HC Deb 02 March 1959 vol 601 cc20-2
32. Mr. Boyd

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what estimate he has made of the relative extent to which the nuclear researches of Western Powers would be hindered as compared with those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under an agreement to suspend such nuclear tests as could be detected by the best inspection arrangements which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has so far been willing to accept.

Mr. Profumo

We should be at a complete disadvantage because the present proposals of the Soviet Government would give us no assurance against the carrying out of clandestine tests of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Boyd

Do the Government accept that the largest and dirtiest explosions register anyway on appropriate instruments in any part of the world? Would it not be well worth while to see that the greatest danger to health and in other respects could be obviated by getting an agreement on the suspension of those tests which could be detected by the inspection arrangements which the Russians are prepared to agree to, granted that this would be more limited, so that we got a limited agreement and then proceeded to negotiate to see what prospects there are of further advance?

Mr. Profumo

We are hoping to get agreement on suspension of all tests.

Mr. Bevan

is it not a fact that it is already possible to detect significant tests? Would it not be very much better to start there in the hope that it would be possible to extend to other tests later? Should not some initiative be taken to give more hope than exists at the moment?

Mr. Profumo

I do not think anything we have done or which is in our power to do is leading to lack of hope. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are anxious to get an agreement, but I do not see how we can get it until we have ironed out the difficulties of a control of tests and inspection system.

Mr. Bevan

Is it not a fact that the Russians have offered to suspend tests, and while it is understood in all parts of the House that it is better to have a refined and controlled system, would it not be better to get an agreement to stop tests, knowing that if they are significant they can in fact be detected?

Mr. Profumo

I think we must not give up hope of full agreement on this matter.

37. Mr. A. Henderson

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to what extent evidence in the possession of Her Majesty's Government indicates that subterranean nuclear test explosions and hidden stockpiles of nuclear weapons, respectively, can be detected if a system of international inspection were established.

Mr. Profumo

As to underground nuclear explosions, I would refer the right hon. and learned Member to paragraph 18 on page 7 of the White Paper on the Geneva Conference of Experts which was tabled last October. Since then the United States Government have given us and the Soviet Government certain new evidence which suggests that the capability of the system recommended by the Conference of Experts would not be so great as originally thought. As to the second part of the Question, there is no method known to scientists whereby hidden stocks of nuclear weapons can be detected.

Mr. Henderson

With regard to the first part of the reply, will the hon. Gentleman say that that qualification put forward by the American scientists will not be allowed to hold up an agreement on the suspension of the tests?

Mr. Profumo

Yes Sir, but I think the right hon. and learned Member would agree that this is a matter which has to be looked at carefully.