POLARIS SUBMARINE BASE (Hansard, 8 November 1960)

§ 45. Mr. Dugdale
asked the Prime Minister whether, before agreeing to give the United States Government a base for the Polaris submarine in this country, he asked the United States Government what other countries had been approached for the lease of bases; and whether he asked what replies they had given.

§ 51. Mr. Donnelly
asked the Prime Minister whether he will issue a White Paper setting out the specific details of the Anglo-American Agreement over Polaris bases in the United Kingdom.

§ 52. Mr. Manuel
asked the Prime Minister if he will publish the precise terms of the agreement arrived at with the United States Government regarding the provision of facilities for a Polaris submarine base in the Firth of Clyde.

§ 53. Mr. Shinwell
asked the Prime Minister if he will publish a White Paper setting out the nature of the agreement with the United States of America on the control to be exercised on the storage and possible use of the underwater Polaris; and whether, when making the agreement, he was informed of the United States intentions about siting, control and use of the land-based Polaris missile.

§ 54. Mr. Grimond
asked the Prime Minister under whose control the warheads, stored on the depot ship for the Polaris submarine, will be; and if he will make a further statement on the agreement reached with the United States of America on the control of the Polaris bases in Great Britain.

§ 55. Mrs. Hart
asked the Prime Minister what further discussions he has had with the United States Government about the basing of Polaris-carrying submarines in Scotland; and, in view of these discussions, if he will now make a further statement about the extent of consultations with the Government of the United States of America that will ocur before the use of missiles from these submarines based in the Holy Loch.

§ 56. Mr. Warbey
asked the Prime Minister if he will issue a White Paper setting out, in precise terms for each type of base, the circumstances in which Her Majesty's Government are able to exercise a veto over the use of United States land, air, or sea bases in the United Kingdom.

§ 57. Mr. Emrys Hughes
asked the Prime Minister if he will publish a White Paper on the agreement about the base for Polaris.

§ The Prime Minister
As I told the House on 1st November, and as my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary repeated in another place on 2nd November, and as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence explained again in the debate in the House on Friday, 4th November, the position as regards control over Polaris submarines in this country is as follows.
As regards all facilities in the territory including the territorial waters of the United Kingdom, we have exactly the same control in an emergency as exists over United States bomber or missile bases in this country. That is to say, there will then be joint consultation regarding the use of these facilities.
But the submarines cannot be treated in exactly the same way as the bombers, still less the missiles, because they are only in United Kingdom waters for comparatively short periods and much of their time will be spent many hundreds of miles away. Consequently, as regards general control, we shall continue to rely on the close co-operation and understanding which exists between us and the United States in all these defence matters and which President Eisenhower has recently reaffirmed.
In my speech on 1st November I went on to give my understanding of the position reached. This is that we can be satisfied that the United States Government will not use these missiles anywhere in the world without the fullest possible previous consultation with us and our allies. I use the words "fullest possible" consultation because consultation might obviously be impossible in circumstances of a sudden surprise attack upon the West. We would, indeed, not wish to insist on prior consultation in such circumstances, because it is the absolute certainty of retaliation which deters aggression.

§ Mr. Dugdale
Is the Prime Minister aware that he has not answered my Question? I asked him specifically whether any other country had been approached to give these facilities. Does he propose to answer that now?

§ The Prime Minister
The Americans asked us to provide this facility. We 832 gladly agreed in the interests of both countries and of the whole Atlantic alliance. The question whether other countries may have been asked to do the same thing does not appear to be relevant.

§ Mr. Donnelly
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the control of these submarines is quite a different matter, whether it is in peace time or in an emergency? To put it bluntly, what we are concerned about is what is to happen to the submarines in peace time. May we have an assurance that they will not be used for what may be, apparently, dangerous patrols close to Soviet quarters in a way similar to that of the RB47 incident?

§ The Prime Minister
I did not understand that that was the point of control in this sense, but I do not think that we can press the analogy between the aircraft and the submarines. There is really no similarity between an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft and a mobile under-water rocket base—for that is what Polaris it—costing £50 to £60 million to build. The routing of a submarine may be such as will keep it at sea for months at a time. Anyway, it would not have its home base in the United Kingdom. Therefore, I think that there is no real analogy between this and the flight from our base and back of a reconnaissance plane.

§ Mr. Manuel
The Prime Minister has not answered my Question, in which I asked him if he will publish the precise terms of the agreement arrived at with the United States Government … It is very necessary that relationships should not be strained further than they are at present. In peace time, when these Polaris submarines are moving out, not on patrol, but to lie on the ocean bed at a place predetermined by the United States, it is necessary that we should have some knowledge in order that aggravations which can be avoided are not aroused.

