, as the passage cited shows, his view was based on the belief, now held to be erroneous, that the applicant had the right to go to every court and ask each court and judge to consider the matter independently. Secondly, Lord Halsbury was speaking seventeen years before the passage of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907.

I do not want to suggest for one moment that the writ of habeas corpus is not an important safeguard of the liberty of the subject. It is a very important weapon indeed, available for use for the protection of individual liberty and for the preservation of freedom under the law. It is a weapon which is fairly frequently used, and more frequently outside these shores. It provides an effective way in which the legality of the deprivation of liberty can be challenged. But this is only one way in which the legality of imprisonment or detention can be challenged before the courts.

In 1890 there was no Court of Criminal Appeal. Since 1907, the legality of a conviction at Assizes or Quarter Sessions can be challenged before that Court and since 1907 both the prosecution and the accused can, if they get the necessary leave, appeal to the House of Lords and seek to get the decision reversed. The hon. Member for Islington, East did not refer to that. Where there is a successful appeal by the prosecution from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal quashing a conviction the man whose conviction was quashed does not go free. Provision is made, similar to the provision in this Bill, for his being held or released on bail pending the hearing of the appeal. If the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal quashing the conviction on appeal is reversed by the Lords the man serves the sentence imposed on him. That is a matter which the hon. Gentleman ought to face.

Bearing in mind that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is in a way a piece of machinery of importance by which the question of liberty can be brought before the courts; why should an applicant for release from custody, when the machinery is by a writ of habeas corpus, get a release and not be liable to reimprisonment if the decision of the court which released him is reversed in the House of Lords? Why should that be the consequence, if the consequence when the question goes up by appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal and then to the House of Lords, is quite different? That is the essence of the matter.

Mr. Fletcher

The Attorney-General must know perfectly well that there are limitations on the use of the habeas corpus machinery where the machinery of criminal appeal is available.

The Attorney-General

I fear that the hon. Gentleman has not followed the argument. Perhaps it was my fault. I was saying that one must bear in mind that when Lord Halsbury was speaking there was no Court of Criminal Appeal, and that when there was a Court of Criminal Appeal the right of appealing to the House of Lords was given to both prosecutor and accused, subject to conditions. I remind the hon. Gentleman that one of the consequences of that was that if a man was released by the Court of Criminal Appeal and the decision of that court was reversed by the House of Lords, he was rearrested, as happened in the first case under the Criminal Justice Act.

I was saying that there could be an appeal from a conviction and that another way in which one could test the legality of imprisonment or detention was by applying for a writ of habeas corpus. I was putting the point, which the hon. Gentleman must face, that if, as we want, we are to give a right of appeal to the House of Lords in habeas corpus cases to both sides when there is a question of custody or imprisonment, for reasons which I will explain it would be wholly illogical and wrong that the consequences of the appeal, if successfully brought by the prosecution, should be dependent on whether the machinery by which the case came before the House of Lords was an appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal or an appeal from the divisional court on habeas corpus.

There is other machinery by which matters which may affect personal liberty can be brought before the courts. Writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition come before the divisional court and the Bill gives the right of appeal to the House of Lords from the decision of the divisional court in those cases.

Another suggestion made by hon. Gentlemen opposite is that where a matter comes to the House of Lords in that way and the House of Lords reverses the decision of the divisional court, then the decision of the House of Lords should not take effect. They proposed that if a matter comes before a divisional court and that court orders a man's release and the House of Lords holds that the divisional court was wrong in law, nonetheless there should be no interference with the effect of the decision of the divisional court. That seems to us, after careful consideration, to be entirely wrong. To alter that situation is not a matter of considerable constitutional importance. It is logical and right that the effect of the divisional court's decision should be altered and the remedy of applying to the court for a writ of habeas corpus is in no way interfered with by that.

Previous to this Measure, there has been no right of appeal to the House of Lords on habeas corpus in criminal matters and we seek to provide a right of appeal in a criminal matter whether the case comes before the divisional court on certiorari, habeas corpus, case stated, or in any other way.

It is all very well to talk about an invasion of freedom, but freedom under the law does not mean freedom from imprisonment because of a decision in an inferior court which has been held to be wrong. If we are to give a right of appeal to the House of Lords in those cases then, just as it was in relation to appeals under the Criminal Appeal Act, it must be right, if the Divisional Court has gone wrong and its decision has to be put right by the House of Lords, that the decision of the House of Lords should have effect.

5.45 p.m.

