VIETNAM AND LAOS (Hansard, 19 December 1960)

§ Mr. John Baird (Wolverhampton, North-East)
I am glad that I have an Adjournment debate at this most appropriate time, because I have just been reading on the tape a speech by the Foreign Secretary in another place on the question of Laos. I was rather shocked when I read the terms of that speech. The first thought that entered my mind was—

§ Mr. Baird
My first thought was how far we could go in crawling to the Americans in our foreign policy. The Foreign Secretary said that the trouble in Laos had arisen as a result of the Pathet Lao insurrection. To put it in Parliamentary terms, that is a completely misleading statement. Indeed, it is the opposite of the facts. Either the Foreign Secretary, being new to his job, does not know the history of this troubled area, or, if he does know its history, he is completely and deliberately misleading Parliament and the country about the true facts of the case.
There are two major danger areas in the world where the cold war might become a hot war. It is rather a peculiarity that they are both ex-French colonial territories—Algeria and Indo-China. I want tonight to deal with Indo-China, especially with South Vietnam, and Laos. I bad the privilege of being one of the few Members of this House who have visited that area in recent years, and I think I can speak with some authority about the position there. I hope that the House will not think me presumptuous if I deal first with the background, because many hon. Members do not understand the problem.
Twice in recent years, the United States of America has threatened the use of atomic power against nations which did not have atomic power themselves 1026 and against nations which were not at war with the United States. It was this concept of a holy war against Communism which, I believe, inspired the Americans to try this action. In Korea, they wanted to bomb Manchuria. It was our then Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, who flew to America and did not mince his words. He told the Americans what he thought and said that we would have nothing to do with it. We stopped that threat of atomic warfare against China. Then, in 1954, when the Vietnamese guerrillas came out of their forests and were winning the battle of Dien Bien Phu, once again the Americans threatened to use atomic warfare against the guerrillas.
I am glad to pay a compliment to Sir Anthony Eden, who was then Prime Minister, because he stood up to the Americans and said that we would not have anything to do with that. It is true that his record afterwards was blackened at Suez, but he showed great courage at that time. We cannot, however, expect that kind of courage from the present Prime Minister. Reading between the lines, I sometimes feel that the Prime Minister was more responsible for Suez than was Sir Anthony Eden.
As a result of the stand taken at that time, however, the Geneva Conference was called to bring about the pacification of Indo-China. That Conference was attended by the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, representing South Vietnam, China—People's China—and North Vietnam. America was there as an observer. It was agreed then to set up a Control Commission to supervise peace in Indo China. The Control Commission was a very neutral commission, consisting of Poland, India and Canada. I do not think we could get a more balanced Commission than that. It was supposed to stay there in all the areas of Indo-China until the pacification of that area. It was solemnly declared at the same time that free elections should be held in Vietnam by 1956. We know what has happened. There have been no free elections, and there are no postal facilities even between North and South Vietnam at the present time.
The Control Commission was to function in all the territories of Indo-China, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Laos and Cambodia were 1027 also there and also signed the agreement. America, while not signing the agreement, agreed to accept it in principle and to abide by it. I am very sincere about this, and I ask the Minister to look at it sincerely. Can there be any nation in the history of the world that has been more hypocritical in its public statements than the United States has been in this area? In the Sunday Times yesterday we read that the United States has sent a note of protest to the Soviet Union about its intervention in Laos, in which they say: The Soviet Government and its agents have attempted to carry out this latest grave action clandestinely under cover of delivering food and petroleum products. They are also sending arms into Indo-China it is suggested. The report continues: While America was determined to maintain the independence of Laos, she denied the Russian allegation that the Laotian Army had been armed 'recently' with United States weapons. The words "recently" is in inverted commas. Tanks and howitzers were supplied long before 9th August. Of course, there has been an American military build-up in South Vietnam and Laos not for months, but for years.
The first question I want to ask the Minister is what right have the Americans to be in Indo-China at all? There has been an arms build-up by the Americans since 1955. France withdrew her troops from South Vietnam between 1954 and 1955, and created a vacuum there. The people of Vietnam wanted a united Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, but the Americans stepped in to prevent it. We have all sorts of organisations set up since then. Perhaps the Minister read the book "The Quiet American", which is a novel, I admit, but historically and basically it is fundamentally true, dealing with the concept of a holy war and the American right to intervene anywhere to prevent the spread of Socialism and Communism.