§ The Prime Minister
I am not prepared to publish a paper giving details of this agreement. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] There are two kinds of detail. Some are ordinary routine working arrangements which are between the two 833 navies and which it would not be suitable to publish in a White Paper, and there is the general agreement which I have explained fully in answer to Questions and in debate. It is, therefore, all in HANSARD.
With regard to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, which appeared to be the same point as that raised by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly), I think that one has only to think for a moment whether the form of the reconnaissance is anything in the least parallel to these aeroplanes that we have in mind. I should not have thought that to set about with a machine which costs £50 million, sitting under the sea, was an extremely good method of obtaining information.

§ Mr. Gaitskell
I should like to put three questions to the Prime Minister. First, is this a written agreement, or is it simply an oral understanding? Is it really so difficult for the Prime Minister to publish at any rate all those parts of it which would not be contrary to public security?
Secondly, despite his answer to the previous question, may I ask him whether he is aware that many of us are anxious that in normal peacetime conditions none of the submarines using this depot ship should take action which could conceivably lead to a war, conflagration or dispute?
Thirdly, under emergency conditions—we all understand the difficulties which obviously arise—is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what we are most concerned about is that the fateful decision to use nuclear weapons of any kind for the first time should not be taken by a single Government alone but only by a collective agreement?
Although I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's point that there might be circumstances where this was extremely difficult, nevertheless, the assurance that in all conceivable cases, and where it is at all possible, the nuclear weapon would never be used for the first time without the agreement of the British Government is of great importance to us on this side.

§ The Prime Minister
I quite understand the right hon. Gentleman's points. First, there has been an interchange and an agreement made. I am not prepared 834 to publish it. I have given a full account of it in my answers and in my statement. There is certainly an agreement. [HON. MEMBERS: "Is it a written agreement?"] There is an interchange of an agreement. It is an interchange of a written agreement. I am not prepared to publish it, although I have given a full account of it in my answers.
On the second point, I repeat that I do not really believe that it is conceivable to use a mechanism of this kind and value for what is called a dangerous reconnaissance purpose.
The third point is, what is meant by "the first time"? The right hon. Gentleman knows about this as well as I do. We have had this out over and over again, at N.A.T.O. and other places. Does it mean the first time by the allies, or the first time by the enemy?

§ Mr. Gaitskell
The first time by the allies.

§ The Prime Minister
I will certainly consider what the right hon. Gentleman says, but, at first sight, to say that if the enemy attacks ourselves, America or our allies with an overwhelming attack of nuclear force, we are, 15 of us, to sit down and see whether we can get into touch before we make the reply is nonsense. It is the fact, it is the certainty, that if an aggression of that kind is made the reply will be made by anybody who is in a position to make it as soon as and as overwhelmingly as possible. That is the deterrent.
If the right hon. Gentleman means an attack by an enemy not using nuclear weapons, then, of course, there is likely to be much more possibility for consultation and delay, because it is not a sudden overwhelming attack. In the case of conventional war there is the movement of troops and things of that kind. Then there is the opportunity for discussion. It is just that consultation which I understand from the President's statement he intends to have with us and with other allies.

§ Mr. Gaitskell
To most of us, and to the British people generally, this is not a laughing matter. This is an extremely important, though admittedly difficult, question, and I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he realises that the vague assurance that he gave in the 835 second part of his answer—that he presumed that, somehow or other, there would be consultation—is not really enough and that what we need in this matter is something perfectly precise so far as the agreement of the British Government is concerned before the first use of nuclear weapons by the allies, except, perhaps, in the first case that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned.
Any sensible person would realise that there might be difficulties of that kind. But surely we can have a precise agreement with our allies, the United States, that, except in that case, nuclear weapons would never be used for the first time without our agreement.

§ The Prime Minister
I still ask what "the first time" means—the first time in the world, or the first time by the allies? [HON. MEMBERS: "By us."] If it is for the first time by us in retaliation to a nuclear or non-nuclear war—let us get it clear. If a nuclear attack is made upon us, I hope that anybody who is in a position to make an answer will make it as rapidly as possible. The knowledge of that is what the deterrent means. We are all agreed above the Gangway, anyway, on that.
If it is something quite different—perhaps the beginning of a movement of troops, an attack on one of the N.A.T.O. countries, or another country, and the beginning of a battle—then there is time for consultation, and it has been agreed with Sir Anthony Eden, with my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) and was reaffirmed by the President to me the other day that that is what he means by "the fullest possible consultation"; and there will be such consultation unless it is of a character such as the right hon. Gentleman has described, which precludes consultation because of the immediacy of the need for retaliation.