The hon. Member said that he had no objection to an applicant for habeas corpus being able to appeal to the House of Lords, but he thought that the prosecution should not have that right. However, the Amendments would completely destroy any right of appeal by either the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus or by the respondent.

Mr. Fletcher indicated dissent.

The Attorney-General

It is no use the hon. Gentleman shaking his head. If he will study his own Amendments he will see that there is no other conclusion. He is seeking to limit the operation of Clause 15 to habeas corpus in civil matters, and if the Amendments were carried the result would be to remove the right of appeal on habeas corpus in criminal matters. I know that that is not what he wants to do, but that is the effect of his Amendments.

He argued his case today in the same way as he did in Committee and I have replied to it fully, I hope, but perhaps more shortly than I then did because I dealt with it as fully as I could on that occasion. We have carefully considered this matter and we do not think that the proposal warrants any of the strong language which has been used about it on a number of occasions.

We think that it is right to give a right of appeal in habeas corpus cases and, as a point of law of considerable importance may arise on which it might be desirable to get the ruling of the House of Lords, and as it might arise in one case when the respondent has failed before the divisional court and in another when the respondent has succeeded, it is only right that, if a right of appeal, with leave, is given to one side, it should also be given to the other.

Bearing in mind the length of time that one has had appeals by way of case stated and effect given to the decision, it is a novel proposition, when we are giving rights of appeal in criminal cases for the first time that, where the divisional court has gone wrong in law and gone wrong in releasing a man from custody, none the less, when that decision is put right, the man should not be returned to lawful custody.

Sir Frank Soskice (Newport)

I propose to reply only briefly to the Attorney-General's argument, which I think my hon. Friends will have found wholly unsatisfactory. The right hon. and learned Gentleman called attention to the fact that we had reverted to this matter on no fewer than three occasions. That indicates a measure of our feeling and it is obviously the case that we can now voice our further protest only in the Division Lobby which, I hope, my right hon. and hon. Friends will do.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman indicated his view that in 1890 Lord Halsbury proceeded upon a misconception of the law of habeas corpus which preceded the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, by seventeen years. The right hon. and learned Gentleman elaborated that argument by pointing out that when Lord Halsbury voiced his opinion there was no right of appeal in criminal cases. What the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not say in those circumstances is whether he also disapproves of the language of Lord Birkenhead in 1923 in the case of Rex v. O'Brien.

When Lord Birkenhead spoke, the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, had been on the Statute Book for about sixteen years. Yet Lord Birkenhead in 1923 used language of the same intensity as that which had been used by Lord Halsbury in 1890. I ask the House to say that both those great lawyers spoke truly of the pith and substance of English law in pronouncing so strongly on the writ.

The substance of the case here is that there is something very special about the writ of habeas corpus. It is the particular measure with which the development of English law has entrusted the preservation from unlawful detention of the individual. It has a special and unique character, and it seems to me that my hon. Friend was justified in using the language that he did to show how strongly the case appeared to him to infringe on what was really something in the nature of a sacred and basic principle of the English common and statute law.

I do not think that it will advance the matter if I again traverse the same ground—

The Attorney-General

It will not.

Sir F. Soskice

The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that it will not.

The Attorney-General

I was not addressing the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I was talking to my hon. Friend on my left.

Sir F. Soskice

The right hon and learned Gentleman gave me a sweet smile and said, "If will not", and I naturally assumed that his remark was addressed to me. If I am mistaken, it encourages me to prolong the attempt I am making to get the right hon. and learned Gentleman to change his mind.

The Attorney-General

The right hon. and learned Gentleman will never do that.

Sir F. Soskice

Being firmly convinced that the Government have made up their mind about this, the only thing that I can do now is to advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to take the matter to the Division Lobby to voice their strong protests at a quite unwarrantable intrusion on the common law and that part of it which safeguards the rights of individuals.

Question put, That "civil" be there inserted in the Bill:—

The House divided: Ayes 154, Noes 212.