There is an organisation which they introduced into South Vietnam known as T.E.R.M.—Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission—which was supposed to go there to collect arms supplied to the French in their wars. It is still there now, five years later. There is 1028 M.A.A.G.—Military Aid and Advisory Group. It was a temporary organisation, too, and it is still there. There are 2,000 American military technicians advising South Vietnam, and they are spending 160 million dollars a year on military equipment in South Vietnam at the present time.
Now they are infiltrating into Laos as well. Why? I ask the House to treat this matter seriously. Is it to protect the United States of America? Is this a defensive movement? It is a long way from America, but someone living in South Vietnam or China would say that this was an aggressive military infiltration designed to destroy the Governments of North Vietnam and China. That is all it can do. Otherwise, why should there be this military build up?
The Americans had their first success in 1958. The Prime Minister of Laos at that time, Prince Souvanna Phouma, was a neutralist, neither pro-Soviet nor pro-American. He wanted to keep out of both camps. He came to a compromise with the Pathet Lao forces, which were led by his cousin. They agreed to form a united Government which would be neutralist in the cold war. In return, the Pathet Lao forces were to disband and the leaders were to enter the Government, as they did.
However, under American pressure of all kinds, economic and military, the Laotian Prime Minister was forced to resign. His Government disbanded and a reactionary Government under American control came in. The Pathet Lao leaders were arrested and thrown into gaol and the troops, who had been disarmed, were sent to concentration camps. When the Foreign Secretary says that this trouble was caused by Pathet Lao insurrection, does he not realise that the Pathet Lao leaders honoured their promise and agreements with the legitimate Government of Laos, but in return were thrown into prison?
That is not all. This reactionary Government demanded the withdrawal of the Control Commission from Laos. What did we do when the Laotian Government demanded the withdrawal of the Control Commission? It should be remembered that Laos signed the Geneva Agreement along with ourselves and that we and the U.S.S.R., as joint 1029 Chairmen, were responsible for seeing that the Control Commission functioned. The Foreign Secretary said that we could not have the Control Commission functioning if the Government of Laos did not want it, but the Government of Laos signed a solemn undertaking to accept the Control Commission. In that case, why has it been withdrawn? What possibility is there, as the Foreign Secretary seems to suggest, that a Government of similar tendencies will recall the Control Commission? We must use all our diplomatic pressure, especially on the Americans, to see that the Control Commission returns to Laos as soon as possible.
Since then, there has been another coup d'etat by young officers who wanted once again to follow a neutralist foreign policy, but again the Americans have intervened. Not only the Americans, but, under American pressure, South Vietnamese troops and officers have entered Laos and that other puppet of the United States, Thailand, has closed its frontiers with Laos, so that both military and economic sanctions are being imposed by the Americans. It was only then that the Russians intervened. The Laotians could not get petrol. They could not get food. The Russians sent them petrol and they sent them food. It is quite possible that they also sent them arms, but while the Americans have been sending arms for five years, the Russians have been sending them for only five weeks. Who is the real aggressor? I should like to know what the Foreign Secretary thinks and what his spokesman in the House here thinks.
On the basis of the facts, can the Foreign Secretary really claim that this trouble in Laos was caused by the Panthet Lao insurrection? Of course not.
Finally, I say that the war is not yet over. Let us face up to it. The forces of progress in Indo-China are still well organised in Laos and in other areas of Indo-China. The guerrillas who at one time under Panthet Lao leadership were based on the two northern provinces are now spread throughout the country. That is not all. China and North Vietnam both feel themselves menaced by the America build-up so near their frontiers. Remember that North Vietnam has perhaps the greatest guerrilla leader of modern times in General Giap, whom both my hon. Friend the Member for 1030 Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), and I have met. He is not a professional soldier. He is a professor of history, but he is the greatest guerrilla leader produced over the last ten or fifteen years and his advice would be available to the guerrillas—I hope so anyway—in Laos.
I warn the House that—

§ Mr. Speaker
I wonder if the hon. Member can help me? I have been waiting for him to say something for which there appeared to be Ministerial responsibility. Could he help me about that?