Several Hon. Members
rose—

§ Mr. Speaker
Order.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

§ Mr. Speaker
Order. I am on my feet. We shall reach a point where it will be evident that we cannot discuss this matter without a Question before the House. For that reason, I wish to 836 resume giving opportunities to those who had Questions on the Order Paper to ask supplementary questions. Mr. Shinwell.

§ Mr. Shinwell
In all the circumstances, political, social and otherwise, does the Prime Minister not consider that it might be worth while making representations to the American Government that it is unwise to construct a base in the midst of a hostile population?
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that we on this side have frequently protested against the presence of British troops and the occupation of territory by British forces in the midst of hostile populations? Is not this a similar case? Will not the Prime Minister make representations to the American Government along those lines?
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, further, whether, in view of this controversy, it would not be wise now for the Government themselves to give us time for the purpose of debating this matter?

§ The Prime Minister
I hope that, on reflection, the right hon. Gentleman will not feel that he is right in his description of the people of Scotland or of Clydeside as a hostile force to the American alliance, on the preservation of which, although we may differ about certain points, I would have said that the great majority of this House and of the country felt that the defence of the free world largely depends.
I should have thought that to give these facilities makes this submarine fleet more effective during the initial years—no doubt, as the years pass, it may not be so important—because it increases the availability of the submarines if they could have facilities and an advance base instead of always having to go back to the Atlantic base. I should have thought that that was a form of work together which we ought to do as good allies, both for our own safety and for that of the whole Western alliance.
I should also have thought that many people would feel that if we cannot get agreement, which we all hope to get, if it should so work out as the years pass that the form in which the deterrent was operated took the place of the present forms, there would be great advantages—advantages from a safety point of view over land-based bombers and, perhaps, 837 some advantages in the real value of the deterrent because of its not being able to be destroyed at a single blow.
Therefore, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not press the point in quite the way that he has stated it, because it would, I am sure, be wrong to say that they would be thought to be enemy troops among a hostile population. That is a terrible thing to say about the help we are getting from the United States.

§ Mr. Grimond
May I ask two questions? First, is it clear that, leaving aside a sudden devastating nuclear attack, we are to be consulted if at all possible before this submarine fires nuclear weapons, wherever the submarine may be, whether inside or outside territorial waters, and that we have had some say in the standing orders which, presumably, have been given to submarine commanders?
Secondly, in view of what the Prime Minister has said, has he a clear understanding with the Americans that when atomic Polaris submarines and weapons are available, the fixed bases in this country will be withdrawn?

§ The Prime Minister
In reply to the second part of that question, I can, of course, say nothing. It depends upon whether we wish to have two forms of defence or only one. That is a long way off, anyway.
With regard to the first part of the question, I make it quite clear that we rely on the general understanding between ourselves and the United States, and—I go further—which the United States has with its allies that wherever possible, wherever there is not one of these sudden decisions which has to be taken if the deterrent is to mean anything, there will, of course, be consultation between us. That has been stated many times and it has recently been reaffirmed by the President of the United States.

§ Mrs. Hart
Is the Prime Minister aware that on 17th October, in answer to a question on television, Admiral Arleigh Burke, the American Chief of Naval Operations, said that the Polaris submarine could be used as a military instrument without reference to political considerations and that this was a 838 valuable adjunct to the missile? Is this the Prime Minister's interpretation of the agreement which he has reached with the United States Government, or would he wish to disagree with the Admiral's interpretation?
Further, may I ask the Prime Minister how much importance he attaches to the views of the trade union movement in the west of Scotland, which has firmly committed itself against the idea of basing the Polaris in the Clyde?

§ The Prime Minister
I did not see what Admiral Burke said. If the hon. Lady will send me a copy of it, I will have a look at it.

§ Mr. Emrys Hughes
Is the Prime Minister aware that he has said just enough to justify a full-dress debate in the House in which we can all express the views of our constituents and also oppose the Government by a vote? Is he aware that opinion in the west of Scotland is very strong on this issue and that it is an issue in which he should demand a vote of confidence—and that we are not prepared to give it to him?

§ The Prime Minister
I think that in view of that, I should have to get into quite a lot of the usual channels.

§ Mr. Dugdale
Is the Prime Minister telling us that he never discussed with the United States of America whether this base might not be in a N.A.T.O. country other than this one? Do we not already have enough American bases here? Will the right hon. Gentleman take note of the point made by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), that if this base is to be here it might well replace one of the static bases?

§ The Prime Minister
I would feel much happier that it is in this country. The fact that we have this co-operation helps us to exercise our influence in the alliance and certainly does not hinder us. If this terrible thing were ever to happen to the world, the precise position of this or that base would not save us. Either the deterrent is strong enough to prevent this terrible thing ever being done, or we shall all make the world uninhabitable for human beings.
We cannot wriggle out of these responsibilities by saying, "Let it be in Holland". "Let it be in France". "Let 839 it be in Germany", or "Put it in Italy, and then those countries will suffer". We had far better exercise our influence by playing our full part in the alliance.