Division No. 153.] AYES [5.53 p.m.
Ainsley, William Hamilton, William (West Fife) Popplewell, Ernest
Albu, Austen Hannan, William Prentice, R. E.
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.) Hart, Mrs. Judith Probert, Arthur
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe) Hayman, F. H. Randall, Harry
Awbery, Stan Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis) Rankin, John
Bacon, Miss Alice Herbison, Miss Margaret Reynolds, G. W.
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.) Hill, J. (Midlothian) Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Beaney, Alan Holt, Arthur Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Bence, Cyril (Dunbartonshire, E) Houghton, Douglas Ross, William
Blackburn, F, Howell, Charles A. Shinwell, Rt. Hon, E.
Blyton, William Hoy, James H. Short, Edward
Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S.W.) Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire) Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Bowles, Frank Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.) Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Braddock, Mrs. E. M. Hunter, A. E. Skeffington, Arthur
Brockway, A. Fenner Hynd, H. (Accrington) Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Brown, Alan (Tottenham) Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill) Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper) Irving, Sydney (Dartford) Small, William
Brown, Thomas (Ince) Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, s.) Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.) Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield) Spriggs, Leslie
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) Jones, Dan (Burnley) Steele, Thomas
Callaghan, James Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.) Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Chetwynd, George Kelley, Richard Stonehouse, John
Cliffe, Michael Key, Rt. Hon. C. W. Stones, William
Collick, Percy Ledger, Ron Strachey, Rt. Hon. John
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.) Logan, David Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)
Cullen, Mrs. Alice Loughlin, Charles Summerskill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Edith
Davies, Harold (Leek) Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson Swingler, Stephen
Deer, George MacColl, James Sylvester, George
Dodds, Norman McInnes, James Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Donnelly, Desmond. Mackie, John Taylor, John (West Lothian)
Driberg, Tom McLeavy, Frank Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Dugdaie, Rt. Hon. John McMaster, Stanley R. Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Ede, Rt. Hon. Chuter MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling) Thorpe, Jeremy
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly) Mallalieu, J.P.W.(Huddersfield, E.) Tomney, Frank
Edwards, Robert (Bilston) Manuel, A. C. Wade, Donald
Edwards, Walter (Stepney) Mapp, Charles Warbey, William
Evans, Albert Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A. Watkins, Tudor
Fitch, Alan Marsh, Richard Weitzman, David
Fletcher, Eric Mellish, R. J. Wells, Percy (Faversham)
Foot, Dingle Mendelson, J. J. Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton) Millan, Bruce White, Mrs. Eirene
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh Mitchison, G. R. Whitlock, William
Galpern, Sir Myer Moyle, Arthur Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C. Oliver, G. H. Wilkins, W. A.
Gourlay, Harry Owen, Will Williams, D. J. (Neath)
Greenwood, Anthony Padley, W. E. Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)
Grey, Charles Paget, R. T. Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly) Parker, John (Dagenham) Winterbottom, R. E.
Grimond, J. Pavltt, Laurence Woof, Robert
Gunter, Ray Peart, Frederick Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.) Pentland, Norman
Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley) Plummer, Sir Leslie TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Mr. Redhead and Mr. Lawson.
Agnew, Sir Peter Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Aitken, W. T. Brooman-White, R. Crowder, F. P.
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.) Browne, Percy (Torrington) Curran, Charles
Allason, James Bryan, Paul Currie, G. B. H.
Arbuthnot, John Bullard, Denys Dalkeith, Earl of
Ashton, Sir Hubert Bullard, Wing Commander Eric de Ferranti, Basil
Balniel, Lord Burden, F. A. Digby, Simon Wingfield
Barber, Anthony Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden) Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.
Barlow, Sir John Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn) Doughty, Charles
Barter, John Carr, Compton (Barons Court) Drayson, G, B.
Batsford, Brian Cary, Sir Robert Duncan, Sir James
Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate) Channon, H. P. G. Eden, John
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm) Chataway, Christopher Errington, Sir Eric
Berkeley, Humphry Chichester-Clark, R, Farey-Jones, F. W.
Bevins, Rt Hon. Reginald (Toxteth) Clark, William (Nottingham, S.) Farr, John
Biggs-Davison, John Cleaver, Leonard Fell, Anthony
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel Cooke, Robert Finlay, Graeme
Bishop, F. P. Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K. Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Black, Sir Cyril Cordle, John Foster, John
Bossom, Clive Corfield, F. v. Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Bourne-Arton, A. Costain, A. P. Freeth, Denzil
Box, Donald Coulson, J. M. Gardner, Edward
Boyle, Sir Edward Craddock, Sir Beresford George, J. C. (Pollok)
Brewis, John Critchley, Julian Glover, Sir Douglas
Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.) Longbottom, Charles Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)
Gough, Frederick Longden, Gilbert Russell, Ronald
Gower, Raymond Loveys, Walter H. Scott-Hopkins, James
Grant, Rt. Hon. William (Woodside) Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby Seymour, Leslie
Green, Alan Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.) Sharples, Richard
Gresham Cooke, R. Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh Shaw, M.
Gurden, Harold McAdden, Stephen Shepherd, William
Hall, John (Wycombe) MacArthur, Ian Simon, Sir Jocelyn
Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough) McLaren, Martin Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'rd & Chiswick)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.) MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty) Smyth, Brig, Sir John (Norwood)
Harris, Reader (Heston) Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries) Speir, Rupert
Harrison, Brian (Maldon) Maddan, Martin Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye) Maginnis, John E. Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd) Maitland, Sir John Storey, Sir Samuel
Harvie Anderson, Miss Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R. Studholme, Sir Henry
Hay, John Marten, Neil Sumner, Donald (Orpington)
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel Matthews, Gordon (Merlden) Talbot, John E.
Henderson-Stewart, Sir James Mawby, Ray Tapsell, Peter
Hendry, Forbes Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C. Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe) Mills, Stratton Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin
Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk) Montgomery, Fergus Turner, Colin
Hocking, Philip N. Moore, Sir Thomas Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
Hollingworth, John Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles van Straubenzee, W. R.
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John Nugent, Sir Richard Vane, W. M. F.
Hopkins, Alan Orr, Capt. L. P. S. Vickers, Miss Joan
Hornby, R. P. Osborn, John (Hallam) Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Patricla Page, Graham Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)
Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives) Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale) Wall, Patrick
Howard, John (Southampton, Test) Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe) Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John Peel, John Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Hughes-Young, Michael Percival, Ian Watts, James
Hulbert, Sir Norman Peyton, John Webster, David
Hurd, Sir Anthony Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth Wells, John (Maidstone)
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye) Pilkington, Capt. Richard Whitelaw, William
Jackson, John Pitman, I. J. Williams, Dudley (Exeter)
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich) Pitt, Miss Edith Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle) Pott, Percivall Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Johnson, Eric (Blackley) Powell, J. Enoch Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Kerans, Cdr. J. S. Price, David (Eastleigh) Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Kerr, Sir Hamilton Prior, J. M. L. Woodhouse, C. M.
Kitson, Timothy Ramsden, James Woodnutt, Mark
Lancaster, Col. C. G. Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin Woollam, John
Leavey, J. A. Rees, Hugh Worsley, Marcus
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry Renton, David Yates, William (The Wrekin)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Lilley, F. J. P. Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley) TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Lindsay, Martin Robertson, Sir David Mr. Gibson-Watt and Mr. Noble.
Linstead, Sir Hugh Roots, William