§ Mr. Baird
Ministerial responsibility? The Foreign Secretary is joint Chairman of the Geneva Conference which is responsible for the Control Commission in Indo-China.

§ Mr. Speaker
I know that he was co-Chairman of the Conference which came to an end, but I want to go a stage further than that, if the hon. Gentleman will help me.

§ Mr. Baird
The Conference has not come to an end. The Conference adjourned. The Conference set up a Control Commission for the whole of Indo-China. It still functions. Its reports are presented by the Control Commission to the Foreign Secretary and to the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and are available in the Vote Office regularly every year, sometimes twice a year. Therefore, the House has directly responsibility for this. There is no question about it.

§ Mr. Speaker
I would welcome assistance from the Joint Under-Secretary of State. My ignorance is perhaps misleading me, but having given the hon. Member as much rope as I could in the context, I would welcome assistance from the Under-Secretary of State. I am unaware that the co-Chairmen by virtue of being Chairmen can give any direction to the Control Commission. I do not follow quite how the hon. Member is attaching Ministerial responsibility. Perhaps I am wrong, but I should like some help.

§ The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. J. B. Godber)
My understanding is exactly that, Mr. Speaker—that the co-Chairmen have no special position in this regard. It is 1031 perfectly true that the Control Commission reports, but the co-Chairmen have no executive power at all.

§ Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)
On a point of order. Would it be out of order for the House to discuss documents which appear in the Vote Office and when the co-Chairmen have power to recall the Conference?

§ Mr. Speaker
If the hon. Member had been urging that the Conference should be recalled I should not have had to interrupt.

§ Mr. Baird
Yes.

§ Mr. Speaker
The hon. Member has not yet said that.

§ Mr. Harold Davies
That is exactly the point. This is a trick.

§ Mr. Baird
We have discussed the question on numerous occasions in the House before.

§ Mr. Speaker
But not perhaps on an Adjournment debate. We have special rules to apply in an Adjournment debate.

§ Mr. Baird
We have raised this subject on the Adjournment more than once previously.
I want the Minister to tell us what the Foreign Secretary is going to do. Will he demand the recall of the Geneva Conference? I believe that it is the only way to prevent another Korea and perhaps another world war. Or are the Government going to remain the lackeys of the United States and carry out the United States' policy? I believe that if Great Britain really wants to play a good part in this area of the world, she must demand, along with the Soviet Union, the recall of the Geneva Conference at the first and earliest opportunity.

§ Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East)
Before the Joint Under-Secretary of State replies, might I ask him to answer two questions which arise out of the Lord Privy Seal's Answer to a Question on this subject this afternoon? The Lord Privy Seal said that Her Majesty's Government were now consulting what he called the "provisional administration" in Laos to see whether it would agree 1032 to the return of the Control Commission. This provisional administration, as the hon. Gentleman knows, was formed as the result of armed action by a general who was armed and supported from abroad and whose open purpose was to overthrow the Geneva Agreement, to which Her Majesty's Government are a party.
My first question is whether Her Majesty's Government consider that this provisional administration has the right in itself to veto the return of the Commission. The second question is whether the hon. Gentleman can tell us whether the United States Government are now supporting the policy aim of Her Majesty's Government as defined by the Lord Privy Seal this afternoon, namely, to try to negotiate the formation of a Laotian Government of national unity.

§ The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. J. B. Godber)
I am afraid that I have not much time in which to deal with the various points which have been raised, but I will try to touch briefly on such of them as I can. I think it would be profitable if I confined myself to the position in Laos, although the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mr. Baird) referred to Vietnam.

§ Mr. Baird
They are both in the same position.

§ Mr. Godber
Yes, to some extent they are. However, I think the House will agree that the situation in Laos is the really critical one at the present time, and that was the cause of the statement made by my noble Friend in another place and my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal in the House today. There is general agreement, I am sure, that it is a grave situation, and I think it is important to get the facts of the matter correct, particularly in view of some of the things which the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East, said.
I would remind the House that in July last year the Pathet Lao abandoned the path of legality after having been invited to go into the Government, and went back into a period of insurgency. Since then they have been in open rebellion against the Government, with support and assistance from North Vietnam.