§ Mr. W. Yates
Is my right hon. Friend aware that the majority of the British people are absolutely in favour of and will support the American alliance, whether it is with nuclear weapons or ordinary conventional weapons? I should like to say that on behalf of the majority of people in this House and in the country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Certainly. Is my right hon. Friend aware that anybody trying to let down the American alliance at this juncture can do no service whatever to international relations?

§ The Prime Minister
I am gratified at what my hon. Friend has said.

§ Mr. G. Brown
Is the Prime Minister aware that if his purpose really were to unite maximum opposition to this project the way in which he answers Questions in the House about it would be the exactly right way to go about it? [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] The Prime Minister has referred several times to an agreement. He said, under pressure, that it was a written agreement; that is, written, I understand—perhaps he will correct me if I am wrong—between him and the President of the United States. If it is not, would he tell us between whom it is written?
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Minister of Defence, in the House last Friday, said that the United States grants us—Britain—no special place in relation to this thing, that if there were to be any consultation it would take place among the 14 others? I ask the Prime Minister, is there a written agreement between Great Britain and America covering the provision of facilities by Great Britain to America for servicing these submarine ships? Is the right of consultation given because we provide the facilities? Does that consultation amount to the same degree of joint decision over the operations as we have in the case of the aeroplane bases?

§ The Prime Minister
I will try again. There is a written agreement with regard to the facilities, largely technical in character.

§ Mr. Healey
What about controls?

§ The Prime Minister
Let me make it perfectly clear. So far as the use of the facilities in our own territory, which, of course, includes territorial waters, is concerned, it is operated in the same way as have been past agreements, but outside that, if this submarine, which happens to have touched down here, goes 2,000 or 3,000 miles away we cannot control that particular submarine, or a submarine which started from Maine and never happened to come to Clydeside. There may be no time, and there may, perhaps be 30, 40 or 50 of these, and it would be absurd and not in our interest to say that we could.
Therefore, on the wider question, on which there is not a written agreement, we rely on the general understanding with the Americans that they will not, unless there are the circumstances which, I think, we are all agreed about, the special circumstances of a sudden attack upon us, start a nuclear war without the fullest consultation with their allies and particularly with ourselves. I think that the fact that we have entered into this puts us in a stronger position than ever before.
On the bases, we can only exercise a control on these particular machines. But I really think that it puts us in many ways in a stronger position and puts the Americans under a greater moral obligation to work closely with us in the broad policy decisions.

§ Mr. G. Brown
Let us just get this clear. Are we now clearly understanding that there is an agreement on the purely technical base operation, but that there is not an agreement about consultation over operation of vessels which use the base? Is it not a fact that in the case of the aeroplanes there could be 50 or there could be 500 up at any one time, of which only one took off from Lakenheath, but in the case of the aeroplanes it was not held to deny us a joint decision, not merely consultation, over the use of this Lakenheath base? What difference is there? Will the Prime Minister particularly confirm that we have no right of consultation over the use of the submarines which use the bases here?

§ The Prime Minister
I say again that there is a written agreement in regard to the facilities to be offered and a number of routine questions. In that 841 agreement we have a right of general control over any submarines in the base and the use of the base and territorial waters, but we do not claim, under that agreement, that a submarine which may have touched down here for a month and has gone away and is in the Pacific is under our control. For that, we rely upon the general control and general understanding which we have between ourselves and the Americans.
I am only saying that I regard that as just as strong as anything else. I did say "wherever possible", because I wanted to be accurate. I will look up again what I said. Some people are against the deterrent, and I understand that, but, as has been brought out here today, if the deterrent is to deter and we are in favour of the deterrent, one could not bind onself never to launch a counterattack, however serious an attack were made upon us or one of our allies.

§ Mr. Warbey
Would the Prime Minister say, first, in exactly what form the President of the United States has committed the United States not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons except after 842 consultation with America's allies, and secondly, whether that undertaking applies to the use of American nuclear weapons in the Pacific?

§ The Prime Minister
No. I will simply say that as regards the wider field, and I have repeated it many times, we cannot have the same thing as for the aeroplanes, because of the difference of the base. As I say, it is much more the position of giving certain facilities. A ship goes away for three or four months; perhaps a year passes. Are we to say that we are to have complete, special control over the ship? In this case we rely on the general understanding, which is common sense, because no one is going to start this thing off without consultation with allies so deeply tied together. If it comes to an attack made upon us or upon our allies, then, if there is not time, action will have to be taken.

Several Hon. Members
rose—

§ Mr. Speaker
Order. We really cannot debate this now.