6.0 p.m.

Mr. Fletcher

I beg to move, in page 10, line 4, at the end to insert: (2) No appeal shall lie against any order for the release of the person restrained made on an application for habeas corpus in any proceedings involving consideration of the Extradition Acts or the Fugitive Offenders Acts. A few moments ago the Attorney-General was reproving me—rather ungraciously, I thought—for the fact that when I made some quotations from Lord Halsbury and Lord Birkenhead I failed to refer to the fact that at an earlier stage in our proceedings my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) had made them. That enables me to remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that this Amendment was inspired by speeches made by two of his hon. Friends in the Second Reading debate and in Committee. For that, if for no other reason, the right hon. and learned Gentleman may give the Amend- ment more consideration than he did to the previous one.

It was the hon. Member for Billericay (Mr. Gardner), followed by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), who pointed out that applications for habeas corpus which involve consideration of the Extradition Acts or the Fugitive Offenders Act stand in a different category from all other applications for habeas corpus, because when we are dealing with an application for habeas corpus arising out of some criminal proceedings in this country, in most cases the person who alleges that he is wrongfully detained has stood his trial, whereas when an application is made in respect of extradition, in most cases the person wrongfully detained has not stood his trial; the merits of his case have not been inquired into by the foreign court.

As the hon. Member for Billericay pointed out, where proceedings under the extradition Acts or the Fugitive Offenders Act are contemplated by the Executive, in order that it may fulfil its duties, as an Executive, to a foreign Government, in most cases the merits of the case in respect of which the unfortunate individual is wanted for extradition still have to be investigated abroad. The validity of an extradition order made by a magistrate is normally tested by an application for habeas corpus and it seems to us that in this case, above all, if a court makes an order that the extradition Acts do not apply, and that the man is wrongfully detained and should be set at liberty, that order should be final and should not be regarded as the sort of order which may be open to challenge up to the House of Lords.