Baird
That is not true.

§ Mr. Godber
Yes, it is true. In August this year, the then Laotian Government under Prince Somsanith was overthrown by Captain Kong Lae, and in due course a new Government under Prince Souvanna Phouma was formed. Unfortunately, however, the authority of this Government was never accepted by the revolutionary committee which was set up by General Phoumi in Savannakhet. Nor was it able to complete negotiations which it entered into in order to re-integrate the Pathet Lao into the national community. There was an attempt to get the Pathet Lao back in the Government, which I am sure hon. Members would have wished to have seen. For three months Laos was divided into three parts.
I should like to deal with the particular allegations which the hon. Member has made in regard to the Americans arming General Phoumi in order to enable him to attack Prince Souvanna Phouma's Government. What happened was that the Laotian Army was no longer under a proper unified command and great difficulty was experienced in getting various units supplied in order to maintain them in being and to enable them to defend themselves should they be attacked by the Communists. The Government in Vientiane were not in a position to distribute pay and weapons themselves, and they arranged with the American Government for supplies to be sent to the individual units direct.

§ Mr. Harold Davies
I was there at the time. It is not true.

§ Mr. Godber
It is true.

§ Mr. Davies
It is not true.

§ Mr. Godber
By the end of November it became apparent to the Prime Minister that his attempts to bring General Phoumi and the revolutionary committee into a Government of national unity had broken down and that the general was preparing an attack on Vientiane. He asked the Americans not to supply further arms, and the United States Government at once suspended the supply.
I have been asked what right the Americans had to send these arms at all. They have been supplying arms at the request of the legitimate Government in 1034 each case. The Communists have been supplying them to the insurgents. That has been the difference, and it is a distinct difference which must be borne in mind.

§ Mr. Davies
The Indian Embassy told me differently from Laos.

§ Mr. Godber
I have only a few minutes in which to reply, and I want to answer the questions raised by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey). He asked whether the provisional administration had the right to veto the return of the Commission. Certainly they have not the right to veto it, but I think it was right that we should ask them what their attitude was and that we should then consider, in the light of their reply, what the position was. It is true that they are a provisional Administration. We do not know how the situation will develop and must assess it as we go along. We do not feel that they are in a position to exercise the veto, but I think that the Commission could not go back against the wishes of the people with whom it had to work. That is the difficulty which must be faced.
His second question was whether the United States Government are in line with our views. We have been in touch with the Americans and I think I can safely answer "Yes" to that question.

§ Mr. Baird
Will the Government recall the Geneva Conference?

§ Mr. Godber
We have made clear in the statement today what our position is about the Commission. It has been set out in my noble Friend's statement and that of my right hon. Friend—that there may be merit in reconstituting the Commission if proper agreement can be obtained, but I do not see any point at this stage in going beyond that to recall the Geneva Conference.

§ Mr. Baird
Why?

§ Mr. Godber
Because we think that the most useful thing here, if any outside help is to be given, is for it to be given through the Commission. It is more appropriate for the Commission to be involved here than to go back and recall the Conference, which would be a lengthy procedure. We see no definite benefit arising out of that.
1035 The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) referred to the position of India. It was Mr. Nehru himself who suggested this particular course, and I hoped that that might have commended it to the hon. Member.

§ Mr. J. J. Mendelson (Penistone)
If the provisional authorities were to reject the suggestion, would that mean that the Foreign Office would not continue its attempt, or can we have an assurance that it would still demand a recall?

§ Mr. Godber
I have already tried to answer that point, which was previously framed in a different way. Obviously I could not commit the Government at the present time about how the position will develop. We must see what the reactions are. It is our hope that we shall be able to make progress in this 1036 way, and in the light of that my noble Friend has been in touch with the Russians already about this matter.
We are trying to find some way to solve this problem. We are just as anxious as hon. Members opposite to see this unhappy position resolved. It is no good seeking to blur the facts by putting a one-sided view, as did the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East. I am sorry that he did so and even more sorry that I have not been given enough time in which to reply to the debate properly, but I hope that the House will give me the opportunity—