It is very unfortunate for the person concerned if he has to face not only a series of trials in this country to determine whether he should be extradited, but afterwards a further series of trials in some other country to which he may be extradited—whether to Russia or to the United States of America does not seem to matter, because extradition is a very serious thing. The criminal codes of other countries do not follow the pattern of the British criminal code. Although we have extradition treaties and observe them in order to fulfil our obligations to foreign Governments, so far as I know it has never been suggested, until the Attorney-General suggested it, that we might be in default of our obligations to foreign Governments if we did not give the prosecution the right of appeal to the House of Lords in a matter of extradition.

In Committee, the Attorney-General said that that was his justification for the whole idea of allowing appeals by the prosecution at all. He said: It seems to us that it would be very difficult to defend a provision whereby a person who had obtained a writ of habeas corpus in the divisional court should"— It seems to me that a "not" has been left out there— in those circumstances be liable to be extradited even if the decision of the divisional court were to be reversed on appeal."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 14th July, 1960; c. 86.] I understand from the right hon. and learned Gentleman that there should be a "not" there: as a rule the observations of the Attorney-General make sense, although one does not always agree with them, but this did not seem to make sense when I read it. We now have it on record that the Attorney-General was putting forward the proposition that we could not defend our position with foreign Governments if, when a person had obtained a writ of habeas corpus in a matter of extradition, the prosecution did not have the right to challenge the decision of a divisional court to grant a writ of habeas corpus.

That proposition is surely fallacious. Through the centuries there has never been an appeal by the prosecution in a habeas corpus case. There has been no right of appeal. Has any foreign Government ever complained of the fact that a grant of a writ by a single judge is final and cannot be called into question? Have we ever had any complaint that we have failed scrupulously to observe our obligations under the extradition Acts? There never has been a right of appeal to the prosecution to the House of Lords. It seems to me that the right hon. and learned Gentleman was using a very bogus argument when he spoke on this matter in Committee.

I call in aid what was said by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South, who made two very cogent speeches in Committee. I am sorry that the hon. Member is not present in the Chamber now, because I am sure that he would agree with what I say. I hope that the Attorney-General will recognise that, whatever reservations he may have with regard to applications in criminal cases arising out of criminal suits in this country, we should be particularly scrupulous to regard and protect the rights of innocent people—I say "innocent" because they have not been found guilty of any offence—who have wanted to stand their trial before some criminal court in some foreign country. If any such person previous to extradition is entitled to be free, that should be the end of the matter and he should not be subject to the distress and uncertainty of any further trial.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Jocelyn Simon)

This Amendment seeks to preclude an appeal by the person wishing to uphold the legality of the detention of an applicant for habeas corpus in the case, in the exceptional case, of proceedings under the Extradition Acts or the Fugitive Offenders Act. I would remind the House of the background against which we are considering this Amendment. First, there is the general background which was put so clearly and cogently during the last debate by my right hon. and learned Friend. For over a hundred years we have had appeals by prosecutors against acquittals by courts other than juries; and, of course, a successful appeal by the prosecutor in those circumstances can involve the liberty of the subject. A successful appeal can involve a sentence of imprisonment, whereas under the judgment appealed from the accused would have gone free.

My right hon. and learned Friend reminded the House further that under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, this House expressly provided for appeals by the prosecutor against an acquittal by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Of course, in addition to that, this House by decisions taken on this Bill in passing the Clauses which we have passed, has already extended the prosecutor's rights of appeal in this class of case. It has extended the prosecutor's rights because we now have the power on the part of the prosecutor to appeal from the Divisional Court to the House of Lords in any criminal case or matter.

In addition, by relaxing the fetters on appeal by the prosecutor under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, we have extended the right to appeal; and indeed, the Opposition, for reasons that were perfectly plainly expressed, desired to remove the fetters further. That is the first thing. The general background shows that it is by no means exceptional. Indeed, one might say it is the general rule now in our law that a prosecutor can appeal against an acquittal on a point of law, the verdict of a jury being the natural exception.

Further, this Amendment must be viewed against the decision taken by the House on the last Amendment, when the House decided after a division that there should be no general provision precluding appeals against an order for release in habeas corpus proceedings arising in a criminal case or matter. The question before the House on this Amendment is: should we make an exception? In spite of the general background, in spite of the decision taken on the last Amendment, should we, exceptionally, say that in cases under the Extradition Acts or the Fugitive Offenders Act there shall be no appeal against an order for release?

6.15 p.m.

Shall we say that although there shall be an appeal against an order for release in the case of an ordinary person in custody in this country, for example, a person detained under Part V of the Mental Health Act, nevertheless, in these two cases there shall be no appeal against an order for release?

I ask the House on what possible principle could we justify such an exemption? Indeed, such differences as exist point all the other way. These are Acts giving reciprocal rights in this country to those we enjoy in other countries. May I give an example to the House of the way this works? Take the case of a fraud in Italy. There might be a particularly cruel fraud in which a number of humble people were deprived of their means. One knows the type of fraud, it is well known to our own criminal courts. In addition, the perpetrator of the fraud might actually be convicted in Italy. With respect, the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) was not right in saying that the Extradition Acts do not apply to persons who have been convicted. I see that the hon. Gentleman now recognises that they apply equally to persons who have been convicted.

Take the case of such a person who has been convicted, and jumps his bail during the appeal, or escapes from custody. He comes before the magistrates in this country for an extradition order which the magistrates allow. He then makes an application for a writ of habeas corpus on which a point of law arises. We are here solely concerned with the point of law. I am sure that hon. and learned Gentlemen or hon. Gentlemen with experience of this type of case will recognise that time and again the point of law is a purely technical one. For example, it may be whether a warrant was properly backed, as we had in a recent case—whether the sticking on of a label on the back of the warrant amounted to proper backing. That sort of case arises time and again; and, of course, it is perfectly right that it should be adjudicated on with strictness by our courts, since the liberty of the subject is in question. But why is one to say that there shall be no appeal from a decision on a technicality of that sort, or rather that we should allow the accused to appeal but not the prosecutor?

Suppose in the case that I have given the Divisional Court does allow an appeal on a technicality. On the proposal of the Government there can be an appeal to the House of Lords to ascertain whether that point of law is well founded, just as in all the other criminal cases which the House has just decided shall come under that provision. Why should not this—particularly, as I say, when we owe a duty to foreign countries because they extend reciprocal rights to us? So I submit to the House that there is no reason at all for making an exceptional case of these cases which arise under the Extradition Acts or under the Fugitive Offenders Act. In my submission, such differences as one can ascertain point in the other direction, that we should be justified in seeking the judgment of the House of Lords as a valuable tribunal of law in this country on such points that do arise, whether at the instance of the prosecutor or the accused.

Sir F. Soskice

The Solicitor-General asked upon what principle we could seek to justify the exclusion for which we now ask in the Amendment under debate.

The considerations which actuated my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) were, I think, largely pragmatic. He was hoping to save something out of the wreck. What he has done—and, in my opinion, perfectly rightly done—is to select a case which, I would submit, is particularly a precedent in which the freed person would be faced with the possibility of proceedings going up to the House of Lords. The Solicitor-General posits the case of the divisional court having let somebody off as a result of a technicality. After all, the word "technicality" is somewhat loosely used.

In the assumed circumstances, the divisional court would have let somebody off on the ground that he had been detained in circumstances in which the law does not allow his detention. It does not advance the matter very much further, in a great many cases at any rate, to say that the ground on which he obtained his release from the divisional court is technical. Is it? The law allows people to be detained only if the requirements of the law have been strictly complied with and, if they have not been strictly complied with, even if the failure is of a somewhat technical nature, it is perfectly right that the individual concerned should be set at liberty.

The Solicitor-General

Is not the right hon. and learned Member identifying the law with what is declared by the divisional court without the opportunity of review by the House of Lords? We could see no reason for adding that rider.

Sir F. Soskice

I am taking as the law that law which has been expounded by competent judges; the divisional court is manned by highly competent judges. If the judges in the divisional court had come to the conclusion that the individual should be set at liberty because the requirements of the law had been neglected, I should have thought that was an adequate warrant for leaving him at peace. It is somewhat oppressive to face him with the possibility, or likelihood, of a further consideration of the matter by the House of Lords with the result that he might be again taken into custody and sent overseas to face his trial before a foreign tribunal possibly with wholly different customs and procedures which may or may not conduce to the same standard of justice as we think essential in this country before a person can be deprived of his liberty.

Those were the motives which actuated my hon. Friend, and he put them forcibly. I do not think that I can advance the matter by repeating what he said in a way not quite so effectively as he said it. We have endeavoured, in this Amendment, to make a slight advance towards what we think is the right goal. We have again failed, as appears from the remarks of the Solicitor-General, but if the advice I offer is accepted we should like to voice our protest in the Division Lobby against what we think is a wholly unreasonable and obdurate view expressed by the Government spokesmen.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

I should have more sympathy for the attitude of the Government in asking for this new privilege if they were prepared to pay for it. Let us take the example of a foreigner who is here. Any Government, it might be the Italian Government or it might, of course, be an Iron Curtain Government, asks for that man and we are to give them the privilege of ruining him.

He goes to the divisional court and the decision is made by competent judges that that man is entitled to his liberty. It is now to be said in the case of a foreigner that because our judges have made a mistake he is to have the prodigious expense of going to the Court of Appeal and going to the House of Lords charged to him. Is that fair? From the nature of things he is probably not in a position to have much in the way of funds here, yet he has to face the expense. Surely, if the Government wish to ask for this privilege and say that these are important matters which it is important should be settled by the highest tribunal, it is something the Government should pay for.

The Attorney-General

The hon and learned Member is aware, I suppose—I seek to remind him—that if it is the case of a foreigner over here he can get legal aid for all these matters.

Mr. Paget

He can get legal aid, but that is nothing like enough in these circumstances. If the Government wish to proceed in this manner they should pay the expenses of both sides and provide equally adequate services to both sides. Where the Government ask for a special privilege from this House of having a decision because they want to test the matter, they should pay for what they are asking. Surely that is just.

A man who is taken to the House of Lords in those circumstances can be completely ruined, even if he wins. The expenses are prohibitive. I have always felt it unjust that a man who has the misfortune to be wrongly charged cannot recover the expenses to which he has been put in meeting that charge, but to progress from that and extend it right up to the House of Lords surely would be very wrong.

Question put, That those words be there inserted in the Bill:—

The House proceeded to a Division—

Mr. William Yates(seated and covered) (The Wrekin)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I do not know whether Standing Orders were complied with on the occasion of the last Division and whether it lasted the full seven minutes which is allowed to hon. Members. I believe that it lasted for six minutes, but, of course, I was not able to check. Can you please confirm, Mr. Speaker, that the Division was in accordance with Standing Orders and lasted for seven minutes?

Mr. Speaker

I was guided in this instance by the clock on the Table. It may be wrong. I will have a check made of it with a stop-watch. I cannot tell the House more than that. It is a convenient governing factor for the Chair to operate with. I am confirmed in my recollection that I did not misread the little red lights which govern me. I cannot help the House more than that.

Ayes 142, Noes 197.

Division No. 154.] AYES [6.26 p.m.
Ainsley, William Chetwynd, George Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Albu, Austen Cliffe, Michael Gourlay, Harry
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe) Collick, Percy Greenwood, Anthony
Awbery, Stan Craddock, George (Bradford, S.) Grey, Charles
Bacon, Miss Alice Cronin, John Grimond, J.
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.) Cullen, Mrs. Alice Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Beaney, Alan Davies, Harold (Leek) Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Bence, Cyril (Dunbartonshire, E.) Donnelly, Desmond Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Blackburn, F. Driberg, Tom Hannan, William
Blyton, William Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John Hayman, F. H.
Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S.W.) Ede, Rt. Hon. Chuter Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)
Bowles, Frank Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly) Herbison, Miss Margaret
Braddock, Mrs. E. M. Edwards, Robert (Bilston) Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Brockway, A. Fenner Edwards, Walter (Stepney) Houghton, Douglas
Brown, Alan (Tottenham) Fitch, Alan Howell, Charles A.
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper) Fletcher, Eric Hoy, James H.
Brown, Thomas (Ince) Foot, Dingle Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.) Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton) Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh Hunter, A. E.
Callaghan, James Galpern, Sir Myer Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill) Padley, W. E. Stonehouse, John
Irving, Sydney (Dartford) Paget, R. T. Stones, William
Jeger, George Parker, John (Dagenham) Strachey, Rt. Hon. John
Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield) Pavitt, Laurence Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)
Jones, Dan (Burnley) Peart, Frederick Summerskill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Edith
Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.) Pentland, Norman Sylvester, George
Kelley, Richard Plummer, Sir Leslie Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W. Popplewell, Ernest Taylor, John (West Lothian)
Ledger, Ron Prentice, R. E. Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Logan, David Probert, Arthur Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Loughlin, Charles Randall, Harry Thorpe, Jeremy
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson Rankin, John Tomney, Frank
MacColl, James Reynolds, G. W. Warbey, William
McInnes, James Roberts, Albert (Normanton) Watkins, Tudor
Mackie, John Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.) Weitzman, David
McLeavy, Frank Ross, William Wells, Percy (Faversham)
McMaster, Stanley R. Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E. Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling) Short, Edward White, Mrs. Eirene
Manuel, A C. Skeffington, Arthur Whitlock, William
Mapp, Charles Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.) Wilkins, W. A.
Marsh, Richard Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield) Williams, D. J. (Neath)
Mellish, R. J. Small, William Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)
Mendelson, J. J. Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.) Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Millan, Bruce Snow, Julian Winterbottom, R. E.
Mitchison, G. R. Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank Woof, Robert
Moyle, Arthur Spriggs, Leslie Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Oliver, G. H. Steele, Thomas
Owen, Will Stewart, Michael (Fulham) TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Mr. Redhead and Mr. Lawson
Agnew, Sir Peter Doughty, Charles Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Aitken, W. T. Drayson, G. B. Leavey, J. A.
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.) Duncan, Sir James Leburn, Gilmour
Allason, James Eden, John Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Arbuthnot, John Errington, Sir Eric Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Ashton, Sir Hubert Farey-Jones, F. W. Lilley, F. J. P.
Balniel, Lord Farr, John Lindsay, Martin
Barber, Anthony Fell, Anthony Linstead, Sir Hugh
Barlow, Sir John Finlay, Graeme Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Barter, John Fletcher-Cooke, Charles Loveys, Walter H.
Batsford, Brian Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton) Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby
Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate) Freeth, Denzil Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Berkeley, Humphry Gardner, Edward Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald (Toxeth) George, J. C. (Pollok) McAdden, Stephen
Biggs-Davison, John Glover, Sir Douglas MacArthur, Ian
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.) McLaren, Martin
Bishop, F. P. Gough, Frederick Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Black, Sir Cyril Gower, Raymond Maginnis, John E.
Bossom, Clive Grant, Rt. Hon. William (Woodside) Maitland, Sir John
Bourne-Arton, A. Green, Alan Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Box, Donald Gresham Cooke, R. Marten, Neil
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John Gurden, Harold Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Brewis, John Hall, John (Wycombe) Mawby, Ray
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough) Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Brooman-White, R. Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.) Mills, Stratton
Browne, Percy (Torrington) Harris, Reader (Heston) Montgomery, Fergus
Bryan, Paul Harrison, Brian (Maldon) Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Bullard, Denys Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye) Noble, Michael
Bullus, Wing Commander Eric Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd) Nugent, Sir Richard
Burden, F. A. Hay, John Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden) Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel Osborn, John (Hallam)
Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn) Hendry, Forbes Page, Graham
Carr, Compton (Barons Court) Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe) Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Cary, Sir Robert Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk) Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Channon, H. P. G. Hocking, Philip N. Peel, John
Chataway, Christopher Hollingworth, John Percival, Ian
Chichester-Clark, R. Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John Peyton, John
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.) Hopkins, Alan Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Cloaver, Leonard Hornby, R. P. Pilkington, Capt. Richard
Cooke, Robert Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Patricia Pitman, I. J.
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K. Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives) Pitt, Miss Edith
Cordie, John Howard, John (Southampton, Test) Pott, Percivall
Corfield, F. V. Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John Powell, J. Enoch
Costain, A. P. Hughes-Young, Michael Price, David (Eastleigh)
Coulson, J. M. Hulbert, Sir Norman Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)
Critchley, Julian Hurd, Sir Anthony Prior, J. M. L.
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col O. E. Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye) Profumo, Rt. Hon. John
Crowder, F. P. Jackson, John Ramsden, James
Curran, Charles Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich) Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin,
Currie, G. B. H. Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle) Rees. Hugh
Dalkeith, Earl of Johnson, Eric (Blackley) Renton. David
de Ferranti, Basil Johnson Smith, Geoffrey Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Digby, Simon Wingfield Kerans, Cdr. J. S. Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M. Kitson, Timothy Robertson, Sir David
Roots, William Sumner, Donald (Orpington) Wells, John (Maidstone)
Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey) Talbot, John E. Williams, Dudley (Exeter)
Russell Ronald Tapsell, Peter Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Scott-Hopkins, James Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury) Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Seymour, Leslie Turner, Colin Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Sharples, Richard Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H. Woodhouse, C. M.
Shepherd, William van Straubenzee, W. R. Woodnutt, Mark
Simon, Sir Jocelyn Vane, W. M. F. Woollam, John
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'rd & Chiswlck) Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.) Worsley, Marcus
Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood) Wall, Patrick
Speir, Rupert Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth) TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.) Watts, James Mr. Gibson-Watt and Mr. Whitelaw.
Studholme, Sir Henry Webster, David